Luiz Felipe Dias Pereira
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 18, n. 1, e1300, 2023
1-28
Orthodox Christianity, Church-State
relations and pro-Russia stance in
contemporary Greece and Romania
1
Cristianismo ortodoxo, relações
Igreja-Estado e posicionamento pró-Rússia
na Grécia e Romênia contemporâneas
Cristianismo ortodoxo, relaciones
Iglesia-Estado y postura prorrusa en la
Grecia y Rumania contemporáneas
DOI: 10.21530/ci.v18n1.2023.1300
Luiz Felipe Dias Pereira
2
Abstract
This research aimed to analyze the pro-Russia stance in Greece and
Romania in the religious aspect. The hypothesis is that the secular
environment of the favours a distancing of these countries from the
European Union. This different perception of the role of religion in
public life may contribute to a favourable perception of Russia as
the protector of Orthodox Christians in the world. The theoretical
framework was composed mainly of critical constructivism and
the debate regarding religion in the field of International Relations.
The applied methods were Guzzini’s interpretive process tracing
and content analysis.
Keywords: Religion; Secularism; International Relations; Orthodox
Christianity; Russia.
1 This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de
Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.
2 Doutorando da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (PUC Minas),
Brasil. (luizfdpereira@gmail.com). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5135-1044.
Artigo submetido em 04/09/2022 e aprovado em 25/03/2023.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
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Orthodox Christianity, Church-State relations and pro-Russia stance in contemporary Greece and Romania
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 18, n. 1, e1300, 2023
2-28
Resumo
Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar o posicionamento pró-Rússia na Grécia e na
Romênia no aspecto religioso. A hipótese é de que o ambiente secular da União Européia
favorece um distanciamento desses países em relação à organização. Essa percepção
diferente do papel da religião na vida pública contribui para uma percepção favorável da
Rússia como protetora dos cristãos ortodoxos no mundo. O referencial teórico foi composto
principalmente pelo construtivismo crítico e o debate referente ao papel da religião nas
Relações Internacionais. Os métodos utilizados foram o process-tracing interpretativo de
Guzzini e a análise de conteúdo.
Palavras-Chave: Religião; Secularismo; Relações Internacionais; Cristianismo Ortodoxo;
Rússia.
Resumen
Esta investigación tuvo como objetivo analizar la postura prorrusa en Grecia y Rumania en
el aspecto religioso. La hipótesis es que el ambiente secular de la Unión Europea favorece
un distanciamiento de estos países de esta última.. Esta percepción diferente del papel
de la religión en la vida pública contribuye a una percepción favorable de Rusia como
protectora de los cristianos ortodoxos en el mundo. El marco teórico estuvoteórico estuvo
compuesto principalmente por el constructivismo crítico y el debate sobre la religión en las
Relaciones Internacionales. Los métodos utilizados fueron el interpretive process tracing
de Guzzini y el análisis de contenido.
Palabras clave: Religión; Secularismo; Relaciones Internacionales; Cristianismo Ortodoxo;
Rusia.
Introduction
A research carried out by the Pew Research Center (2017) revealed a favorable
perception of Russia’s foreign policy – in both geopolitical and religious terms
– in Orthodox-majority countries. In Catholic-majority countries, religiously
mixed countries and in countries where there is no is official religion, this “pro-
Russian” public opinion appears to be lower in quantitative terms. The survey
was carried out in 18 countries, and the data (%) obtained from people who
strongly or totally agree with each of the statements:
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Table 1 – In most Orthodox-majority countries, Russia seen as buffer against West
% who completely mostly agree the statement ...
A strong Russia is
necessary to balance
the influence of the
West
lt is in our country’s
interest to work closely
with the U.S. and other
Western powers Diff.
Orthodox majority
Russia 85% 55% +30
Belarus 76 56 +20
Serbia 80 61 +19
Armenia 83 66 +17
Bulgaria 56 48 +8
Greece 70 62 +8
Moldova 61 54 +7
Georgia 52 69 -17
Romania 52 82 -30
Ukraine 22 62 -40
Catholic majority
Croatia 50% 68% -18
Hungary 44 63 -19
Poland 34 71 -37
Lithuania 34 74 -40
Religiously mixed
Bosnia 55% 66% - 11
Latvia 40 61 -21
Estonia 34 72 -38
Majority religiously unaffiliated
Czech Republic 49% 67% -18
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, it was observed that support for Russia as a buffer against the
influence of the West among those who agree with the statement that “There is
a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West”. The
results obtained were:
Orthodox Christianity, Church-State relations and pro-Russia stance in contemporary Greece and Romania
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Table 2 – Support for Russia as buffer against West more widespread
among those who see value conflict with Western countries
% who agree that a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West among those who ...
Agree there is a
values conflict with
Western countries
Disagree there is a
values conflict with
Western countries Diff.
Romania 68% 38% +30
Moldava 71 47 +24
Poland 46 22 +24
Ukraine 38 14 +24
Bosnia 65 43 +22
Croatia 66 44 +22
Czech Republic 62 40 +22
Georgia 60 38 +22
Serbia 86 66 +20
Estonia 48 29 +19
Hungary 58 40 +18
Russia 91 75 +16
Lithuania 44 29 +15
Greece 77 63 +14
Belarus 84 71 +13
Bulgaria 68 58 +10
Latvia 48 38 +10
Armenia 86 78 +8
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, the report also informs that:
Regression analysis shows that even after controlling for age, gender,
education, ethnic Russian identity, religious observance and country of
residence, the perception that there is a values conflict with the West and
Orthodox religious affiliation are both strongly correlated with the view
that a strong Russia is needed to balance the influence of the West. (Pew
Research Center 2017, 37).
Considering that both Greece and Romania are members of the European
Union (EU) (since 1981 and 2007, respectively) (European Union 2020a; 2020b),
it would be expected that these countries would be closer to Western European
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countries in terms of common values and institutions, such as Church-State
relations. However, although a substantial part of their respective populations
affirms, they would also like to have relations with Western countries (Pew Research
Center 2017), more than half of their populations keep close ties with Russia in
religious terms. Therefore, this article is based on the following question: how
is it possible to understand this pro-Russia stance in Greece and Romania?
With the aim of understanding this phenomenon, this research is guided by
the following hypothesis: the secular environment of the European Union favors a
distancing of these countries from the organization. The aversion to Western values
(such as secularism) in Orthodox-majority countries may explain the perception
of Russia as an Orthodox powerful ally in international politics. It is also argued
that these societies have a perception about the role of secularism in society that
is different from the Western European model of Church-State relations.
The general objective of the research is to identify the relationship between
Orthodox Christianity and the pro-Russia stance in Greece and Romania presented
in the aforementioned research. In order to achieve it, the following specific
objectives were defined: 1) To identify the role of Orthodox Christianity in the
formation of both Greek and Romanian national identities; 2) Explore the contexts
of the integration processes of Greece and Romania into the EU; 3) Demonstrate the
relationship between EU’s secularism and the Orthodox Christian identities of Greece
and Romania and 4) Investigate the histories of Greece and Romania concerning
their respective spheres of influence. The analytical framework is composed of
Muppidi’s (2004) critical constructivism and the concepts of secular, secularization
and secularism as proposed by Casanova (2007; 2011). The methodology consisted
of Guzzini’s interpretivist process-tracing and content analysis.
Therefore, this research attempts to provide theoretical and empirical
contributions to the study of international relations/International Relations (ir/IR).
Firstly, it addresses gaps regarding the role of religion in the study field of IR. It
is known that religion has been overlooked in the discipline of IR (Chadha 2022)
and, as argued by Jeffrey Haynes (2021), religion is still an “opaque component
of how we understand international relations/International Relations” (Haynes
2021, 14). According to Hatzopoulos and Petito (2003, 1), religion has long been in
“exile” from international relations. This was seen as a condition for the existence
of modern international politics, since the absence of religion in international
relations goes back to the Wars of Religion in Modern Europe and the perception
that religion was a threat to security to order (Hatzopoulos & Petito 2003).
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Sandal and Fox (2013) cite the existence of three types of debates concerning
the role of religion in ir. The first would be the recognition of the absence of
religion in the field of IR, while the second type refers to the reason why religion
was neglected in IR, the third type includes studies that drawed attention to this
neglection but did not provide insights concerning the integration of religion
into ir. Finally, there is also the debate regarding the attempts of approaching
religion in IR theory. Thus, the present study offers a contribution to this
sub-field in IR studies, not by simply recognizing the marginalization of religion
in IR studies, but also providing an empirical analysis that may be generalized
and compared with other cases.
In this sense, the research contributes to the study of religion in international
relations by approaching the role of religion in foreign policy. Considering that
empirical events are the “main driver of developments in IR theory” (Haynes
2021, 3), this study seeked to contribute to the field of IR by pointing out a
phenomenon that demonstrates how religion can influence in public opinion
and the preferences in both states and non-statal actors (for instance, as in the
cases of Russia’s religious diplomacy and the pro-Russia stance in Greece and
Romania, respectively). In addition, by analysing the studied phenomenon,
this research also aimed to show how the relationship between religion and
politics may overlap the boundaries of the domestic and international politics
(Haynes 2021, 4).
Analytical framework and methodology: secularism, social
imaginaries and the interpretivist process-tracing
The study of Church-State relations in the field of International Relations
(IR) requires the introduction of relevant concepts related to the ideas of the
religious and the secular. Therefore, it is important to define three different
concepts that, although interconnected, have different meanings: The “secular”,
“secularization” and “secularism”.
The secular can be understood as an epistemic category in the context
of modernity – to refer to a reality external to the religious (Casanova 2011).
There may exist different secularities that can be “Codified, institutionalized,
and experienced in various modern contexts and the parallel and correlated
transformations of modern ‘religiosities’ and ‘spiritualities’.’” (Casanova 2011, 54).
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Casanova (2007) proposes an understanding of secularization from three
different meanings:
“a) Secularization as the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern
societies, often postulated as a universal, human, developmental process;
b) Secularization as privatization of religion, often understood both as a
general modern historical trend and as a normative condition, indeed as
a precondition for modern liberal democratic politics; c) Secularization
as the differentiation of the secular spheres (State, economy, science),
usually understood as “emancipation” from religious institutions and
norms (Casanova 2007, 7).
Secularism may have multiple meanings. It can be understood as “modern
ideologies concerning ‘religion’, “different normative-ideological state projects”
different legal-constitutional frameworks of separation of state and religion
and to different models of differentiation of religion, ethics, morality and law”
(Casanova 2011, 66). Nevertheless, Casanova (2011) also proposes an analytical
dinstinction between two meanings of secularism, being one of them secularism
as an ideology and the other being secularism as a “statecraft doctrine” (Casanova
2011, 66). The latter refers to the separation between religion and politics in order
to maintain the neutrality of the State towards all religions or for the sake of
protecting people’s freedom fo conscience. As for the former, Casanova (2011, 66)
argues that religion “becomes an ideology the moment it entails a theory of
what ‘religion’ is or does. It is this assumption that ‘religion’, in the abstract, is
a thing that has an essence or that produces certain particular and predictable
effects that is the defining characteristic of modern secularism”.
Critical constructivism
A critical constructivist approach, as proposed by Muppidi (2004), assumes
that agents interact socially through demands. The concept of social claims is
related to “Individual demands, obligations, and self-understandings, social
claims furnish analysts with a way to conceptualize an agent’s actions as they
relate to the actions of other units.” (Muppidi 2004, 22). In this sense, agents
manifest their own interests when faced with social demands. This process
requires the interaction with another agent, and these interactions only have
meaning when interpreted according to each social context. Social imaginaries
can be understood as “distinct fields of meanings and social power” (Muppidi
2004, 25) 21. Nevertheless, Muppidi (2004) also argues that:
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Operating as a field of meanings, the social imaginary provides an organized
set of interpretations—or social claims—for making sense of a complex
world. Operating as a field of social power, the social imaginary works to
produce specific relations of power through the production of distinctive
social identities. My analytical separation notwithstanding, both operations
are moments of the same process. (Muppidi 2004, 25).
In a social imaginary, symbols and meanings can be articulated. Muppidi
(2004) defines the process of articulation as:
Political mechanisms produced within a social imaginary. Their production
and reproduction involve political struggles over which combinations of
social meanings are legitimate and which are illegitimate. Such political
struggles involve critical constructivism implicit and explicit claims and
contestations over social identities involving, among other things, existing
imaginings of personal and community identities (Muppidi 2004, 26-27).
The process of interpellation, in turn, concerns how social agents receives
these meanings. For the author (2004), the analytical utility of the interpellation
is mainly given by the help with regard to understanding the persuasive power of
social statements. If the processes of articulation and interpellation are confirmed
(being complementary), this process gives rise to what Muppidi (2004) defines
as “reciprocal circles of meanings and social powers that generate specific social
identities with distinct social practices, interests and powers.” (Muppidi 2004, 27).
The main method selected to carry out this research is Guzzini’s (2012)
interpretivist process-tracing. The method’s premise is that the meanings and
effects of a given social phenomenon depend on the way in which it is perceived
and interpreted, and that meaning is given in a certain context (Guzzini 2012).
Understanding this meaning requires “placing particular beliefs/ideas within
their wider cultural context or more specific discourses.” (Guzzini 2012, 255).
This premise can be applied to this research since it proposes to understand
the relationship between different ideational structures since “ideas are not
conceptualised as objects that externally cause behaviour, but are constitutive
of interests and identity” (Guzzini 2012, 255).
Interpretivist process-tracing should be “interpretivist, historical and
multilayered.” (Guzzini 2012, 254). First, the method must be interpretivist, as
it deals with ideational elements, considering ideas, meanings, beliefs, among
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other elements of social reality that are in the context of a certain society. The
interpretation of certain phenomena, instead of focusing on the effect of a
certain international event on States, considers the interpretation of agents to be
essential for an analysis of the phenomenon. Analyzing this interpretation also
requires an investigation at the domestic level, aiming at an understanding of
the influence of meanings and beliefs shared by society, since both the meaning
and the effect caused by a social phenomenon depend on the way in which it
was interpreted by the agents (Guzzini 2012).
The method considers relevant the interpretations of agents in the face of a
social phenomenon, but it is also important to mention that, when applying the
method, the analysis should not be limited to interpretations at the individual
level, but observe the cultural context of each case more broadly. For this reason,
interpretivist process-tracing proposes an analysis that considers not only beliefs
and worldviews, but also the ideational bases from which social elements that must
be contextualized and not taken as presuppositions, such as beliefs, meanings,
ideas, identities and interests were constituted (Guzzini 2012).
However, interpretivist process-tracing must also be historical. Elements such
as time and the idea of sequence are necessary to understand the unfolding of
a given process (Guzzini 2012). About this characteristic, the author States that
“as in all processes related to identities, memory and representation of history
and sequence must also be incorporated in the analysis” (Guzzini 2012, 255).
Another relevant feature of Guzzini’s (2012) interpretivist process-tracing is
the idea of multiple layers. Instead of analyzing the process in question from
a single line, but from several, id est, it should also consider the evolution of
several autonomous processes, in different layers of society. Each layer (e.g.,
political, institutional, social) has its own rhythm, therefore, it is necessary to
analyze the temporal relationships and intersections and their relationship with
the processes studied (Guzzini 2012). Thus, it follows the logic of a “[...] the
temporal intersection of distinctive trajectories of different, but connected, long-
term processes. (Guzzini 2012, 256).
The other method applied was a content analysis that includes the collection
of qualitative and quantitative data. The Eurobarometer publishes data on
public opinion in the European Union. Qualitative data was collected from
the Observatoire des Religions et de Laïcite (ORELA), which publishes reports
regarding secularism in the European Union. Besides, data provided by the Pew
Research Center surveys were also included in the analysis.
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Reports, news and speeches by religious leaders were included. These
documents were obtained from websites related to the Orthodox world and some
excerpts from these documents were selected for the content analysis. Bauer’s
(2003) definition of content analysis was applied. The method allows the analyst
to make inferences based on texts, considering the social context in which the
latter is produced. Therefore, the analysis includes representations of social
realities, considering texts as vehicles of expression. Texts can be interpreted as
expressions of a social context since they can be understood as representations of
social realities and are directed towards an audience (Bauer 2003). In this sense,
the texts analysed allow the researcher to reconstruct “cosmovisions, values,
attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes.” (Bauer 2003, 192).
The orthodox social imaginary and social mechanisms
The first step of the research process was to apply the interpretivist process-
tracing in the study of the object, following its historical aspect and the idea of
multiple layers. It was intended to analyse micro and macro dynamics in Greece
and Romania, looking for the possible influence of intersubjective elements –
such as religion and culture – in this society (e.g. the role of religion in national
identity).
In 1054, a fragmentation in the Christian world led to the establishment
of the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church of the East, the latter
being predominated in the nations located at the Eastern part of Christianity.
The Orthodox world is composed of independent Churches and the absence of
a central authority – such as the Pope – a characteristic that would contribute
to the emergence of local Churches, that is, the adaptation of Orthodoxy to
regional (and national) cultural elements (Ware, 1964). This fact is essential
for understanding the relationship between religion and national identity in the
contemporary world.
Today, it is possible to observe a sharp geographical division on the religious
(primarily Christian) map of Central and Eastern Europe, as shown by the figure
below:
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Figure 1 – Religious majorities in Central and Eastern Europe
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
The figure presents the relevance of Orthodox Christianity in Central and
Eastern European countries. There is a positive public opinion in these countries
that “Religion should be kept away from governmental policies.” (Pew Research
Center 2017, 97). However, in these same societies, about a third of their respective
populations agree with the idea that the government should promote religious
values. This was also observed in Greece and Romania.
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Graph 1 – Majorities favor separation of church and
State, but substantial minorities disagree
% who say ...
22% 76%
75
70
69
68
67
62
61
59
59
57
51
50
50
50
47
44
36
25
27
26
28
34
29
36
36
36
46
42
42
42
43
52
59
21
Bosnia
Czech Republic
Poland
Croatia
Estonia
Hungary
Greece
Latvia
Moldova
Serbia
Ukraine
Romania
Belarus
Bulgaria
Russia
Lithuania
Georgia
Armenia
Governments should support spread of religion
Religion and government policies should be separate
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. Religious Belief and National
Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, this phenomenon presents even greater complexity. It was also
observed that in Orthodox-majority countries there is greater support for the
idea that governments should spread religious values when compared to Western
European countries, and this opinion does not have the same popularity in
Catholic-majority countries or those whose religious background is mixed or
where there is no national or privileged religion (Pew Research Center 2017).
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Nevertheless, at the same time, in Orthodox-majority countries, there is higher
support for public funding of national churches compared to countries that do
not have a privileged religion.
Graph 2 – Higher suppor in Orthodox countries
for government funding of the dominant church
% who say the dominant church in
the country should receive financial
support from the government
Lithuania
Croatia
Poland
Hungary
Georgia
Moldova
Armenia
Romania
Serbia
Bulgaria
Russia
Belarus
Ukraine
Greece
82%
68
62
58
58
53
50
44
38
42%
41
44%
30
18%
40
28
18
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Orthodox majority
Catholic majority
Majority religiously unaffiliated
Religiously mixed
Source: Pew Research Center. 2017. Religious Belief
and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Among Orthodox-majority countries, there was a higher percentage of
individuals who agreed with a possible “conflict between our country’s traditional
values and those of the West.” (Pew Research Center 2017, 151). This conflict of
values is more visible in Orthodox-majority countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
which have similar/common values with Russia (Pew Research Center 2017). In
Greece and Romania, 70% and 51% of their respective populations agree with
the aforementioned statement (Pew Research Center 2017).
In addition, the concept of “Orthodox Anti-Westernism” (Makrides 2009, 211)
is primordial to understanding the differences between Western and Central/
Eastern Europe concerning religious values. It is a phenomenon not restrained to
the religious sphere and it refers to an aversion to Western institutions existing
among Eastern Orthodox societies. It is also related to the idea that the EU
neglects Orthodox demands, which, in turn, contributes to a perception of the
EU as an institution at the service of the West (Makrides 2009).
The Greek Case
While “opening the black box” of the Greek State, the first element analysed
was the level of attatchment of Greek citizens to the European Union. In the autumn
2016 Eurobarometer, Greece had one of the lowest percentages of attachment to
the institution (32%), ranking in the bottom three, along with the Czech Republic
(31%) and Cyprus (26%) (European Commission 2016a). In the autumn 2017
Eurobarometer, only 8% of Greeks said they felt very attached to the bloc, and
29% felt relatively attached to the European Union, while 35% and 28% said
they felt not very attached and definitely not attached, respectively (European
Commission 2017).
Vasilopoulou (2018) argues that Greeks’ perception of the EU became more
negative from 2009 onwards. The economic crisis led Greek society began to
associate the EU with a supposed loss of sovereignty, and the reception of
refugees, contributed to the construction of an opinion among Greeks that the
EU would no longer be able to help the country with the crisis: this context, in
turn, favored the rise of skepticism regarding integration (Vasilopoulou 2018).
It is therefore argued that, in the Greek case, there is a point of convergence
between social dynamics (at different times) at the micro and macro levels
(the crisis and the growing lack of identification with the EU and with Europe
itself) which, at the same time, they interact with the main social mechanism
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identified, i.e., Greece’s entry into the European Union and its adaptation to
the bloc’s secularism. In the context of the crisis and skepticism towards the
European Union, there are some signs of secularization in Greek society despite
the fact that religion still has an influence on the daily life of the population
(Orela 2018). According to Orela’s dossier:
The broad social legitimization of the Orthodox Church has probably
rendered it the most influential ‘interest group’ within Greek politics. In
short, religious officials lobby in order to reproduce the Church monopoly
and social capital, and try to influence the decision-making process in order
to carry through their policies. In exchange for preferential treatment, the
Church constitutes, historically, a pillar for the shaping of social consensus
(Papastathis 2015, n/p).
Recently, Archbishop Ieronymos and former Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
reached an agreement on removing priests and bishops from their status as
civil servants, a fact that has generated discontent among them, although the
agreement includes maintaining the payment of their salaries (BBC 2018);
agreement rejected by the Holy Synod of the GOC in 2019 (Kampouris 2019). In
fact, it is possible to say that “Global economic crisis has moved religious issues
to the background.” (Orela 2018, 14,)110, since the country has been suffering
from a humanitarian crisis since 2010 (context in which the Church assumed
an important philanthropic role, providing services to the population, such as
food, housing and financial assistance) (Makris; Bekridakis , 2013). Therefore,
in contemporary Greek society, it is possible to observe the concepts of secular,
secularism and secularization manifesting themselves in different ways.
A report published by the European Commission points to the existence
of a favorable perception of Russia in contemporary Greece. In the Special
Eurobarometer 451 on the future of Europe, citizens of each member country
were asked as follows: “Would you say that the political influence of the EU is
currently stronger or weaker than that of…? Russia.” (European Commission
2016b, 19); Greece’s percentages of total numbers of “stronger” and “weaker”
were 28% and 67% (European Commission, 2016b). In the same survey, faced
with the question “And in your opinion, in 2030, the political influence of the
EU will be stronger or weaker than that of…? Russia?”, the total numbers of
“stronger” and “weaker” of Greeks interviewed were 25% and 60%, respectively
(European Comission, 2016b, 25). Nevertheless, the question “As regards each of
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the following countries or group of countries, do you have a positive or a negative
view about it?” revealed that 66% of Greeks have a positive image of Russia,
while 32% have a negative view (European Comission 2016b, 38). According to
Marantzidis and Siakas (2017), this “russophilia” can be understood as having
an “‘emotional’ or fanciful’” character, while Europeanism is characterized as
“rational”, since Russia does not present itself as attractive when it comes to
issues such as work and study (Marantzidis; Siakas 2017, n.p.).
The Romanian case
In the Eurobarometer of 2016 (Autumn), Romanians were asked about
their feeling of attachment to the European Union. The percentages of “fully
attached” and “fully non-attached” were 54% and 43%, respectively (European
Comission 2016a). Romania has a relatively positive level of attachment to the
EU. In the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2017, Romania showed a feeling of
belonging to the bloc slightly above the average of member countries: citizens
were asked how attached they considered themselves to the EU, being able to
choose between the options: “very attached”, “relatively attached”, “not very
attached”, “definitely not attached” or “does not know”. While the average across
countries was 14% “very attached”, 41% relatively attached, 31% “not very
attached”, 12% “definitely not attached” and 2% “don’t know”, Romanians’
rates the rates of Romanians interviewed were 17%, 38%, 30%, 11% e 4%,
respectively (European Comission 2017).
Since Orthodoxy is supposed to be one of the foundations for Romanian
national identity, that is, it is rooted in the individual and collective identities
of Romanians, it is possible that religion provides a standard model of behavior,
which includes values, norms and ethics, that is, they shape attitudes (Sandor;
Popescu 2008). Also, there is today in Romania a positive perception of the role
of religious institutions in strengthening morality and creating social bonds (Pew
Research Center 2017).
According to a report by Humanists International (2020) on freedom of
thought in Romania, despite the constitution and other laws guaranteeing freedom
of religion and/or belief, it is observed that the Romanian government not only
favors the ROC, but also limits the freedom of beliefs and practices of other
minorities, whether religious or not. The Romanian government provides public
funding for religious institutions that, according to the law, receive incentives
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from the State fund according to the number of believers of each denomination;
consequently, the Romanian Orthodox Church receives most of this fund (Humanists
International 2020).
Religion is also present in the educational system. In addition to the fact that
the Romanian constitution allows for State-subsidized educational institutions,
public schools offer religious education (for recognized religions), with students
attending classes related to their parents’ religion (Humanists International
2020). Romanian students who choose not to take religious education subjects in
schools must make an application, which is “An option that had not been widely
publicised before the end of 2014, and which may be socially discouraged.”
(Humanists International 2020, 3).
An example of Romanian perception of secularism can be the construction
of the largest Orthodox cathedral in the world: The Cathedral of the Salvation
of the People, whose construction began in 2010, being financed with public
money and having the approval of the vast majority of the Romanian population,
although there are some disagreements about the transparency of public money
invested (Turp 2018). In this regard, Turp (2018) quotes the speech of a councilor
from Bucharest, Ciprian Ciucu, who States that
The problem is that this is public money and yet there has been no
transparency regarding the way it is spent,” said Ciprian Ciucu, a Bucharest
city councillor. “OK, we allocate money to the church, but the church in turn
should be obliged to present quarterly reports as to what it has done with
that money. I recognise the benefits of the church and the spiritual comfort
it brings to people, but in a secular State the church must nevertheless
respect its formal obligations. (Ciucu apud Turp 2018, n/p.).
The councilor conceives of Romania as a secular country, but its articulation
in the Romanian social imaginary does not separate the Church from the State,
as we could observe from the practices, both through the expression of public
opinion and the influence of the ROC in public education. In this sense, it is
possible to infer that Romanians find themselves in an ambiguous condition
(compared to Western secularism), with its own understanding of the secular.
Romania went through the communist experience and was in the Russian
sphere of influence. This trajectory is of great relevance to analyze the perception
of Russia in contemporary Romania, which diverges from those previously
mentioned. In a survey conducted by the Center for Insights in Survey Research
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(2018) in Romania – 69% of Romanians interviewed strongly agreed with the
Statement that maintaining relations with the Union European Union would
be better for national interests, while 22% somewhat agreed, 5% somewhat
disagreed, 2% strongly disagreed and 2% did not know or had no opinion. While
the EU had the highest approval rating in this regard, Russia was second to last,
on the same issue, 35% of Romanians strongly agreed with the Statement that
“national interests would be better served by maintaining strong relations with”
Russia, while 32% somewhat agreed, 20% somewhat disagreed, 10% strongly
disagreed and 4% had no opinion (Center For Insights in Survey Research 2018).
In the 2016 Special Eurobarometer (451) on the Future of Europe, Romanians
when asked whether the current EU influence would be stronger or weaker than
Russia’s, or whether they believed this influence would be stronger or weaker in
2030 and the picture of each country mentioned, 36% of Romanians said that the
EU’s influence in their country is currently stronger than that of Russia, while
49% believed that the EU’s influence was weaker than that of Russia. Romanians
were divided on whether the EU’s influence could be stronger or weaker than
Russia’s in 2030, with 38% stronger and weaker. Finally, in total numbers, 53%
of Romanians claimed to have a positive image of Russia, while 41% Stated to
have a negative image (European Commission, 2016b).
Russia’s religious diplomacy
Since 2012, the Russian Orthodox Church has presented a discourse that
emphasizes the ideas of “family values” and “spiritual ties” in contrast to a
supposed model of Western modernization; nevertheless, in this context, Orthodoxy
and its traditional values are at the base of Russian society, also representing a
defence against liberalism (Antunez 2017). According to Demacopolous (2017),
the significance of the Moscow Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians is related
not to a supposed theological statement, but to the meaning of geopolitics and
the Russian State, that is, it is associated with the way in which President Putin
came to highlight Orthodox Christianity as a significant feature of Russian culture.
In this sense, the perception of Orthodox Christians about Putin, Russia and
the Moscow Patriarchate is related to the traditional values defended by them,
considering that the “Russian government’s promotion of ‘traditional values’,
which are very popular among Christians orthodox, is often juxtaposed with the
idea of “a godless, secular West” (Demacopolous 2017, n.p).
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Secularism and identity in the orthodox social imaginary
An analysis of documents found on the websites of Churches and/or
Patriarchates, produced and disseminated by important members of their respective
hierarchies, aiming at an interpretation of speeches that are related to the orthodox
perception of secularism was conducted during this research. The documents found
were messages from religious leaders – and from President Putin –considering
these speeches as an expression of Greek and Romanian social imaginaries.
The first excerpt to be explored – entitled Speech by Patriarch Daniel Ciobotea.
Religious education: training young people for life. Held at the International
Congress on Youth Education in the Context of Current Secularization, 2016 – was
taken from a message from the Patriarch of Romania addressed to the Romanian
population (Anghel 2016)3.
[...] In the context of current secularisation, when traditional values are
weakened and education is subject to changes of paradigm, young people
need support from Family, Church and School, since only through proper
orientation and by promoting authentic models they will be able to discern
between current challenges and future perspectives. [...] In the educational
field, the Romanian Orthodox Church played a significant role throughout
the history of the Romanian people, helping to organise and enrich education
and national culture. The Romanian school was founded in the church
porch and continued to exist and develop in close connection with the
Church. (Ciobotea apud Anghel 2016).
In the first excerpt, current secularization is represented in a negative way,
a threat whose effect on society can already be seen through the “weakening” of
traditional values and the “paradigm shift” in education. The ROC, as a subject,
is related to “education” and “national culture”, which points to the fact that
these elements have always been connected by a close relationship throughout
the history of the Romanian people. It is observed that, through the mentioned
terms and their functions as subject/predicate, the discourse reinforces the need
for the presence of the ROC in the area of education.
3 Message of His Beatitude Daniel, Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church, on the occasion of the International
Congress of Theology Religious Education of Young People in the Context of Current Secularisation (Bucharest,
3-7 September 2016).
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The second excerpt4 was taken from an interview by Patriarch Daniel Ciobotea
about the mission of the Church in the last ten years. Among the topics addressed
were the use of technology in pastoral action, the missions of the Church in
society, among others (Iftimiu62017). In the speech, the Patriarch mentions
secularization in three passages, which will be analyzed here:
In an environment of growing secularisation and even of hostility against
religion, we are called to acknowledge our duty to confess Christ’s love
for humanity in its entirety. We also need to recognise the challenge of
receiving His message in a society prone simply to ‘tolerate’ the presence
of the Church, as a mere player in the reconciliation process in case of
conflict, or as an institution of human charity and solidarity without
reference to salvation or eternal life. (Ciobotea apud Iftimiu 2017, n.p,).
As in the previous speech, when mentioning secularization, it is described
as a source of threat to society. Considering that the phenomenon is “growing”,
it is up to the subject “us” to react to secularization and resist the supposed
social hostility. This hostility, in principle directed towards religion, summons
the subject “we” to act actively, so that, in order to receive the divine message,
it is necessary for the Church and the Romanian Orthodox christians to seek the
establishment of a greater space of the Church and religion in society. Posteriorly,
secularization is mentioned one more time:
In every circumstance, we must fulfil our vocation to be servants of the
Gospel of Christ’s love, even if we are frequently faced with the hostility
of a secularised society, defined by religious indifference. We also have the
sacred calling to be defenders of life, identity and dignity of the human
person, even when we encounter the icy breath of desacralisation in a
globalised society, which at once ‘flattens down’ identities, and at the
same time seeks, with an obvious bias, to marginalise the Church’s role
and presence in society. (Ciobotea apud Iftimiu 2017, n.p).
Again, the speech contains a call against the “hostility” associated with
secularization. The very construction of “gospel” and “hostility” of a “secularized
society” can be interpreted in such a way that secularization is a phenomenon
that necessarily interferes negatively in the relationship between God and the
faithful. That is, the construction of the subject “we” – “must”, “be” – also
4 4.2 Text 2: Exclusive Interview | Patriarch Daniel speaks about the mission of the Church in the past 10 years.
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establishes the other, that is, the secular, as a threat directed not only to the
Church, but to the lives of all the faithful. The emphasis on the processes of
secularization and globalization as a threat to social identities also reinforces
the idea that the Church must maintain its space in society.
The following excerpts was taken from a text on the Holy and Great Counci
website5. Having as search criteria the presence of terms such as “secular”,
“secularism”, “secularization/secularized”, “identity” and “Church”. In the
text, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew addresses President Pavlopoulos (of
Greece). The passage was selected because of the mention of the ideal Orthodox
model of relations between State and Church. In the words of the Ecumenical
Patriarch himself:
It is a well-known fact that the relations between Church and State have
gone through many phases, but regardless of the different ways we may
characterize these relations, it is true, as a matter of fact, that both the State
and the Church are concerned about man and improving the condition of his
life. The State focuses her concern on the secular welfare of her citizens and
the Church, while concerned about the earthly life, is also holding promise
both for the present life and the life to come, to use ecclesial language.
Your Excellency is certainly aware of all this for you are an expert in the
field of law and political science and you are someone who knows very
well our education and history since you also were raised in an Orthodox
environment. You fully understand the importance of the collaboration of
these two great institutions and continue this good and blessed tradition of
affable relations of cooperation and non-interference between the two.[…]
With these thoughts, Your Excellency Mr. President, we thank through your
person the honorable Greek State and the beloved Greek people for their
prayerful presence and support of the work of our Synod and we promise
that Orthodoxy shall fulfill Her historic duty and responsibility that has
been assigned to her by the Lord and the illumination of the Comforting
Holy Spirit. eHoly and Great Council 2016).
Here, the Ecumenical Patriarch, regarded by Greek society as the highest
Orthodox religious authority, mentions the general idea of symphonia in his
speech to the Greek president. The speech has an assertive tone in relation to the
5 4.34.2 Text 3: Toast by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew Chairman of the Holy and Great
Council of the Orthodox Church at the Official Luncheon Hosted in His Honor and in Honor of Their Beatitudes
the Primates of the Orthodox Autocephalous Churches by His Excellency Prokopios Pavlopoulos President of
the Republic of Greece.
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subject “you”, “you were also raised in an orthodox environment”, “are aware”,
“completely understand”. The speech attributes to the subject “you/president”,
who is also immersed in an Orthodox culture, and consequently, to the State
and to the Greek nation, the maintenance of a State-Church relationship based
on orthodox historical models.
The transcript of Putin’s speech on his visit to Greece in 2016 (Department
for External Church Relations 2016)
6
can be interpreted as an expression of his
religious diplomacy, therefore, the selection criterion for this passage is related
to an exemplification of this phenomenon. Considering the relevance of Russian
diplomacy with regard to the research problem proposed here. On his trip, the
Russian president sought to highlight common symbolic ties with the Greeks.
On the occasion, Putin Stated that
For over a thousand years now, the spiritual traditions and our common
values have been carefully preserved and enriched here. I fully agree
that the role played by Mount Athos is crucial at a time when Orthodoxy
is growing stronger in Russia and other countries where it is confessed.
Orthodoxy is gaining ground, helping a great number of people, including
Russians, to find inner support. […] In 2016, we are holding a reciprocal
Year of Culture between Russia and Greece. For centuries our people
have been united by a common faith and mutual affection, which, as has
already been mentioned, have helped our peoples overcome difficulties
and vanquish. This was true during the liberation of the Balkans and at
other stages of world history. Today’s generation of our citizens fully shares
these deep mutual feelings. (Putin apud Department for External Church
Relations 2016, n/p).
In this passage, the speech illustrates an expansion of Orthodoxy that is
actively expanding, attributing part of this process to the preservation of Orthodox
values on Mount Athos. In this sense, the expansion of Orthodoxy “in other
countries”, Orthodoxy, as a subject, does not appear accompanied by any of
the nationalities, as they usually appear; This may represent a rapprochement
between peoples that is not limited to the national Churches. Furthermore, the
speech does not present religion alone as the only element that unites nations.
The context of the following excerpt refers to a meeting between Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow and Patriarch Daniel of Romania (Department for External
6 2.1 Text 4: President Putin visits Russian St. Panteleimon Monastery on Athos.
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Church Relations 2017a)7. During the discussions, he commented to Patriarch
Kirill of Russia that:
As we discussed in Bucharest, the main problem for the society today
is secularization, which means a change in the mentality and order of
human life in the way as if there is no God. [...] I think, at our further
pan- Orthodox meetings we should speak of the family and secularisation.
(Ciobotea apud Department for External Church Relations 2017a, n.p).
As in the excerpts previously presented, in this brief commentary Patriarch
Daniel reinforces the idea that secularization is not just a social problem, but the
“main” capable of altering the social order itself. Referring to “pan-Orthodox”
meetings, the discourse attributes to secularization an issue of relevance at a
global level, which probably needs an articulation between all Churches in order
to be properly addressed (Department for External Church Relations 2017a).
The following excerpt was taken from a meeting of Patriarch Kirill with the
Committee of Representations of Orthodox Churches for the European Union
(Department for External Church Relations 2017b)8. The excerpt was selected
with a view to demonstrating the way in which the Churches articulate between
itself, defending its interests. Bearing in mind the pro-Russian stance in countries
with Orthodox culture, it is important to note Patriarch Kirill’s meeting with the
Orthodox representations of the EU:
We know that the process of forming this Orthodox representation was not
quite easy. Yet, by God’s mercy, today there is a high level of understanding
of how we should work together in our interaction with the European
institutions. [...] We, as the one Orthodox Church, have common views,
and we need to represent our interests together. (Kirill apud Department
for External Church Relations 2017b, n/p).
This speech by Patriarch Kirill with representatives of the Committee of
Representatives of Orthodox Churches for the European Union also builds an idea
of common interests and problems. From the speeches presented, it is possible to
infer that there is an alignment of narratives between the Greek, Romanian and
Russian Orthodox discourses about secularization being treated as a threat (both
7 Patriarch Kirill meets with Patriarch Daniel of Romania.
8 His Holiness Patriarch Kirill meets with members of the Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches
to the European Union.
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external and internal). Understanding this relationship between these discourses
is important to understand how these religious authorities, which have influence
in countries where the Orthodox religion is the majority, legitimize practices,
identities and interests that can be internalized by their respective populations.
Final remarks
The favorable perception of Russia in Greece and Romania is manifested
at a time when dynamics at national and international level corroborate the
existence of this phenomenon. Thus, the argument of this analysis consists of
the following premises:
1) The Orthodox social imaginaries in Greece and Romania, through the
articulation of meanings, interests, power relations and identities, allowed
the construction of an ideational basis, in which values, norms, and
understandings about the functioning of the world led to a different
interpretation of European integration and the idea of Europe. Social
mechanisms, microdynamics and parallel dynamics contributed to the
perception of Europe and secularism to constitute distinct meanings.
2) Due to different historical trajectories and Greek and Romanian Orthodox
social imaginaries, modernity, human rights and secularism have different
meanings from those existing in the West.
4) Putin’s religious diplomacy – a parallel phenomenon that is, in fact,
relevant – occurs at the same time that this Russophilia manifests itself
in these countries, however, it should not be analyzed as the main cause
of this phenomenon.
Conclusion
Based on the evidences presented, it is possible to argue religious and cultural
elements may help to explain the pro-Russia stance in Greece and Romania. In
both cases, this good perception of Russia seems to be related to these countries’
common values and aversion to Western secularism. Future studies could benefit
from analysing this type of phenomenon through the theoretical approeaches
of desecularization (id est, an analysis of the ways in which religion returns to
the public sphere) and post-secularism. The concept of desecularization can
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contribute to research related to contemporary Russian religious diplomacy,
analysing this process as a “counter-secularization” (Karpov 2010, 236). Studies
on post-secularism are relatively recent in the field (Mavelli; Petito 2014) and
assume that the European secular experience did not materialize in non-Western
countries, but also to the cases of the Orthodox-majority countries in the EU.
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