ISSN 2526-9038 • V. 14, Nº 1, janeiro/abril de 2019 • DOI: 10.12530/ci.v14n1.2019

PUBLICAÇÃO DA ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

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Relações Internacionais

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2019 Associação Brasileira de Relações

Expediente

Sumário

Japan, a Normal State? | Japão, um Estado Normal? | 5

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo

sul-africano? | South Africa and its surroundings: is there a South African

subimperialism? | 31

Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond

the South China Sea disputes | As relações sino-filipinas como o jogo tributário

moderno: para além das disputas no Mar do Sul da China | 52

Bruno Hendler

International conflict and strategic games: challenging conventional

approaches to mathematical modelling in International Relations | Conflitos

internacionais e jogos estratégicos: desafios às abordagens convencionais de

modelagem matemática em Relações Internacionais | 80

Enzo Lenine

Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies | Adaptar para

Sobreviver: As Estratégias Mutantes do Estado Islâmico | 103

Jorge M. Lasmar

Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca

A influência do complexo industrial-militar na Política Externa dos Estados

Unidos da América após os atentados do 11 de Setembro | The influence

of the military industrial complex on the Foreign Policy of the United States of

America after the attacks of September 11 | 127

Elias David Morales Martinez

Thaís Regina Servidoni

Genealogia e Agonismo como Metodologia nas Relações Internacionais:

Reflexões a partir da Justiça de Transição | Reflecting upon Genealogic

and Agonistic Methodologies in International Relations: the case of Transitional

Justice | 153

Emerson Maione

Thiago Rodrigues

Ruling through the International Criminal Court’s rules: legalized

hegemony, sovereign (in)equality, and the Al Bashir Case | Governando

por meio das regras do Tribunal Penal Internacional: hegemonia legalizada,

(des)igualdade soberana e o Caso Al Bashir | 177

Luisa Giannini

Roberto Vilchez Yamato

Claudia Alvarenga Marconi

Da audácia ao pragmatismo: política externa bolivariana e o Mercado

Internacional de Petróleo (2007-2012) | From audacity to pragmatism: bolivarian

foreign policy and the International Petroleum Market (2007-2012) | 202

Pedro Henrique de Moraes Cicero

Dispersão e concentração espaciais dos cursos de Relações Internacionais

no Brasil: contrastes e desafios da expansão da oferta nacional | Spatial

dispersion and concentration of International Relations undergraduate programs

in Brazil: contrasts and challenges to the national offer expansion | 225

Matheus Hoffmann Pfrimer

Giovanni Hideki Chinaglia Okado

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

Japan, a Normal State?

Japão, um Estado Normal?

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v14n1.2019.887

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

Abstract

This article seeks to demonstrate that Japan throughout time has made gradual adjustments

throughout time to increase its military capacities, in order to regain autonomy in relation to

its defence. With this process of “adjustment”, without constitutional reforms, Japan presently

possesses military capabilities that are similar to those of the primary global powers in terms

of budget, technologically advanced military resources, manpower, and it masters the entire

cycle for the production of a nuclear weapon. In an unstable regional scenario, entwined

with the rise of threat to Japan’s strategic and economic security and with the increase of the

possibility of being abandoned by the United States, what is preventing Japan in claiming

its defence autonomy and taking collective security actions? The first part of this reflection

introduces some concepts that indicate the contradictions, paradoxes, and fundaments that

underpin the construction of the Japanese security identity. The second part concentrates on

the analysis of the tendency of revision or of reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution

with regards to possessing Armed Forces as a foreign policy instrument.

Keywords: Japan; Normal State; Militarization; Pacifism; Japan-USA Alliance.

Resumo

Este artigo propõe demonstrar que o Japão aplicou ao longo do tempo ajustes graduais de

crescimento das suas capacidades militares para recuperar autonomia em sua própria defesa.

Com este processo de “ajustes”, sem reformas constitucionais, Japão detém atualmente

capacidades militares similares às das principais potências mundiais em termos de orçamento,

recursos materiais tecnologicamente avançados, contingentes humanos e domina todos os

1 Ph.D. in Sociology, University of São Paulo (USP). Visiting Professor at the Institute of International Relations,

University of Brasília (UnB).

Artigo submetido em 07/02/2019 e aprovado em 19/04/2019.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Japan, a Normal State?

ciclos para produção da arma nuclear. Em um cenário regional instável, com a emergência

de riscos à sua segurança estratégica e econômica e com aumento da possibilidade de ser

abandonado pelos Estados Unidos, o que falta para o Japão assumir sua autonomia em defesa

e atuar em ações de segurança coletiva? O texto avalia, na primeira parte, alguns conceitos

que apontam as contradições, paradoxos e fundamentos que embasam a construção da

identidade de segurança do Japão. E, na segunda, concentra-se na análise da tendência de

revisão ou de reinterpretação da Constituição Japonesa no que tange ter Forças Armadas

como instrumentos de Política Externa.

Palavras-chave: Japão; Estado Normal; Militarização; Pacifismo; Aliança Japão-EUA.

Introduction

Different contributions with focus on East Asia have concluded that in spite

of its economic-commercial interdependencies, the region is marked by the lack

of institutions which would be able to create even a modest sense of security. The

regional security architecture is basically embedded in military alliances with the

United States (USA), and the physical presence of its troops.

Apart from the fact that Asia is the region with the strongest presence of

nuclear states, – a circumstance which is further exacerbated by North Korea´s

recent demonstration of possessing nuclear capabilities – an extensive series of

contentious issues also became apparent, which generates an environment of

continued tension and relative instability. The Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are

the most important locations regarding such matters, and, when it comes to Japan,

the territorial disputes with Russia, China, and South Korea should also be noted,

as well as the historical resentments related to the country´s imperialist past.

Confronted with this unstable scenario, and with the worst safety environment

during the Cold War (CW), Japan considers that in the post-CW period, four

menaces that threaten its strategic and economic security have become evident:

i) the Chinese emergence; ii) the North Korean regime’s aggressiveness; iii) the

possibility of being abandoned by the USA; and iv) the relative decline of its

economy (SAMUELS, 2007, p. 258-60).

The big question which Japan faces (without Armed Forces and nuclear

capacities) relates to what and who should guarantee its security. What certainty

does the country have that the USA effectively would protect it in case of a

conventional or nuclear attack? Should Japan recover its sovereignty within

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

the strategic-military dimension by directly assuming the responsibility for its

own defence? Are nuclear capabilities indispensable? How can economic power

be transmuted into political power? Are military capabilities a pre-requisite for

political capabilities?

These issues have become more pressing with the current USA president´s

emphasis on defending the “America First” strategy, thus making clear that his

primary interest is self-preservation with the country´s institutions and intact

values, but in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to avoid nuclear war with

China (ALLISON, 2017).

In order to guarantee its security, since 1945 Japan has applied a gradualist

strategy of increasing its military capabilities according to the i) varying increase

or decrease of the feeling of security or insecurity; ii) the different stages in its

economic growth; iii) the changes in the interests of the domestic coalition in

power, and; iv) the external possibilities.

With this process of “adjustment”, without constitutional reforms, Japan

presently possesses military capabilities that are similar to those of the primary

global powers in terms of budget, technologically advanced military resources,

and manpower. Furthermore, it masters the entire cycle for the production of

nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear launching capabilities (PARIS, 2016). What

else is required in order to officially announce its offensive capabilities, assume

its autonomy in defence-related matters, and act in collective self-defence?

The term “normal state”, or “normal country”, was introduced by the Prime

Ministers Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956) and Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960) as a

“traditional nation-state”, in the defence and expectation of Japan´s reassessment

of its autonomy and national power (IOKIBE, 2011, p. 213-14). Hook (1996, p. 2)

states that Japan’s normalization process has begun in the end of the 1940s as a

result of the intensification of the CW, therefore still during the period of Allied

Occupation (1945-1952).

The definition of a new national security strategy is understood, in this regard,

as the process of transformation of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) into

an army with the ability to act in offensive missions, and it also means to avoid

an imminent attack or to take part in collective security arrangements outside the

Japanese national territory. In other words, it corresponds to the jargon which

often has been used in relation to “normalization”, or rather “a country able

and willing to defend itself with military force, with or without U.S. assistance”

(BERKOFSKY, 2011, p. 9).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Japan, a Normal State?

“Normalization” comprises two crucial moments; the first relating to the

demilitarization during the Occupation, while the second concerns the (re)

militarization as a process of restoring the legitimacy of the military as a public

policy instrument (HOOK, 1996, p. 173). The flexibilization of the traditional

pacifist posture does not necessarily imply a militarist and offensive tendency,

but simply that the responsibility of self-defence is assumed.

Without being able to preview how these trends of change will continue in the

future, Pyle (2007, p. 17) affirms that after more than half a century of distancing

from international politics, “Japan is revising its domestics institutions and

preparing to become a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first

century”. These tendencies became much more pronounced during the mandates

of the PMs Junichuro Koizumi (04/2001-09/2006) and Shinzo Abe (09/2006-09/2007

and 12/2012-…).

On the external level, the uncertainties are centred on the continuance or

the disruption of the Japan-USA Alliance and to the reactions of the countries in

North East Asia (China and the Korean Peninsula). A priori, the very hypothesis of

normalization already creates tension, with China and Korea positioning themselves

very negatively towards such normalization. If Japan seeks autonomy in order

to guarantee its security, will the maintenance of the Alliance with the USA as

it is today not eventually frustrate the Japanese aspiration towards sovereign

independence? (HUGHES, 2015).

The objective of this article is to demonstrate that Japan has accepted the

Constitution of Peace, but never abdicated from the right to recover its plain

sovereignty, with autonomy to maintain its own defence. Through a continuous and

consistent strategy of adjustment, based on different constitutional interpretations,

Japan has become marked by conditions which permit the affirmation that it

nowadays possesses Armed Forces and no longer an SDF. Yet, confronted with a

hostile regional scenario, it seeks to maintain and consolidate a military alliance

with the USA, yet, from a position of equality and not of subordination.

The first part of this reflection introduces some concepts which indicate the

contradictions, paradoxes, and fundaments that underpin the construction of

the Japanese security identity. The second part concentrates on the analysis of

the tendency of revision or of reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution with

regards to possessing Armed Forces as a foreign policy instrument. It concentrates

on the analysis of the specific instruments developed in order to guarantee its

security and on their adjustments throughout time.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

Japanese Security Identity

The Japanese security identity

, which was defined upon its surrender in

1945, was related to domestic anti-militarism, moulded by the principles of i)

not possessing a traditional Armed Force; ii) abstaining from the use of force

unless in self-defence; and iii) not participating in foreign wars. These are central

principles within its security identity that serve as a basis for policy formulation,

and especially foreign policy (OROS, 2015, p. 139-141).

The Japanese Constitution (the Peace Constitution), and particularly in its

preamble and Article 9, is a symbol of the post-CW pacifism. In popular and

academic perception, a profound belief in the “Japanese pacifism” can be detected

– even if imposed by the victors. This is how the Japanese are seen and how they

would like to be seen among themselves. In spite of recognizing the presence of

innumerable and convinced pacifists in the country, Almog (2014) criticizes the

general perception of the Japanese state as pacifist. In his perspective, the Article

9 was not inserted in the constitution with a pacifist motivation, but rather in

order to avoid that Japan would become a threat to the USA in particular, and to

the world one more time.

Although the Article 9 states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other

war potential, will never be maintained”, the existence of Japanese troops,

euphemistically denominated as “self-defence” forces, is nonetheless mentioned.

Hook et al. (2012: p. 3-7) refer to this as a “metaphor of contradiction” and in

the same line of argument highlight how the Japanese international insertion

raises a series of conflictive interpretations and “has evinced, and continues

to evince, metaphors and polemics of change, challenge, contradiction and

capriciousness”.

In the specific case of nuclear threats, the notion of a pacifist Japan presents

a profound ambivalence. A staunch defender of global nuclear disarmament,

Japan is nonetheless very keen to stay below the USA nuclear umbrella and to

preserve its warranty of extended deterrence (VAN DE VELDE, 1988; WALTZ, 2000).

On the other hand, Japan has maintained its nuclear weaponry option since the

late 1950s, and has the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons because of its

2 “A security identity is a set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad political support regarding

the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalized into the policy-making process

… providing an overarching framework recognized both by top decision makers and by major societal actors

under which a state shapes its security practices”(OROS, 2008, p. 9; OROS, 2015, p. 145).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Japan, a Normal State?

technological expertise. However, the country has made it very clear that it will

only develop such weaponry if it were to be abandoned by the USA (HOEY, 2016;

PARIS, 2016; OROS, 2017; ROEHRIG, 2017).

Objectively, Akimoto (2013) considers that “Japan’s security identity has been

constantly changing and elusive”. Or rather, it presents “schizophrenic tendencies”,

as it has changed from a militarist ultra-nationalist state to a pacifist state after its

defeat. As a disarmed state, it appears to want to preserve its security “by trusting

in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world”; participating in

a military alliance, it refuses to take part in the Korean and Vietnam wars.

Paraphrasing Coulmy´s work (1991, p. 8-9), Martre underlines the high degree

of contradiction within Japan´s defence policy, which in practice can be translated

as a permanent ambiguity. These contradictions thus become apparent as one

accepts that Japan is “a society in movement, with long term objectives, departing

from a disastrous initial situation, resulting from the capitulation in 1945”.

Amongst these contradictions, the Japanese-American relationship as the

basis for the Japanese defence policy can be highlighted, as well as the role of the

Japanese society. For the USA, Japan has always held the role of a defeated nation,

but still constituted an ally in the confrontation with the Soviet Union (today

with China); a vassal, but also a technological powerhouse. On the internal level,

a population which is “allergic to all kinds of military engagement and nuclear

armaments” should be highlighted, yet, it is still conscious of the vulnerabilities

resulting from the lack of resources and dependency of sources and external

markets, and also recognizes the threatening presence of nuclear powers within

this unstable region.

Nevertheless, this relationship with the USA can also be interpreted, not as

a contradiction, but as a result of a continued pattern of international insertion

moulded by the adhesion to, and support for, the leading world power, “whether

this is the Middle Kingdom of China, imperialist Great Britain, revanchist Germany,

the hegemonic USA, or the post-9/11 USA conducting war on terror” (HOOK et

al. 2012, p. 35).

In this regard, the Japanese narratives about sovereignty and autonomy are

normally correlated with its hierarchic relations, no matter if it is towards Asia, the

West, or the USA in the post-war period. Its identity is therefore constituted by the

practice of comparison with the “others” (KOLMAS, 2018), or by differentiation

in relation to the other, seen as either superior or inferior (HAGSTRÖM and

GUSTAFSSON, 2015).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Henrique Altemani Oliveira

The reflections regarding the different approaches to identity in relation to

Japan show that the first one regards an identity which is constituted by norms

and a domestic culture, and comprises of interests that define norms, while the

other regards processes of differentiation vis-à-vis to “others”, – Hagström and

Gustafsson (2015, p. 1) conclude that the second, relational approach is more

theoretically solid as it permits that continuity and change be treated within the

same relational structure, and the authors also indicate that Japan tends to assume

“a political agenda centred on strengthening Japan militarily”.

For Japan, Asia remains a reified entity with multiple meanings. On the one

hand, it is a space in which Japan can exercise leadership, – generating economic

opportunities – and on the other, it contains potential threats, not less likely to the

resurgence of territorial disputes with its neighbours (TAMAKI, 2015). Gustafsson

(2015) pinpoints that as long as China recognizes the Japanese identity as pacifist,

Japan is more disposed to maintain this idea of itself. Yet, when the anti-Japanese

feeling grows, the Japanese actors seek to distance themselves from this identity

and to “normalize” itself.

In this regard, if the regional security environment continues to evolve in a

dramatic way, the security identity of domestic antimilitarism “will grow even

more disconnected from the previous environment under which it was crafted,

which could result in a much more ‘proactive’ version of the articulated policy

of ‘proactive pacifism’” (OROS, 2015, p. 157).

It thereby becomes essential to question whether pacifism or antimilitarism

represents an identity reality which is moulded by culture and norms (OROS, 2008),

or an imposed, yet, pragmatic pacifism and antimilitarism?

For Green (2010, p. 485) the idea that culture and norms determine security

practice is evidently problematic as the surge of antimilitarism is intrinsically

connected to Japan’s devastating defeat in the war. The author broadens this

reflection considering that the realists can use “the constructivists’ insights as

intervening variables and still maintain a focus on the distribution of power as

the primary driver for change or non-change in Japanese security practice”.

Meanwhile, there is still a profound rift between those who seek to explain

“how identity is created and maintained (using identity as a ‘dependent variable’)

and those who seek to explain how identity affects policy-making (using identity

as an ‘independent variable’)” (OROS, 2015, p. 159). Merging constructivist and

realist perspectives, Komine (2014, p. 91) underscores that although constructivism

does not manage to fully comprise of the changing process in defence policy, “the

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Japan, a Normal State?

public culture of anti-militarism in Japan can be a useful lens for understanding the

trade-off between external military requirements and internal normative restraints”.

In line with the perspective of “a society in movement”, although the rebirth of

security in Japan represents a rejuvenation of thinking and conceptual approaches,

it does not constitute an outright rupture with the past. Old ideas and memories

of elites and societies in general continue to influence the Japanese thinking on

security and to generate obstacles for the establishment of defence policies. These

“legacies from the past” are i) the memories of its colonist past until the Pacific

War; ii) the more than sixty years of antimilitarism (or pacifism); and iii) the

unequal and continued security alliance with the USA (OROS, 2017, p. 24-25).

Taking such legacy into consideration, it becomes possible to infer that

adjustments or changes in Japanese security or defence policies depend on the

Japanese identity and are permeable to the regional or international scenario. In

other words, the Japanese international military agency “cannot be understood

fully without taking into account the complex interaction between the people, the

state and international society in defining ‘identity’ and ‘normality’ in the process

of determining defence and security policies” (HOOK, 1996, p. 1-2).

This rationale is reinforced by the consideration that international politics

can, and does present a broad variety of failures and misperceptions “but rarely is

it the simple product of shifts either in external balances of power or in domestic

debate” (SAMUELS, 2007, p. 294). In this perspective, the modern Japanese

history is characterized by long periods of polarized debate, culminating in a

grand consensus around the implementation of a national security strategy.

On three different occasions the Japanese leaders, on basis of internal

legitimacy and consensus, managed to device a coherent and broadly implemented

national security strategies (SAMUELS, 2007, p. 297-303). The first, the Meiji

Revolution, was related to the construction of a “rich country, strong army”; the

second, in the beginning of the 20th century, focused on Japanese hegemony in

Asia; and the third, in the CW, presented Japan as a pacifist trading state. According

to Samuels (2007), Japanese politics nowadays is, once again, going through a

process of defining a new national security strategy.

In these historical moments of consensus construction, autonomy and prestige

were the central values related to achieving national objectives, and vulnerability

the enduring reality. Recognizing the importance of vulnerability, Samuels (2007, p.

287) defends that “Japan has evolved a “strategic culture” and a national identity

in which vulnerability has long been a central feature”.

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

In spite of the defeat and the forced reforms of the post-war, the Japanese

surviving political leaders maintained the objective of reaching national power,

yet this time with focus on economic development, characterizing a “mercantile

realism”. Nonetheless, the economic-commercial emphasis did not imply a

radical distancing from military security. The agenda with focus on economic and

technological security included the military and diplomatic spheres (HEGINBOTHAM

and SAMUELS, 1998).

Obviously, confronted with the proliferation of the feeling of vulnerability,

every amendment or reinterpretation of the Constitution is strongly focused

on Article 9. Furthermore, this dilemma is far from recent, it has emerged in

different moments since the post-war period. Nixon (1958) for example, publically

declared that the imposition of Article 9 and the disarmament of Japan were

“mistakes” (PYLE, 2007, 229). Coulmy (1991) highlights that it was an unrealistic

decision and that Article 9 quickly led to a series of problems. PM Hatoyama’s

declaration, in 1956, exemplifies this line of criticism, stating that “it is unreasonable

to think that the purpose of the Constitution is that Japan has to sit and wait for

death when it comes under attack by missiles and other weapons” (KITAOKA,

2018, p. 2).

There is a consentual perception that as a result of the defeat, the nuclear

attacks, and the pressures from the occupying forces, Japan adopted the principle of

renouncement of war (Article 9), accepted to deactivate all its military contingencies

and, with the guarantee provided by the USA-Japan security treaty, assumed a

pacifist attitude. This is basically the history of a defeated country forced to submit

itself, it eventually accepted submission as a strategy for economic recovery.

As the Security Treaty by its very nature is asymmetric and relegates Japan the

role of a dependent partner, “the fear of abandonment has been a more constant

aspect associated with the alliance security dilemma than the fear of entrapment”

(ASHIZAWA, 2014, p. 71-73). This makes room to the emergence of two different

movements: one of anxiety and insecurity regarding the USA commitment; and

the other, constituted as a pressure to ensure continuance of the USA´s presence

in Asia. Azhizawa later adds that that this fear became even stronger after the

defeat of the USSR.

The Japanese anti-militarism has never been “a pacifist security identity”,

as it both leaves room for the existence of an army in the post-war period; and

brings Japan closer to a military alliance (OROS, 2017). Furthermore, it is important

to consider, despite popular support to its pacifist ideal, Japanese Constitution

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 5-30

Japan, a Normal State?

has been imposed. In this sense, Article 9 “far from representing a pacifist ideal,

amounts to no more than the victor disarming the defeated” (LUMMIS, 2013, p. 3).

Although the Japanese society is permeated by pacifist norms that shape

its identity, Japan should not be viewed as a “military pygmy”. On the contrary,

during the CW “Japan transformed itself from a burned-out ruin to one of the

world’s foremost military powers” (LIND, 2004, p. 93). In the post-war period,

Japan was sometimes seen as a military super power, sometimes as a dwarf, or a

state with an unusual and reactive foreign policy, ignoring the fact that the country

“had one of the largest defence budgets in the world, and also one of the world’s

most technologically advanced defence forces” (HAGSTRÖM and GUSTAFSSON

2015, p. 12-16).

On the basis of such complexity, when regarding the perception of the role and

the intentions of Japan, – recognized as pacifist and antimilitarist, yet participating

in a military alliance and with technologically advanced weapons – different

analysts point to the impossibility of one single theory explaining its insertion in

a region without institutionalized security mechanisms, and in which insecurity

is a present and continuous issue (AKIMOTO, 2013; INOGUCHI, 2014b). Oros’

theoretical framework, for example, is positioned in the intersection between a

realist

and a constructivist approach, as it accepts the realist paradigm, but still

considers the concept of Japanese security identity, which is “the collectively held

principles that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role

of state action in the security arena and that are institutionalized in the policy-

making process” (LINDGREN, 2017, p. 575).

Inoguchi (2014b) defends that varying aspects of Japanese foreign policy are

explained by different traditions. The objectives of survival and of maintaining the

status quo are shaped by classical realism: the transformative pragmatism seeks

to capacitate the Japanese state to act with strength and without being dependent

of the USA. Liberal internationalism, by its turn, would explain the aspiration to

strengthen international norms and institutions, cooperating with other states in

a multilateral fashion.

Akimoto (2013) recognizes that alternative theories or alternative conceptual

branches alone are not enough to Japanese reality, but mutually complementary

3 A symbolic example of the difficulties of a dissociation from the realist perspective was Nye´s (2001, p. 95)

statement about the reactions to his analysis of the East Asian security context in 1995, “Friends have sometimes

remarked on the irony that someone so closely associated with the concept of transnational interdependence

should have helped produce a report that rested heavily on Realist thinking”.

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

within an analytical eclecticism. The author suggests that Japan embodies three

types of pacifisms: the pacifism against war in the immediate post War of the

Pacific; the realist pacifism during the CW; and the international pacifism since

the end of the CW, Together they correspond to the three traditions of the English

School of International Relations: the Kantian Idealism, the Hobbesian Realism

and the Grotian Institutionalism. The author complements this line of reason

speculating that absolute pacifism (the negation of all types of war, contrary to

the relative pacifism which justifies the need for war or the use of violence in

some circumstances) works negatively both in relation to individual as well as

collective self-defence (AKIMOTO, 2014).

Lind (2004) argues that pacifism and antimilitarism correspond to the

constructivist norms, while Japan, when recognizing threats, employs a realist

strategy of buck-passing, or rather, the transference of the costs of balancing to

others. In this regard, it becomes evident that Japan is under pressure to normalize

its behaviour. And, although this normalization might be in its interest, it is still

convergent with the maintenance of Japan-USA alliance, recognizing that China

already is stronger than Japan, but that the two (Japan and the USA) are stronger

than China (NISHI, 2018, p. 908).

The structure of the Security System

A widespread and often highlighted interpretation about Japanese behaviour

sees the country as a free-rider which, by delegating its security to the USA, has

been exclusively focused on its process of economic recovery. The present analysis,

though, operates with the presumption that the Japan-USA Security Treaty is

rather a bargain. The USA would defend and guarantee the Japanese security

while Japan would concede installations, and bases for the USA operations in

the Far East (SMITH, 2011).

Secondly, we also seek to demonstrate that Japan always has nurtured the

intention, and has been forced to amplify its military capacities in order to guarantee

its security, although it is not possible to identify a specific moment of change

(OROS, 2017, p. 35). On the contrary, this trend has constituted a response to the

need to confront possible threats (vulnerability), and also to enhance its standing

within the international system (prestige).

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Japan, a Normal State?

Thirdly, this regards a Treaty which is marked by an unequal relation which,

as it institutionalizes a mode of cooperation, has been transformed into an alliance,

and as Japan has assumed the control of military operations, it has become more

akin to a partnership with mutually beneficial and symmetric positions.

For Oros (2017), the surge of new threats in the post-CW period has spurred

a “gradual awakening” with regards to the imperative of enhancing military

capabilities. Shinoda (2011, p. 13) thus highlights that in the post-CW “Japan was

forced to review its asymmetrical alliance with United States to become a more

active player for international peace and security”.

The analysis in this section focuses on two moments, the CW and the post-

CW, due to the changing nature of the threats. We consider that the end of the

CW interrupted a period which might be characterized as “the golden age”

(1972-1989), when the Sino-American approximation made it possible for Japan

and China to establish diplomatic bonds and maintain friendly relations with the

USA vis-à-vis the USSR (VOGEL et al., 2002). Put differently, the end of the CW

broke with the dynamic of the security architecture in North East Asia, which

was based on the logic of bipolarity, thus requiring a new structure in order to

confront novel threats (BUZAN, 2003).

The Cold War

This tendency of “continuous change” in the definition of Japanese security

was initially a consequence of the fact that the Occupation Forces (1945-1952)

did not have a plan for how to maintain Japanese security.

Contrary to Roosevelt´s (1943) intentions of “unconditional surrender”, the

Potsdam Declaration (July 1945) reverted this disposition and thus avoided a

direct military occupation, with the unconditional surrender explicitly maintained

in relation to “all of the Japanese armed forces”. In any case, we can identify the

first contradiction, as we cannot speak of an unconditional surrender, but rather

of “an unconditional acceptance by the loser of conditions provided by the victor”

(IOKIBE, 2011, p. 22).

Demilitarization, democratization, and breaking the foundations of the

Japanese industry were MacArthur´s objectives. The demilitarization was

immediate, with the total demobilization of the military and police contingencies,

and the destruction of their weapons. The reformulation of the Meiji Constitution

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

was likewise a very hasty process

, as it was formulated by MacArthur´s staff and

approved in October 1946, and implemented in May 1947, with the demilitarization

(Article 9) incorporated to the Constitution.

Had it been laid down after the beginning of the CW, Article 9 would probably

not have been inserted. The Japanese weaknesses, defenceless and demilitarized

as the country was, became clear with the beginning of the Korean War, which

pointed towards the urgency of certain adjustments; i) the rearmament and

participation in military operations; ii) the creation of a police force for defence;

iii) the definition of Japan´s security; and iv) the resumption of the industrial

arms production.

With the advance of the CW, Japanese identity changed significantly, from

being a subordinated enemy, towards being maintained in permanent submission

as a member of the alliance led by the USA against communism, with a capitalist

emergent economy and a liberal democratic political system. From the beginning of

1948, Japan´s role was thereby to serve as an advanced base for the USA military

with its nuclear arsenal. “Japan was also to act as a symbol of the benefits of

capitalism and as a beacon of democracy in communist Asia” (KELLY, 2015, p. 55).

The signature of a peace treaty in order to define Japan´s security thus became

imminent. Hereby, in September 1951 the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the

Japan USA Security Treaty were signed. This unequal treaty maintained USA troops

on Japanese territory and permitted the projection of military power on third

countries. Yet, it did not include the commitment and the obligation to defend

Japan (PYLE, 2007). For the USA, the treaty served two purposes: to construct a

fortress against communism and to control Japan (CHA, 2009).

In 1950, Foster Dulles pressured Japan to rearm, re-establish the Armed Forces

and participate in the Pacific Pact led by the USA (CHOONG, 2015). Apart from

Article 9, the Japanese denial considered the negative popular reactions and the

priority of economic recovery. So, following an order from MacArthur, the National

Policy Reserve was created with 75.000 members and, in 1952, was transformed

into the National Security Force (COULMY, 1991; PYLE, 2007).

Because of the Japanese opposition, the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement

(MDA) signed in 1954 maintained the USA forces in the country and forced Japan

to assume greater responsibilities for its defence. Interpreting that Article 9 would

4 MacArthur was in a hurry as he sought to rush back to the USA in order to present himself as a republican

presidential candidate (CHA, 2009).

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Japan, a Normal State?

not veto self-defence, permitting “the necessary minimum” for defence in the

case of an attack, the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) and the JSDF were created,

with a contingency of 152.000 men, much inferior to the 350.000 demanded by

the USA (MASWOOD, 1990; PYLE, 2007). Would the MDA, thus, not answer the

main question: what is the reason for foreign troops to be stationed on Japanese

territory if these would not act in Japan´s defence?

With Kishi´s pressures for a more direct commitment from the USA in the

defence of Japan, the Security Treaty, which was revised in 1960, defined the

obligation of the USA to intervene in case of hostilities on Japanese territory

(SHIMAMOTO, 2015), yet, without any reference to the question of extended

nuclear dissuasion or the nuclear umbrella (ROEHRIG, 2017). The Basic Policy for

National Defence was also established with the objective of developing defence

capacities in accordance with the country´s resources, but within the limits

imposed by self-defence.

Yet, towards the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the two

sides felt the need for further adjustments in their relations. The USA increased

its pressures on Japan to assume a more active role, not only in its own defence,

but also in the region within the political, economic, and security dimensions.

The announcement of the probable retreat of the American forces from Asia

(the Nixon Doctrine) and the Sino-American rapprochement in 1971 intensified the

Japanese feeling of abandonment. Consequently, the country sought to strengthen

the JSDF, qualitatively and quantitatively, and to reinforce its national security

policy in a more independent manner (KOMINE, 2014).

Thereby, the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO, 1976) and the

Guidelines for USA-Japan Defence Cooperation (1978) were implemented. With

the NDPO, Japan should maintain minimum levels of defence with capacity to

resist a limited external attack without foreign assistance. The USA also made

the insertion of Japan below the nuclear umbrella official (ROEHRIG, 2017). In

order to avoid an elevated rise in defence spending, a ceiling of 1% of GDP was

established (Nakanishi, 2011, p. 121). With the Guidelines, Japan and the USA

agreed to broaden their military cooperation, with hitherto unprecedented measures

in the joint defence planning, as a response to the armed attack and cooperation

in relation to East Asian security questions that could potentially affect Japanese

security (SHIMAMOTO, 2015).

With these new guidelines, Japan did not only permit the continued presence

and support for American forces on its territory, but it also guaranteed a direct

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

military contribution for the implementation of an American security strategy

in the Asia Pacific (HOOK, 1996). Effectively, this took form much more as an

alliance than merely as an instance of security cooperation, which justified the

change in rhetoric in referring to the Japan-USA Security Treaty as a Japan-USA

Alliance. According to Maslow (2015), these innovations concluded the process

of the formation of Japan´s security system in the post-war.

In order to supply the forces involved in the Korean War, the USA officially

authorized the production of weapons (03/1952) and returned 859 military

installations to the Japanese, “among them 314 aircraft factories, 131 military

arsenals, 25 aircraft and weapons research centres and 18 shipyards” (DRIFTE,

1986, p. 9).

The production and the prohibition of weapon exports (1967) were fundamental

to the revitalization of the economy and for the advancement of dual technologies

upon the transfer of USA military technology to Japan (COULMY, 1991, 111).

While the USA saw the production as a way to consolidate the JSDF, the Japanese

industries took advantage of this in order to gain a more central position within

the general process of economic reconstruction, and particularly in relation to

weapon production (DRIFTE, 1986, p. 10).

As dual technology can be applied to both civil and military sector, the

weapons production has been designated to the most qualified of the large Japanese

industrial conglomerates, without the investments being registered within the

JDAs budget (COULMY, 1991, p. 177-183).

Thus, through a conventional understanding, it might be claimed that there

are no weapon industries or military-industrial complexes in Japan. Although

in practice all of the large conglomerates were involved in direct production or

supply of components, few were registered as JDA producers, even though with

the export prohibition, this is the only client (DRIFTE, 1986, p. 86).

Based on the Directives of 1978, and the MDA of 1954, Japan ceded to

American pressures in 1983 and flexibilized the “three principles of arms exports”

that restricted the American access to technology and equipment. As it transferred

technology, the Japanese demands for access to the secret American defence

patents were met through the participation in the Strategic Defence Initiative

Programme (SDI) in 1988 (DRIFTE, 1986; CHIEH-LIN, 1989; COULMY, 1991;

MURATA, 2011; GRONNING, 2018). It is worthwhile to note Reagan´s description

of the SDI as “an alternative to the system of nuclear deterrence” (KATZENSTEIN

and OKAWARA, 1993, p. 114).

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Japan, a Normal State?

With the approval of the Atomic Energy Basic Act (1955), Japan reinitiated

its nuclear development research from the period of the Pacific War, yet now for

peaceful purposes. Even so, Kishi declared in 1957 that the Constitution did not

veto the possession of nuclear weapons, an official interpretation which has been

maintained by different administrations since then (CHOONG, 2015).

With the considerable resources that were invested in mastering the complete

nuclear cycle, it becomes possible to affirm that Japan has the sufficient material

resources and knowledge to quickly develop a nuclear weapon (PARIS, 2016).

Financial costs and possible negative domestic and external reactions would

dissuade the production of nuclear weapons, but in case of a rupture of the USA

commitment to extended deterrence, Japan does possess the necessary conditions

to quickly resume its development (ROEHRIG, 2017).

It can thereby be concluded that Japan does not have the intention of

possessing nuclear weapons while still enjoying the protection of the USA nuclear

umbrella.

Based on its economic and technological capacities, during the 1980s Nakasone

sought to transform Japan into an international actor that would play a political

role that corresponded to its economic power, with the military also serving as a

legitimate instrument of state power (HOOK, 1996). Consequently, towards the

end of the CW, Japan had become a sophisticated producer of technologically

advanced weapons, and it maintained a similar arsenal to that of the main powers,

as well as a scientific-technological cooperation with the USA. It also played

a significant role within international security by possessing high technology,

which constituted a critical resource in terms of international security matters,

meaning that its interests in reassuming a position of power were not restricted

by technology, but only by politics (VOGEL, 1992, p. 56-57).

Post-Cold War

The end of the CW and of the bipolar international system represented, on the

one hand, a movement towards its restructuring, and on the other, changes which

would compromise global stability, and/or the confidence in existing international

regimes. In the specific realm of security, the disappearance of bipolar conflict

did not spur, – as was otherwise presumed – a long era of peace and economic

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

development, but rather the surge of new threats, also within the field of nuclear

development.

By reaffirming its hegemonic position, the USA adopted a strategy of pressuring

for a higher degree of division of responsibilities, with different states participating

in the maintenance of international stability and prosperity (IKENBERRY, 1998).

Some trends which already had become evident in Japan were exacerbated,

such as the deepening of Japanese-American cooperation, or the reaffirmation of

expectations to reacquire plain sovereignty, and thus, to normalize itself on the

basis of a growing nationalism.

The aspirations towards regional leadership due to the relative distancing of

the USA, eventually clashed with the rapid Chinese emergence in the beginning

of the 21st century, but also with the USA policy of maintaining its presence in the

region. Confronted with the new status of China and the growing North Korean

nuclear threat, Japan resumed the strategy of strengthening its military alliance

with the USA.

In the immediate post-CW, due to the belief that Russia – with its reduced

capabilities – was the only threat, the revision of the NDPO (1995) emphasized

international cooperation (especially military cooperation), approved the reduction

of personnel and heavy material, and scheduled further reductions, including

even the probable termination of USA military presence in Japan (OROS, 2017;

NISHI, 2018).

The eruption of the War in Iraq (1990) pressed Japan to review its policies of

international insertion. After strong critique of Japan´s “check book diplomacy”

during the Gulf War, the pressures for normalization grew, and Ozawa

began

to call out for participation in international peacekeeping operations (PKOs)

(YASUTOMO and ISHIGAKI, 2017, p. 958).

The debate about participation in PKOs was marked by three different

positions: i) respecting the Constitution, with participation in multilateral

operations restricted to civil assistance; ii) reinterpreting the Constitution in order

to permit the assumption of greater international responsibilities, and iii) that the

Constitution already did permit such action in the case of sufficient political will

and leadership (NEWMAN, 2006, p. 331-32).

5 Ichiro Ozawa, at the time the General Secretary of the LDP and author of the work Blueprint for a New Japan:

The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo & New York: Kodansha International, 1994), apart from introducing the term

of a normal state also defended that Japan should assume a more active role within international politics and

within the international peace operations.

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Japan, a Normal State?

In fact, the absence of a Japanese contribution to the Gulf War reflected

an incapacity to recognize the emerging norms that stipulated the involvement

of UN members in military issues, independently of their domestic policies

(KURASHINA, 2005).

The approval of the International Peacekeeping Operations Law made it

possible to send troops to Cambodia in 1992 and, more importantly, generated

“a new security role for the SDF, namely expanding the SDF’s identity from a

force with a national defence mission to one that incorporated an international

dimension” (SINGH, 2010, p. 443).

The North Korean nuclear development (1993-1994) and the Chinese missile

tests (1995-1996) in the Taiwan Strait demonstrated the importance and the

weakness of the Japan-USA Alliance and constituted the basis for the Hashimoto-

Clinton Declaration (IOKIBE, 2011, p. 230), which resulted in the revision of the

Japan-USA Guidelines for Defence Cooperation in 1997.

With this reformulation, the Alliance´s character of self-defence was reaffirmed,

but its operational scope was widened to include the broader region, or the “areas

surrounding Japan”. In practice, the JSDF assumed the role of containing foreign

troops (FUKUSHIMA and SAMUELS, 2018), yet, under the USA command (PARIS,

2016, p. 6). Nonetheless, the rather vague character of the concept of “surrounding

areas” generated much questioning and impeded its implementation.

The offensive North Korean escalation with the launching of the Taepodong 1

(1998) and the War Against Terror in the post-9/11 period removed the constraints

and permitted the approval of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (10/2001)

and made it possible to send Maritime SDF for logistic support for USA and

coalition troops in Afghanistan (KAWASHIMA, 2005; OROS, 2017).

Inoguchi (2008) considers that these measures and Japan´s support to the USA

in the fight against terrorism marked the beginning of a period of transformation

into a “global ordinary power”. With the continuity of the external threats, and the

growing mistrust in relation to how the USA would react in the case of an attack

on the Japanese territory, the Koizumi and Abe governments made great efforts

to increase military capabilities, reinforcing the Japan-USA Alliance and defining

a greater global role for the JSDF, and more objectively, made an amendment to

the Constitution which legitimized the JSDF and collective self-defence.

The creation of the Ministry of Defence (2007) and the establishment of the

General Chief of Staff (2010) with authority over the three branches of the JSDF

(land, sea, and air), and the reforms proposed by Abe in 2013 for the establishment

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

of an autonomous operational command, demonstrated that Japan advanced

significantly in the direction of acquiring greater autonomy (PARIS, 2016).

Re-elected in December 2012, Abe declared that he had returned in order to

rejuvenate Japan, to surpass the long period of economic stagnation and restore

pride and national power (INOGUCHI, 2014a, p. 102). With high prestige due to

the initial success in reviving the sluggish Japanese economy, Abe introduced

the doctrine of “proactive pacifism” in a clear demonstration of the changes that

would mark his mandate.

The proactive pacifism implied that Japan would change its traditional

reactive posture and seek to anticipate concrete threats. The creation of the

National Security Council, resulting from the National Security Strategy and the

State Secrets Protection Law, was a clear sign of this ambition. Considered as

“a potential watershed in Japanese strategic policy-making” these sought, – starting

with the centralization of security policies – to develop a sophisticated scheme

for crisis management with the objective of controlling alliances and reducing the

dependence on the USA. Amongst other motivations, the most threatening was

the fact that “the USA military had lost exclusive control of the air and sea near

the Chinese coast, a portentous geostrategic shift” (FUKUSHIMA and SAMUELS,

2018, p. 773-778).

The revision of the Guidelines (2013/14) assured the maintenance of the

extended nuclear deterrence for the Asia Pacific, and by including the right to

collective self-defence, broadened the role of Japan within regional security, while

still maintaining the principle of the use of “minimal necessary force” (KOMINE,

2014; KIM, 2015). In March 2016, the constitutional reform became effective,

after having been approved in the Lower Chamber and the Senate (in July and

September 2015), thus legitimizing the deployment of Japanese troops in combat

situations abroad and allowing Japan to assume a greater strategic weight in the

international scenario.

With these changes, it is possible to affirm that Japan today possesses armed

forces and that it already has become a normal state, but still maintains its adherence

to pacifism, by renouncing war and by the eradication of nuclear weapons.

Hughes (2015, p. 11) sustains that Abe acted aggressively by imposing Japan

a more radical external agenda, minded upon subordinating the Yoshida Doctrine

to the Abe Doctrine “in seeking recognition of Japan’s standing among the first

rank (...) of capitalist powers, recovery of its autonomy as an international player,

recognition as a crucial USA partner and leader in Asia”.

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Japan, a Normal State?

Although the deepening of this constitutional revision has occurred during

the Abe government, this ideational framework, defined by Kishi Nobusuke and

by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the point of its creation in 1955,

has not been previously implemented due to the lack of internal and external

political conditions, and due to the recognition of the country´s weaknesses and

the inherent costs of a radical change. Most of these reforms were initiated by

the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), reflecting a consensual moment between

the leadership of the LDP and the DPJ on the restoration of the country´s security

policy (ROSS, 2015, p. 7).

What is more profoundly novel, and spurring a more thorough reassessment

of the institution, decision-making procedures and the revision of Article 9, is

the intensification of the tensions between Japan and China, especially because

the dispute for the Senkaku/Diaoyu has raised a new dilemma for the USA: “for

the first time in the alliance’s history, a conflict that begins between Japan and

another power seems possible”. Until then, Japan imagined using force only for

defensive purposes, and possibly in conflicts related to the Korean Peninsula and

the Strait of Taiwan. With the new scenario of possible conflict between Japan

and China, what would Washington´s capacity to demote tensions between these

two countries amount to? (SMITH, 2016, p. 259).

The Chinese emergence was already a preoccupation for Japan. Yet, in the

second decade of the 21st century, it became viewed as a concrete threat not only

because of the claims over the Senkaku Islands, but also due to the investments

and the modernization of the Chinese military capacities and increased aerial and

maritime control of the first chain of islands, as defined in its maritime strategy.

Washington worked with the consensus that the Chinese engagement

simultaneously with the strengthening of the Japan-USA Alliance would maintain

a favourable balance of power in Asia, and at the same time legitimize its regional

military presence (GREEN, 2011). Nonetheless, this strategy seems to have collapsed

due to the increased Chinese assertiveness.

As continuous and cumulative adjustments have occurred since the promulgation

of the Constitution, the present debate about the Japanese intent to normalize

constitutes an anachronism, because “Japan has made the transition toward

becoming a normal country, while holding on to some of its old and “abnormal”

characteristics of the antimilitaristic propensity” (KIM, 2015, p. 223-24).

Considering what is normal or abnormal, Soeya et al. (2011, p. 9) speculate

that changing Article 9 is not a high priority, as “Japan has managed to live with

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

the contradiction of Article 9 for more than fifty years and could probably do so

for another fifty if necessary”. Furthermore, “it is probably more important for

Japan to carry more of the regional and global security burden than to try to iron

out a symbolic constitutional anomaly”.

Japan has always sought to strengthen the Alliance, partly in order to maintain

its pacifist image, and in part because it does not possess nuclear weapons and

considers extended nuclear deterrence as indispensable. The Japan-USA Alliance

is still the main security anchor and Japan will only withdraw from this in case

that Washington fails as an ally (GREEN, 2007).

Even so, in the doubt of whether the USA will maintain its commitment or

whether the Japan-USA Alliance will be sufficient to maintain a favourable military

balance within the region, Japan is establishing new regional partnerships with India

and Australia, thus strengthening capacities with ASEAN countries, intelligence

cooperation with South Korea, and taking advantage of points of convergence with

Russia in order to neutralize China (SAMUELS and WALLACE, 2018).

In line with these preparations for an eventual drastic change in the security

structure, Japan has taken precautions to master the different stages of production

of a nuclear weapon, lacking only the conduction of a nuclear test (PARIS,

2016, p. 5).

Final Considerations

The recent reinterpretations of Japanese security policies, with legal approvals

from the Diet and revisions in the Japan-USA Alliance, reformulated the pacifist

system of the Peace Constitution. Japan can already participate in military

operations, with or without the USA, to defend friendly countries or to contribute

to the maintenance of international security inside or outside its region.

The tendency towards the formation of new alliances complements this new

status, especially the ‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific, as well as the Quadrilateral

Security Dialogue, with strategies to contain China or to compete with the Belt

and Road Initiative.

The initial question can thus be raised again: why does Japan avoid officially

recognizing the armed forces, and not the SDF, as is its foreign policy instrument?

In spite of the Japanese emphasis on highlighting that these changes do

not represent an intention of aggressive militarisation, but rather a responsible

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Japan, a Normal State?

contribution in accordance with its economic and technological capabilities to

pursue international collective security, these are viewed with much scepticism.

In this regard, the maintenance of Article 9 in the Constitution can be

interpreted as an unmistakable strategy of demonstrating the continuity of its

pacifist intentions.

An example related to this strategy was the nuclearization of India which

merged the Nehruvian pacifism with a significant dose of realism: a foreign policy

instrument, but also a way to assure a more stable strategic region. A noticeable

result, in spite of its negative consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation,

was the rapprochement with the USA and the signature of the Accord for Civil

Nuclear Cooperation.

As the changes have been mainly concentrated on the security cooperation

guidelines between Japan and the USA, there is no reason to expect a dismantling

of the Japan-USA Alliance. However, such changes reinforce the Alliance and

are aligned with each party´s wishes. It might even be claimed that in order to

maintain security in East Asia, the USA needs Japan in much the same way that

Japan needs the USA, being the concern with the maintenance of the extended

nuclear deterrence the main difference between their aims. Under this nuclear

umbrella, Japan will not pursue the development of nuclear weapons, as India did

when it lost the Soviet protection and found itself confronted with the growing

Chinese military capacities and the Pakistani nuclear advances.

Due to the fear of abandonment, Japan retains sufficient technological knowledge

and material resources to quickly develop a nuclear weapon, but it will only take

this step in case that it would no longer be able to count on USA guarantees.

Even though the Japanese population is strongly opposed to militarization

and the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, it is nonetheless aware of

the country´s vulnerabilities to growing threats. Consequently, it tends to support

measures to maintain the country´s security.

Thus, in practice, today Japan is a country with military capacities that

are relatively similar to those of the main powers, with operational freedom to

participate in collective self-defence. The non-revocation of the Article 9 strengthens

its pacifist identity and its opposition to, and renouncement of war, while the

references in the Preamble of the Constitution to “international cooperation” and

to “its place within the international society in the struggle for international peace”

justify and impose a greater Japanese contribution in the process of maintenance

of international security.

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Henrique Altemani Oliveira

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31Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

África do Sul e o seu entorno regional:

existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

South Africa and its surroundings:

is there a South African subimperialism?

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v14n1.2019.882

Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

Resumo

O objetivo deste texto é analisar as relações da África do Sul com seu entorno regional desde

o fim do apartheid, problematizando a noção de que os governos do Congresso Nacional

Africano (ANC) praticam uma política subimperialista. A análise se apoia em documentos

e entrevistas realizadas na África do Sul, Zimbabwe e Zâmbia. Inicialmente, é apresentada

uma visão geral das relações da África do Sul com seus vizinhos, evidenciando a assimetria

que as caracteriza. A seguir, é discutida a tentativa malograda do presidente Thabo Mbeki

de liderar um renascimento africano sob a égide da Nepad, e seus desdobramentos.

A terceira seção enfoca a África Austral, examinando as consequências da expansão mercantil

sul-africana em Zimbábue e Zâmbia. Na sequência, discuto, a partir de entrevistas, se essa

expansão corresponde a uma estratégia determinada dos governos da ANC. Nas reflexões

finais, avanço a hipótese de que, embora constate-se uma assimetria nas relações da África

do Sul com seus vizinhos, as debilidades e contradições do Estado e do próprio capitalismo

sul-africano limitam sua possibilidade de atuação. Como resultado, a expansão regional de

negócios sul-africanos se dá à despeito de qualquer estratégia estatal, o que enseja repensar

a caracterização desse fenômeno como um subimperialismo.

Palavras-chave: África do Sul; Subimperialismo; Integração Regional; ANC; NEPAD.

1 Pesquisa realizada com apoio da Fapesp, processo 2017/05588-7.

2 Doutor em História Econômica pela Universidade de São Paulo. Pós-Doutorado no centro Genre, Travail, Mobilités,

Centre de Recherches Sociologiques et Politiques de Paris. Professor do Departamento de Relações Internacionais

da UNIFESP. Research Associate, Society, Work and Politics Institute (SWOP), University of Witswatersrand,

Johanesburgo. Research Associate, Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru

University, Nova Delhi.

Artigo submetido em 28/01/2019 e aprovado em 24/04/2019.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

32 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

Abstract

This text analyzes South Africa´s relations with its neighbors since the end of apartheid,

questioning the understanding that African National Congress (ANC) governments have

pursued subimperialistic policies. This analysis is supported by documents and interviews

undertaken in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Initially, an overview of South Africa´s

relations with its neighbors is presented, bringing to light the imbalance that typifies them.

Then I discuss the failed attempt of president Thabo Mbeki to lead an African Renaissance

under the frame of Nepad and its outcomes. Third section focuses on Southern Africa, as the

consequences of South African business expansion in Zimbabwe and Zambia are examined.

Next, I discuss if such expansion is strategized by ANC government, through interviews with

different players. In the final reflections, I suggest that although there is an imbalance in

South Africa´s relations to its neighbors, the weaknesses and contradictions of the State and

of South African capitalism in itself, limit its scope of intervention. As a result, the regional

expansion of South African business seems to take place despite any State strategy, thus

problematizing the characterization of such phenomena as subimperialism.

Keywords: South Africa; Subimperialism; Regional Integration; ANC; NEPAD.

Introdução

A América do Sul ocupou um lugar de destaque na política externa das

gestões petistas no Brasil, entre 2003 e 2016. O esteio econômico dessa política

foi o apoio à internacionalização de grandes empresas de capital nacional ou

sediadas no país, entendidas como vetores do desenvolvimento capitalista nacional:

a política das “campeãs nacionais”. Seus veículos principais foram a diplomacia

empresarial praticada pelo Itamaraty e a política de crédito do Banco Nacional de

Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). Em linhas gerais, a racionalidade

petista previa que a internacionalização de corporações brasileiras serviria de

alicerce material para projetar regionalmente a influência do país, modificando

seu padrão de inserção internacional. A intenção, em última análise, era fazer do

Brasil um global player (GARCIA, 2018).

Essa política sofreu críticas no campo da própria esquerda, no Brasil e em

países vizinhos (FUNDAÇÃO ROSA LUXEMBURGO, 2009; GARCIA, 2012: ZIBECHI:

2012). Em linhas gerais, argumentou-se que a política brasileira reforçava vínculos

assimétricos com os países da região em benefício próprio – seja dos negócios das

“campeãs nacionais”, seja dos desígnios de projeção internacional brasileira –,

referidos a uma política que não questionava a divisão internacional do trabalho

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

33Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

prevalente, nem a hegemonia estadunidense. Aos olhos de alguns autores, essas

críticas foram sintetizadas na evocação de um “subimperialismo brasileiro”,

recuperando uma noção forjada pelo economista Ruy Mauro Marini no contexto

da ditadura militar (1964-1985) (LUCE, 2007; MARINI, 2000).

A recuperação desse conceito no contexto brasileiro no início do século XXI

instigou uma apropriação inesperada do outro lado do Atlântico. A partir da intensa

atividade intelectual de Patrick Bond, difundiu-se na África do Sul e em países

do seu entorno imediato a caracterização de que esse país, à maneira brasileira,

praticava uma política subimperialista sob os governos do Congresso Nacional

Africano (ANC), partido que governa o país desde o fim do apartheid (BOND: 2006;

BOND; GARCIA, 2015).

O objetivo deste texto é apresentar um conjunto de elementos que problematizam

o uso dessa categoria no caso sul-africano. Não discutirei teoricamente a noção de

subimperialismo, o que já foi feito na América do Sul e também na África do Sul,

nem se sua aplicação ao caso brasileiro é pertinente (FONTES, 2012; HADLER:

2013; TANDON, 2014). A partir de uma compreensão genérica do termo, acima

enunciada, me limitarei a apresentar elementos de uma pesquisa em andamento,

que inclui entrevistas realizadas na África do Sul , no Zimbábue e em Zâmbia em

julho de 2018, além de revisão bibliográfica e de documentos

. Minha hipótese é

que a expansão de negócios sul-africanos no continente, em particular na região

austral, é um processo que se dá de maneira casuísta e não corresponde a uma

estratégia elaborada do Estado sul-africano, comparável ao projeto acalentado

pelas administrações petistas.

O texto se desdobra em quatro seções, seguidas de reflexões finais. Inicialmente,

é enfocada a inserção regional da África do Sul, arrolando dados que oferecem

uma radiografia das relações do país com seu entorno imediato, evidenciando

a assimetria que as caracteriza. Esse é o pano de fundo estrutural que embasa

a percepção de um subimperialismo sul-africano. Em seguida, é abordada a

tentativa de promover um “renascimento africano”, liderada pelo sucessor de

Mandela, Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), que teve como principal expressão a New

Partnership for Africa´s Development (Nepad). Alguns impasses que conduziram

ao malogro da iniciativa são analisados, enquanto sua dimensão infraestrutural

foi incorporada pelo African Development Bank (AfDB), atualmente na forma do

Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). Na terceira seção,

3 Entrevistas realizadas pelo autor nos marcos da pesquisa apoiada pela Fapesp, processo 2017/05588-7.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

34 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

é enfocada a África Austral e a South African Development Comunity (SADC). Em

particular, são examinadas as consequências da expansão de negócios sul-africanos

em Zimbábue e Zâmbia desde o fim do apartheid, que dá lastro à noção de um

subimperialismo sul-africano nesses países. Na última seção, indago, por meio

de entrevistas com intelectuais, policymakers e funcionários de alto escalão nos

setores público e privado, se essa expansão corresponde a um projeto do governo

sul-africano sob o comando da ANC. Nas reflexões finais, concluo que a hipótese

de um subimperialismo sul-africano deve ser no mínimo matizada, diante dos

constrangimentos e contradições que caracterizam o Estado e, em última análise,

o próprio capitalismo sul-africano.

África do Sul em perspectiva regional

Quando a África do Sul se juntou aos países BRIC em 2011, muitos apontaram

que esse recrutamento não correspondia a critérios estritamente econômicos, mas

envolvia considerações de outra natureza, principalmente geopolítica. Afinal,

o PIB do país era, em 2018, cerca de 1/3 do mexicano, turco ou sul-coreano, ou

1/5 do brasileiro (BOND; GARCIA, 2015).

No entanto, o país é a segunda maior economia da África, depois da Nigéria,

rica em petróleo. Visto em perspectiva regional, o país responde por 1/3 do PIB da

África subsaariana, ou 3/4 do PIB da South African Development Comunity (SADC),

que congrega os países mais próximos

. Conforma-se uma situação paradoxal,

uma vez que a economia da África do Sul tem uma dimensão modesta no plano

global, ao mesmo tempo em que tem um peso desproporcional na relação com

os demais Estados da região.

Nesse contexto, o país é visto, desde o fim do apartheid, como um candidato

natural à liderança regional. Ao mesmo tempo, formuladores de políticas no país

entendem que esse papel é uma condição necessária para a projeção mundial

do país. Nas palavras de uma diretora do South African Institute of International

Affairs (SAIIA), se a África do Sul quiser ser um hegemon, precisa de tamanho,

ou seja: precisa de uma região (BERTELSMAN-SCOTT, 2018).

Entretanto, o histórico das relações do país com a região é delicado. O regime

do apartheid esteve na contramão das lutas anticoloniais no contexto da Guerra

4 Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Maurício, Moçambique, Namíbia,Swazilândia, Tanzânia, Zâmbia, Zimbabwe,

Malawi, Seychelles, Angola, Comoros e a República Democrática do Congo.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

35Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

Fria, em que a emancipação de países de maioria negra se articulou a um ideário

antirracista de unidade africana. Longe de limitar-se a um antagonismo ideológico,

o Estado segregacionista interferiu consistentemente nos países vizinhos em

uma direção contrarrevolucionária, por vezes de modo massivo, como na longa

guerra civil em Angola (GLEIJESES: 2016). Por outro lado, o campo anticolonial,

liderado pelo tanzaniano Julius Nyerere, articulou uma coalisão informal de

Estados da África Austral contra o apartheid, conhecida como Frontline States.

Inicialmente integrada por Tanzânia, Zâmbia e Botswana, a coalisão fortaleceu-se

com a independência de Angola, Moçambique e Zimbábue, resultado de lutas

hostilizadas pelo regime sul-africano.

Portanto, o governo que assumiu a liderança da África do Sul pós-apartheid

encarnou um legado político contraditório, embora o ANC fosse uma organização

aliada e apoiada pelos Frontline States, o Estado que agora comandava tinha uma

longa história na direção contrária. A situação é ainda mais delicada em função

do peso econômico desproporcional da África do Sul em relação ao seu entorno

imediato. Nesse contexto político e econômico sensível, impuseram-se relações

ambivalentes com os países vizinhos, uma vez que a expectativa de que a África

do Sul assuma uma liderança regional é contraposta ao receio de que esse papel

seja exercido de modo a reforçar interesses particulares no contexto regional:

o temor de um “subimperialismo sul-africano” (BOND, 2018). Nessa perspectiva,

a ideia de Mandela de que a África do Sul não pode ser uma ilha de prosperidade

em um mar de pobreza (ainda que essa prosperidade seja relativa) é problematizada

pela natureza dos nexos econômicos do país com seu entorno imediato.

O país tem uma relação comercial superavitária com o continente africano,

concentrada nos países vizinhos, para os quais exporta cinco vezes mais do que

importa. Enquanto 3/4 das exportações sul-africanas para o resto do mundo

envolvem minerais, no comércio com o continente o país exporta manufaturas:

86% das exportações industriais da África do Sul tem como destino a África e,

dentre essas, 70% são absorvidas pelos países mais próximos – o chamado BNLS:

Botsuana, Lesoto, Namíbia e Suazilândia, que integram, com a África do Sul,

uma das mais antigas uniões aduaneiras do mundo, a South African Customs

Union (SACU). Nas relações comerciais entre esses países, institucionalizou-se o

uso do rand, moeda sul-africana (GWYNNE-EVANS, 2018). Em 2013, a África do

Sul exportou mais manufaturas para Botsuana do que para a China, mais para o

Lesoto do que para Rússia e Brasil somados.

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36 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

Nesse mesmo ano, o superávit com vizinhos regionais (BNLS mais Moçambique

e Zimbábue) foi suficiente para compensar 2/3 do seu déficit comercial com o

resto do mundo. As exportações para o entorno responderam por cerca de 18%

do total, uma importância superior à da China (14%), seu principal destino

mundial. A África subsaariana foi o destino de 28% das exportações do país e 43%

das exportações de manufaturados, dos quais 1/4 se dirigiu aos países vizinhos

(ALENCE, 2015). As manufaturas sul-africanas não competem globalmente com

as indústrias low-cost asiáticas, mas a proximidade geográfica compensa os custos

de produção no contexto regional. Como decorrência, o comércio intrarregional é

uma fonte de divisas crucial para a estabilidade macroeconômica do país e para

a vitalidade da sua combalida indústria (DUBE, 2018; TEMBO, 2018).

O fim do apartheid em 1994 abriu a possibilidade de a África do Sul afirmar

sua liderança regional. O país se integrou à SADC, constituída nos anos de

1980 pelos Frontline States com o objetivo original de justamente contornar a

dependência econômica da região em relação à África do Sul. Entretanto, no início

do século XXI, a política externa sul-africana adotou um escopo mais abrangente,

orientando-se para o continente como um todo.

Nepad e a integração africana

O sucessor de Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008),

ancorou-se no prestígio mundial da ANC naquele momento para capitanear

uma tentativa de recuperar o ideário de unidade africana, nos marcos do que foi

chamado como um processo de “renascimento africano”. A principal expressão

dessa política foi a New Partnership for Africa´s Development (NEPAD). A iniciativa

surgiu em 2001, como resultado da fusão entre o “Omega plan” avançado pelo

presidente do Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, com a “Millenium Partnership for the

Revival of Africa” (MAP), proposta inspirada na Declaração do Milênio adotada

pela ONU no ano anterior, avançada por Mbeki em conjunto com os presidentes

da Nigéria, Olusegun Obasanjo, e da Argélia, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Apesar do esforço em conceder à Nepad uma legitimidade continental, Mbeki

foi desde o início seu principal propulsor: como indício de seu compromisso, o

governo sul-africano fretou um avião que levou 80 funcionários para o lançamento

da iniciativa em Abuja na Nigéria, oferecendo carona aos participantes angolanos

no caminho (MULLER, 2018). Embora vinculada à União Africana, o secretariado

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

37Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

da Nepad incluiu, desde o início, pessoal do Development Bank of South Africa

(DBSA), sediado em Midrand, e opera até os dias de hoje em um prédio próximo

ao banco (TSHANDU, 2018).

No campo popular, a Nepad foi criticada desde o início por dois motivos

principais: avaliou-se que a racionalidade econômica da iniciativa correspondia

àquela de organizações financeiras multilaterais como o FMI e o Banco Mundial,

consideradas corresponsáveis pelas mazelas econômicas do continente. Por outro

lado, condenou-se a forma como foi gestada e implementada a iniciativa, em um

processo hermético que não se preocupou em ampliar as discussões, nem em

envolver segmentos da sociedade civil e movimentos sociais (BOND, 2005).

Angulada na perspectiva de uma integração africana e não de um regionalismo

sul-africano, a Nepad foi concebida a partir de uma abordagem fundamentalmente

política (GWYNNE-EVANS, 2018; PARSHOTAN, 2018). No plano do desenvolvimento,

vislumbrou-se um conjunto de projetos de integração de infraestrutura, cuja

realização estava referida a um novo padrão de relacionamento menos assimétrico

com as potências mundiais – daí a ideia de uma “nova parceria”. Concretamente,

os projetos de integração esboçados dependiam de recursos obtidos fora do

continente para saírem do papel, conforme reconhecia o parágrafo 147 do seu

documento fundador (BOND, 2005). Como a maioria dos países envolvidos é

pobre, o êxito da iniciativa dependeu da mobilização de doadores internacionais,

que não decolou. Com o tempo, a Nepad acabou se transformando em uma longa

lista de desejos não realizados (MULLER, 2018).

Em 2018, a Nepad era vista como um projeto que perdeu relevância, processo

acelerado durante a gestão de Jacob Zuma (2009-2018), que concedeu escassa

importância à política externa e à integração regional (PERE, 2015). Especulava-

se que o novo presidente Cyril Ramaphosa retomaria esforços nessa direção,

revalorizando a Nepad. Pois, como disse um observador, se a política externa

sul-africana deve voltar a funcionar, será necessária uma instituição como a

Nepad (MOSHOESHOE, 2018). Enquanto isso, prosperava uma Nepad Business

Foundation, propondo mediar vínculos entre os setores público e privado com

o propósito de acelerar projetos de desenvolvimento na África, sob a consigna:

“o nosso negócio é o sucesso do seu negócio na África”.

Entretanto, a dimensão infraestrutural da integração continental subjacente aos

projetos que convergiram na Nepad foi, em certa medida, recolhida e cultivada sob

a égide do African Development Bank (AfDB). O banco gerencia o fundo NEPAD-

Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF), constituído em 2005, e que,

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

38 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

em 2018, mobilizava U$ 102 milhões amealhados a partir de uma diversidade de

contribuidores. O foco dessa instituição é tornar financiáveis (bankable) projetos

de infraestrutura na região (NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA´S DEVELOPMENT-

INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT PREPARATION FACILITY, 2018).

Muitos desses projetos confluíram para a carteira do Programme for

Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), concebido em 2012 como o sucessor

da Medium to Long Term Strategic Framework (MLTSF) da Nepad. O PIDA tem

como propósito articular uma visão estratégica de conjunto para o desenvolvimento

da infraestrutura regional e continental no longo prazo (2012-2040), pensada

a partir de quatro dimensões: energia, transporte, informação e tecnologias da

comunicação, e recursos hídricos transfronteiriços. O PIDA prevê a construção de

37.200km de estradas, 30.200km de ferrovias e 16.500km de linhas elétricas até

2040. Também planeja adicionar 54.150 megawatts de capacidade de geração de

energia hidroelétrica, além de 1,3 bilhão de toneladas de capacidade comercial

portuária (PROGRAM FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 2017.

Formalmente, a African Union Commission (AUC) e a Nepad compartilham

com o AfDB a responsabilidade sobre o PIDA, mas, concretamente, o banco é a

agência executora do programa, uma posição similar à do BID em relação à IIRSA

na América do Sul. Também à maneira da IIRSA, o PIDA arrolava em 2017 uma lista

de 51 “Priority Action Plan” (PAP) – projetos e programas prioritários distribuídos

pelo continente, que se desdobravam em 433 projetos nas quatro dimensões

citadas. O custo estimado das obras entre 2012 e 2020 era de U$ 68 bilhões anuais,

dos quais 95% se concentrava em projetos de energia e transporte (AfDB, 2018).

Os financiadores incluem o próprio AfDB, bem como instituições vinculadas ao

governo do Japão, da Alemanha e a União Europeia, dentre outros (PROGRAM

FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 2017). Entretanto, de acordo

com a agência Nepad, havia uma lacuna de recursos da ordem de U$ 31 bilhões

anuais, que incluem 75% dos investimentos de capital e 25% das despesas de

manutenção (OFFICE FOR SPECIAL ADVISOR IN AFRICA, 2015).

O financiamento dessas obras é parte de um desafio maior para suprir a lacuna

de infraestrutura no continente que, segundo uma estimativa do Banco Mundial

feita em 2009, exigiria investimentos da ordem de U$ 93 bilhões por ano até

2020. Para resolver esse gargalo, está em andamento um esforço para transformar

o desafio em oportunidade de negócio. Pretende-se compensar a capacidade

decrescente do capital tradicional de investir em ativos na África com acesso

aos relativamente inexplorados recursos financeiros do continente, sobretudo a

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

39Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

fundos de pensão e fundos soberanos. A capitalização do mercado acionário no

continente subiu de U$ 300 bilhões em 1996 para U$ 1.2 trilhão em 2007. Além

disso, desde 2011, mais de uma dúzia de países emitiram títulos internacionais

pela primeira vez, com o objetivo de financiar projetos de infraestrutura (OFFICE

FOR SPECIAL ADVISOR IN AFRICA, 2015).

Nesta perspectiva, o AfDB estabeleceu o Africa50 como um instrumento

para mobilizar o financiamento privado em infraestrutura, enquanto a Nepad

iniciou em 2017 a campanha “Agenda 5%”, estimulando os investidores a aplicar

5% dos seus fundos em infraestrutura no continente, em lugar dos atuais 1,5%

(NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA´S DEVELOPMENT , 2017). Nos marcos desse

esforço, a campanha defende que se reformem os marcos regulatórios nacionais e

regionais que orientam o investimento institucional na África. Ao mesmo tempo,

estimula o desenvolvimento de novos produtos no mercado de capitais para

diminuir o risco do crédito, favorecendo que os proprietários de ativos africanos

identifiquem no investimento em infraestrutura um ativo atrativo para o seu

portfólio. A campanha foi lançada em setembro de 2017 na bolsa de Nova Iorque

(SUSTEINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FOUNDATION, 2017).

Toda essa movimentação amparada pelo AfDB sugere que a Nepad proposta

por Mbeki teve desdobramentos e rendeu frutos. Entretanto, a África do Sul

perdeu o papel de liderança a que se propôs. Com sede no Senegal, o AfDB é visto

como um banco em que predominam funcionários francófonos e que tem como

foco os países de baixa renda, portanto, não seria muito envolvido com a África

do Sul, país visto antes como fonte de capital no continente do que como um

recebedor (BERTELSMANN-SCOTT; MARKOWITZ, 2018). Analisando a carteira

de projetos do PIDA em 2018, observa-se apenas 5 projetos envolvendo a África

do Sul, incluindo a modernização de dois postos de fronteira. Em contraste, um

país pequeno como Ruanda recebe 9 projetos, enquanto Uganda tem quase vinte

e a Tanzânia participa em dezenas dos 411 projetos listados (PROGRAM FOR

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA , 2018).

O entorno regional

Continente que contém o maior número de países no mundo, a racionalidade

da integração africana apoia-se na integração de subcomunidades econômicas

regionais. Um exemplo desse enfoque no plano da infraestrutura é dado pela

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40 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

própria SADC. Em uma cúpula da organização em 2003, adotou-se o “Regional

Indicative Strategic Development Plan” (RISDP), um plano de dez anos concebido

para conectar a região. A sintonia com a Nepad foi explicitada no plano de

trabalho divulgado naquele mesmo ano: “Neste contexto, o Programa Nepad da

União Africana é abraçado como uma referência confiável e relevante no âmbito

continental, enquanto o RISDP é sua expressão regional no âmbito da SADC, seu

veículo para atingir os mesmos ideais” (SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNITY REVISED REGIONAL INDICATIVE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT

PLAN, 2003, grifos meus). Em 2014, o RISDIP foi revisado e atualizado.

No plano da integração comercial, a SADC, a East African Community (EAC)

e o Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) se engajaram

em 2015 em uma área de livre-comércio abrangendo a metade dos países do

continente. Em março de 2018, 44 dentre os 55 membros da União Africana

assinaram em Ruanda um acordo para estabelecer uma área de livre-comércio

continental (CFTA). Embora fosse um dos principais incentivadores do acordo,

a África do Sul não o assinou naquele momento por questões de sensibilidade

política, mas certamente participará (GWYNNE-EVANS, 2018; PARSHOTAM, 2018).

As corporações do país devem se beneficiar do fim de barreiras tarifárias em

escala continental, como aconteceu na região austral. Entretanto, há uma leitura

consensual de que a proposta de uma área de livre-comércio continental esbarra

em múltiplas dificuldades concretas. Nesse contexto, a ideia de aprofundar a

integração a partir das comunidades econômicas regionais soa razoável (CHEELO,

2018; MAJAHA, 2018).

Porém, obstáculos de outra natureza se colocam. A SADC tem poucos

funcionários que não são bem remunerados e a organização depende de doações,

principalmente da União Europeia. Muitos países enfrentam problemas domésticos

e rivalidades cuja solução está fora do alcance da diplomacia sul-africana.

Ainda, prevalecem estradas ruins, alfândegas lentas, cortes de energia, dentre

outros gargalos estruturais (BERTELSMANN-SCOTT, 2018). Como resultado,

frequentemente a integração se concentra no setor mineral. E, nesse caso, muitas

vezes tal integração se confunde com a mera expansão dos negócios sul-africanos

na região (CHEELO, 2018).

Quando o Zimbábue presidiu a SADC em 2015, o país promoveu uma agenda

de industrialização, visando a formação de cadeias regionais de valor. Entretanto,

analistas consideram que a África do Sul não tem interesse nessa agenda.

O foco da sua política é facilitar as trocas regionais. Mais especificamente, o foco

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41Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

sul-africano é promover a colaboração entre o setor privado, estimulando a

expansão e penetração de seus negócios na região (DUBE, 2018; MAHAJA, 2018;

TEMBO, 2018).

Essa percepção remonta aos anos de 1990. Naquele momento, o desmanche

do apartheid encerrou o isolamento político do país, mas também o bloqueio

econômico. Nesse contexto, reformas reduziram as barreiras ao comércio

intrarregional, o que favoreceu a expansão de negócios sul-africanos. Companhias

nos ramos de supermercados, bancos, transporte, logística, mineração, construção,

manufatura, serviços financeiros, telecomunicações, turismo e lazer se expandiram

pela região. As indústrias de pequena escala de Zâmbia e Zimbábue foram

particularmente afetadas pela concorrência do vizinho austral (BOND, 2005.

Em 2008, entrou em vigor a SADC Free Trade Area, aprofundando a tendência à

integração comercial regional.

Como decorrência desse processo, o Zimbábue, país que já teve 30% do PIB na

indústria, agora é um escoadouro de manufaturas sul-africanas. Cerca de metade

das importações e exportações do país se orientam à África do Sul, seu principal

parceiro comercial: 85% das trocas comerciais do Zimbábue são com a África e,

como o país não tem saída para o mar, suas exportações viajam principalmente

pelo porto de Durban, na África do Sul. Como em outros países da região, há

bancos, grifes e supermercados sul-africanos, que importam a quase totalidade

dos seus produtos do seu país de origem. Capitais sul-africanos também têm uma

importante participação no setor minerador, e controlam a produção de platina,

que é refinada na África do Sul.

Esses fortes laços econômicos ajudam a explicar a cumplicidade dos governos

da ANC com o regime opressor de Robert Mugabe (1987-2017), para além dos laços

históricos de fraternidade que uniam a organização sul-africana ao Zimbabwe

African National Unity (ZANU), partido de Mugabe, que liderou a independência

na ex-Rodésia. O apoio sul-africano foi crucial para conceder alguma legitimidade

ao regime, amenizando o seu ostracismo internacional. Em 2018, no momento

em que o regime de Mugabe chegou ao fim e o novo presidente anuncia que

“Zimbabwe is open for business”, os capitais sul-africanos se movimentavam,

visando aproveitar as oportunidades iminentes (BOMBA, 2018; CHIRIMAMBOWA,

2018; MUDZONGA, 2018).

Por outro lado, a África do Sul recebe 2/3 da diáspora do Zimbábue, que não

é pequena: calcula-se que um quarto da população vive fora do país. Profissionais

qualificados formados no sistema educacional do Zimbábue, um legado positivo

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42 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

do regime de Mugabe, encontram trabalho na África do Sul, configurando uma

fuga de cérebros. Entretanto, muitos outros migram para fazer qualquer trabalho,

engrossando a massa de desempregados: deparam-se com uma política pública

altamente restritiva para a concessão de visto, o que condena a maioria à ilegalidade

e à xenofobia (SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY ONLINE, 2018).

Em Zâmbia, observa-se uma trajetória similar. A indústria nacional, menos

desenvolvida do que no Zimbábue, foi duramente afetada pela abertura comercial

nos anos de 1990. A crise econômica do país foi uma oportunidade para capitais

sul-africanos, que penetraram no país por duas vias principais: bancos e comércio

varejista. Em Lusaca, como em outras grandes cidades da África Austral, há centros

comerciais parecidos entre si e recheados de marcas sul-africanas, de modo que, se

alguém caísse do céu, pensaria que está em Johannesburgo (MULOBELA, 2018).

A presença sul-africana também é notável em outros campos, da construção

civil ao agronegócio, passando por serviços de segurança, mineração e a indústria

de entretenimento. A maior parte do conteúdo televisivo, principalmente em canais

pagos, é sul-africana. Segundo o diretor do Departamento de Mídia e Comunicação

da Universidade de Zâmbia, observa-se a influência sul-africana até mesmo na

língua, pois há diversas expressões correntes no país incorporadas de idiomas do

vizinho austral, seja em africâner ou em zulu (HAMUSAKWE, 2018).

Capitais sul-africanos também se beneficiaram das privatizações em massa nos

anos de 1990, adquirindo negócios nos ramos de mineração (como a corporação

ZCCM – Chibuluma Mine), turismo (Hotel Intercontinental em Livingstone,

cidade das cataratas Vitória), industrial (Zambia Oxygen Limited), dentre outros

(ZAMBIA DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, 2010). Outras empresas utilizam a África

do Sul como base de suas operações regionais, que incluem Zâmbia, como é o

caso da agora britânica Anglo American. Diante dessa realidade, observadores

consideram que o país não será muito afetado pelos acordos de liberalização

comercial em negociação, porque já não resta muito mercado ao qual proteger

(MUDENDA, 2018).

De modo geral, analistas no Zimbábue e em Zâmbia opinam que a projeção de

negócios sul-africanos não é casual, e obedece a uma estratégia do governo desse

país (CHEELO, 2018; CHIRIMAMBOWA, 2018; MADIMUTSA: 2018; MULOBELA,

2018). Curiosamente, essa visão não é partilhada por observadores sul-africanos,

que salientam debilidades do Estado para concretizar qualquer projeto nesse

sentido.

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43Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

O governo sul-africano tem uma estratégia?

Constatada a expansão mercantil, cabe indagar se os governos da ANC

desenharam alguma estratégia para a projeção regional de negócios sul-africanos ou

sediados no país, comparável à política das “campeãs nacionais” das administrações

petistas no Brasil. Em primeiro lugar, é pertinente investigar se há instituições

financeiras que cumprem um papel análogo ao BNDES brasileiro.

Em tese, a Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) tem o papel de fomentar

projetos associados ao desenvolvimento nacional. Entretanto, embora a IDC

financie projetos de infraestrutura na região vinculados à exportação de serviços

sul-africanos e também ofereça algum financiamento industrial, sua participação

é pequena e dirigida principalmente a projetos intensivos de capital no setor de

mineração (MOHAMED, 2010, 49). Um estudo que a compara ao BNDES aponta

que o banco sul-africano não tem uma participação equivalente no planejamento

e na concepção de políticas estatais, nem tem representação nos mais altos níveis

do governo (MAIA; MONDI; ROBERTS, 2005).

Já o Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), constituído originalmente

para financiar o desenvolvimento dos bantustões, ampliou o seu escopo de atuação

e, a partir de 1997, tem como mandato específico o desenvolvimento infraestrutural

no Sul do continente. Recentemente, a abrangência geográfica dos investimentos se

ampliou, e o banco tem a pretensão de ir além da região SADC (NOTSHULWANA,

2018). Porém, sua abordagem é essencialmente mercantil, financiando projetos

comercialmente viáveis em áreas como energia e transporte. Em suma, considerados

os limites políticos e financeiros do IDC e do DBSA, um ex-assessor do ministro da

Fazenda conclui que o país não tem instrumentos adequados para o investimento

de longo prazo na região, só tem negócios (KASSIM, 2018).

Desse ponto de vista, a questão fundamental é saber se o DBSA poderá

competir com as instituições estadunidenses e europeias (GOVENDER, 2013). Em

2014, esses países abocanhavam 40% dos projetos no continente, cujo valor total

alcançava U$325 bilhões, seguidos pelos chineses que realizavam 12% das obras,

enquanto empresas de países como Índia, Emirados Árabes e Austrália respondiam

pelas demais (DELOITTE REPORT, 2015). Embora construtoras sul-africanas atuem

no continente, especialmente no seu entorno regional, elas têm padecido diante

da concorrência chinesa e a escala da sua presença não é comparável à expansão

das construtoras brasileiras na América do Sul sob as gestões petistas.

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44 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

Se a expansão da construção civil é inibida pela competição internacional,

particularmente chinesa, e não tem como ponto de apoio fundamental instituições

de crédito nacional, como se dá a internacionalização em outras áreas de negócios

sul-africanos?

Um setor que tem se expandido é o agronegócio, impulsionado pela escassez

de água e terras em território sul-africano (GOGA, 2018; NAIR, 2018). No entanto,

em muitos casos esse movimento se dá em associação com capitais globalizados

que, em parte, atuam por meio da África do Sul. Além disso, desde a criação de

um mercado de futuros (SAFEX) envolvendo os principais produtos agrícolas do

país nos anos de 1990, constata-se uma crescente financeirização do setor.

Por exemplo: a empresa de investimento britânica/sul-africana Emergent Asset

Management Ltd, que despontou nos setores de defesa e indústria de alta tecnologia

nos Estados Unidos, agora se especializou em fundos de investimento agrícola. Em

meio à recessão global em 2008, estabeleceu um African Agricultural Investment

Fund que ambiciona amealhar 3 bilhões de euros, prometendo retornos anuais na

casa de 30%. A empresa se associou a Grainvest, uma das maiores companhias

sul-africanas na SAFEX, para constituir a Emvest Agricultural Corporation,

empresa que serve de veículo para investimentos britânicos, sul-africanos ou de

outra origem na agricultura continental. Outro exemplo é o United Fruit Farmers

and Agri Asset Management, parte da Old Mutual’s African Agricultural Fund,

vinculado à poderosa seguradora sul-africana. Esse fundo oferece a possibilidade

de investir tanto no mercado doméstico como na região (COUSINS; HALL, 2018).

Ao mesmo tempo, multinacionais têm adquirido corporações sul-africanas, que

servem como veículo para a expansão regional. Um exemplo é a Pannar Seeds, que

foi adquirida por uma marca da Du Pont, a Pioneer Breed em 2013, consolidando

uma divisão do mercado de sementes sul-africano nas mãos de duas empresas:

Pioneer e Monsanto. Outro exemplo dessa trajetória é a gigante do açúcar Ilovo,

que opera em seis países da região, mas que atualmente pertence à Associated

British Foods. Embora mantenha sua base de operações na África do Sul, não se

trata mais de uma companhia sul-africana. Companhias sul-africanas também

participam de empreendimentos florestais em Moçambique e Gana, projetos

agrícolas no Congo, Moçambique, Swazilândia, Zâmbia, Zimbábue e Nigéria, e,

em turismo, como em safaris e ecoturismo, em Moçambique, Tanzânia e Uganda

(BOMBA, 2018; COUSINS; HALL, 2018).

Portanto, a expansão do agronegócio sul-africano tem acontecido em

competição, mas também em associação com corporações dos países centrais.

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45Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

Muitas das empresas sul-africanas de semente, agrotóxicos e fertilizantes participam

de processos de fusões e aquisições, nos marcos da sua expansão internacional.

Outra característica da expansão regional de negócios sul-africanos é a

coexpansão, ou seja, a projeção regional de parcerias comerciais já existentes.

A Unitrans, que opera em 10 países na África Austral, opera em parceria com

outras empresas sul-africanas, como a Tiger Brands e a RCL Foods. Outro caso

ilustrativo é a expansão de cadeias de fast-food e de supermercado. Quatro grandes

redes sul-africanas expandiram suas operações na região: Shoprite, Pick n Pay,

Spar e Woolworths. A principal delas, Shoprite, estabeleceu programas de apoio a

produtores locais para que eles atendam aos requisitos de quantidade e qualidade

de suas operações. No entanto, em 2016, ainda importava 98% de suas frutas e

vegetais da África do Sul (TEMBO, 2018).

Nesses casos, não foi possível mapear políticas específicas do Estado sul-

africano em apoio da expansão regional, para além de uma atuação em prol da

liberalização comercial, já descrita. Na realidade, os testemunhos de analistas,

servidores públicos de alto nível e homens de negócios sugerem que essa expansão

tem sido um assunto privado, que acontece em grande medida à revelia do Estado.

Um executivo da MTN, empresa de telefonia sul-africana que se expandiu

globalmente, relata um episódio que ocorreu quando trabalhava na sua principal

concorrente, a Vodacom – atualmente controlada pela britânica Vodafone. Essa

empresa teria entrado no mercado moçambicano em resposta a um pedido pessoal

do então presidente Nelson Mandela. Do ponto de vista corporativo, trata-se

de um país em que os potenciais clientes se concentram em poucas cidades

esparsas em um vasto território, o que torna a cobertura telefônica dispendiosa

e, portanto, pouco rentável. Entretanto, como disse o executivo, “ninguém dizia

não a Madiba” – modo como é conhecido Mandela. Questionado sobre a forma

de penetração dessas empresas na região, relatou que, frequentemente, governos

africanos convidam empresas sul-africanas a fazerem negócios em seu país, porque

elas aportam investimento em economias pouco diversificadas (NYOKA, 2018).

Nesse mesmo diapasão, mas de um ângulo distinto, um servidor, que ocupava

em 2018 um alto cargo vinculado ao Ministério de Indústria e Comércio, opina

que há pouca estratégia governamental e que a expansão corporativa tem sido, em

larga medida, um movimento na esfera privada (GWYNNE-EVANS, 2018). Prevalece

entre os analistas a percepção de que a internacionalização evolui caso a caso,

sem constituir uma política totalizadora que articule esse movimento econômico

a um projeto político de liderança regional, ou de projeção global (GOGA, 2018;

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

46 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

NAIR, 2018). Outro economista que serviu no governo lembra que as corporações

sul-africanas se beneficiam do seu conhecimento da realidade africana para fazer

negócios, escoradas na superioridade relativa das instituições e da infraestrutura

do país no contexto da região (KASSIM, 2018). Nessa perspectiva, a África do

Sul opera também como porta de entrada para negócios globais no continente

(SCHOLVIN; DRAPER, 2012).

Entretanto, se a África do Sul se destaca no contexto regional, o país encara

obstáculos para que essas vantagens comparativas se desdobrem em um projeto

nacional. Constatam-se dificuldades de natureza diversa, desde o tamanho

relativamente pequeno da economia até entraves políticos. Um analista, que

esteve presente no lançamento da Nepad, entende que a dificuldade de formular

uma estratégia coerente é acentuada pelo descolamento entre os negócios,

majoritariamente nas mãos dos brancos, e a política, comandada pelos negros

(MULLER, 2018). Sugere-se que a formulação de uma política consistente de

integração regional esbarra também na escassa coordenação entre os governos

da região, agravada pela falta de coesão entre os diferentes ministérios e órgãos

governamentais no seio do governo sul-africano (BERTELSMANN-SCOTT, 2018;

KASSIM, 2018; MONDI, 2018?).

Reflexões finais

Resultado de intensa pressão social, mas também de constrangimentos

econômicos, o fim do apartheid implicou ambiguidades na política sul-africana.

No plano doméstico, a transição pactuada implicou em uma modalidade de

arranjo em que os brancos preservaram seu poder econômico, enquanto os

negros assumiram o comando da política e o controle do Estado. Nesse processo,

o histórico ideário igualitário, associado à Freedom Charter dos anos de 1950,

cedeu passo às políticas de ajuste estrutural características do neoliberalismo.

Na esfera internacional, o fim do apartheid encerrou o isolamento sul-africano,

ao mesmo tempo em que aumentou a suscetibilidade aos movimentos do capital

global que então se intensificavam. Por outro lado, a posição do país no contexto

africano modificou-se radicalmente, e o Estado, até há pouco repelido pelos

vizinhos, subitamente investiu-se do prestígio internacional que a liderança de

Mandela lhe conferiu.

O sucessor de Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, sonhou grande e pretendeu recuperar

o ideário de unidade africana. Entretanto, esse desígnio ambicioso confrontou-se

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

47Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos

com limitações econômicas e políticas para prosperar sob liderança sul-africana.

À maneira da IIRSA na América do Sul, mas sem que se tenha criado uma organização

comparável à UNASUL no caso africano, as aspirações mais nobres de unidade se

esvaziaram com o passar dos anos, enquanto o esqueleto associado à integração

infraestrutural segue avançando sob a égide do AfDB, um primo do BID.

Entretanto, prosperou a expansão de negócios sul-africanos no continente.

Esse movimento teve particular intensidade na África Austral, onde arranjos de

integração comercial favoreceram a indústria sul-africana às expensas de países

vizinhos, como nos casos de Zimbabwe e Zâmbia. A avalanche de negócios e

produtos sul-africanos em setores que vão desde o comércio varejista à rede

bancária, do conteúdo televisivo às grifes nos centros comerciais, lastreou a

noção de que existe um subimperialismo sul-africano na região. Os superávits

comerciais desse país com seus vizinhos, que ademais sustentam uma atividade

manufatureira que não é competitiva em outros mercados, reforçam tal percepção.

As entrevistas em Zimbábue e Zâmbia, embora constituam apenas uma

amostra, revelam o sentimento de que essas assimetrias estão calçadas em um

desígnio estratégico do governo sul-africano, percebido como um ator poderoso

e, portanto, determinante no contexto regional. Posturas de arrogância ou de

insensibilidade dos investidores desse país, que importam em lugar de abastecerem

seus hipermercados de hortifrutigranjeiros locais, por exemplo, agravam essa

hostilidade. Cumpre ressaltar que essa percepção transcende filiações ideológicas,

e está presente em análises sob o prisma da esquerda, mas também no campo

liberal.

Contudo, as entrevistas na África do Sul, envolvendo intelectuais, policy-makers

e funcionários de alto escalão nos setores público e privado, apontam em outra

direção. Sob o prisma desses observadores, o país sob o comando da ANC emerge

como uma potência econômica no contexto regional em que está inserido, mas cujo

potencial de liderança política não se realiza. Salientam-se múltiplas contradições

que atravessam o governo e, em última análise, o próprio capitalismo sul-africano,

dentre as quais: negócios principalmente nas mãos de brancos, enquanto o Estado

é comandado pelos negros; relações econômicas superavitárias com os vizinhos

que, por sua vez, sustentam relações deficitárias com o mercado mundial; a

expansão de negócios sul-africanos que, ao se internacionalizarem, frequentemente

deixam de ser africanos; contradições entre as exigências mercantis imediatas

(por exemplo, do DBSA) e a necessidade de consolidar as estruturas para uma

articulação econômica e política regional.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 31-51

48 África do Sul e o seu entorno regional: existe um subimperialismo sul-africano?

Nesse contexto, a descrição dos governos da ANC como subimperialistas deve

ser matizada, pois embora constatem-se relações assimétricas na região, o Estado

parece simplesmente impotente para consolidar um projeto político coerente nessa

direção. Talvez a África do Sul pretendesse ser subimperialista, mas parece não

reunir a capacidade para isso sob a ANC.

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52 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary

game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

As relações sino-filipinas como o jogo tributário

moderno: para além das disputas no Mar do Sul da China

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v14n1.2019.877

Bruno Hendler

Abstract

This article examines the China-Philippines relations in the South China Sea (SCS) from

1997 to 2017. The premise is that the China’s interaction with litigating neighbors in the

SCS (such as Vietnam and the Philippines) is shaped by strategic, political-economic and

symbolic relations analogous to the dynamics of the Imperial China with the nomadic peoples

of Central Asia in the so-called “tributary game” (ZHOU, 2011). The central hypothesis is

that, just as the tributary game lasted for centuries in an asymmetric but relatively stable

pattern, the same asymmetrical and stable pattern tends to prevail in the contemporary

stage. In this scenario of a de facto Chinese control of many positions in the SCS and the

expectation of economic gains by the Philippines, it is more likely that the tributary game

shall move away from a conflictive stance and towards the conciliation-submission stance

consolidated by the mutual learning process and by the inevitable economic and diplomatic

gravitation of Asian countries around China.

Key-words: China-Philippines Relations; China’s Pre-modern Tributary Game; South China

Sea Disputes; China’s Foreign Policy; Philippines’ Foreign Policy.

Resumo

Este artigo examina as relações China-Filipinas no Mar do Sul da China (MSC) de 1997 a 2017.

A premissa é que a interação da China com os vizinhos litigantes no MSC (como o Vietnã e

as Filipinas) é moldada por relações estratégicas, político-econômicas simbólicas análogas

à dinâmica da China Imperial com os povos nômades da Ásia Central no chamado “jogo

1 Professor Adjunto do curso de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria.

Artigo submetido em 04/01/2019 e aprovado em 17/04/2019.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

53Bruno Hendler

tributário” (ZHOU, 2011). A hipótese central é que, assim como o jogo tributário durou séculos

em um padrão assimétrico, mas relativamente estável, o mesmo padrão assimétrico e estável

tende a prevalecer no estágio contemporâneo. Em um cenário de relações bilaterais com

controle chinês de facto de muitas posições no MSC e de expectativa de ganhos econômicos

pelas Filipinas, é mais provável que o jogo tributário se afaste do polo conflituoso e se

aproxime do polo de submissão-conciliação, consolidado pelo processo de aprendizagem

mútua e pela inevitável gravitação econômica e diplomática dos países asiáticos em torno

da China.

Palavras-chave: Relações China-Filipinas; Jogo Tributário Pré-moderno da China; Disputas

no Mar do Sul da China; Política Externa da China; Política Externa das Filipinas.

Introduction

This article examines the China-Philippines relations in the South China

Sea (SCS) from 1997 to 2017. The premise is that the China’s interaction with

litigating neighbors in the SCS (such as Vietnam and the Philippines) is shaped

by strategic, political-economic and symbolic relations analogous to the dynamics

of the Imperial China with the nomadic peoples of Central Asia in the so-called

“tributary game” (ZHOU, 2011). The central hypothesis is that, just as the tributary

game lasted for centuries in an asymmetric but relatively stable pattern, the same

asymmetrical and stable pattern tends to prevail in the contemporary scenario,

in line with Steve Chan’s (2016, 36) argument.

Nevertheless, we argue that the contemporary tributary game (which oscillates

between poles of cooperation and conflict) is embedded in a gradual long-term

process in which China, as a regional power, creates new core-periphery relations

with its Asian neighbors. The cooperation-conflict oscillation is constant in

international relations, but the core-periphery dynamic adds complexity to the

specific case of Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the SCS, resembling the

pre-modern tributary game. Furthermore , the US´ projection in Asia Pacific

is another novelty of the contemporary period and must be considered as an

intervenient variable in the tributary game, as well as its historical proximity with

the Philippines in particular.

This article is also inspired by the “lines in the sand” research agenda, which

offers an unconventional interpretation of territorial boundaries: rather than a

territorially fixed static line, the concept of border should be understood as dynamic

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

54 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

and flexible, product of a series of political, social and economic practices (PARKER

et al., 2009). And just as lines in the sand are easily erased and redrawn, lines

in the water, such as the SCS case, are also constantly drawn and redrawn as the

product of material and symbolic processes among societies and sovereign states.

In order to understand this process, the article is divided into the following

topics: i) a conceptual debate on the pre-modern tributary game; ii) the new core-

periphery relations produced by China’s rise in the 21

Century; and iii) the new

tributary game between China and the Philippines, in which the SCS issue and

the “lines in the water” play a relevant role.

The tributary game in China’s history

The idea of a Chinese tributary system was developed by the American

scholar John K. Fairbank in the first half of the twentieth century. The author

suggested the existence of a set of relations among nations of Central and East

Asia in which an outer periphery (of barbarian peoples) and an inner periphery

(of Sinicized peoples) would gravitate towards the Chinese Empire (LEE, 2016).

Fairbank (1942) argues that China’s civilizational centrality would derive both

from a material basis of military power and economic strength and also from a

cultural superiority expressed in Confucian literature, arts, and codes of conduct.

Above all the cited elements , the author emphasizes the symbology of the

rituals of submission to the Chinese emperor and the subsequent diffusion of

Chinese values. The emperor´s political authority conferred by Confucianism would

be the basis of the Empire’s relations with foreigners, in a dynamic of mutual

expectations and mutual gains. Foreign leaders would send tributary missions with

rare commodities, exotic animals and a commission of official representatives (or

the foreign ruler himself) would perform the ritual of formal submission (kowtow).

Such products had a rather symbolic value, strengthening the prestige of the emperor

before his subjects and the foreign polities (FAIRBANK, 1942). In addition, the

Chinese sovereign granted titles and investitures, coopting allies and forming a

buffer zone of sinicized kingdoms that protected the heart of the empire against

the attacks of non-sinicized “barbarian” peoples. Thus, in addition to symbolic

gains, the formation of an allied belt also had an important military function.

On the other hand, the tributary system was also important for its vassals.

Formal submission conferred prestige to legitimize foreign leaders before their

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

55Bruno Hendler

subjects and neighboring polities. The connection with China guaranteed not only

symbolic status, but also access to trade in high value-added Chinese products

and military support in conflicts against internal factions and against neighboring

kingdoms. Thus, in Fairbank´s view, the symbolic sphere was the core of the

tributary system and was complemented by material gains in trade and regional

and domestic power disputes. Although the centrality of the symbolic ties is often

questioned, much of the academic literature that followed is based on at least

one of these three elements (civilizational/cultural centrality, military power and

economic strength) hence Fairbank’s importance for the area studies.

One of these lines of research, the borderland studies, examines the interaction

between Imperial China and the nomadic peoples. In this field, Fangyin Zhou

(2011) perceives a pattern of interactions and proposes a theoretical tool to examine

specific cases in history. The author aims to analyze the stability of what he calls

the “tributary system” and to see it as “a continuous set of abstract principles that

were applied to both diplomatic strategy and foreign policy over several thousand

years of Chinese history” (ZHOU, 2011).

Feng Zhang (2009) infers that each Chinese dynasty had its own tributary

system and ponders: “Why was Chinese foreign policy characterized by rigidity

at certain times and by pragmatism and flexibility at others?” (ZHANG, 2009)

How can we explain the “constancy” of sinocentric discourse in face of historical

“variables”? How did the narrative of Chinese centrality remain relevant despite

the multiple aspects it acquired? And in a realistic perspective, Zhang’s response

(2009) is: through legitimacy and security. Thus, the author follows Fairbank’s

vision but attributes an equal relevance between the strategic and the symbolic

dimension. To him, security stems from the premise that the Chinese Empire, like

any empire, was concerned with its physical security and, whether in a strong

dynasty (Ming) or in a weak one (Song), the same legitimacy granted by sinocentric

discourse was used either for expansion or defense purposes.

In this line, Zhou (2011) adopts a neorealist view of the tributary system,

which is defined by the distribution of power among state units and by rational

choice in strategic interactions, in a kind of “tributary game”. In face of the

asymmetry of capabilities in favor of China, Zhou suggests that each agent

faces a dilemma between two options: China may play a conciliatory strategy or

that of a punitive expedition, each of which, respectively, represents peace or

war; and the peripheral state can either engage in border harassment or submit

to China.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

56 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

Figure 1 – The Tributary Game

Peripheral state

Border Harassment

Submission

China

Conciliatory stance

Punitive mission

Source: elaborated by the author based on Zhou, 2011.

The table above shows the possible results in the tributary game. (B) is the

Nash Equilibrium, when neither player has incentives to change the status quo

This is the optimal response, when submission to China, rather than border

harassment, is more beneficial to the peripheral state; and a conciliatory stance,

rather than a punitive mission, is more beneficial than a punitive mission for

China. Thus, (B) is the ideal situation for an eternal balance in the tributary game:

China adopts a peaceful and non-hostile stance towards its neighbor, which does

not represent a military threat, and it eventually submits to the sinocentric world.

Zhou finds empirical cases in history with the following pattern:

A =

C =

D =

B =

A. Confronted by border harassment from a peripheral

state (B =

A), China moves from the conciliatory stance to the punitive one

(A =

C). In this case, the peripheral state maintains the aggressions despite

the punitive missions because the benefits from looting are high. But there is a

moment when the costs of fighting Chinese forces are greater than the gains from

looting, so the peripheral state passes to the submission stance (C =

D).

This model is applied to regions and peoples that China was unable to formally

annex due to geographic, social or military reasons, i.e., if an independent polity

was incorporated to the Chinese Empire, it would lose the autonomy to play

the tributary game. Thus, if the ultimate conquest is impossible, China tends

to end the punitive missions and subjugate its neighbor s by a mix of economic

and symbolic incentives. The Middle Empire moves to the conciliatory stance

(D =

B) when Chinese emperors send gifts and give symbolic titles to neighboring

leaders (investitures) and grant privileged access to long-distance trade networks,

giving upthe military option temporarily.

Zhou argues that the tributary game prevailed in the following cases: Qing

Dynasty’s Emperor Qianlong relations with the Kingdom of Burma in the mid-18

2 In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a kind of solution concepts of a game involving two or more players,

where no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy. In other words, If each player has chosen

a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged,

then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding pay-offs constitute a Nash equilibrium (Hotz).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

57Bruno Hendler

Century; Ming Dynasty’s response to the Japanese invasion of Korea in the 17

Century; and the Sui-Tang dynasties’ relations with the kingdoms of Korea in the

century. Nevertheless, if we consider only the last two Chinese dynasties (Ming

and Qing), the frequency of conflicts with nomadic peoples is much greater than

those with sedentary kingdoms. There is a vast bibliography that portrays Central

Asia but not East Asia as the main source of military threats to China (KANG,

2010; PERDUE, 2005). Actually, clashes with nomads accounted for almost 80%

of all China´s external conflicts during Ming and Qing

Dynasties (1368-1841).

Table 1 – Frequency of conflicts in the tributary system

Ming (1368-1644) Qing (1644-1841) Total (1368-1841)

Nomads 200 52 252

Pirates 60 0 60

Sinic Sates (Vietnam, Korea, Japan) 11 1 12

Source: Elaborated by the author, based on KANG, 2010.

Based on this data, we assume that Late Imperial China’s strategic thinking

for the north-west boundary arc (with the nomadic peoples) had a discernible

pattern. It was the locus of security threats where “war” properly happened. In this

scenario, it was necessary to adopt a defensive stance, either by conciliation or by

punitive missions, and even territorial expansion was justified by the creation of

buffer zones with sinicized peoples to protect the agricultural heart of the empire

and to ensure the security of long-distance trade routes.

The construction of the Great Wall in various periods of China’s history

illustrates a great contradiction in this case. On one hand, it represents the

defensive logic against the constant harassment of smaller polities. On the other,

it depicts the inefficiency to deal with the mobile military forces of these nomadic

peoples, preventing the emergence of a well-defined territorial boundary. In spite

of the Great Wall effort, China’s north and western borders were truly mutable

and flexible “lines in the sand”. It was a transitional area containing merchants,

nomads, oasis settlers, peasants, fortifications and military men – all from multiple

nationalities (PERDUE, 2005).

In a dialogue between Peter Perdue and Zhou, we infer that there was a

well-defined pattern in China’s northern and western frontiers, a certain degree

3 The Qing Dynasty lasted until 1911 but the data ends in 1841, when the Opium War put an end to the Sinocentric

World.

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58 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

of predictability in the instable borderlands. In other words, the frequent clashes

between nomads and Chinese forces were not chaotic, they were crises within the

system, but not crises of the system itself. Thus, the existence of a stable tributary

game that faced constant military instability is a plausible thesis. The means of

violence between polities was a relevant variable of this system, although not

the only one.

In sum, we know the Chinese were unable to hold the invasions of Mongols

and Manchus in different moments of history, but in spite of these two failures,

they were successful in preventing hundreds of other incursions from northern/

western polities. And this was a consequence of: a) the choice, by other polities,

to avoid direct confrontation with China or to submit to its world order; and b)

the tributary system, which could bear a “limited instability” of border harassment

and punitive missions in order to preserve itself.

The structural contemporary process: China’s rise in the 21

Century and the new Core-Periphery relations

Zhou’s tributary game (2011) is a type of game theory with the following

premises: i) there is an asymmetry of capacities between two actors (China and

the peripheral state); ii) this asymmetry is moderate, i.e., the maximum gain

does not imply the annihilation of one actor by the other; and iii) as a theoretical

model, it is ahistorical and not subjected to long-term processes.

The tributary game oscillates between two poles: cooperation (neighbor’s

submission and China’s conciliation) and conflict (neighbor’s harassment and

China’s punitive missions). As a cycle, there are no eternal points of maximum

gain or loss: there are occasions when border harassment is more advantageous

than submission (to the neighbor) and others when a punitive mission is more

advantageous than co-optation (for China). However, the system tends to a cycle of

cooperation and conflict that would be eternal if it was not affected by a learning

curve process between the actors, who familiarize and predict the behavior of the

other, and by historical processes of medium and long duration.

Our central hypothesis is that China’s disputes with the Philippines in the

South China Sea (SCS) present a dynamic analogous to the tributary game.

However, instead of the eternal oscillation between the conflict and cooperation

poles, it has been gradually shaped by the mutual learning process and, above all,

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

59Bruno Hendler

by China’s rise as a regional power. Even though it does not imply the annexation

of peripheral states such as the Philippines, it tends to reduce their margin of

maneuver and push them to the submission stance with economic and symbolic

gains in lieu of strategic concessions.

The disputes in the SCS are “lines in the sand” in the sense that they are

affected by flexible and dynamic issues. It is a phenomenon that shapes and is

shaped by social, political and economic matters that stretch far beyond hard

politics. The three vectors of China’s external projection since 1997 are expressed

in the intersections 1, 2 and 3 and the question that this model intends to answer

is: if the abstract model of the tributary game reemerged today, what would be

its concrete implications?

Figure 2 – China’s vectors of external projection

STRATEGIC

POLITICAL

ECONOMY

SYMBOLIC

INSTITUTIONAL

Econ.

Statecr.

Peaceful

Rise

Win-Win

Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.

The political economy vector has undergone profound transformations since

2008. Based on a successful and complex struggle between the government and the

national bourgeoisie, there was a complexification of economic relations with the

outside world under state guidance (NOGUEIRA, 2018). If this vector was driven

by structural reforms, foreign direct investment attraction, public investment and

export incentives in the 1990s and 2000s, foreign trade remained important, but

it started to share attention with other sectors that make up a complex “toolkit”

of economic projection, which we call economic statecraft. Leonard (2016) points

out China’s five major tools since the late 2000s: trade, investment, financial

services, Renminbi internationalization and logistics integration through the Belt

and Road Initiative (BRI).

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60 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

These processes arise from the saturation of a model based on public

investments and exports surplus. One of the main internal constraints that impel

this economic statecraft is the idle capacity of numerous productive sectors, which

enhances a growing reliance on infrastructure works, an inflation of the real estate

market, indebtedness of provinces and local governments, and a high leverage

rate of banking and non-banking sectors. In order to mitigate these tendencies,

state banks such as the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) and

the China Development Bank (CDB) started to support the internationalization

of public enterprises through cheap credit (CINTRA; PINTO, 2017). In addition,

China’s high savings rate and corporate governance structure were combined

with the distorted capital market to support the Chinese Outward Foreign Direct

Investment (OFDI). Therefore, with the high competition in the domestic market,

exploited by domestic and foreign companies, and the competitive leap of Chinese

firms, the country’s OFDI rose considerably in the mid-2000s and 2010s.

This way, Chinese companies started to invest abroad to gain more control over

value chains and to access new technologies, markets and resources (NOGUEIRA,

2012). The approach to African countries, for example, has taken place through

internal articulations that bring together the Chinese government, the financial

institutions (Exim and CDB) and the state companies (Ribeiro, 2017) and such

processes denote a change of focus from developed to developing countries. In

short, the political economy projection through the state’s dirigisme in vital sectors

such as energy, infrastructure, food and technology has functioned as a relief for

internal constraints.

The strategic vector underwent significant changes in the last decade as well.

In quantitative terms, there were no surprises because public spending in the

military remained around 2% of the GDP since the late 1990s. However, there

was a sharp growth in absolute values: the official data indicates that, from 2008

to 2016, investment jumped from US$60 billion to US$151 billion, but there is

evidence that the Chinese government minimizes the indicators. Other sources

such as the SIPRI point to a leap from around U$86 billion to US$215 in the same

period. Thus, in spite of a relative decline in military spending in 2017 (1,3% of

the GDP in 2016), absolute values are still rising and remain much higher than

other Asian countries’ spending.

However, the great strategic shift is qualitative and consists on a military

doctrine change: from an extensive and defensive logic (it focused on quantity

of troops and weaponry for border protection) to an intensive and offensive one

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61Bruno Hendler

(centered on non-conventional sectors, such as space program and cyberwar, and

greater emphasis on power projection in the Asia-Pacific scenario and beyond

through the Navy and the Air Force). These changes began in the 1990s and

2000s, with cuts in personnel, improvements in the industrial-military complex

and integrated joint operations in the armed forces (FISHER JR, 2010), gaining

momentum in the last decade with the construction of aircraft carriers, submarines

and other vessels capable of navigating beyond the Asia-Pacific’s first island chain.

Finally, there is a growing focus on informatization of command and control lines,

air force modernization and investments in cyber and space sectors.

Above these doctrine changes there are permanent strategic concerns:

separatism (Tibet and Xinjiang), the status of Taiwan, the Koreas issue and the

relations with the great powers. But one of the main changes, which is linked to

the new military doctrine, refers to the maritime territorial disputes with Japan

and the Southeast Asian countries. The military asymmetry with the latter and

the historical resentments with the former are elements of growing relevance in

Chinese strategic calculation and reinforce a doctrine focused on the projection

of naval power. As a matter of comparison for further analysis, China is ranked

in the 3th in the global firepower index, while the Philippines is only the 64th.

The unbalanced correlation of naval power between both countries is expressed in

numbers: 52 to 3 frigates, 76 to 0 submarines, 42 to 10 corvettes, 192 to 39 patrol

craft and the total naval assets is 714 to 119 (GFP).

The interface between the political economy and the strategy vectors is the

hard core of the Chinese post 2008 external projection. The asymmetric economic

interdependence that China has built with its neighbors has been shaping their

behavior on sensitive topics such as Taiwan and the SCS, hence the more dependent

on Chinese capitalism the less combative these countries tend to be. Another issue

is that Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE´s) have operated in strategic sectors

of neighboring countries such as energy, communications and transport and can

be used to blackmail or threaten governments in case of a military escalation.

In that sense, Chong (2014) presents an interesting debate on Singapore’s cyber

vulnerability towards China. In a complementary way, the strategic vector is also

important to the political economy one because it ensures the safety of sea lanes

and generates income from the exports of the industrial-military complex products.

Finally, the symbolic and institutional vector goes far beyond traditional

diplomacy and encompasses the activities of politicians such as Xi Jinping and

Li Keqiang, academics, military, media and envoys to international organizations.

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62 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

Naturally, Chinese diplomacy has its own dynamics, but its performance tends to

be an extension of the other two vectors both in bilateral and multilateral contexts.

The interface with the political economy sphere is clear by the diffusion of

the “win-win game” motto, which creates a positive image of Chinese enterprises

through media and political direct support in negotiating contracts with foreign firms

and governments. In bilateral relations, particularly with developing countries, the

Chinese government has promoted cooperation projects in several topics such as

agriculture, trade, finance, investment, tourism, technology, circulation of people,

etc. (Clemente, 2016). In the multilateral level, Beijing has sponsored and/or actively

participated in hundreds of medium and high-level meetings, strengthening the

image of China as a responsible partner and a promoter of development.

The symbolic interaction with the strategic vector has appeared on the so

called military diplomacy, with China’s participation in joint military exercises,

training of foreign forces, humanitarian aid and transfer of arms and military

equipment. From 2003 to 2016 Beijing participated in 349 joint military exercises

with 56 countries, ranging from combat training to operations of hospital-ships

in poor countries in Africa. In the multilateral arena, China has been actively

participating in UN peacekeeping missions and joined regional institutions and

regimes such as the Asean Regional Forum and the Declaration of Conduct in the

South China Sea. Thus, the military diplomacy reinforces the image of China as a

rising, responsible and non-revisionist power, concerned with peace and stability

in its regional and global environments.

Nevertheless, the US projection in Asia Pacific, recently updated to Indo-Pacific

by the White House vocabulary, remains a relevant factor to counterbalance China´s

rise. The US presence in Asia Pacific dates back to the mid-nineteenth century

when, in 1854, Commodore Perry’s celebrated Naval Expedition, inspired by the

Manifest Destiny, used gunboat diplomacy to establish formal relations with Japan

and open the ports of Hakodate and Shimoda for free trade. At the turn of the

twentieth century the Americans also secured trade interests with China. In 1902,

as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, the US took Spanish territories in

Central America (Cuba and Puerto Rico), in the Pacific Ocean (Guam and Wake)

and, after supporting the Moro Rebellion against Spanish rule, they repressed this

nationalist movement and turned the Philippines into a formal protectorate until

1946 (Pires, 2013).

Throughout the Cold War, American influence became even stronger with the

creation of SEATO and the hub-and-spock system of bilateral alliances with Japan,

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63Bruno Hendler

South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. At the

end of the Cold War, this system gained new contours: instead of containing the

socialist bloc, it became a tool to counterbalance China through softer elements

of power such as its participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, increased

economic interdependence and cooperation on non-conventional security issues

such as counterterrorism and humanitarian aid in cases of natural disasters and

pandemics (Acharya, 2008, 41).

The tributary game between China and the Philippines: is China

acting as its former self?

“China is acting as its former self”. This is how Julio Amador III described the

current posture of the Asian giant in the 21

Century

. He continued: “China wants

new tributaries? It might even be true, but the former tributary system lasted long

only because its associates had commercial benefits with China. Philippine sailors

landed in China before Chinese sailors landed in the Philippines” (AMADOR III,

2017). If that is the case, how can the tributary game explain the current affairs

between the two countries?

The disputes in the SCS are at the intersection of China’s three outward-

projection vectors because the states involved are tightly bound by strategic,

symbolic, and political economic issues. Furthermore, the tensions bring to the

surface the contradictions of China’s rise in a mirrored version, a kind of upside-

down world in allusion to the series Stranger Things. That is, China’s economic

statecraft may be affected by unprofitable projects and may jeopardize the national

security of its neighbors; the win-win motto can turn into a win-lose game because

of socio-environmental impacts and asymmetric interdependence; and the “peaceful

rise” may be overshadowed by the “China threat” due to military modernization

and to Chinese assertiveness in territorial disputes.

Isolating variables and identifying causal links are difficult tasks, but

a historical glance may reveal some clues about this process. Based on the

Philippines’ presidential mandates we perceived how the country moved from a

cooperative relationship with China (with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo) to a conflictive

one (with Benigno Aquino III) and from that to a new friendly dynamic (with

Rodrigo Duterte) that fits into the “conciliation-submission” analogy of the tributary

4 Interview conceded during the author´s fieldtrip to Southeast Asia in October and November, 2017.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

64 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

game. And comprising all these mandates from 2001 up to date (2019), there was

a gradual process of mutual learning between the two countries’ bureaucracies

and China’s regional rise has built new core-periphery relations with its neighbors

(including the Philippines).

The elements of rapprochement in Arroyo’s two mandates (2001-2010) are

notorious. China’s peaceful rise motto was reinforced by joint military exercises

with Manila, the signing of a bilateral memorandum of understanding (in 2004),

the first official visit of a Philippine warship to Beijing and China’s multilateral

adherence to the Code of Conduct in the SCS in 2002. Nevertheless, president

Arroyo put into practice a policy of equi-balancing between China and US

(Castro, 2016: 139). She visited Washington in November 2001, received George

W. Bush in 2003 and strengthened security cooperation in the context of the War

on Terror: the US military assistance rose from US$38 million in 2001 to US$114

million in 2003

; the country was granted, along with Thailand, the status of major

non-NATO ally and became a center of logistics operations for the US military;

moreover its armed forces received training to fight the guerrillas in Mindanao

(CHIANG, 2017: 11). Due to the kidnapping of a Filipino worker in Iraq in 2004,

Angelo de la Cruz, Arroyo chose to withdraw the supporting troops in the American

occupation in Iraq, shaking relations with the US, but only temporarily.

China’s win-win motto was reinforced by the prolific presidential diplomacy

between Hu Jintao and Arroyo, coined as the “golden age of partnership” and

materialized in the subsequent signing of 83 bilateral cooperation agreements.

The economic statecraft was reinforced in two ways: bilateral trade grew

exponentially with a considerable Philippine surplus; and Chinese companies

invested about three billion dollars in the Philippine energy sector between 2008

and 2010 (AEI; CLEMENTE, 2016: 222).

The table below presents the main topics of bilateral relations through the

lenses of China’s vectors of external projection. For the most part of the 2000s

the interaction leaned toward the cooperation pole, as Beijing adopted a more

conciliatory stance and Manila a more submissive one. Because these are only

ideal concepts, it does not mean that the Philippines were totally obedient to

China – actually, Arroyo adopted a wise equi-balancing foreign policy between

US and China as aforementioned. The point is that both countries developed a

“mutual learning process” made possible by Manila’s openness to engage Beijing

5 There are divergences about these numbers. The USAID website displays a change from US$10 million to US$55

million.

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65Bruno Hendler

and by China’s charm offensive in Asia, which took shape precisely in the 2000s.

In broad terms, the SCS issue was not a top priority in the bilateral agenda: it

was neither used to promote “border harassment” by the Philippines nor used to

promote “punitive missions” by China.

Figure 3 – Arroyo and China: cooperation and equibalancing

in the “Golden Age of Partnership” (2001-2010)

Security/Strategic

• MOU (2004);

• JME’s with China;

• Philippine Vessel visits Beijing;

• US cooling in 200 (Angelo de la Cruz)

Symbolic – lnstitutional

• Cooperation projects (83 projects);

• Presidential diplomacy: “Golden Age of Partnership”

Political Economy

• Chinese FDI rises (2008 onwards);

• Philippine positive bilateral trade with China

South China Sea

• Note top priority issue until 2009, when both countries officialized

their claims on SCS

Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.

The golden era of partnership showed signs of exhaustion in 2009: President

Arroyo was linked to corruption allegations involving Chinese investments.

Furthermore, in March 2009 the president approved the Philippine Archipelagic

Baselines Law, which defines the territorial jurisdiction of the country and includes

the Scarborough Reef. In May 2009 the Chinese delegation submitted to the UN

the 9-dash line, Beijing’s official demand on SCS, which overlaps the 200 miles

exclusive economic zone of many countries in SE Asia. As a result, the number

of bilateral agreements fell abruptly and bilateral relations have cooled.

These facts changed the stances in the tributary game: Manila moved from

“submission” to the “border harassment” stance and Beijing from the “conciliatory”

to the “punitive mission” one. This trend gained momentum with the succeeding

president, Benigno S. Aquino III (2010-2016), who came to power with a campaign

of criticism on the rapprochement with China. It is impossible to infer which side

took the “first move” and it is sufficient to assume that both sides embarked in a

new phase of mutual misperceptions and hostilities that were channeled to the SCS.

This process was developed in three phases: first with the sparse clashes

between navies and fishermen from both countries in 2011. Second, with the

rise of tensions that culminated in a maritime standoff in Scarborough Schoal

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66 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

(April, 2012), which affected the multiple facets of the bilateral relations and pushed

Aquino to institute arbitral proceedings against China in the PCA in January, 2013

(PCA). And third, the withdrawal of Philippine forces from Scarborough and the

subsequent Chinese occupation of several SCS elevations (including Scarborough),

sparkling a process of construction works of civil and military facilities in these

islands from 2013 onwards.

The table below describes the main events and characterizes them according

to China’s vectors of external projection.

Figure 4 – Philippines-China escalation in the South China Sea

Date Description of event Category

Feb, Mar, Oct, 2011 Sparse clashes between navies and ﬁshermen

Strategic and

Economic Statecraft

April, 8, 2012 Scarborough standoff between navies Strategic

April, 12, 2012

Hackers invade PH's Universities websites Symbolic-lnstitutional

April, 25, 2012 US-PH Joint Military Exercises Strategic

May, 2012 China's trade boycon Economic Statecraft

May, 2012 China's tourism boycon Economic Statecraft

May, 2012 Mutual protests in each other's Embassies Symbolic-lnstitutional

May-August, 2012 China vetoes ﬁshing activities in Scarborough

Strategic and

Economic Statecraft

May-August, 2012 PH's ﬁshermen ignore the veto

Strategic and

Economic Statecraft

June, 2012 PH forces retreat from Scarborough Strategic

January, 2013 PH opens the case against China in the PCA Symbolic-lnstitutional

April, 2014

PH-US sign the Enhanced Defense Cooperation

Agreement (EDCA)

Strategic

May, 2014

China: Construction sites in Johnson Reef

(Airstrip)

Strategic

April, 2015 China: Construction sites in Mischief lsland Strategic

September, 2015

China: Construction sites in Fiery Cross Reef

(Airstrip)

Strategic

January, 2016 China: Submarine base in Mischief Strategic

February, 2016

PH accuses China of building missile facilities

in the SES

Strategic

Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.

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67Bruno Hendler

Chan (2016) infers that Beijing’s counterparts in the maritime disputes “face a

trade-off between promoting thriving economic relations with China and contesting

vigorously its sovereignty claims”. The asymmetric economic interdependence

induces the peripheral country to seek a separation between economic and political

affairs, while the stronger party usually mixes them because it has more resources

to act on both boards.

Chan (2016) argues that China adopts a “reactive assertiveness” in the SCS:

“It has shown a general inclination to postpone confrontation unless it perceives

the other party in a dispute to have taken unilateral actions to breach or threaten

the status quo”. This concept fits China’s “conciliatory” stance in the tributary

game, when cooptation is less costly than coercion. But in 2011-2015 China was

far from a conciliatory power: it used economic and strategic tools as punitive

missions to push the Philippines to the “submission” stance. And only in 2016,

with a more favorable government in Manila, did Beijing switch to the reactive

assertiveness.

If we examine this process through China’s three vectors of foreign projection

we will find evidences of their “mirrored versions”. The peaceful rise motto was

jeopardized by its mirrored version – the China threat -, as Beijing started its

assertive policy in the SCS generating friction between Philippine and Chinese

navies on the oil exploration in Reed Bank and harassing Filipino fishermen around

the Scarborough reef. After the first clashes in 2011 and 2012, Aquino launched a

legal challenge to China’s demand in the SCS (in January, 2013) at the Permanent

Court of Arbitration, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS) and cooled the bilateral relations (CHIANG, 2017).

Pushing even harder to the “border harassment” stance, Aquino found US

support with Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy, which sought to strengthen

ties in the region to counterbalance China. The parties reached the Framework

Agreement on Enhanced Rotational Presence and Agreement in 2012 and the

Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014 (AMADOR III, MERCED,

TEODORO, 2015). This sequence of agreements can be seen as the update of the

Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, for it grants access to military facilities in the

Philippines for US troops in return of modernization, maintenance and transfer of

supplies to local forces and aid to Filipino Coast Guard in maritime surveillance

(CHIANG, 2017; CASTRO, 2016). Furthermore, Aquino also strengthened military

cooperation ties with Japan, signing maritime security agreements and carrying

out the purchase of its vessels, naval technology and supplies (CASTRO, 2016).

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68 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

The chart below demonstrates the sharp rise in US’ aid to the Philippines

both in economic and military sectors.

Chart 1 – Philippines: US Financial Aid (in US$ millions, from 2001 up to 2016)

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

12345678910111213141516

Economic

obligations

Military

obligations

Source: explorer.usaid.gov

This move may be perceived as a threat by China for three reasons: first,

for the quasi-permanent return of American forces in the Philippines. Second,

because Japan’s influence in the Philippines also grew. And finally because the

concept of rotating US forces in the Philippines could serve as an example for

other countries that feel threatened by China, such as Vietnam and Malaysia. In

short, after a decade of Arroyo’s equi-balancing with a smart move towards China,

Aquino moved away from Beijing and strengthened ties with US.

The win-win game was also affected by its win-lose mirrored version. The

number of cooperation projects fell from 52 (in 2005-2010) to 9 (in 2011-2016)

and the presidential diplomacy of Xi Jinping-Benigno Aquino did not replicate

the golden age of partnership of its predecessors. Instead of official visits, both

leaders met only briefly at the occasion of the APEC Summit, in 2014 in Beijing,

when only vague words on “finding constructive ways to resolve the SCS dispute”

were stated (ARCANGEL, 2014). Besides, Aquino also cancelled an official visit

to China in 2013, during the peak of maritime tensions.

6 This data was collected by March, 2018.

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69Bruno Hendler

Finally, Beijing used its economic statecraft to pressure Manila’s defiant posture

in three ways. First, the number and value of China’s FDI projects fell (Table 7).

Second, there was a tourism boycott applied by Chinese agencies concerned with

the safety of their citizens (Agbayani, 2012). And third, China started a trade war

against Philippines’ exports of tropical products, especially bananas. Through

non-tariff barriers, the Chinese authorities slowed inspections of perishable goods

from the Philippines in 2012 such as bananas, papayas, mangoes, coconuts and

pineapples, sending Manila a message without seriously damaging the Philippine

and Chinese economies (ASIA SENTINEL, 2012; STRATFOR, 2012). Instead of

harming strategic sectors such as electronics, Beijing used a limited “punitive

mission” to press the Philippine “border harassment” in the SCS. Subsequently,

since CAFTA came into force in 2010, the Philippines trade with China turned into

negative balance and the deficit faced a sharp fall after 2012.

The table below presents the main topics of bilateral relations during Aquino’s

administration. In the three axis of analysis there was a move from cooperative

to conflictual stance. And if the SCS issue was put aside in the “Golden Age of

Partnership”, it was turned into the focal point of distrust and mutual hostilities.

Figure 5 – Aquino and China: from cooperation to escalation (2010-2016)

Security

• SCS Clashes;

• Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)/UNCLOS litigation;

• US Rapproachment (EDCA);

• Strategic cooperation with Japan.

Symbolic-lnstitutional

• Decline of cooperation projects;

• Cooling of presidential diplomacy. Cease of ofﬁcial visits.

Political Economy

• Decline of FDI projects;

• Trade boycott;

• Tourism boycott;

• Slight commercial deﬁcit (cafta came into force in 2010).

South China Sea

• Escalation of clashes between Marines and ﬁshermen of both countries;

• Litigation at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.

After the escalation in 2011-2013, there was a turning point, when the costs of

the “border harassment-punitive mission” instance were higher than its benefits.

Of course, the facts on the ground changed: since the Scarborough standoff, China

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

70 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

took gradual control of many islands and islets in the SCS. But the gains in the

security dimension had a price – the peaceful rise and the win-win mottos were

stained as the country faced a defeat at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),

practiced an intense bullying against Philippines’ Navy and fishermen, and used its

economic statecraft to press Aquino’s administration. As for the Philippines, despite

the symbolic triumph at the PCA and the “return” of American troops under the

EDCA, the economy suffered with the Chinese boycott in trade, investments and

tourism. In other words, Beijing used economic and strategic “punitive missions”

that eventually coerced Manila to alter its stance from “border harassment” to

“submission”, although it also meant some symbolic and even strategic blowbacks

for China, such as the PCA case and the US “return” to Asia.

The tributary game changed to the cooperative pole when Rodrigo Duterte

became the new president of the Philippines in July, 2016: Manila leaned in favor

of a rather submissive stance and Beijing to a conciliatory one. Again, it is not our

goal to identify what exactly triggered this process and it is sufficient to assume

that the learning process of an intense asymmetric relation in the recent decades

played a role with mutual signs of rapprochement.

The table below presents the main topics of bilateral relations during the first

years of Duterte’s administration.

Figure 6 – Duterte and the “China´s pivot” (2016-)

Security

• Dubiety towards US: end of JME but keeps the military cooperation;

• China’s Navy visits Davao City;

• Duterte halts construction work in Sandy Cay;

• Military cooperation with US and China (ﬁght against Abu-Sayyaf).

Symbolic-lnstitutional

• Presidential diplomacy: Pivot to China, "New Alliance”, BRI,

disagreement with Obama;

• PCA dismiss.

Political Economy

• Chinese FDI growth: diversiﬁcation of projects (infrastructure,

tourism, services);

• The Philippines joins the AIIB;

• Sharp trade deﬁcit with China.

South China Sea • De-escalation of tensions in the SES.

Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.

Despite the didactic separation, these processes are all interconnected. It is

possible that the wind of change came with Duterte’s speech act: he declared an

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

71Bruno Hendler

alignment of another ideological type with China and Russia and promoted his

“pivot to China” motto (BLANCHARD, 2016; HEYDARIAN, 2017). The presidential

diplomacy between Duterte and Xi Jinping seems to retake the Arroyo-Jintao’s

“Golden Age of Partnership” given the resumption of official visits, the promise

of new cooperation agreements, the Philippines’ accession to BRI and the slight

cooling between Manila and Washington. However, the historical conjuncture

in 2016 is much different from that of the 2000s, so now we shall examine the

ruptures and continuities.

Duterte’s rhetorical twist matches with China’s win-win motto, economic

statecraft and peaceful rise, but would be just empty words if it was not accompanied

by symbolic and material changes. The first twist was the timid reception of the

favorable decision granted by the PCA on the SCS. The decision came two months

after Duterte’s election, in July 2016, who had adopted a much more moderate

speech than his predecessor, defending a negotiated resolution with China and a

possible agreement for the joint exploration of resources in the SCS.

Another diplomatic twist came with the jolting of the Manila-Washington

relations in the early months of Duterte’s administration, when the president

declared that he would put an end to the joint military exercises and would prohibit

the US Navy to use Philippine ports for operations in the SCS (CHIANG, 2017:

18). In addition, the president made some controversial statements: he personally

offended President Obama during the ASEAN Summit in Laos, in May 2016, and

in another occasion he stated that the Philippines would be divorcing the US and

forming an alliance of a different ideological line with China and Russia. Now,

with Trump in the White House, Duterte seems to be adopting a more moderate

approach due to the US aid in the struggle against Abu-Sayyaf and to Trump’s

blind eye with regards to alleged human rights violations of Duterte’s War on

Drugs (KURLANTZICK, 2017). It is not a coincidence that the US’ military aid to

Manila kept growing in 2016 in spite of a decline in economic aid (Chart 1).

On the other hand, the Manila-Beijing military cooperation also boomed

during the last years, when the Chinese promoted their military diplomacy in many

ways. China sent $16 million worth of rifles and ammunition, and a donation of

almost $300,000 for the rehabilitation of Marawi, a city in Mindanao threatened by

Abu-Sayyaf guerrilla in 2016-2017 (CHAVES, 2017). The Philippines-China Annual

Defense Security Talks (ADST) (PARAMESWARAN, 2017a), created in 2005 and

halted in 2013, was resumed in 2017. Three ships from the PLA’s Navy Task Group

150 were part of a three-day visit at Sasa Wharf in Duterte’s hometown of Davao

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72 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

City from April 30 to May 2, 2017 (PARAMESWARAN, 2017b). Duterte stopped

construction work on a newly formed sandbar (Sandy Cay) in the disputed South

China Sea after China protested in November, 2017 (GOMEZ, 2017). Thus, in the

strategic arena, Duterte seems to be playing an equi-balancing policy between

the great powers, trying to find a middle ground between the submissive and

the hostility stances towards China, although the historical ties with US are still

more relevant.

China’s economic statecraft gained a new momentum with Duterte. The main

indicators are the foreign direct investment projects over US$ 100 million. The

table below shows that, coincidentally, administrations closer to China were the

recipients of larger investment flows. Arroyo’s second term presented considerable

numbers, with five projects amounting to a total of US$ 3.3 billion. The Aquino

government presented a fall, with three projects for a total of US$1.9 billion. And

after a little more than one year the Duterte’s government has already accounted

for eight projects worth a total of US$ 4.2 billion.

Table 2 – China’s FDI in the Philippines (in US$ millions)

Value of projects

of projects

President

2008 $ 1.580 1

Arroyo2009 $ 690 2

2010 $ 1.060 2

2011 $ 0 0

Aquino IlI

2012 $ 350 1

2013 $ 600 1

2014 $ 1.000 1

2015 $ 0 0

2016 $ 3.340 6

Duterte

2017 $ 910 2

Total $ 9.530 16

Source: American Enterprise Institute

Another characteristic of Chinese FDI in the Philippines is the gradual reduction

of the share dedicated to the energy sector, particularly coal (from 96% to 70%).

This is due both to Beijing’s effort to encourage domestic renewable energy market

7 This table presents only projects that represent more than US$ 100 million.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

73Bruno Hendler

and to the opportunities offered by Duterte’s government in areas such as tourism,

construction and transportation, which answer for the other 30% not linked to

energy. And this trend seems to gain momentum as the Senate of the Philippine

ratified the Article of Agreements of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in

December, 2016 (RAPPLER, 2016).

Table 3 – China´s FDI in energy/total China´s FDI (in US$ million)

2005-2010 (Arroyo) 2011-2015 (Aquino) 2016-2017 (Outerte)

FDI in energy $ 3.220 $ 1.600 $ 2.990

Total FDI $ 3.330 $ 1.950 $ 4.250

Energy/total FDI 96% 82% 70%

Source: American Enterprise Institute (2018).

The tourism sector was especially reinvigorated after the de-escalation in the

SCS. China became the second source of tourists for the Philippines after South

Korea, surpassing the US. New direct flights from Xiamen (Fujian) to Puerto

Princesa (Palawan) were inaugurated in February 2018 (UNITE, 2018). Only in

2017, the Philippines received a total of 968,000 Chinese tourists, an increase of

43% compared to the previous year (CHI, 2018).

With regards to trade balance, the dynamics are different. The chart below

presents the Philippines’ balance of trade with China. Until 2004, the balance was

close to zero, but from 2005 to 2010 the country presented a surplus (except for

2009). China’s demand for primary products grew and was undoubtedly one of

the factors that attracted Arroyo’s administration by enhancing exports of nickel,

copper, oil and coal, but also parts of electronic products such as optical readers

and conductors. China’s Early Harvest program

in 2005 also contributed, though

modestly, to increase exports of tropical fruitlike bananas, mangoes, papayas and

vegetable oil.

8 The Early Harvest Program is a free trade arrangement under the framework of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area

(FTA) and is designed to accelerate the implementation of China-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement. By reducing the tariffs of some products, agricultural products in particular, including livestock,

meat, fish, dairy products, live plants, vegetables, fruits and nuts, the ASEAN countries can attain early access

to China’s huge domestic market prior to the establishment of the FTA (Embassy of the People´s Republic of

China in the Republic of the Philippines, 2004).

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74 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

Chart 2 – The Philippines´ trade balance with China (in US$ million)

4.000

2.000

-2.000

-4.000

-6.000

-8.000

-10.000

-12.000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Early Harvest

CAFTA

SCS Escalation

Source: Trademap.com

However, trade balance was reversed since China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

(CAFTA) came into force in 2010. The sharp fall was mainly due to the flood of

Chinese products like electronics, toys, textiles, footwear and diesel fuel

– but the

geopolitical tension in 2012-2015 has also influenced the decrease in the Chinese

imports (CLEMENTE, 2016, 217) mainly with the non-tariff barriers for tropical

products. In 2016-2017 the sharp decline was softened, but remained significant.

As a consequence, China surpassed the US and Japan as the main exporter to the

Philippines (chart below).

Chart 3 – Relative share of the three main exporting countries to the Philippines

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

United

States

Japan

China

Source: International Trade Center, 2019.

9 This data was collected in March, 2018.

10 The full data can be accessed at tradedata.org.

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75Bruno Hendler

Sino-Filipino economic ties were strengthened in these two years of

Duterte’s administration. The three vectors of China’s projection were activated

in face of Manila’s willingness to seek economic benefits and put aside the SCS

dispute. China’s economic statecraft and win-win motto gained sympathy in

the Philippines with booming trade, diversification of FDI, influx of tourists and

adherence to AIIB. In sum, Manila adopted a submissive stance towards the

SCS as Beijing displayed its conciliatory face , which is expressed in economic

incentives that keep the main military threat (the US) at bay and reproduces the

logic of the tributary system.

However, the peaceful rise motto is constantly overshadowed by its inverse

concept of “China threat”. If Chinese military diplomacy prospered with Duterte,

it was only possible because the PLA Navy secured de facto control of many

positions in the SCS in previous years. In addition, Duterte’s pivot to China

was motivated not only by the expectation of economic gains, but also by the

mutual learning process of the previous administrations, when Aquino exposed

Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions and Arroyo fostered vectors of communication

and cooperation with China.

Final considerations

Two conjunctural processes shaped the Sino-Philippine tributary game: the

growing complexity of China’s vectors of external projection and the mutual

learning process. Naturally, other factors are also relevant, such as the domestic

politics in both countries and the US influence in East Asia. However, this study

defined the first two variables as more relevant.

China’s vectors of external projection have progressed considerably since

1997 and economic statecraft and the win-win motto became more complex.

The gravitational power the Chinese exercised in Arroyo’s Philippines, which

was halted during Aquino’s administration tends to be resumed on a larger scale

with Duterte. On one hand, this also meant more investment, more tourists and

more financial services from China. On the other, Manila faces a colossal deficit

in bilateral trade since CAFTA came into force in 2010 and as China became a

major trading partner it may represent a stronger pressure on the Philippines’

Balance of Payments.

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76 Sino-Philippine relations as the modern tributary game: moving beyond the South China Sea disputes

China’s strategic projection in SE Asia gained momentum with the shift to

the expansive naval paradigm and displayed its two faces. The peaceful rise was

enhanced by China’s accession to multilateral forums and to a memorandum of

understanding, military diplomacy, joint military exercises and cooperation in the

fight against terrorism. In contrast, China´s threat was evident in the escalation

of tensions in the SCS, in the very shift of the military paradigm and in the huge

amount of military investment.

Faced with de facto Chinese control of many of the elevations in the SCS

and the economic gains that can be earned by the Philippines, the tendency is

for the tributary game to return to the pole of conciliation-submission supported

by the mutual learning process and the inevitable economic and diplomatic

gravitational pull which China is exerting in Asia. In the words of Steve Chan (2016),

“increasing economic interdependence and an emphasis by almost all the region’s

governing elites [in East Asia] work to restrain China’s maritime disputes from

getting out of hand”.

In the scenario of a de facto Chinese control of many positions in the SCS

and the expectation of economic gains by the Philippines, it is more likely that

the tributary game shall return to the conciliation-submission pole consolidated

by the mutual learning process and by the inevitable economic and diplomatic

gravitation of Asian countries around China. Furthermore, it also means that US

might face a decline of its influence in the Philippines – and in Southeast Asia

in general.

As Professor Lucio Pitlo

(from the University of the Philippines) defined

to me in an interview (in November, 2017), it is a matter of “managing the

disputes” rather than “solving them”. And as Professor Alan Chong

(RSIS,

Singapure) stated to me also in an interview (in October, 2017), there is no reason

for a permanent closure in the SCS: it is more likely that it will remain an open

issue because Asians might even prefer this way. In the end, we turn to the first

words of this article to infer that the “lines in the water” in the SCS are just

like “lines in the sand”: fluid, dynamic and the product of political, social and

economic practices.

11 Interview conceded during the author´s fieldtrip to Southeast Asia in October and November, 2017.

12 Interview conceded during the author´s fieldtrip to Southeast Asia in October and November, 2017.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 52-79

77Bruno Hendler

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