Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

98 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

The Role of UNASUR in the South American

Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

O Papel da UNASUL nas Crises Democráticas

Sul-Americanas (2008-2015)

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v13n1.2018.729

Elias David Morales Martinez

Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Abstract

The paper aims to analyze the performance of UNASUR in its first initial phase of activities

in cases of democratic crises that happened in South America, during the period 2008-2015.

Thus, it examines the cases of Bolivia (2008), Ecuador (2010), Paraguay (2012) and Venezuela

(2014-2015). The central hypothesis of this study is that the defense of democracy and its

institutions has been incorporated as one of the fundamental elements of the organization.

Therefore, UNASUR is guided by political dialogue and consensus building for the maintenance

of the democratic order in the South American countries and, consequently, a deepening of

the regional integration process. It is argued that UNASUR includes democracy as one of its

core values and acts to defend it in unstable situation. Therefore, the strengthening of the

organization depends, among other factors, on its ability to resolve conflicts and promote

democracy in the continent.

Keywords: UNASUR. South America; Regional Integration; Democracy; Democratic Crisis.

1 This research was feasible with the financial support of CNPq / CAPES Agencies.

2 Professor Adjunto Universidade Federal do ABC – UFABC. Professor do Curso de Relações Internacionais e

da Pós-Graduação em Ciências Humanas e Sociais UFABC. Dr. Integração da América Latina, PROLAM/USP.

Mestre em Relações Internacionais, Universidade de Brasília – UnB. Cientista Político, Universidad Nacional de

Colômbia.

3 Professora do Curso de Relações Internacionais – Centro Universitário Tabosa de Almeida – ASCES-UNITA.

Doutora em Ciência Política – Universidade Federal de Pernambuco – UFPE. Mestre em Relações Internacionais,

Universidade Estadual da Paraíba, UEPB.

Artigo submetido em 14/11/2017 e aprovado em 13/03/2018.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

99Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Resumo

O artigo objetiva analisar a atuação da UNASUL na sua fase inicial de atividades em casos de

crises democráticas que aconteceram na América do Sul no período 2008-2015. Para tanto,

examinam-se os casos da Bolívia (2008), Equador (2010), Paraguai (2012) e Venezuela (2014-

2015). A hipótese central deste estudo é que a defesa da democracia e de suas instituições tem

sido incorporada como um dos elementos basilares da organização. Portanto, a UNASUL age

pautada no diálogo político e geração de consenso para a manutenção da ordem democrática

nos países sul-americanos e, consequentemente, aprofundamento do processo de integração

regional. Defende-se que a UNASUL incorpora a democracia como um dos seus valores

centrais e age para defendê-la em situação de instabilidade. Conclui-se que o fortalecimento

da organização está fundamentando em sua capacidade de resolver conflitos. Além disso,

o aprofundamento do processo integrativo e o futuro da organização dependem do avanço

das democracias sul-americanas.

Palavras-chave: UNASUL. América do Sul; Integração Regional; Democracia; Crises Democráticas.

Introduction

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was created in 2008,

the result of Brazil’s proposal for regional integration. Since its beginning,

the organization has drawn attention to a the multiplicity of issues. Given its

multidisciplinary vocation, the institution includes thematic councils on various

issues, from energy integration to health.

Among the issues that the organization deals with, defense of democracy is

one of the most prominent. In 2010, member countries approved the Additional

Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy

(known as the democratic clause), indicating the importance of this issue for the

organization. Thus, this study seeks to analyze how UNASUR has acted in defense

of democracy at the regional level. It explores UNASUR intervention in four cases

of turmoil in the democratic order of South American countries: Bolivia (2008),

Ecuador (2010), Paraguay (2012) and Venezuela (2014/2015).

The central hypothesis is that the defense of democracy has been incorporated

as one of the basic elements of the organization. Therefore, the UNASUR acts

based on political dialogue and consensus building for the maintenance of the

democratic order in South American countries, strengthening regional integration.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

100 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

The methodology used in this research is the interpretative, based on the

documental and bibliographic analysis. The paper is divided in three main sections.

The first section deals with the origins of UNASUR and the way its actions have

been outlined since 2008. The second one discusses the Additional Protocol to the

Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy, institutional

framework for defense of democracy. Finally, the third section contains the analysis

of the four cases. The conclusion of the paper is that the strengthening of the

organization is based on its ability to resolve conflicts. In addition, the deepening

of regional integration and the Organization’s future depends on the stability of

the South American democracies.

UNASUR: origins and modus operandi

As a reformulation of South American Community of Nations (CASA),

the UNASUR has deep roots in the Cusco Declaration (2004), reaffirming that the

South American countries “have faced common internal and external challenges

and they present a political and philosophical thought born from their tradition”

(BRAZIL, 2005, p. 95, free translation). Therefore, they seek “the convergence of

political, economic, social, cultural, and security interests, as a potential factor

in their strengthening and the development of their internal capabilities for better

international insertion”

(BRAZIL, 2005, p. 96, free translation).

Saraiva (2012) argues that the establishment of the UNASUR may be observed

from an optimistic perspective; not simply as a result of the emptying of the

CASA. For the author, the UNASUR has been a real and symbolic advance, which

allowed the construction of consensus and action in regional crises, becoming a

mechanism for intra- and extra-regional negotiations. According to Saraiva (2012,

p. 97-98, free translation):

The change [from CASA] to UNASUR was the result of the Venezuelan

government claims articulated with the political will of Lula’s government

and the organization became the main multilateral action channel. It is a

4 “têm enfrentado desafios internos e externos comuns e apresentam um pensamento político e filosófico nascido

de sua tradição” (Brazil, 2005, p. 95).

5 “convergência de interesses políticos, econômicos, sociais, culturais e de segurança, como um fator potencial

de seu fortalecimento e desenvolvimento de suas capacidades internas para sua melhor inserção internacional”

(Brazil, 2005, p. 96).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

101Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

mechanism that emphasizes the political dimension of the Brazilian policy

in the region and through which the Brazilian diplomacy has built consensus

among the neighboring countries to deal with difficult situations, and always

seeking to occupy a prominent role.

The UNASUR was born in a new global geopolitical context, in which the US is

concentrated on its war on terror, following the September 11 attacks. The change

in the strategic dynamics of superpower impacted on regional relations. Again,

South America has been excluded from the US priorities list as its geopolitical

focus turned to the Middle East. This changing scenario – along with the relative

failure of the neoliberal policies of the 1990s, which led many South American

countries to crisis – has allowed the emergence of new leaders, especially from

the left and developmental bias.

The new regional panorama has enabled changes in the political scene.

It has led South America to the protagonist of its own development. Thus, two

markedly different perspectives emerged. On the one hand, “the geostrategic and

military vision full of ideological elements, illustrated by Hugo Chavez’s foreign

policy” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 6, free translation).

On the other hand, the Brazilian

perspective, whose guiding element is the perception that South America needs a

“multidimensional development based on productive, industrial and commercial

development” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 7, free translation)

Although they are not mutually exclusive visions, Brazil and Venezuela

represent different positions for the development of South America, particularly

regarding the relationship with the US. In accordance with Serbin (2009), Chavez

represented the direct confrontation with Washington, seeking to create an

anti-hegemonic network among countries of the region. However, the Venezuelan

strategy is contradictory due to Venezuela’s dependence on the US consumer

market. Chavez’s position was strongly based on oil diplomacy, in which money

from the oil trade was the basis for actions and regional prominence of Venezuela.

On the other hand, Brazil “sought the development of a peaceful coexistence

6 “A mudança [de CASA] para Unasul foi o resultado de reivindicações do governo venezuelano articuladas com

a disposição política do governo Lula e a organização se converteu no principal canal de ação multilareal. É um

mecanismo que enfatiza a dimensão política da política brasileira para a região e através do qual a diplomacia

brasileira tem construído consensos entre os países vizinhos para lidar com situações difíceis, e buscando

sempre ocupar um papel de destaque” (SARAIVA, 2012, p. 97-98).

7 “visão geoestratégica e militar carregada de elementos ideológicos, ilustrada pela política exterior de Hugo

Chávez” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 6).

8 “multidimensional e [baseado] no desenvolvimento produtivo, industrial e comercial” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 7).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

102 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

with the United States and recognition as a partner in a relationship that does not

threaten its regional and global aspirations” (SERBIN, 2009: p. 7, free translation).

During the opening speech of the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations,

former President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, said:

In my continent, the UNASUR was created last May, as the first treaty – after

200 years of Independence- that congregates all South American countries.

This new political union will coordinate the region’s countries in terms of

infrastructure, energy, social policies, complementarities of production,

finances and defense (SILVA, 2008, p. 3, free translation).

The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, in Article 2, takes the responsibility to

strengthen the South American democracies, proposing to build a reliable area,

stability and peace. Thus, the UNASUR aims to break the South American history,

marked by coups and abrupt process of succession of power in an attempt to

achieve a virtuous cycle of development and political stability in the region. Figure

1 outlines the cycle desired by UNASUR, in which three elements (integration,

dialogue and democracy) feed and strengthen each other.

Figure 1. Virtuous cycle desired by UNASUR

Strengthening

the democratic

order

Political

dialogue

Deepening

Integratio

Source: elaborated by authors based on the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR.

9 “procurou o desenvolvimento de uma convivência pacífica com os EUA e o reconhecimento como interlocutor

em uma relação que não ameace suas aspirações regionais e globais” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 07).

10 “Em meu continente, a Unasul, criada em maio deste ano, é o primeiro tratado – em 200 anos de vida independente

– que congrega todos os países sul-americanos. Com essa nova união política, vamos articular os países da

região em termos de infraestrutura, energia, políticas sociais, complementaridade produtiva, finanças e defesa”

(SILVA, 2008, p. 3).

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103Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

In the 1990s, several countries in the region (Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador,

and others) were affected by attempts to destabilize the democratic order. South

America was space for political crises and difficulties in consolidating young

democracies. In this sense, after the establishment of UNASUR, the organization

began to mediate crises in defense of the legitimacy of governments, institutions

and the democratic system as a whole.

In 2008, shortly after its creation, the UNASUR had to deal with the Bolivian

crisis, triggered by the approval of the Hydrocarbons Law, which caused instability

to Evo Morales’s government. This was one of the first actions of the organization

in defense of democracy, which was followed by diplomatic management of crises

in Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela.

In order to fulfill the objectives of UNASUR, a politically stable region is

necessary. This includes the protection and promotion of democracy. From this

perception, in 2010, an additional protocol was established to deal strictly with

democratic order in South American countries, “the Additional Protocol to the

Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy”

, which is

explored in the next section.

In addition to this mechanism, in 2012, the UNASUR created its Electoral

Council (CEU) in order to cooperate, integrate and share good practices in relation

to electoral processes as well as observing and monitoring elections, when

requested by a Member State.

In this sense, the UNASUR has established a institutional structure with the

task of supporting one of the most basic elements of a democratic regime: free

elections. Also, it has incorporated to its institutional apparatus technical and

political instruments to strengthen the procedures for the consolidation of young

democracies in the region.

The emergence and consolidation of UNASUR would not have been possible

without the values expressed in the external policies of the South American

countries that it was feasible to carry out an exclusive integration process for

the region. The possibility of harmonizing these interests, searching for a South

American identity, reinforced the projects derived from progressive governments,

which pushed integration strategies at a different level to the previous integration

processes.

11 From this point on, the term Protocol on Democratic Commitment will be used to refer to the Additional Protocol

to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy.

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104 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

Sarti (2014) argues that this new orientation given to Latin American integration

processes, was possible with the arrival of more progressive governments in the

2000s, which initiated a virtuous cycle in regional politics. The strategy of seeking

the sovereign insertion of the region in order to overcome the subaltern role of

the periphery, in which it was relegated from the beginning, it focused on the

implementation of autonomy foreign policy and a reinvigoration of democratic

institutions associated with the purpose of economic and social development. In

fact, this came to constitute a watershed on the continent.

Guimarães (2014) understands this autonomy as a condition of possibility

for sovereign development through the building of prosperous, democratic and

autonomous economic and political blocs in South America. For this reason,

strengthening democracy in the region becomes necessary for regional and

emancipatory public policies to take place with broad action.

In this perspective, Nery (2016) emphasizes that due to this new context

at the beginning of the 21st century, South American countries’ foreign policies

adopted more autonomous decisions, which allowed the construction of a different

regionalism marked by heterogeneity and political character of emancipation

before the constant American influence. UNASUR has thus become a multilateral

space for political coordination and cooperation based on the ideological plurality

of members. On the one hand, it may be perceived as a place of resistance to US

power, on the other hand it offers an environment for concerting regional positions

about defense of the interests of the region and the pursuit of the collective good.

Likewise, for Vigevani and Ramanzini (2014) this new South American

perception of collective space led to a vision that the region is exclusively entitled

to solve controversies and crises, which is based on the autonomy of the external

policies. In the Brazilian case, the objective was to strengthen cooperation on

defense and security issues, as well as to establish a counterpoint to the influence

of the USA, mainly to Andean countries. The point that the authors emphasize is

that the countries of the region did not have a history of cooperation in security

and defense because different interpretations about those subjects that were

subordinated to relation with the USA or the regimes and institutions dominated

by this country.

Once analyzed the emergence of UNASUR and the factors that allowed its

implementation, it is essential to proceed to the study of the relevance of democracy

in the process of political integration,conciliation and resolution of crises among

South American countries.

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105Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

The Democratic Clause of UNASUR

Since its creation, the UNASUR has dealt with political problems in the region.

Before tensions in the continent, political leaders have perceived the need to

create a mechanism to strengthen the South American democracies. Democratic

crises in Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2010), for example, were essential for the

adoption of a “democratic clause” by the organization.

In 2010, during the South American Summit in Georgetown, Guyana, it approved

the “Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of the UNASUR on Commitment

to Democracy”. Such a mechanism would be applied to member states in cases of

“break or rupture threatening the democratic order, violation of the constitutional

order or any situation that threatens the legitimate exercise of power and the validity

of democratic values and principles” (UNASUR, 2010a, p. 1).

Soon after the establishment of the Protocol on Democratic Commitment,

Hugo Chavez – former president of Venezuela – said that the instrument intended

to prevent “coup attempts”, stating that “it is a protocol to support democracy and

the attack on coups and destabilizing movements that continue to be a threat to

the region” (CHÁVEZ 2010, p. 1, free translation).

On the same occasion, Rafael

Correa, President of Ecuador, said that the democratic clause is a “shielding and

protection against coups in member countries, [those who try to] take the power

of a de facto government will know they will face total rejection from the region”

(CORREA, 2010, p. 1).

At the regional level, enforcement tools and commitment to democracy are not

exclusive of UNASUR. The Rio Group, in 1986, affirmed “the need to join forces

and capabilities to find region’s own solutions [...] and boost the independent and

sustainable development [...] unites us to the purpose of strengthening democracy

from a growing process of cooperation and integration” (FLACSO, 2008, p. 17).

The

Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), in 1996, reaffirmed that “the solidarity

12 “ruptura ou ameaça de ruptura da ordem democrática, de uma violação da ordem constitucional ou de qualquer

situação que ponha em risco o legítimo exercício de poder e a vigência dos valores e princípios democráticos”

(UNASUL, 2010a, p. 1).

13 “é um protocolo de apoio à democracia e de ataque aos golpes de Estados e movimentos desestabilizadores

que seguem sendo uma ameaça à região, sobretudo à Bolívia, Equador e Venezuela” (Chavez, 2010, p. 1).

14 “blindagem e proteção contra o golpismo nos países membros, [aqueles que tentarem] tomar o poder de um

Governo de fato saberão que terão que enfrentar o repúdio total da região” (CORREA, 2010, p. 1).

15 “necessidade de unir esforços e capacidades para encontrar soluções próprias [...] e impulsionar o desenvolvimento

independente e sustentável [...] nos une ao propósito de fortalecer a democracia a partir de um crescente

processo de cooperação e integração” (FLACSO, 2008, p. 17).

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106 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

of the American states and the high aims which it pursues require the political

organization of those states to be based on effective exercise of representative

democracy” (MERCOSUR, 1996, p. 1).

In addition, the Presidential Declaration on

Democratic Commitment in MERCOSUR states that democracy is essential condition

for participation in the group and provides for the suspension of infringing States.

In 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) also established a

“democratic clause”: the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which lifted

democracy to the level of rights of the American people. Miranda (2013) argues

that the Protocol on the Democratic Commitment and the Charter have similar

spirits. The difference lies in the instruments that each document has to strengthen

democracy. While the Inter-American Democratic Charter provides only diplomatic

and suspension actions, the Protocol on Democratic Commitment sets out a number

of different measures, ranging from diplomatic crisis management to economic

sanctions to infringers governments.

Thus, the Protocol on Democratic Commitment aims to provide the UNASUR

with institutional mechanisms for peaceful resolution of regional tensions in

situations of rupture or threat to the democratic order in South American countries.

It also allows the rapid consultation between members to decide about sending

diplomatic missions and charging penalties on infringers States, in order to restore

democratic regular process.

In this sense, the Protocol on Democratic Commitment guarantees the respect

for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and provides several punishments

to lawbreakers countries such as:

a) suspension of the right to participate in various organs and bodies of

UNASUR; b) total or partial closure of land borders, including suspension

and / or restriction of trade, air and shipping, communications, energy

supplies, services and supplies; c) promote the suspension of the affected

State in the context of other regional and international organizations;

d) promote, together with third countries or regional blocs, the suspension

of the rights and / or benefits of the affected state, derived from cooperation

agreements; and e) adoption of additional political and diplomatic sanctions

(UNASUR, 2010a, p. 2, free translation).

16 “a solidariedade dos Estados americanos e os altos fins que ela persegue exige a organização política dos mesmos

com base no exercício efetivo da democracia representativa” (MERCOSUL, 1996, p. 1).

17 a) suspensão do direito de participar dos diversos órgãos e instâncias da UNASUL; b) fechamento parcial ou

total das fronteiras terrestres, incluindo a suspensão e/ou limitação do comércio, tráfego aéreo e marítimo,

comunicações, abastecimento de energia, serviços e suprimentos; c) promover a suspensão do Estado afetado

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

107Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Therefore, The Protocol on Democratic Commitment, therefore, is a milestone

in the institutional development of UNASUR, since it is a binding mechanism

(as well as the Constitutive Treaty). It is a protocol that needs to be validated by

the national parliaments, indicating acceptance by majority institutions of the

South American countries. Moreover, Miranda (2013,p. 198-199, free translation)

calls attention to the possible uses:

[The Protocol on Democratic Commitment] is based on a constitutional

principle that assumes as democratic governments elected in legal manner,

but also leaves open the possibility of application of the ‘democratic clause’

in case of risk to the effectiveness of ‘democratic values’ and ‘legitimate

exercise of power’.

The Protocol on the Democratic Commitment enhances the legitimacy of

elected governments as expression of people’s will, however, without neglecting

minority rights. The document reiterates the commitment to protect the rule of law

and its institutions, the democratic order and fundamental freedoms, including

freedom of expression and opinion. These elements are considered essential and

fundamental not only for the development of regional integration, but also for

participation in the UNASUR (UNASUR, 2010a).

Finally, the approval of the Protocol on the Democratic Commitment means

regional commitment to democratic order. Democracy seems to work as an element

that foster regional integration; and its defense is part of the set of actions to

deepen integration promoted by the UNASUR.

The UNASUR and crises in the South American democracies

(2008-2015)

The defense of democracy seems to support the proposal of UNASUR and

finds resonance to analyze activities undertaken by the organization in mediating

disputes in the South American States. However, it is necessary to make a brief

analysis on what democracy is, and the concept of democracy that the UNASUR

no âmbito de outras organizações regionais e internacionais; d) promover, junto a terceiros países ou blocos

regionais, a suspensão dos direitos e/ou benefícios do Estado afetado, derivados dos acordos de cooperação

dos quais fizer parte; e e) adoção de sansões políticas e diplomáticas adicionais (UNASUL, 2010b, p. 2).

18 [o Protocolo] parte de um princípio constitucionalista que pressupõe como democráticos governos eleitos nos

moldes legais, mas também deixa em aberto a possibilidade de aplicação da ‘cláusula democrática’ em casos

de risco à vigência dos ‘valores democráticos’ e ao ‘legítimo exercício de poder’ (MIRANDA, 2013, p. 198-199).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

108 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

manifests to defend like its own cause, in order to guarantee the success of the

process of integration between the regional countries. Although the cases analyzed

allow us to observe that democracy in South American countries is constantly in

process of maturation. There is a perception of possible fragilities distorting the

democratic experience, because its understanding is limited only to the matter

of the breach of constitutionality, that is not the perception used in this article.

The current South American case denotes a resumption of the democratization

of its governmental regimes is directly related to the difficulties in all spheres of the

social coexistence during the military regimes in the second half of the twentieth

century. The re-democratization of political institutions allowed the inclusion of

deep debates on the classic division of powers from the new realities that the

Latin American countries came to understand.

Hermet (2002) argues that during the process of democratic transition in the

region, there was a significant change in ideological perception by most Latin

American citizens. This perception consisted that democracy would undoubtedly

bring benefits beyond previous regimes. However, the new democratic governments

have faced enormous problems implementing strategies that lead to a better

quality of life for citizens.

In this sense, for Guimarães, Barros and Pinto (2014) the problems that Latin

American countries have faced in the process of democratization are related

to the specific characteristics of the region. It is worth noting that the new

democracies tend towards a certain insulation of politics, in addition to focusing

on the administrative and procedural dimensions, in detriment of the quality of

mechanisms for the incorporation of identities and strategies of the new social

actors, who were traditionally excluded and marginalized in their possibilities of

participation and exercise of citizenship in the process of democratic consolidation.

Therefore, we believe that UNASUR through the Democratic Clause and the

Protocol perceives as a fundamental element the defense of this comprehensive

democracy, not limited to the existence of elections and participation in the

decision-making process, but also to the community process of social integration

to strengthen the institutionalization of the Rule of Law and reflective cooperation

between the countries of the Region.

19 Honneth (2001, p. 65-67) argues that the Habermasian view of democracy can be complemented by Dewey's

postulates on democratic proceduralism through the model of social cooperation, since the relationship between

state and law, there is a solidary citizenship with the possibility of organizing society through processes of

communicative consultation and implementation of institutional programs that lead to the strengthening of

institutional procedures.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

109Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Thus, this section explores briefly four events in which UNASUR has

attempted to contain tensions concer ning democratic order in South American

countries. Chart 1 below presents the general information about the crises, such

as actors involved, period, motivations, among others. It can be observed that the

different crises have a thematic scope and do not necessarily refer to the breach

of constitutionality.

Chart 1. UNASUR and democratic crises in the region (2008 – 2015)

COUNTRY YEAR KEY ACTORS

MAIN

MOTIVATIONS

MAIN ACTIONS

DEVELOPED BY THE

UNASUR

Bolivia 2008 Demonstrators

for and against

Evo Morales'

government.

Dissatisfaction

with the Law of

Hydrocarbons.

• Conﬂict Mediation.

• Support for Bolivia's

democratic order.

• Declaration of La

Moneda.

Ecuador 2010 Unsatisﬁed military

and government

forces.

Changes in budget

and management of

public safety.

• Extraordinary meeting

of heads of state

• Support for Ecuador's

democratic order.

• Elaboration of the

Additional Protocol to

the Constitutive Treaty

of the UNASUR on

the Commitment to

Democracy.

Paraguay 2012 Conservative and

leftist social sectors.

Dissatisfaction of

some sectors with

policies of former

President Fernando

Lugo.

• Meeting of members of

UNASUR.

• Suspension of Paraguay

from UNASUR.

Venezuela 2014-2015 Nicolas Maduro's

government and

opposition forces.

Dissatisfaction

with Maduro's

administration.

• Conﬂict Mediation.

• Mission.

• Pressure for

parliamentary elections

in 2015.

• Monitoring of the

elections.

Source: elaborated by the authors based on information available in UNASUR website (www.unasursg.org)

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

110 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

Thus, the crises in Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela will be analyzed

in more detail below, in order to better understand how UNASUR has conducted

its regional activities in matters related to the defense of the democratic order of

the South American countries that experienced crises in the period 2008-2015.

The Bolivian crisis (2008)

Bolivia, under Sánchez de Lozada’s administration (2002-2003), had been

suffering from intense protests related to the sale and use of hydrocarbons which

became known as the “gas war”. In 2005, Evo Morales was elected with strong

support from the Bolivian social and indigenous movements. Based on a political

platform that favored a strategy for defense of the national interest, Morales

proposed review and renegotiation of hydrocarbon exploration contracts with

foreign companies. Moreover, the president of Bolivia projected the redistribution

of royalties arising from natural gas and oil exploration, reducing the share of

resources for producers states such as Pando and Santa Cruz.

President Morales has been confronted in two ways: national and international.

The nationalization of hydrocarbons was rejected by investors and international

companies, creating problems with the governments of Spain, England and Brazil.

Domestically, the president faced problems with autonomist groups, calling for

more freedom from central government for some departments. It added to this

controversy and discussions on the reformulation of laws on the maximum size

of farms in the Andean country (DOMINGUES, 2008).

The crisis resulted in increased demonstrations against Morales, led by

the eastern departments of Bolivia. There were clashes between pro and

anti-government demonstrators, causing the death of dozens of people and

subsequently the state of siege. The opponents of Morales’s government sought

the repeal of the Hydrocarbons Law.

Upon request by La Paz in April 2008, Brazil, Argentina and Colombia formed

the “Friends Group” to facilitate dialogue between Morales’ administration and

internal opposition forces. However, the effort was not fruitful. Referendum held in

the same year approved the autonomy of the department of Santa Cruz, which was

promptly rejected by the Bolivian president on the grounds of unconstitutionality.

After the referendum of Santa Cruz, three other departments also consulted on the

autonomy of the regions. In all cases, it was observed the significant support from

the local population to greater independence from Bolivia’s central government.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

111Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Domingues (2008) stresses that to call – through a presidential decree- a

referendum to approve a new constitution brought more instability to the Bolivian

political scene. The National Electoral Court did not accept the summons, stating

that consultations should firstly be submitted to the Congress. Thus, the situation

became more radicalized, with clashes between government and opposition forces.

Due to the worsening of the crisis and the expansion of violence, the US

diplomat Philip Goldberg was expelled from Bolivia on charges of helping

government opponents and planning a coup. As a result, Washington expelled

the Bolivian ambassador, Gustavo Guzman. In solidarity to Bolivia, Venezuela

also expelled the US ambassador and the presidents of Nicaragua and Honduras

canceled official meetings with Washington. Therefore, the crisis took hemispheric

proportions.

When internal conflict intensified and separatist groups emerged,, the UNASUR

proposed to establish a space for dialogue, while ensuring regional support for the

sovereignty of Bolivia. The pro-tempore president, Michelle Bachelet (2008-2009),

convened a special meeting in order to present the UNASUR as mediator of the

conflict. On that occasion, UNASUR reached a political concert that produced the

Declaration of La Moneda, strengthening – at the same time – the South American

democratic order and the newly created organization.

The Declaration of La Moneda was a milestone for the UNASUR. The document

expressed full regional support for Morales’ government and condemned any

attempt at destabilization, coup or territorial division of Bolivia. Moreover, it

created two committees to assist in containing the crisis. The first group would

develop a fair investigation of deaths during confrontations of divergent forces.

The second group, coordinated by Chile, had the task of monitoring negotiations

between representatives of the Bolivian government and opposition.

After support from the extraordinary meeting, Morales thanked the UNASUR

for “the firm position of defending democracy and unity of the people of Bolivia”

(MORALES, 2008, p. 1, free translation)

, and stressed that “for the first time

in Latin American history, South American countries decide among themselves

to solve their own problems” (MORALES, 2008, p. 1, free translation)

. Then

Morales met with opposition. They signed guidelines to end the crisis, which

included a period of two days for negotiations, investigation of killings during the

20 “pela posição firme de defender a democracia e a unidade do povo da Bolívia” (MORALES, 2008, p. 1).

21 “pela primeira vez na história latino-americana, os países da América do Sul decidem entre si resolver seus

próprios problemas” (MORALES, 2008, p. 1).

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112 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

clashes, and indication of The UNASUR, the European Union (EU), the Catholic

Church and the United Nations (UN) as facilitators of negotiations. The choice

of mediating organizations stands out to exclude the OAS, demonstrating the

decrease in strength and influence of the hemispheric organization in the South

American issues.

For Serbin (2009, p. 11, free translation) the Declaration of La Moneda was “the

first successful intervention of UNASUR in internal affairs of one of its member

states”.

The author argues that the work in Bolivia was based on three elements

proposed by Brasilia and accepted by the other members of UNASUR; they are:

a) the intervention should be called by the democratically elected government

of Bolivia; b) seek to consolidate the existing democratic institutions and

promote dialogue between the conflicting parties; c) avoid any reference or

questioning the role of the US (SERBIN 2009, p. 12, free translation).

The management of the Bolivian crisis was a positive intervention of the

UNASUR, helping not only the consolidation of South American democracies, but

also the real and symbolic advance of South America as manager of its problems.

The UNASUR performance showed the relative maturity and autonomy of the

region and the search for consensus of the South American governments in

cases of local instability. In addition, the successful action of UNASUR enabled

its institutional strengthening – the organization was created in the same year of

the bolivian crisis – and the deepening of regional integration.

Ecuador’s crisis (2010)

When Rafael Correa initiated his presidency, in 2007, a series of reforms were

implemented: from redirection of the Ecuadorian foreign policy to land reform.

In this context, it created a stormy atmosphere, with tensions with political parties,

public opinion, unions and social movements.

Changes promoted by Correa hit mainly the security sector. He started to

investigate complaints of human rights violations by the National Police, what

22 “primeira intervenção bem-sucedida da UNASUL nos assuntos internos de um dos seus Estados membros”

(SERBIN, 2009, p. 11).

23 “a) que a intervenção fosse convocada pelo governo eleito democraticamente da Bolívia; b) que buscasse

consolidar a institucionalidade democrática vigente e promover um diálogo entre as partes em conflito; c) que

evitasse qualquer referência ou questionamento quanto ao papel dos EUA” (SERBIN, 2009, p. 12).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

113Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

generated dissatisfaction in the military sector. In 2010, Correa sent to Parliament

a bill that would change the public service (Organic Public Service Law). This

project eliminated bonuses for coordination and promotion of the military, but

included compensation for overtime. Given the dissatisfaction of the military, the

Ecuadorian Congress proposed to negotiate with the category. However, Correa

vetoed the negotiation affirming that there could be no exceptions.

On 30 September 2010, the situation radicalized. The Police of the 1st Regiment

of Quito, the Ecuadorian capital, refused to leave the police station and provide

public security services. Soon, other regiments of Quito and other regions also

joined the protest. That same day, the military blocked National Unity Bridge, in

Guayaquil, and closed Quito’s international airport. Avenues were closed, schools

dismissed their students, merchants closed their activities, the public transport

stopped and public buildings were evacuated because of the violence – looting,

theft etc. – that occurred in the absence of the police (CEPEDA; PAZ, 2011).

Given the chaotic situation, Correa decided to head to the police base. In an

attempt to leave the location, Correa was the target of insults. He decided not

to withdraw, since he was the President of the country and head of the military.

This decision deepened the crisis, and Correa got caught in the military hospital

on the other side of the base. The place was taken by demonstrators who threw

tear gas and chanted slogans. At the same time, protests took place in Congress

and clash between opposing and pro-government forces (CEPEDA; PAZ, 2011).

There is no consensus on whether or not there was an attempted coup,

mainly due to unknown leadership or real proposals to replace the president. In

any case, the crisis was serious and showed real danger to Correa’s life, as well

as to the democratic order.

The Secretary General of UNASUR, Nestor Kirchner (between May and

October 2010), brought together the South American presidents, in Buenos Aires, to

support Correa and defend the democratic order in Ecuador. The UNASUR strongly

condemned the situation, treated as a coup by the organization. Furthermore, it

was articulated a visit of Member States’ foreign ministers to Quito. The UNASUR

requested that the events were explained and the perpetrators punished (CEPEDA;

PAZ, 2011).

On October 1, 2012, The UNASUR presented the Declaration of Buenos Aires

on the situation in Ecuador. In the document, the organization listed six points

in which it condemned the crisis and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Ecuadorian

president. According to the Declaration of Buenos Aires:

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114 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

The Heads of State and the Government of UNASUR [...] claim that their

respective governments energetically reject and will not tolerate, under no

circumstances, any new challenge to the institutional authority or attempted

coup to civil power legitimately elected; and warned that in case of new

breaches of constitutional order, shall take concrete and immediate measures

such as border closures, suspension of trade, air traffic and the provision of

energy services and other supplies (UNASUR 2010b, p. 1, free translation).

Due to the crisis experienced by Ecuador, the UNASUR had new space

to consolidate the guiding principles of its activities. During this episode, the

organization quickly summoned its members to discuss measures for strengthening

the democratic order in the region. It was Ecuador’s crisis that highlighted the

need for a regional instrument to strengthen democracy. Moreover, in December

2010, during the annual meeting, the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty

on the Commitment to Democracy was established, which ensured “concrete

measures to be adopted by Member States of UNASUR in situations of rupture of

the constitutional order” (ISAGS 2011, p. 1, free translation).

The immediate regional reaction and especially consensus were an important

element for the maintenance of the democratic order in the Andean country.

The organization was responsible for establishing dialog and demonstrated that

the other South American countries would not connive with ruptures or cope;

and would apply sanctions to those that bring risk to democracy. The UNASUR,

therefore, showed strength and ability to solve regional problems. The episode

was also important to strengthen democracy as one of the core values of the

institution and to the development of mechanisms to defend it.

The Paraguayan crisis (2012)

Paraguayan political crisis (2012) is deeply rooted in the agrarian question.

The country is marked by conflicts between peasants, landless movement, and

large landowners. The victory of Frente de Esquerda, led by Fernando Lugo in

24 As Chefas e Chefes de Estado e de Governo da UNASUL [...] afirmam que seus respectivos Governos rechaçam

energicamente e não vão tolerar, sob nenhum conceito, qualquer novo desafio à autoridade institucional nem

tentativa de golpe ao poder civil legitimamente eleito; e advertem que, em caso de novas quebras da ordem

constitucional, adotarão medidas concretas e imediatas, tais como fechamento de fronteiras, suspensão do

comércio, do tráfego aéreo e o fornecimento de energia, serviços e outros suprimentos (UNASUL, 2010b, p. 1).

25 “medidas concretas a serem adotadas pelos Estados Membros da UNASUL em situações de ruptura da ordem

constitucional” (LUGO, 2012, p. 1).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

115Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

2008, put an end to 60 years of Colorado Party domination. Its political platform

was based on an agenda that favored land reform, which should be carried out

“without traumatic or violent processes” (LUGO, 2012, p. 1, free translation).

During the brief government of Lugo (2008-2012), there were several clashes

between large landowners and peasant movements, which led to the end of his

presidency. In 2010, Lugo declared state of emergency in the North due to constant

land invasions and attacks by the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP), which has

strong connections with the FARC (GIRALDI, 2013).

Political instability in Paraguay worsened in June 2012, when eleven peasants

and six policemen were killed and dozens of people were injured during conflicts

in farm fields Morombi, to the northeast of Asuncion. The ownership of land

was attributed to the former senator from Colorado Party – opposition to Lugo’s

government – Blas Riquelme, who was accused of illegally getting hold of the

property during Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship, also from Colorado Party.

Tensions resulted in the resignation of the Interior Minister (Liberal Radical

Autêntico Party, an important supporter of Lugo’s government). However, it

was found that the property in dispute did not belong to Blas Riquelme, leading

Paraguayan President to seek closer ties with the Colorado Party, offering them

the Ministry and therefore losing the support of the Liberal Party.

In only four days (between 15 and 19 June 2012), tensions intensified,

culminating in the beginning of Lugo impeachment on June 20th, 2012. The

Paraguayan legislature based on Article No. 225 of the Constitution and claimed

“poor performance of duties” to justify the deposition of Lugo. The charges

related to six major elements: 1) links with social movements, which intensified

land invasions; 2) authorization of Engineering Command of the Armed Forces

in 2009 for political act; 3) Ñacunday case in which Lugo was accused of being

condensending with land invasions; 4) explosion of violence related with

weaknesses in public security policy; 5) conflict in Curuguaty, which resulted in

the death of 17 people; and 6) support for Ushuaia II protocol within MERCOSUR

without parliamentary ratification (GAIO, 2012).

On June 22, 2012, seven days after the killings in Curuguaty and two days

after the opening of impeachment, President Lugo was ousted and his deputy,

Federico Franco of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party, took over the presidency

of Paraguay. Lima (2012, p. 1, free translation) argues that the fast impeachment

is a type of “neogolpismo”. Lima (2012) indicates that the Paraguayan case sets

a dangerous precedent: the facility to unseat presidents democratically elected

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116 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

through processes that have legal or institutional appearance. The coup in Paraguay

took on distinct characteristics of coups (and attempts) that hit South America

during the 20th Century and early 21st. For Lima (2012, p. 1, free translation):

[neo-coup requires] less use of violence than in the past; civilian leadership,

and may rely on indirect involvement of the military; maintenance of some

institutional appearance; absence of overt participation of a power (USA);

and seeks to resolve quickly any kind of social or serious political standoff.

Franco’s government was hailed as legitimate by the United States, Canada,

Spain and the Vatican. Nevertheless, it triggered a counter reaction in the region,

where many countries classified it as a democracy breakdown in Paraguay. In

this sense, the South American countries did not recognize the legitimacy of the

impeachment and declared support for Lugo.

Before the decision of the Paraguayan Congress, UNASUR Member States

were gathered in Rio de Janeiro for the Rio + 20 Conference. During the event,

it was decided the immediate dispatch of a mission to Asunción in support of

President Lugo. After hearing the Paraguayan President, the UNASUR defended

the democratic order and did not recognize the impairment process is based on

three main arguments: 1) failures in the charges; 2) disregard to due process; and

3) curtailment of the right to legal defense.

Alí Rodriguez, General Secretary of UNASUR (2012-2014), accompanied

UNASUR’s mission in Asuncion, and said that opposition had no interest in

ending the political crisis, and the situation configured a coup. Shortly before

the formal announcement of Lugo’s impeachment, Rodriguez said that UNASUR

“could not give a different direction to events. [...] What we saw was that they

had already made a decision, a coup” (RODRIGUEZ, 2012, p. 1, free translation).

Speaking to foreign ministers of UNASUR Member States participating in the

mission, Rodriguez said that Paraguay fit in Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Protocol on

Democratic Commitment, indicating no regional support for the development of

the Paraguayan case.

26 [o neo golpismo apresenta] menor uso da violência que no passado; liderança civil, podendo contar com

participação indireta dos militares; manutenção de alguma aparência institucional; ausência da participação

ostensiva de uma potência (EUA); e o objetivo de resolver de forma rápida algum tipo de impasse social ou

político grave (LIMA, 2012, p. 1).

27 “não pôde dar um rumo diferente aos acontecimentos. [...] o que vimos é que já há uma decisão tomada, um

golpe de Estado” (RODRIGUEZ, 2012, p. 1).

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117Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

Based on the democratic clause, the South American organization decided to

suspend Paraguay. UNASUR Member States ratified the suspension

of Paraguay

until the restoration of democratic order, which they expected to happen after

the 2013 elections. Such decision created an unusual situation, since Paraguay

was responsible for the pro-tempore presidency of UNASUR. Peru faced with

this standoff, had to take over the continuing presidency rotation stipulated

by the organization.

Despite the suspension, UNASUR Member States decided not to impose

economic or trade sanctions to Paraguay, because such measures would only

further harm the Paraguayan people and increase political and social tensions.

This decision however faced internal disagreements. The Ecuadorian President

expressed the need of full compliance with the Protocol on Democratic Commitment,

which included the suspension of economic relations as a way to curb coup

movements in the region. On the other hand, Brazil and Argentina lobbied against

economic measures, since both countries have strategic interests – mainly related

to the energy sector – in Paraguay. In the end, the position of Brasilia and Buenos

Aires prevailed.

The Paraguayan case was the first failure of UNASUR in preventing the

interruption of the democratic order in South America. It highlighted the difficulties

of acting in a context of neogolpismo, which eliminates the use of armed forces and

uses the fragility of democratic institutions in some countries, making it difficult

to characterize it as a coup. On the other hand, the existence of strong national

interests made it difficult for the Organization to deal with the crisis. Both factors

helped to build UNASUR ambiguous reaction. That is, the organization provided

a quick diagnosis of the crisis and it was strong in the discursive level; however,

its proposal for overcoming the crisis and developing conciliatory alternatives

was weak.

Democracy in South America in general, and of Paraguay, in particular,

has not been strengthened. The situation might be seen from the perspective

of the organization’s weakness in dealing with the interests of South American

states. However, it is clear that UNASUR actions were important for the exercise

of regional autonomy, as the organization was the main interlocutor between

the parties. As in previous events, the South American countries dismissed

28 It is important to mention that the president of Paraguay, Federico Franco, questioned the suspension based

on the alleged illegality of UNASUR democratic clause, since it had not been approved by the Paraguayan

Parliament, therefore, would not be valid.

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118 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

extra-regional interference – in particular the US. Although it has failed in

terms of finding a solution to the crisis, the UNASUR creating room for effective

dialogue in South America.

The Venezuelan crisis (2014-2015)

The last years of Hugo Chavéz’s government marked the slowing down of

the Venezuelan economy. The death of Chavez, in March 2013, raised further

doubts about the survival of his development model. However, the former

Venezuelan leader managed to leave a successor. Nicolas Maduro reached the

presidency of Venezuela committed to advancing the Chavism in face of the evident

economic crisis.

In February 2014, a series of protests took place against Maduro’s government,

led mainly by Leopoldo López, the leader of the right-wing party Voluntad Popular.

Among other things, protesters demanded a solution to the economic crisis in the

country, caused by the decline in government revenues in face of falling commodity

prices on the international market.

It is important to mention that the Venezuelan economy is strongly dependent

on resources from oil sales. This market has been marked by disputes of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the US due to the North American shale oil

and gas. This situation has brought down oil price in recent years. As a result,

instabilities in the oil market have had negative impact in the Venezuelan economy.

In recent years, the country has faced a staggering rise in inflation rate

, decline

in exports

and shortages of essential items in retail markets (IMF, 2015).

The protests that happened between February and June 2014 left the total of

43 people dead and 878 injured (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015). One of the

leaders of the demonstrations, Leopoldo López, has been accused of incitement,

conspiracy and attempted coup what culminated in his arrest by the Venezuelan

government. López has handed himself and has been arrested at a prison in Caracas.

Given the instability in Venezuela, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa

has called an UNASUR extraordinary meeting to address the issue. During the

inauguration ceremony of the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the worsening situation

29 According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook Database,

Venezuela's inflation was 56.193% (in 2013), 69.829% (in 2014) and the forecast for 2015 is 55.914% (IMF, 2015).

30 In 2013, the volume of exports fell 6.17%. In 2014, the drop was 0.189%. It is expected a slight recovery in 2015

(IMF, 2015).

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119Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

in the Andean country was discussed. In an official statement, the organization

rejected the violence and expressed condolences to victims’ families, as well as

solidarity to the Venezuelan people and the democratically elected government

(UNASUR, 2014).

The resolution signed at the Extraordinary Meeting of the UNASUR Council of

Foreign Ministers on Venezuela approved five points: 1) support the Venezuelan

government’s efforts to establish dialogue with opposition forces and social

movements; 2) creation of a mission to mediate negotiations, following Venezuela’s

request; 3) statement of the Pro Tempore Presidency to organize the work of

the Council of Foreign Ministers to act on the issue; 4) reporting and requesting

information about activities of Foreign Ministers to mediate the conflict; and

5) a statement of concern about threats to the independence and sovereignty of

Venezuela (UNASUR, 2014).

The UNASUR sent diplomatic missions composed of foreign ministers of Brazil,

Colombia and Ecuador, in addition to the current Secretary General of UNASUR

and former Colombian President Ernesto Samper. The organization has taken

two distinct courses of action. First, to mediate negotiations between Maduro’s

administration and opposition forces. Second, to negotiate with the US the end

of economic sanctions imposed by Washington to Venezuela.

In early 2015, Obama said the situation in Venezuela was a “national emergency

[...]. Unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy”

(OBAMA, 2015, p. 1, free translation)

. In addition, the US president imposed

sanctions against officials of Venezuela, as the freezing of economic transactions,

as well as prohibition to enter into the United States territory. These sanctions

are linked to Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, signed

by Obama in December 2014.

Relations between Washington and Caracas have been unstable since the

beginning of Chavism. After the 2014 protests, the situation has deteriorated

mainly due to Maduro accused the US of interference and support for coups in

Venezuela. Even though, Maduro requested UNASUR mediation for improving his

relations with the US, making the assessment of the Venezuelan situation even

more complex.

In March 2015, the UNASUR condemned the US classification of Venezuela as

a security problem and rejected sanctions imposed by Washington. At the same

31 “emergência nacional [...]. Ameaça não usual e extraordinária à segurança nacional e à política exterior”

(OBAMA, 2015, p. 1).

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120 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

time, it requested dialogue with the US. The UNASUR’s requests seem not to

have echoed in the northern portion of the continent, demonstrating that it is not

yet strong enough to dialogue with the superpower. In addition, it is important

to mention the curious fact that the Secretary General of UNASUR has not been

allowed to enter the US territory since 1996, when his visa has been suspended

for involvement with the Colombian drug trafficking (COSTA, 2015).

Although the attempt to negociate with the USA shows the evident fragility of

the organization, the internal context is slightly more encouraging. The UNASUR

has sent two missions to Venezuela, but the actual results are controversial. On

the one hand, it has entitled both by Maduro and opposition. In 2014, it held

negotiations between the parties and set some concrete solutions, such as the

release of prisoners, no use of lethal weapons by government military forces and

reestablishment of dialogue. However, opposition accused Maduro of not fulfilling

agreements, generating more instability.

The UNASUR put pressure on the Venezuelan president to implement the

partial renewal of public authorities, who were with expired mandates (MEZA,

2015). Maduro allowed the selection of new directors to the National Electoral

Council (CNE), the Supreme Court and the Comptroller General, important

institutions for the functioning of the democratic order. However, Maduro was

accused of hindering opposition’s access to these posts.

On the other hand, the UNASUR compromised its action in managing the

Venezuelan case due to some negative statements by Samper in relation to members

of the Venezuelan opposition. Malamud (2015, p. 1, free translation) accuses the

Secretary General of “abandoning the equidistance, being much closer to Maduro’s

government than to opposition forces”.

This perception complicated mediation

attempts, since the UNASUR has been one of the few organizations involved in

resolving regional tensions. The organization cannot afford the price of losing

symbolic capital in a period of economic and internal crisis of its members, which

has led to near paralysis of the organization.

Despite the criticism, the UNASUR put strong pressure on Caracas for holding

parliamentary elections, which is seen as a solution to the crisis and means to

normalize the democratic order in the country. In June 2015, the organization made

a series of announcements emphasizing the urgency of elections. The organization

said it “is going to keep on defending through [...] diplomatic channels the

32 “abandonar a equidistância, mostrando-se muito mais próximo do governo Maduro do que das forças de

oposição” (MALAMUD, 2015, p. 1).

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121Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

democratic institutions and the right of Venezuelans to resolve peacefully their

own differences” (UNASUR, 2015a, p. 1, free translation).

On June 22nd, 2015, the organization welcomed Venezuela by setting a date

for the elections – one of the points agreed in negotiations with the opposition –,

scheduled for December 6th, 2015. The UNASUR declared that “will implement an

immediate Election Monitoring mission which was requested by the president of

CNE and the Chancellors Committee of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador” (UNASUR,

2015b, p. 1, free translation).

Another statement, issued on June 24, 2015, the

organization stressed the importance of parliamentary elections and reiterated its

“fundamental commitment to ensure the effectiveness of peace, democracy and

human rights in the region” (UNASUR, 2015c, p. 1, free translation).

Venezuelan elections of November 2015 took place without major hassles.

The Election Monitoring Mission of UNASUR monitored the elections and, more

importantly, the calculations of votes and declaration of winners. It is important

to note that the result of this election was a major defeat for Chavism. Opposition

was largely successful, generating fear in the region for possible reactions from

Maduro’s administration. However, the Venezuelan government conceded defeat;

the first one since the dissolution of the old Congress in 2000.

Despite criticisms regarding an alleged omission, lenient reaction or dubious

position of its Secretary-General, it is important to note that UNASUR has provided

great contributions to the management of the Venezuelan crisis. The organization

used diplomatic channels and search for consensus, which are organization’s basic

elements. The Venezuelan case was crucial to test the UNASUR action ability in a

period of severe economic crisis and changes in domestic politics in the continent.

Conclusiones

Regionally, the UNASUR has become the central space for discussions of

South American problems. Its constant participation as conflicts mediator has

strengthened its pacifying feature. Even in face of limitations and flaws, the

33 “seguirá defendendo através de [...] canais diplomáticos a institucionalidade democrática do país, e o direito

dos venezuelanos de solucionar de forma pacífica suas próprias diferenças” (UNASUL, 2015a, p. 1).

34 “porá em prática imediatamente uma Missão de Acompanhamento Eleitoral que foi solicitada pela própria

presidenta do CNE, a Comissão de Chanceleres do Brasil, Colômbia e Equador” (UNASUR, 2015b, p. 1).

35 “compromisso fundamental de assegurar a vigência da paz, da democracia e dos direitos humanos na região”

(UNASUL, 2015c, p. 1).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

122 The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)

organization has demonstrated increasing authority to intervene in regional crisis,

especially with regard to destabilization of the democratic order.

Increased legitimacy of the UNASUR as conflicts mediator is accompanied

by the decrease of regional role played by the OAS. Although the hemispheric

organization is older and has a more consolidated institutional architecture,

counting on protection mechanism and promoting democracy, the UNASUR has

occupied – albeit with severe flaws – this space.

The emergence of UNASUR as a regional authority is remarkable. Its

performance has been based on the appeasement of the crisis, encouragement of

dialogue and rapid search for solutions with participation of member states. The

organization is informed by realpolitik, based on a relatively efficient and flexible

method for conflict resolution. In all cases presented, the organization tried to

mobilize the region rapidly to make decisions and build consensus, demonstrating

that its process of integration depends on the defense and promotion of democracy.

During the crises in Bolivia and Ecuador this attitude was very evident.

In relation to Paraguay, the UNASUR also sought dialogue and solutions quickly.

Although it has not reached its goal in the Paraguayan case, the organization

has shown that it has mechanisms to promote democracy at the regional level.

However, it proved to be weak in dealing with interests of economically strong

countries – Brazil and Argentina – in its mission to promote the South American

democratic order.

Furthermore, the complexity of Venezuelan politics prevents a quick decision

of UNASUR, as it involved an increasingly isolated and violent government,

a dubious opposition, allegations of the US interference, and the severe economic

crisis. The Venezuelan case shows the UNASUR’s weakness. The organization,

which has worked based on the presidential voluntarism, seems not to have the

previous power.

During this period of political and economic crisis in South American countries

(especially Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela), the UNASUR seems stuck on the South

American problems. The resolution of the Venezuelan conflict was linked to the

very progress of the organization; a failure of perception may mean the paralysis

of UNASUR and compromise its goals. Thus, the future of this integrative project

becomes dependent on its ability to maintain democratic order in the region.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 13, n. 1, 2018, p. 98-126

123Elias David Morales Martinez; Mariana P. O. de Lyra

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