
Luisa Giannini; Derek Assenço Creuz
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 19, n. 3, e1473, 2024
7-27
OSSIÊD
As múltiplas crises
do internacional
548–49). With the prerogative to try the perpetrators of the most atrocious
crimes possible, the ICC began its activities aer the entry into force of the
Rome Statute on July 1, 2002.3 Its mission is to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes, considered to be of concern to all humanity, and
consequently contribute to ensuring that such crimes do not occur again.
Therefore, preventing the recurrence of such crimes is an important element of
the Court’s foundation and is present in the preamble of the Rome Statute. The
Court’s web page also introduces to the public the beacon which sets its mission.
It presents that the Court’s call is to participate in a global fight to end impunity,
and through international criminal justice, […] to hold those responsible
accountable for their crimes and to help prevent these crimes from happening
again (International Criminal Court n.d.). This capacity for deterrence would
be exercised, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber I — when judging the OTP’s
request for the issuance of an arrest warrant against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo –,
especially due to the existence of two elements: the Court’s focus on trying high-
ranking military ocials and politicians (Pre-Trial Chamber I 2006, para. 54);
and the additional gravity threshold established by the Rome Statute’s article
17(1)(d) (Pre-Trial Chamber I 2006, para. 60). Through these two components,
the ICC would be ensuring its eectiveness “to perform its deterrent function
and maximizing the deterrent eect of its activities” (Pre-Trial Chamber I 2006,
para. 60).
The discussion related to the legitimacy of the ICC is closely linked to the
frequent and recent references to a crisis in the Court. ICC’s legitimacy has
been increasingly challenged (de Hoon 2017, 593). Most of the literature on the
subject anchor the Court’s ability to achieve its proposed mission to a greater
degree of legitimacy4 (see, for example, deGuzman 2009; Hibbert 2019; Dutton
and Sterio 2023). However, an appraisal of the ICC’s crisis requires an analysis
3 Despite coming into force on July 1, 2002, the irst judges elected to the ICC were only sworn in on March 11,
2003 (International Criminal Court 2003).
4 Since assessing the ICC’s legitimacy goes beyond (and perhaps against) our proposal, we do not elaborate
upon the way these events impact the Court’s legitimacy or even what comprises the notion of legitimacy.
These events’ impact on the Court’s legitimacy is undeniable. Our skepticism is, however, in relation to
the possibility of measuring an event’s impact on the Court’s legitimacy. It is our belief that discourses on
legitimacy are open and subject to constant modiication, a dispute over truth. Recognizing the contingency
concerning the deinition of legitimacy and the inability of its use in a descriptive way to explore its critical
potential, we embody the semantic incommensurability of legitimacy (see Florentino 2017, 211).