Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
103Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
Adapting for Survival:
Islamic State Shifting Strategies
1
Adaptar para Sobreviver:
As Estratégias Mutantes do Estado Islâmico
DOI: 10.21530/ci.v14n1.2019.826
Jorge M. Lasmar
2
Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
3
“I wonder if I’ve been changed in the night. Let me think.
Was I the same when I got up this morning?
I almost think I can remember feeling a little different.
But if I’m not the same, the next question is
‘Who in the world am I?’ Ah, that’s the great puzzle!”
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
Abstract
This article discusses the strategic shifts that the Islamic State (IS) has implemented in order
to survive, especially in what regards its propaganda and military tactics. We argue that – for
a long time now and in both domains – the IS and its predecessors have been flexible and
resilient enough to adapt to new realities on the ground being able to shape and reshape its
strategy and tactics towards its enemies’ capabilities and policies. In terms of propaganda,
despite a decrease of its online presence, the IS has struggled to adapt some of its main
narratives to the new reality brought about by the beginning of the international coalition
1 The authors would like to thank Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de Minas Gerais – FAPEMIG (APQ 00808-14)
– for financially supporting the research project that generated the findings for this article.
2 Jorge M. Lasmar holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political
Sciences (LSE), UK. He is currently Professor of International Relations at PUC Minas, Brazil and Professor of
International Law at Milton Campos, Brazil.
3 Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca is a Brazilian Federal Police Agent and holds a Master in International Relations
from PUC Minas, Brazil.
Artigo submetido em 11/07/2018 e aprovado em 17/10/2018.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
104 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
attacks. However, evidence seems to suggest that the group will likely be able to maintain
its online relevance yet for some time. Regarding its military tactics in Syria and Iraq, history
and current evidence points to a return to its insurgent roots. This seems to be corroborated
by the group’s current increasing resort to terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Lastly, we argue
that it is still premature to either claim the rebirth of the IS or to declare its demise.
Keywords: Islamic State; Iraq; Propaganda; Insurgency; Terrorism.
Resumo
Este artigo discute as mudanças estratégicas que o Estado Islâmico (EI) tem implementado
para sobreviver, especialmente no que diz respeito à sua propaganda e táticas militares.
Argumentamos que, já há muito tempo e nas duas áreas, o EI e seus predecessores têm sido
flexíveis e resilientes o suficiente para se adaptarem às novas realidades locais e moldarem
e adaptarem suas estratégias e táticas às políticas e capabilities de seus inimigos. Em termos
de propaganda, apesar de uma diminuição de sua presença on-line, o EI tem buscado adaptar
algumas de suas narrativas principais à nova realidade trazida pelo início dos ataques da
coalizão internacional. Contudo, a evidência aponta que o grupo provavelmente ainda será
capaz de manter sua relevância on-line por algum tempo. No que diz respeito às suas táticas
militares na Síria e Iraque, a história e as evidências atuais apontam para o retorno às suas
raízes insurgentes. Isto parece ser corroborado pelo crescente recurso ao terrorismo e às
táticas de guerrilha pelo grupo. Finalmente, argumentamos que ainda é prematuro declarar
o renascimento ou a morte do EI.
Palavras Chave: Estado Islâmico; Insurgência; Iraque; Propaganda; Terrorismo.
Introduction
Over the last three and a half years, the Islamic State
4
(IS) has been suffering
uncountable defeats. The group has now lost over 90% of the territories it once
controlled (HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b). The Iraqi and Syrian governments have even
declared the defeat of the group while US has already signaled that the IS is no
4 In this article, we chose to use the expression "Islamic State" to refer to the group also known as ISIS (Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham); ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or Daesh (al-Daula al-Islamiya al-Iraq
wa Sham), since this is its most commonly used denomination. We are aware that the term "Islamic State" is
inadequate to refer to the group as not only it is not a state but also several Islamic leaders strongly contest
the "Islamic" nature of the group. Therefore, following Jacques Derrida, the use of this expression in this
article should be understood as being "under erasure". In Derrida's words, being under erasure means that
even though "these terms are problematic we must use them until they can be effectively reformulated or
replaced."(DERRIDA, 1983, p.3).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
105Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
longer at the top of its security agenda (JOSCELYN, 2018). Nevertheless, many
analysts have been warning that territorial losses of the organization does not
necessarily imply its demise. In fact, there are increasing signs that the group
may not even have been militarily defeated, let alone ideologically socially and
politically (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018).
5
Evidence
6
now suggests that the group has been recalibrating its strategies
in at least two important areas – propaganda and military tactics – both of which
will be the focus of this article. In order to understand how IS has been adapting
its strategies in light of recent setbacks, we undertook a thematic analysis of its
primary sources. To be more specific, we analysed their propaganda material as
drawn from the Al Hayat Media Centre and Al Furqan as well as content drawn
from social networks, especially Twitter. This analysis was further corroborated by
the use of secondary sources. Amongst the secondary sources used, we opted for
working mainly with material produced by local and/or on-the-ground researchers
such as consultants of the Iraqi government (e.g. Renad Mansour and Hisham
Al-Hashimi) as well as Syrian academics (e.g. Hassan Hassan and Aymenn al
Tamimi). This was in part a deliberate choice and in part a decision incentivised
by the content of this piece. Given that we are discussing on-going events that
are continuously evolving, there is thus far, little engagement with this subject in
academic publications. However, we have also consciously attempted to balance
our secondary sources by also leveraging publications by academics from the
global North whose research focusses upon monitoring the publications and/or
strategic shifts of the Islamic State.
Thus, we will first shed light on the extent to which IS’s virtual productions
have decreased since its territorial losses as well as highlight the key shifts in its
narratives since the beginning of the attacks by the international coalition in Syria.
However, while this article clearly demonstrates that IS’s propaganda structure is
flexible enough to guarantee a degree of relevance in the near future, it is further
stressed that the key problem with the idea of a “Virtual Caliphate” is that it falls
into the trap of believing that the organization is already permanently defeated
on the ground. In light of this assertion, we analyze how the IS has been adapting
5 See also: JOSCELYN, 2018; DEMPSEY, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BURKE, 2017, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017;
COTTEE, 2017; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON,
2017; ABRAMS, 2017; MESEROLE, 2017; SKY 2017.
6 This article is based on a thematic analysis of Islamic States’ primary sources. To be more specific, it is based
on an analysis of their propaganda material as drawn from the Al Hayat Media Centre and Al Furqan as well
as content from social networks. This analysis is further corroborated by secondary sources (see references).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
106 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
its military approach in order to, first and foremost, survive thereby waiting for a
more promising moment in which to re-invigorate their armed struggle. Finally, we
peruse some possible scenarios for the IS’s future, especially the two most likely
outcomes under discussion today: the first, that the IS is definitively finished, and
the second; that the group, although weakened, will rise once again. In contrast,
we posit that it is still too early to reliably predict either outcome.
A “Virtual Caliphate”?
The term “Virtual Caliphate” was initially used by the media and academia
around 2015 less than a year after the organization proclaimed the creation of an
Islamic Caliphate in the Levant. Winter was one of the first analysts who used the
term to describe the entire apparatus of IS propaganda. He used the term virtual
Caliphate to refer not only to IS’s propaganda structure and capacity but also
to incorporate its strategy and support network comprised by formal members,
informal fans, disseminators and “media operatives”
7
(WINTER, 2015a; 2015b).
Nevertheless, as the group progressively loses control of its territories inside Syria
and Iraq, the term “Virtual Caliphate” has begun to be used in a different meaning.
The term has recently been used to express the idea that the IS will survive only
on the virtual battlefield relying on its online presence and propaganda strategy to
both endure and retain its appeal. As it will be discussed below, this understanding
is deeply problematic as it is founded upon the premature premise that the IS is
facing an irreversible defeat on the ground (HASSAN, 2017b)
8
.
Indeed, it is likely that the organization and its ideology will survive on the
internet
9
(WINTER; PARKER, 2018). It will probably maintain itself as one of
the most prominent Sunni jihadist groups, at least for the next few coming years
7 In 2016, the IS published a document named “Media operative: You are a Mujahid too”. It reveals the extent to
which the organization made efforts to inflate the ego of its online supporters by equating their importance to
those who fights on battles. The IS argues that the jihad fought with words can be even more important than
the jihad with the sword and thus considers its online fans who share jihadist contents true “virtual warriors”
(WINTER, 2017a).
8 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; INGRAM; WHITESIDE, 2017.
9 Although it is probable that the IS ideology will survive online for some time yet, its ideology and part of its
appeal has been intimately linked to the territorial aspect of its project. In this sense, the failure of the Caliphate
may harm the IS’S attractiveness (COOLSAET, 2017). However, the extent to which it will impact the appeal
of its narrative is still unknown as the narrative itself has also been adapting to the losses. See also: CLARKE;
MOGHADAM, 2018; WINTER, 2017a; GAMBHIR, 2016.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
107Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
(GAMBHIR, 2016)
10
. The IS has long created a resilient propaganda strategy and
structure that has been proving to be able to endure even in the face of both the
reduction of its output capacity
11
as well as the more controlled and policed internet
(WINTER, 2017b)
12
. This resilience can be attributed to both the operational
and material (content) characteristics of the IS’s propaganda machinery. On the
operational side, the IS’s internet propaganda machinery is operated by different
kinds of media operatives
13
– such as formal and informal members – which
grants it a strong capacity to adapt under unfavorable circumstances (LISTER
2015a; 2015b)
14
. On the material perspective, the very IS´s narratives have been
constantly changing and diversifying since the group began to dominate vast
swaths of territory in 2014 to better reflect their social reality and needs (WINTER,
2015a; GAMBHIR, 2016). In fact, there are already evidences that the organization
has been recalibrating its messages and overall narrative since its leaders realized
that territorial retraction was inevitable (WINTER, 2017b).
In this sense, it is useful to shed a light on how the messages and their contents
changed since the declaration of the Caliphate in 2014
15
before analyzing how
the IS has been adapting its narratives and propaganda to survive after the recent
10 See also: WINTER; PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017a.
11 According to Winter (2017c), during its height, the organization was able to publish more than 200 media
outputs weekly (including videos, radio programs, magazines and photo reports), as well as daily claims about
its military operations. Evidence suggests that media officials had a direct line to the Caliph himself and their
work pervaded every aspect of the group in order to create a brand and a utopia of a perfect and functional
state. Currently, the IS can hardly release 20 media outputs weekly with the utopian message being replaced
by a nostalgic feeling of missing the glorious days of the Caliphate (WINTER, 2017b). As this reduction of its
publishing capacity coincides with its territorial losses, it can be inferred that a great part of its propaganda was
dependent on its territorial control. However, this decrease can also be explained by Intelligence, counterterrorism
(as many strategists and media centers were neutralized by air strikes) and cyberwarfare actions (WINTER;
PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017d).
12 See also: VIDEO; STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; ZELIN, 2015.
13 IS has crowdsourced its propaganda in an unprecedented way relying on formal and informal members and
followers to spread its publications (BARRETT, 2014). These informal members can act as “disseminators”, IS
fans who share their beliefs and ideology and helps the group by sharing all the IS’S official content (BARRETT,
2014; WINTER; PARKER, 2018). Some informal members even produced their own propaganda supporting the
group. These informal members have already become increasingly important due to the decrease of IS’S official
production. In fact, the informal propaganda is currently responsible for most available pro-IS online material
(WINTER; PARKER, 2018). These unofficial “operative member” are one of the reasons why IS can sustain its
presence on the internet.
14 See also: WINTER, 2017a, 2017b; GAMBHIR, 2016; STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; ZELIN, 2015,
WARRICK, 2015.
15 The declaration itself represented a turning point regarding the group’s propaganda. Although they were already
active online before, the declaration of the creation of a Caliphate allowed the construction of new narratives
related to the utopian idea of a “truly” Islamic state being constructed on earth (LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
108 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
setbacks. It was no accident that the IS precipitous rise captured the attention of
the international media like no other terrorist group before it (NAPOLEONI, 2015)
16
.
The IS created a well-planned branding strategy integrated with a professional
production of propaganda and a unique outsourced dissemination network
(GARTENISTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016)
17
. The production of content and
narratives of the IS is also very professional and well-thought. The content and
message of their propaganda is not homogeneous and vary according to both the
different audiences as well as their diverse strategic goals. These goals range from
influencing opponents, attracting and seducing potential recruits, to even guiding
and managing active members, disseminators and proselytizers (WINTER, 2015a;
2015b). During its height, the IS was also very skillful in customizing and tailoring
different narratives to different target audiences (LASMAR, FONSECA, 2017). One
example of such customized messaging can be easy perceived in the dissimilar
contents found comparing the English and Arabic language IS’s propaganda
(KHALIL; SHANAHAN, 2016)
18
. Another example is the distinct difference in
the messages geared towards western women and those directed at women from
Muslim-majority countries (RAFIK; MALIK, 2015)
19
.
In terms of the propaganda’s content, one can identify at least nine recurring
themes: 1) the religious obligation to migrate to the Caliphate; 2) sectarianism; 3)
discrediting competition; 4) brutality; 5) mercy; 6) victimhood; 7) war; 8) sense
of belonging; and 9) utopianism (GARTENISTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016;
WINTER, 2015a; 2015b). Possibly one of the main theme in IS’s propaganda after
the declaration of the Caliphate was the narrative that framed the migration to IS’s
controlled territories in the same lights of the religious obligation of able Muslims
to migrate from one’s home when they are persecuted and unable to practice
their religion (Hijra). This narrative helped portrait the migration to the so-called
Caliphate as a religious obligation amongst those who accepted such discourse
and consequently helped to attract thousands of foreign volunteers to their ranks.
However, as the territorial losses increased, the IS almost stopped invoking religion
in order to pressure Muslims to travel and join the group (WINTER; PARKER,
2018). Another important recurring narrative is the discredit of other rival groups –
16 See also: WINTER, 2015a; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; COCKBURN, 2015, McCANTS, 2015.
17 See also: WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; ZELIN, 2015; ALI, 2015; WINTER, 2015a; 2015b;
COCKBURN, 2015.
18 See also: EL-BADAWI; COMERFORD; WELBY, 2015.
19 See also: TARRAS-WAHLBERG, 2016; SALTMAN; SMITH, 2015; ALI, 2015.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
109Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
especially Al Qaeda – and the sectarian message fueling conflict between Shias and
Sunnis
20
(VALLEE, 2015). Another important aspect of its propaganda has been the
displays of brutality used to support their triumphalism
21
(WINTER, 2015a; 2017b).
The carefully designed use of violence in their propaganda sought to intimidate
adversaries, warn local populations of the dangers associated with espionage or
dissent, provoke outrage from the international media and cause hasty and unwise
decisions from hostile countries (WINTER, 2015a). The triumphalism, in its turn,
sought to prove that not only their victories were the sign that their ideals were
righteous and had God’s blessing, but also to highlight the fact that those who
joined the group were part of the few enlightened ones (LASMAR; FONSECA,
2017). Thus, war and violence has always played an important element of their
propaganda and it is present in roughly 92% of the IS’s current propaganda.
However, despite the fact that the IS initially tried to deny its recent military
defeats, it has been forced to abandon the triumphalist discourse. The IS still relies
on violent images related to the war in Syria and Iraq – such as battles, armored
vehicles and martyrdom operations – but has increasingly focused more on its
external operations and the promotion of terrorist attacks around the world. This
is especially true after mid 2015 when the international coalition began to bomb
its positions (CLARKE, 2017; LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017). Thus, currently, violence
and brutality persist in their propaganda materials and narratives. Nevertheless,
the way violence is framed has significantly changed revealing an underlying shift
in their objectives. The narrative of violence is no longer used with the objective
of recruiting or demanding the migration to its territories. Rather, it has become
geared towards the instigation and guidance of worldwide terrorism (WINTER;
PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017d).
“Mercy” is another powerful sentiment commonly explored in their material.
Aimed at potential fighters of other groups as well as civilians who are looking
for a “second chance”, the IS is portrayed as a merciful group that can forgive
any previous sins committed by their new recruits. “Victimhood” and “belonging”
20 Sectarianism is not only an intrinsic part of IS’s ideology but also historically crucial to its strategy. Even now,
while the dream of the Caliphate was at least interrupted in the Middle East, the IS continues to instigate
sectarian tensions by targeting Shias and even Christians in countries such as Afghanistan and Egypt (HUME,
2018; HASSAN, 2017c).
21 However, since the group can no longer boast about its military victories, the IS currently avoids repeating
the idea that its successes in the battlefield against infidels were enough proof that the Caliphate project was
sanctioned by God thus abandoning most of the triumphalism present in its older statements. As its military
victories and territorial control were important features of its narrative, it is possible that the territorial losses
will have a significant impact in the attractiveness of its propaganda.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
110 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
are another classic and recurrent themes in the propaganda of all jihadist groups
which also figures in a significant share of IS’s publications
22
. The first conveys
the message that Muslims worldwide are victims at the hands of a perceived global
war against Islam. The latter was mostly drawn to its western recruits and used to
emphasize the idea of brotherhood in the Caliphate (WINTER, 2015a). Although
these two narratives will always exist, their use has considerably decreased due to
the IS’s territorial losses (WINTER, 2017d). However, the feeling of “victimhood”
is being reshaped to explore a feeling of nostalgia about the “unforgettable days”
of the Caliphate, a project only momentarily interrupted. However, the most
impacted narrative is that about the utopian life in the Caliphate. In 2015, the
propaganda about the utopian life in the Caliphate represented more than a half
of its media output painting a perfect civilian life ranging from free schooling
and thriving agriculture to an exemplar social welfare. Today, the depictions of
the Caliphate utopia have almost vanished with only some nostalgic productions
about its glorious days remaining (WINTER, 2017b; 2017d).
However, one of the most important shifts in IS’s propaganda in the last 3
years is that related to the far-near enemy dilemma (CLARKE, 2017). Traditionally,
the IS and its predecessors have always chosen to focus on its closer enemies, i.e.
the “apostate” regimes ruling Muslim-majority countries (near enemy). Even while
considering Al Qaeda in Iraq – the most famous IS’s predecessor – it disobeyed
Bin Laden’s instructions of focusing the attacks on the United States of America
(far enemy). Nevertheless, after the beginning of the coalition strikes in 2015, IS’s
propaganda increasingly began to instigate terrorist attacks abroad, especially in
the Western far enemy countries. Even though most part of the group’s energies
were spent on local battles against its adversaries on the ground, the IS propaganda
became more and more interested in portraying any violence against Western
civilians as a legitimate retribution against the coalition (LASMAR; FONSECA,
2017). Insofar as the group was losing control of most of its territories, the messages
that instruct and instigate international terrorism against its “far enemies” became
one of its main narratives. The scale and number of attacks attributed to IS (being
it inspired or directed) in the West after 2015 further blurred the lines between the
22 During its height, between 2014 and 2015, the IS used the narrative of victimhood less than other jihadist groups
since it was trying to portray itself as victorious and invincible army. The IS has always overstated its gains
while also downplaying its losses and vulnerabilities (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016). However,
after the beginning of coalition’s bombings, the group started to develop the thesis of an existent international
conspiracy against the Caliphate and the Muslim world (FRONSOM; SIMON, 2015; LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
111Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
far/near enemy focus. Furthermore – and rather unfortunately – since the group
began to change its focus, it has become more effective on inspiring, facilitating
and enabling foreign terrorist entrepreneurs than Al Qaeda in its best moments
23
.
There is yet another interesting revision on the IS’s narrative. From the
moment the group’s setbacks became evident, the group has been relying more
often on classic jihadist concepts such as “long war”. This is because they want
to downplay its defeats by painting them as a merely temporary complication.
The IS has ever since sent messages conveying the idea that they are fighting a
cross-generational war. Therefore, according to the IS’s leaders, the apostates and
the “enemies of Islam” are being deceived by thinking that the loss of territories
equals the IS’s demise (HASSAN, 2017b; COTTEE, 2017). An audio released in
2016 by the then IS’s number two, al-Adnani, is a good example of how the group
started to change its narrative insofar IS’s setbacks was becoming undeniable
(CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018)
24
:
Whoever thinks that we fight to protect some land or some authority, or that
victory is measured thereby, has strayed far from the truth. Oh America,
would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take Mosul or
Sirte or Raqqa? Certainly not! We would be defeated and you victorious only
if you were able to remove the Quran from Muslims’ hearts (AL-ADNANI
Apud COTTEE, 2017, p. 1).
More recently, the IS has also re-calibrated their narratives regarding
hot-topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. Even more so after Trump recognized
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and decided to relocate the American embassy from
Tel Aviv. The IS has become increasingly critical and vocal about the Palestine
authorities and organizations such as Hamas. In their view, these groups should
call for less words and more action. The IS takes advantage of Trump’s moves to
criticize other Islamist groups: “sixty years and Jerusalem has been in the hands
of Jews, and it is only now that people cry when the crusaders announced it today
as their capital” (OSTAEYEN; HAMMING, 2018, p. 1).
23 The IS not only proved to be more effective on using internet, and especially social media platforms but also
was more efficient on taking advantage of more recent apps which provide the possibility to encrypt messages.
Some attacks initially attributed to lone actors were later classified as “directed attacks” or even “remote
controlled” by the IS (CALLIMACHI, 2017).
24 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; COTTEE, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 2 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
Last, but not least, the IS also changed the narratives regarding the tactics
it has been forced to implement to survive. One interesting example of this shift
lies in its repositioning on whether or not women can actively engage in combat
(WINTER; MARGOLIN, 2017)
25
. While the IS’s predecessor groups (AQI and ISI)
did extensively use female suicide bombers, the IS and other jihadist groups
strictly ruled that women should focus on their roles as mothers and wives
instead of becoming fighters. Possibly, the recent setbacks and sharp decrease
in its recruitment forced the group to lift its moratorium on women combatants.
Recent videos and announcements clearly call women to action
26
(PEARSON, 2017;
DEARDEN, 2018; 2017)
27
. However, it is still controversial whether the group has,
in fact, lifted the restrictions regarding the role of women in military operation
and how much of the discourse is actually implemented on the ground
28
.
(COTTEE; BLOOM, 2017). Nevertheless, it is clear that IS has indeed changed its
narrative on the discourse level. Considering the significant implications of this
change – and regardless if it is only a propaganda strategy or an actual military
shift – the debate on the women’s role in war is another example of how the IS
has been adapting its narratives to survive.
There is no doubt that the virtual arena is one of the main domains in which
the IS struggles to maintain its prominence
29
and keep alive the idea of an Islamic
Caliphate. If, on the one hand, we can verify a relevant decrease of its propaganda
25 See also: PEARSON, 2017; DEARDEN, 2018; 2017.
26 It is important to highlight that this is a controversial topic. Charlie Winter is one of the analysts who have
been extensively researching the IS’s propaganda. In a sequence of tweets posted on February 9
th
on his Twitter
account, Winter (2018) outlined an interesting timeline showing the evolution of the IS’s messages regarding
how the group saw the role of women in combat.
27 See also: WINTER; MARGOLIN, 2017.
28 Until September 2017, before witnessing the most recent publications, Cottee and Bloom (2017) were skeptical
about an actual shift in terms of ideology. In spite of acknowledging that the IS had already stipulated some
very specific situations in which women were allowed to fight – as it can be easily seen in documents such
as the al-Khansaa Brigade “manifesto” (AL KHANSAA BRIGADE, 2015) –, the authors seemed to believe that
it was more a matter of tactical innovation, or a propaganda strategy to shame wavering male supporters into
action, than a true ideological adaptation.
29 It is also important to emphasize that the IS propaganda is not restricted to online productions. Much, if not
most, of the IS’s propaganda is primarily designed and implemented for offline purposes. On the ground, many
locals interviewed said that the bulk of IS’s propaganda efforts were put in face-to-face interactions and written
materials such as pamphlets and letters as well as others kinds of campaigns such as intimidation of clerics who
oppose the group. To properly address the extent to which the territorial losses will damage the IS’s appeal in
the region, it is relevant to understand whether off line propaganda will also be damaged to the same degree.
Moreover, even the online production decline appears to have been inconsistent, with output levels partially
recovering in 2018 probably due to production hubs being relocated (WINTER; INGRAM, 2018).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 3Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
output, on the other hand, the IS has long been structuring its networks and
adapting its narratives to remain relevant and alive, winning both hearts and
minds. However, as argued before, the biggest problem with the idea that the IS
will become only a “virtual Caliphate” is that it takes the IS’s defeat for granted
ignoring how the group has, time and again, proved its resilience and overcame
even harder times throughout its history. As we are going to discuss in the next
section, there is evidence that the IS has also been changing its military approach
in tandem with the reshaping of its propaganda (DEMPSEY, 2018). In fact, hints
of a shift in its military strategy – now much more visible – were already present
in previous IS’s statements dating back to 2016.
Going underground…again!
There is a general agreement amongst analysts who have been following
the history of IS and its predecessors
30
that the recent territorial losses do not
necessarily imply the defeat and demise of the organization (SPYER, 2018)
31
. In
spite of having lost over 90% of the lands it once controlled, there is a chance that
the group might actually not be definitively defeated in neither military nor social/
ideological terms (AL-AZM, 2017)
32
. As will be discussed below, there is some
evidence that, following its narrative amends, the IS has also been changing its
military strategy. Increasingly, the group is going back to acting underground and
progressively relying more on guerrilla tactics and terrorism (SPYER, 2018)
33
. In
some instances, the group seems to be even avoiding combat in order to preserve
its manpower to use it in more favorable times
34
(HASSAN, 2017b, AL-AZM, 2017).
Therefore, repeating a now familiar cycle of expansion and contraction, it is very
30 Almost two decades if we take into account that the IS originated with the foundation of the Jama'at al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad back in 1999.
31 See also: CLARKE, 2018; CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; JOSCELYN, 2018; JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS;
CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; DEMPSEY, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BURKE,
2017, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI,
2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017; ABRAMS, 2017; MESEROLE, 2017; SKY 2017; HASSAN, 2017c.
32 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; BUNZEL,
2016; 2017.
33 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; DEMPSEY, 2018; JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE;
MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c.
34 This strategic and temporary “cease-fire” can be compared to the idea of Hudna implemented in certain occasions
by islamist groups such as Hamas.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 4 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
likely that the IS will once again act from the shadows of the urban centers and
remote areas of desert attempting to preserve some strength while it awaits an
opportunity to reemerge (DEMPSEY, 2018)
35
.
It can be argued that the campaign to destroy the Caliphate started in 2014
has largely achieved its objective. After three and half years, the international
coalition and its regional partners were able to recover as much as 90% of the
territories that IS once seized (SPYER, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b). The flux of
foreign fighters to the region was also interrupted, seriously reducing the group’s
capacity to expand and threat other countries. As mentioned above, the territorial
losses also impacted the group’s ability to produce propaganda in a large scale. In
sum, on can say that the IS is in its weakest moments since 2014 and it no longer
represent the same degree of threat (JOHNSTON, 2017)
36
. Nevertheless, although
all these statements are true, these accomplishments are not enough to draw any
conclusions. Whereas the IS might have been adapting itself to survive, some of
the conditions and external events that enable its last resurgence – such as the
American withdraw or the Arab Spring – are unlikely to be replicated in the near
future (COCKBURN, 2018; ZELIN, 2017).
It is important to remember that the organization has overcome worse periods
before. Around 2010, for instance, before the US withdraw, the IS had also almost
suffered a total defeat. However, it managed to rise again doing exactly what they
seem to be currently doing. Even before 2010, the IS predecessor (named ISI, Islamic
state of Iraq) adapted its strategy downsizing and returning to guerilla and terrorism
tactics. It avoided open battles against US counterinsurgency and the Sunni tribe
forces that had rebelled against the group (CHANDLER, 2017)
37
. The pattern of
the recent attacks on the ground seems to support the IS’s statements suggesting
that it has already contracted in order to preserve its manpower and regroup in
a more favorable operational environment (COCKBURN, 2018)
38
. Although since
2016 the group has been increasingly adopting terrorism and guerrilla tactics in
Syria and Iraq, the great mark on the strategic and tactical shifts happened after
the liberation of Mosul (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017b). In the
fall of 2016, the IS’s leader al-Baghdadi called on IS fighters to fight to death in
35 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BUNZEL, 2017; AL-AZM, 2017.
36 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; BURKE, 2016, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR;
AL-HASHMI, 2017; BAHNEY.
37 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b;
STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
38 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; BURKE, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 5Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
order to defend the city. Such a call was strictly obeyed by thousands of people
who ended up killed after bloody urban battles and airstrikes that left Mosul in
ruins. Since losing its second major urban center, the IS has not again fought to
the last man to maintain control of any other city or village, even in crucial areas
(HASSAN, 2017b)
39
. In regions such as Tal Afar and Hawija, hundreds of fighters
chose to flee or even surrender rather than resisting the liberation forces. In Raqqa
– while most analysts were expecting the same determination displayed in Mosul
– hundreds of local IS’s fighters seemed to have even struck a deal to be evacuated
from the city without being killed (SOMMERVILLE; DALATI, 2017)
40
. Even more
surprisingly, the resistance in the Euphrates River area, around towns as such Deir
ez-Zor, was low. These towns were once the most important remaining IS base of
operations. In summation, recently, IS forces have largely melted away from places
rather than openly confronting Iraqi, Syrian and Kurdish forces (COCKBURN,
2018)
41
. Surely, many factors have contributed to explain why IS’s fighters have
been vanishing before the battles: loss of morale after the fall of Mosul; the desire
of less committed fighters to save themselves, and; the disintegration of part of
the group leadership after years of war. Still, the lack of resistance displayed
suggests that these withdraws are actually part of an old strategy of dispersing
and conserving its manpower in order to adopt a more calculated insurgency
(BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017)
42
. Regarding some liberated areas and even zones
where the IS never had the full control, such as Baghdad and Diyala Province, the
group has been mounting successful terrorist attacks. As it did around 2010, the
IS is already working to provoke the Iraqi government to crack down on Sunnis
and, thus, cause sectarian strife. The Sunni/Shia opposition in Iraq has been one
of the group’s core narratives for recruiting locally and forms a strong part of its
political legitimacy claims (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018)
43
. The use of tactics
such as hit-and-run strikes as well as assassinations of authorities are increasing
at these areas and at the borderlands straddling Iraq and Syria
44
. This is also
39 See also: COCKBURN, 2018; 2017, BURKE, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
40 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017.
41 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017b.
42 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; CLARKE;
MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017; BURKE, 2017.
43 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
44 Interestingly Hassan (2017b) compares what the border between Syria and Iraq means to the IS to what the
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan means to the Taliban. According to the author, even though the IS
has suggested that it could withdraw to the desert as in the past, its attacks will still focus on urban centers
with rural areas as pathways allowing the movement between the two terrains. In this sense, the border region
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 6 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
important because these attacks are rarely accounted for in official statements
related to the progress of the fight against the IS (HASSAN, 2017b). Additionally,
the group is already taking advantage of all areas where the geography and social
environment is difficult for counterinsurgency operations, such as deserts
45
and
certain urban centers and rural areas (HASSAN, 2017b).
Some analysts state that actually this shift is part of a strategy planned around
mid 2016. In that occasion, the IS leadership realized that territorial losses were
inevitable due to the involvement of Russia and Turkey with the international
coalition (DEMPSEY, 2018)
46
. This claim is based on the fact that the IS has been
sporadically hinting at this kind of strategic shift since some unclear messages
came out in 2016. The speech given by al-Adnani in May 2016, for example,
conveyed that the rise and fall of his group was only part of a larger historical
flow – as a deliberate process – since the early days of the Iraq war. Therefore,
territorial losses would be just a new chapter in which the objective of weakening
the enemies would assume other forms. Hence, the propaganda works in tandem
with the tactics (DEMPSEY, 2018) increasing the morale of its members with
the idea of an organization impossible to be defeated in much the same way as
the mythical Phoenix (HASSAN, 2017b). Coincidently or not, after this speech
IS’s videos and publications such as Al Naba increasingly began to portray the
desert as the best place to launch its post-Caliphate insurgency
47
. In recent
statements, the IS’s leaders have explicitly compared the current situation with
the dire conditions faced by the group around 2008 and suggested that adopting
the same strategy will work now as it did before (BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017)
48
.
In a series of articles published in Al Naba in September and October 2017, the
group explains why it would be unwise to openly confront military forces that
have the continuous support of American and Russian air forces. These articles
argued that such enemy’s ground forces had as their main objective to expose
IS’s ground fighters so that they could be targeted by drones and aerial strikes
between the two countries – an area full of desert areas, river valleys, rural towns and small urban centers
– will likely be crucial to the IS’s strategy as it provides a hospitable environment and strategic sanctuaries.
45 According to Cockburn (2017), since 2016 the IS has prepared bunkers, weapons caches and food stocks in the
deserts and semi-deserts between Iraq and Syria as they did around 2011 in order to prepare for its comeback.
46 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2016; BUNZEL, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
47 Multiple videos released by the IS reflect the return of the group’s insurgency activities in liberated areas using
hit-and-run attacks as well as assassinations in order to lower the enemy’s morale and spread fear, just like the
IS did around 2010 (HASSAN, 2017b).
48 See also: HASSAN, 2017b.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 7Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
(HASSAN, 2017b). According to Hassan (2017b) these statements likely support
and reflect the shifts in the IS’s strategy after the fall of Mosul
49
.
The future of Isis
Prudence is always warranted when making predictions, perhaps more so when
it comes to the Middle East. Although history and current signs of adaptations seem
to suggest that the IS could rise again, it is premature to state either its rebirth
or its demise. Many intermediary outcomes may take place between these two
extremes of the spectrum. Possible future scenarios include the disintegration of the
organization (FARAS, 2017); and the appearance of splinters or sub-organizations
(which usually are more extreme than their parent organization). A less probable
scenario of merger with Al Qaeda or other insurgent or terrorist groups; a shift in
focus towards other regions such as Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen or Philippines in
order to create new sanctuaries, and so on. So far, however, it is hard to identify
any other geographical theater exerting the force of attraction that Iraq and Syria
have most recently (COOLSAET, 2017).
Altogether, the problems with stating that the IS has already been defeated
are threefold. First, and as explained in the previous section, the IS has overcome
worse moments before. The second reason why assuming a definitive defeat of IS
would be a hasty analysis is that the international coalition may have defeated the
organization militarily, but not ideologically, socially or even politically (BURKE,
2017)
50
. The United States and its partners may claim to have won the war that
began in 2014 but they certainly seem to have lost the political and social battles
that began much earlier, especially given the evidence that the Sunni communities
in both Syria and Iraq feel more hopeless now than ever before (MESEROLE,
2017)
51
. The coalition has not yet identified any Sunni actors in either country who
command broad local legitimacy and, in the absence of effective Sunni governance,
it is likely that the population will turn to new, old or rebranded armed militant
groups (BUNZEL, 2017)
52
. Furthermore, with many actors posing as victors in
49 It is important to highlight that even the coalition’s US commander, Gen. Joseph Votel, had acknowledged in
2016 that the IS was apparently “reverting in some regards back to their terrorist roots” (HASSAN, 2017b, p.4).
50 See also: BUNZEL, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a.
51 See also: BURKE, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a; 2016.
52 See also: HASSAN, 2016; 2017a; MESEROLE, 2017; AL-AZM, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 8 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
the war against the IS – including the Kurds, Iranians, Russians and Turks – and,
more importantly – with all of them more concerned with war spoils rather than
effective governance, it is fair to expect that most of the ongoing arrangements
regarding who will administer the areas once controlled by the IS will engender
more instability as well as ethnic and sectarian tensions. All this uncertainty will
potentially continue to fuel extremism creating conditions that could eventually
warrant the rise of a reincarnated version of the IS in the region (Al-AZM, 2017).
Unless this aspect of the war on the IS is acknowledged, Western-backed forces are
likely to “keep winning” the same war countless times. Yet whilst they congratulate
themselves, as the world has been witnessing since 9/11, entire towns face multiple
destructions, their populations suffer and extremism becomes both more widespread
and much more deeply entrenched (BURKE, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a). To sum up, the
prospects of a new IS resurrection in the Levant depends upon three main factors:
1) the quality of governance and legitimate Sunni leadership in Sunni areas; 2)
the continuation of sectarian politics by the Shia dominated central governments
of Iraq and Syria; and 3) the capacity to rebuild Sunni majority towns destroyed
in the war against IS, either through external assistance or through initiatives
undertaken by local institutions (BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017). If these issues remain
unresolved, they could potentially enable the IS to continue using its preferred
tactics of insurgency and terrorism, which would in turn undoubtedly provoke a
harsh government response against local Sunni communities that are perceived
to provide legitimacy to the organization. The danger thus lies in potentially
engendering a cyclical pattern of violence and retribution, which would make
conflict resolution in the region even more difficult, if not downright impossible
(BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a).
A third reason as to why it is too early to state whether or not the IS has
already been defeated is related to its finances. Only two years ago, the organization
was regarded as one of the wealthiest terrorist group in existence. Its funding was
derived from a variety of sources ranging from levying taxes and human trafficking
to the export of commodities such as oil and blood antiquities (AL TAMIMI,
2015)
53
. Much of its revenue was contingent upon its control over vast tracts of
territory across Iraq and Syria. In the recent months the IS has lost considerable
swarths of areas it previously dominated and concomitantly an estimated 80%
of its funds (MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018a; 2018b). In addition, the United States
53 See also: FATF, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; BARRETT, 2014.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
11 9Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
and its allies undertook an aerial bombing campaign striking not only revenue-
generating locations but also warehouses, caches and trucks holding IS cash. Still,
some analysts continue to believe that this damage is not enough to undermine IS’s
capacity to finance and organize a dangerous insurgency (MANSOUR; HASHIMI,
2018a; 2018b; 2017; HAID, 2017). One of the problems seems to be that, as is the
case with its ongoing tactical innovations
54
and narrative adaptations, not much
attention is being paid to how the IS’s economic practices are also evolving. This
pattern of evolution in all three fields is effectively enabling the group to rapidly
adjust to its significant losses on the ground. It is important to note that while
territorial losses jeopardize the IS’s sources of revenue on the one hand, they also
generate tremendous opportunities for financial innovation and evolution thanks
to the existence of a ‘war economy’ (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2017)
55
.
Mansour and Hashimi (2018a; 2018b) argue that, according to their Iraqi
government sources, the IS has smuggled an estimated 400 million dollars out
of Iraq and Syria during its recent retreat. Apart from the “hawala system”
56
that
has been used to transport cash outside the Caliphate (HAID, 2017), it has been
reported that since 2016 the group is using the cash looted from Mosul as well as
that earned from its diverse funding sources to speculate on international stock
markets. Evidence suggests that much of its money was wired to Jordanian banks
and could be re-introduced into the Iraqi financial system (i.e. the white market)
via Baghdad or even through “hawala” (FREEMAN, 2016)
57
. The group has also
already heavily invested in the Iraqi market via legitimate businesses, relying
on middlemen who are inspired not by the IS’s ideology but by the prospect of
economic gain (MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018a; 2018b; 2017; HAID, 2017). Many of
these middlemen are tribal leaders or businessmen with clean records who can
easily hide their links to the organization. According to analysts, the IS’s modus
operandi involves providing a sum of cash to these middlemen who then invest
it in a business enterprise – for instance, car dealerships, electronic shops or
pharmacies and small exchange houses – and the group then simply takes a cut
from the profits accrued. These sorts of enterprises typically do not require formal
qualifications or high investments and tend to be cash-intensive. As a result, they
54 On terrorist groups’ innovation, see SINGH, 2016.
55 See also: MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018; 2017; HAID, 2017; EMERSON, 2018.
56 Hawala denotes “in the care of” in Hindi. This popular way of transmitting cash across state boundaries does
not involve any formalised movement of money. Thus, there is no way to trace the transaction.
57 See also: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2018; HAID, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
120 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
are particularly attractive to terrorist groups because cash intensive businesses
are characterised by high-volume, low-value transactions, often with lax financial
oversight, which can be easily manipulated to hide gains and/or co-mingle with
illegal assets (FATF, 2015; SINGH; LASMAR, forthcoming).
On the other hand, and at the other end of the spectrum, a resurrection by
the IS would be more difficult feat to accomplish than the last time because local,
regional and international forces supposedly would not make the same mistakes. In
other words, whilst undoubtedly the IS has learned since the American intervention
of Iraq in 2003, most of its enemies have also grasped how the organization tends
to behave during unfavorable periods (COCKBURN, 2018). Furthermore, even
those Sunnis who once welcomed the rule of the IS has learnt from experience
that the tyranny of the IS can be worse than that of previous leaders, suggesting
that these communities would be less likely to view the group as the lesser of
two evils a second time (COCKBURN, 2018). Moreover, analysts like Zelin (2017)
also highlight the many differences between the current overall circumstances
and the environment that existed in the region in 2013-2014, which makes it
highly unlikely that the IS would be able to once again dominate territory to the
extent, and at the pace, that it did previously. It seems more likely that the IS’s
current territorial swarth will dissolve into a series of unconnected strongholds
rather than the large swaths of land it once dominated. As stated previously, the
fortuitous sequence of events that enabled the rise of IS after 2011 such as the
American military withdraw from Iraq, the Arab Spring or massive operations
such as “Breaking the Walls”
58
are unlikely to occur again.
Furthermore, the region is unlikely to receive a massive flow of foreign
fighters as it did in the 2012-2015 period, not only because their countries of origin
have already implemented new legal regimes in order to impede the recruitment
of potential volunteers but also because neighboring Turkey has cracked down
on foreign fighter movement through its territories. Without the same scale of
foreign recruitment, the IS will have less potential manpower (ZELIN, 2017).
According to Zelin (2017) another difference would be that regional Shia forces,
under expanding Iranian influence, will not tolerate any visible efforts by the IS
58 During the American counterinsurgency campaign against the IS predecessor (ISI), the US and Iraq governments
arrested most of the captured group’s members in just a few prisons. This allowed the IS to both recruit new
members in prison as well as to keep their ideology alive. Later, between 2011 and 2014, the IS stormed Iraqi
jails in operations, such as “Breaking the Walls” and filled its ranks with thousands of freed inmates that were
hardcore jihadists and veteran insurgents.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
121Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
to reconsolidate and rebuild in the Levant, making future territorial gains by the
group more difficult to both achieve and/or sustain (ZELIN, 2017). The ground in
Syria is also now much less favorable to the IS since, unlike in 2011, the group now
faces a multitude of new actors in the region (e.g. Russia and Turkey), which, once
again, makes it more difficult to conquer territory and/or recruit local Sunnis than
it has in the past (ZELIN, 2017). Lastly, Coolsaet (2017) points out that prediction
exercises often tend to overestimate the capacity of jihadist groups to survive
significant setbacks, especially given that in times of crises terrorist leadership is
more inclined to be preoccupied with its own survival rather than organizational
integrity, as was seen with Al Qaeda’s core immediately post-9/11 for instance.
The future of the IS or the appearance of a successor depends much more
on local politicians and institutions rather than measures implemented by world
and regional powers intervening in Syria and Iraq. Still, some external assistance
may well be necessary to strengthen Iraqi institutions thereby preventing other
insurgent/militant actors from filling any vacuum left by the IS (JOSCELYN, 2018;
SKY, 2017). Just as the 2010 Iraqi elections exerted a significant impact upon the
group’s rebirth in the post-2011 period, the presidential elections due to be held
in 2018 also represent a critical turning point for the future of Sunni extremism
in Iraq. The chances of an IS resurgence is more likely if Iraq once again fails to
achieve effective Sunni political representation and a more inclusive government
(JOSCELYN, 2018; SKY, 2017). In short, the territorial defeat of IS should not
lull the United States and other powers into a false sense of security with the
concomitant danger of military and political disengagement (HASSAN, 2015b)
59
.
One of the key problems of the current administration in Washington is that it
seems determined to disengage from the region, especially given that the 2018
National Defense Strategy appears to have shifted the United States’ focus from
terrorism to what appears to be long-term strategic competition with countries
like Russia and China
60
(JOSCELYN, 2018). Even though the future of the region
is heavily dependent upon local actors and their capacity to rebuild effective
political and social institutions, diplomatic efforts by the US and the international
community can still play an important role in enabling more inclusive and less
sectarian politics and thus help to undercut extremism and instability in the region.
59 See also: JOSCELYN, 2018; SKY, 2017; WEISS, HASSAN, 2015 c.
60 Recently, president Trump has also talked about an American withdraw from Syria and Iraq.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
122 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
Conclusion
So far, the campaign to destroy the Caliphate project is questionably successful
even though the international coalition and its regional partners have largely
recovered almost all the land the IS once controlled. The campaign also successfully
interrupted the massive flow of foreign fighters to the IS and other regional Islamist
groups. As described above, these territorial losses also negatively impacted the
IS propaganda output. Thus, one can argue that the IS is at its weakest since
2014 (HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b)
61
. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the
group is already adapting to survive, especially in what regards its propaganda
and military tactics.
This is also true in another important battlefield: the internet. The IS has
been recalibrating its on-line narrative on a variety of issues ranging from new
understandings about the women’s role in combat to an increased focus on
“external terrorist operations” in order to keep its ideology alive. It is important
to understand that due to its decentralized and flexible network of informal
disseminators, the group ideology will likely remain alive online despite all the
efforts to curb its propaganda and output. However, the survival of an idea of a
virtual Caliphate is as dangerous as the existence of a territorial Caliphate. The
danger lies in believing that the current military defeats of the IS in Iraq and
Syria necessarily equals to a permanent military, social and political demise of
the group. In fact, as argued here, there are strong evidences that the IS has long
prepared for surviving a loss of territory by morphing, adapting, and returning
to low-intensity warfare tactics such as terrorism, assassinations and hit-and run
attacks. It is important to remember that this would not be the first time the IS
adopted this modus operandi.
However, we argue that predicting either the demise or the survival of the
IS is still a premature endeavor. The current scenario on the ground is starkly
different from 2011 when many believed the group was defeated. When predicting
the future of the IS in the region it is necessary to acknowledge that it will be
heavily impacted, first and foremost, by Syria and Iraq’s ability to not only
develop their political and social institutions but also address Sunni and Shia
grievances in their respective territories. Furthermore, the role of ideology cannot
61 See also: BURKE, 2016, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI, 2017;
BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
123Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
be understated. Indeed, unless and until Iraq, Syria as well as intervening countries
and international society are unable to understand both the power of ideologies as
well as that the fact that the existence of the IS and similar groups are symptoms
of deeper local problems rather than the cause, the challenges in the region will
persist. This is significant because, as Sky says, “what happens in Iraq, does not
stay in Iraq” (SKY, 2017, p. 1).
References
ABRAMS, Elliot. The United States Can’t Retreat From the Middle East. Foreign Policy,
20 November, 2017.
ALI, Mah-Rukh. Isis and Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women. Oxford: Reuters Institute
for the Study of Journalism, 2015.
AL TAMIMI, Aymenn J. Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province.
Jihadology, 5 October, 2015.
BAHNEY, Benjamin; JOHNSTON, Patrick B. ISIS Could Rise Again. Foreign Affairs,
15 December, 2017.
BARRETT, Richard. The Islamic State. New York: The Soufan Group, 2014.
BUNZEL, Cole. The Islamic State Will Survive. Foreign Policy, 10 July, 2017.
BUNZEL, Cole. Islamic state of Decline: Anticipating the Paper Caliphate. Jihadica,
15 June 2016.
BURKE, Jason. Rise and fall of ISIS: Its Dream of a Caliphate is over. The Guardian,
21 October 2017.
CALLIMACHI, Rukmini. Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror
Plots From Afar. New York Times, 4 February, 2017.
CLARKE, Colin. How ISIS is Transforming. The RAND Blog. 2016.
CLARKE, Colin; WINTER, Charlie. The Islamic State may be Falling, but Its Strategic
Communications Legacy Is Here to Stay. War on the Rocks, 17 August, 2017.
CLARKE, Colin; MOGHADAM, Assaf. Mapping Today’s Jihadi Landscape and Threat.
ORBIS FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, May 2018.
COCKBURN, Patrick. Preview 2018: After a String of Defeats in Iraq and Syria what 2018
Means for ISIS. Independent, 1 January 2018.
COCKBURN, Patrick. ISIS Is Facing Near Total Defeat in Iraq and Syria – But It Has Been
Beaten and Come Back Before. Independent, 11 October. 2017.
COCKBURN, Patrick. The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. New
York: Verso, 2015.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
124 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
COOLSAET, Rik. Anticipating the Post-Daesh Landscape. Brussels: Egmont, 2017.
COTTEE, Simon. ISIS Will Fail, but What About the Idea of ISIS? The Atlantic, 23 March 2017.
COTTEE, Simon; BLOOM, Mia. The Myth of the ISIS Female Suicide Bomber. The Atlantic.
8 September. 2017.
DEARDEN, Lizzie. ISIS Calls on Women to Fight and Launch Terror Attacks for First
Time. Independent, 6 October. 2017.
DEARDEN, Lizzie. ISIS Propaganda Video Shows Women Fighting for First Time Amid
Desperation to Bolster Ranks. Independent, 8 Feb. 2018.
DEMPSEY, Michael P. How ISIS’ Strategy is Evolving. Foreign Affairs, 18 January 2018.
DERRIDA, Jacques. Letter to A Japanese Friend, in WOOD, David and BERNASCONI,
Robert (eds.) Derrida and Différance, Warwick: Parousia, 1983.
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF). Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil). Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2015.
FREEMAN, Colin. Islamic State Earning Millions by Playing the Stock Market. The Telegraph,
02 march 2016.
GAMBHIR, Harleen K. Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State. Washington:
Institute for the Study of War, 2016.
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed; BARR, Nathaniel; MORENG, Bridget. The Islamic State’s
Global Propaganda Strategy. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-terrorism, 2016.
JONES, Seth G.; DOBBINS, James; BYMAN, Daniel; CHIVVIS, Christopher; CONNABLE,
Ben; MARTINI, Jefrey; ROBINSON, Eric; CHANDLER Nathan. Rolling Back the Islamic
State. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017.
JOSCELYN, Thomas. ISIS Hasn’t defeated. Long War Journal, 22 February. 2018.
HAID, Haid. How the Economic Model of ISIS evolves Post-Caliphate. Syria Deeply,
17 July. 2017.
HASSAN, Hassan. The Islamic State After Mosul. New York Times, 24 October 2016.
HASSAN, Hassan. Down But not Out: ISIL will Regroup and Rise Again. The National,
25 December, 2017a.
HASSAN, Hassan. Insurgents Again: The Islamic State’s Calculated Reversion to Attrition
in the Syria-Iraq Border Region and Beyond. Sentinel v. 10 n. 11, p. 1-8, 2017b.
HASSAN, Hassan. Its Dreams of a Caliphate are gone. Now ISIS Has a Deadly New
Strategy. The Guardian, 31 December. 2017c.
HUME, Tim. ISIS and the Taliban compete to kill the most people in Afghanistan. Vice
News 29 January, 2018.
KHALIL, Lydia; SHANAHAN, Rodger. Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The day After.
Sydnei: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2016.
LASMAR, Jorge M.; FONSECA, Guilherme D. Passaporte Para o Terror: Os Voluntários
do Estado Islâmico. Curitiba: Appris, 2017.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
125Jorge M. Lasmar; Guilherme Damasceno Fonseca
MANSOUR, Renad; AL-HASHIMI, Hisham. ISIS Is Still in Business. Chatham House Expert
Comments, 17 January. 2018a.
MANSOUR, Renad; AL-HASHIMI, Hisham. ISIS Inc. Foreign Policy, 16 January, 2018b.
MANSOUR, Renad; AL-HASHIMI, Hisham. ISIS and the New War Economy. Chatham
House Expert Comments, 8 June, 2017.
McCANTS, William. The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision
of the Islamic State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015.
MESEROLE, Chris. Raqqa Has fallen. Has ISIS? Washington: Brookings Institution, 2017.
NAPOLEONI, Loretta. The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State (ISIS) and the Redrawing
of the Middle East. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2015.
OSTAEYEN, Pieter Van and Tore Hamming. Jihadists respond to Trump: ‘In al-Quds we
meet’. Stratejik Bakış, 3 February, 2018.
PEARSON, Elizabeth. Why ISIS Female Suicide Bombers Mean the End of the Caliphate
Dream. Newsweek, 18 July, 2017.
RAFIK, Haras, MALIK, Nikita. CALIPHETTES: Las Mujeres, Objeto y Sujeto de la Llamada
de DAESH. London: Quilliam Organization, 2015.
SALTMAN, Erin M.; SMITH, Melanie. “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part”- Gender and the ISIS
Phenomenon. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015.
SINGH, Rashmi. A Preliminary Typology Mapping Pathways of Learning and Innovation by
Modern Jihadist Groups. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, v. 40 n. 7, 2016, pp. 624-644.
SINGH, Rashmi; Lasmar, Jorge M. Understanding Terrorism. London: Routledge, Forthcoming.
SKY, Emma. Mission not Accomplished in Iraq. Foreign Affairs, 16 October, 2017.
SOMMERVILLE, Quentin; DALATI, Riam. Raqqa’s Dirty Secret. BBC, November, 2017.
SPYER, Jonathan. Welcome to Syria 2.0. Foreign Policy, 25 January, 2018.
STERN, Jessica; BERGER, J.M. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: Happer Collins
Publishers Inc., 2015.
TARRAS-WAHLBERG, Louisa. Promises of Paradise? A Study on Official ISIS Propaganda
Targeting Women. Master thesis in Political Science with a focus on Security Policy,
Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership. Swedish Defence University.
May 2016.
VALLEE, Charles. Digital Jihad: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State -Dabiq vs. Inspire. Herzilia:
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2015.
WEISS, Michael; HASSAN, Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan
Arts, 2015.
WARRICK, Joby. Black Flags– The Rise of ISIS. New York: Penguin Random House, 2015.
WINTER, Charlie. The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda
Strategy. London: Quilliam, 2015a.
WINTER, Charlie. Documenting the Virtual Caliphate. London: Quilliam, 2015b.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
126 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
WINTER, Charlie. Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare.
London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2017a.
WINTER, Charlie. The Islamic State: Terrorism and Influence. Lecture at Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs. Youtube. 2017b. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AmCChpa2mZM>. Acessed on: 15 jan. 2018.
WINTER, Charlie. Is Islamic State losing control of its ‘virtual caliphate? BBC, 9 November,
2017c.
WINTER, Charlie. Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine. Wired,
December. 2017d.
WINTER, Charlie. A Couple of Days Ago ISIS Explicitly Discussed (and Filmed) the Women`s
Deployment in the Battlefield. Charlie Winter’s Account on Twitter. 09 Feb. 2018.
Available at: <https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/961903270749974528.>
Accessed on: 26 feb. 2018.
WINTER, Charlie; MARGOLIN, Devorah. The Mujahidat Dilemma: Female Combatants
and the Islamic State. Sentinel v. 10 n. 7, 2017, pp. 23-9.
WINTER, Charlie; INGRAM, Haroro J. Terror, online and Off: Recent Trends in Islamic
State Propaganda Operations. War on the Rocks, 2 March 2018.
WINTER, Charlie; PARKER, Jade. Virtual Caliphate Rebooted: The Islamic State’s Evolving
Online Strategy. Lawfare, 7 January 2018.
ZELIN, Aaron Y. Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official
Media. Perspectives On Terrorism. v. 9, n. 4, 2015.
ZELIN, Aaron. Revisiting the Islamic State`s 2011-2014 Reemergence: Lessons for the Future.
Washington: The Washington Institute, 2017.
