Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães; João Vitor Tossini
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 18, n. 1, e1299, 2023
1-23
AUKUS, the brazilian nuclear-powered
submarine, and the implications for
the nuclear non-proliferation regime
AUKUS, o submarino de propulsão
nuclear brasileiro e as implicações para
o regime de não proliferação nuclear
AUKUS, el submarino brasileño de
propulsión nuclear y las implicaciones
para el régimen de no proliferación nuclear
DOI: 10.21530/ci.v18n1.2023.1299
Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães
1
João Vitor Tossini
2
Abstract
In 2021, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom
announced the formation of a security partnership. Hence, Australia
and Brazil could become states without nuclear weapons but
with nuclear-powered submarines. The objective is to identify
the consequences of the decision made by these countries to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system.
The methodology consisted of a literature review and comparative
method. It was concluded that the main consequences are related
1 Doutoranda no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais
San Tiago Dantas (UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP). Bolsista CAPES/BRASIL no
projeto 88887.387832/2019-00 e no projeto 88887.696984/2022-00.
(victoria.viana@unesp.br). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4344-6542.
2 Doutorando no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais
San Tiago Dantas (UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP). Grant nº 2021/06878-4, São
Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). (vitor.tossini@unesp.br).
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9844-4675.
Artigo submetido em 31/08/2022 e aprovado em 30/04/2023.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
ISSN 2526-9038
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to IAEA safeguards, nuclear proliferation and the reinforcement of inequalities within
the NPT.
Keywords: Non-proliferation; AUKUS; Nuclear-powered submarine.
Resumo
Em 2021, Austrália, Estados Unidos e Reino Unido anunciaram a formação de uma parceria
de segurança. Assim, Austrália e Brasil poderiam se tornar estados sem armas nucleares,
mas com submarinos de propulsão nuclear. O objetivo é identificar as consequências da
decisão desses países para o Tratado de Não Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (NPT) e o
sistema de salvaguardas da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA). A metodologia
consistiu na revisão de literatura e no método comparativo. Concluiu-se que as principais
consequências estão relacionadas com as salvaguardas da AIEA, a proliferação nuclear e
o reforço das desigualdades dentro do TNP.
Palavras-chaves: Não proliferação; AUKUS; Submarino de propulsão nuclear.
Resumen
En 2021, Australia, Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido anunciaron la formación de una
asociación de seguridad. Por lo tanto, Australia y Brasil podrían convertirse en estados sin
armas nucleares pero con submarinos de propulsión nuclear. El objetivo es identificar las
consecuencias de la decisión tomada por estos países al Tratado sobre la No Proliferación
de Armas Nucleares (TNP) y al sistema de salvaguardias del Organismo Internacional de
Energía Atómica (OIEA). La metodología consistió en una revisión de literatura y un método
comparativo. Se concluyó que las principales consecuencias están relacionadas con las
salvaguardias del OIEA, la proliferación nuclear y el reforzamiento de las desigualdades
dentro del TNP.
Palabras-clave: No proliferación; AUKUS; Submarino de propulsión nuclear.
Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães; João Vitor Tossini
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Introduction
On September 15th, 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States jointly announced the formation of a new trilateral security partnership
in the Indo-Pacific, known by their initials: AUKUS. This security partnership is
the initial result of a shared Anglo-American interest in reaffirming their strategic
position in a region witnessing increasing strategic competition derived from a
perceived Chinese security threat. In addition, to expand cooperation in defence
and security between the three countries and increase their performance in the
Indo-Pacific, through AUKUS, it was established that Australia would obtain
nuclear-powered submarines. The Australian reasoning behind the deal is mainly
based on perceived security threats in the Indo-Pacific, sharing similar strategic
concerns with the British and Americans regarding China (White 2022). However,
it should be noted that the then government took this decision with almost no
consultation with the Opposition or the people of Australia. Thus, while it has
been confirmed in March 2023 as going to proceed, there is some opposition to
the proposal by many Australians based on cost, the timing of building these
submarines, the risks to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear waste disposal concerns,
whether it is the optimal type of submarine to use, whether in fact, China is a
threat and if so whether these submarines are the best response to this threat.
Australia is not the first country without nuclear weapons to embark on
a nuclear submarine programme. Brazil has been working on developing a
nuclear-powered submarine since the late 1970s. Although in the mid-1990s, the
programme practically halted, in 2008, it received a new financial boost through
the creation of the Submarine Development Program (Prosub). The Brazilian
nuclear submarine programme has multiple drivers: protection of its coast and
offshore natural resources, protection from potential enemies approaching from
the sea, naval bureaucratic interests, and the country’s desire to bolster its
international standing (K assenova 2014). Thus, its drivers are quite different in
comparison to the Australian case.
Despite their differences, both countries could become States without nuclear
weapons but with nuclear technology for military purposes. It is important to
emphasise that only six countries — the US, Russia, UK, France, China and
India — currently possess nuclear-powered submarines. Therefore, Brazil and
Australia would be the first non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to maintain
nuclear-powered submarines without nuclear strike capabilities. In the Treaty on
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the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard system, there exists what many academics
have called a “loophole” (Cormier 2022; Costa 2017; Kaplow 2017; Von Hippel
2019 ; Moltz 1998; 2005; 2006)3 or “grey area” (Desjardins; Rauf 1988) that
allow NNWS to remove fissile material from the safeguards regime and use
it in non-weapon and non-explosive related military applications like fuelling
nuclear submarine reactors. Hence, acquiring or developing nuclear-powered
submarines is not necessarily illegal, but as Marianne Hanson (2023) has pointed
out it “undermines the spirit of the NPT” (verbal information).
Considering this context, the article’s objective consists in identifying the
consequences of the decision made by these countries to the NPT and the
IAEA safeguard system through a historical analysis. The research was designed
around the question: What are the consequences for the NPT and the IAEA
safeguard system derived from the AUKUS agreement and the Brazilian Nuclear-
Powered Submarine? It is argued that the Brazilian and the Australian decision
to pursue nuclear-powered submarines can encourage other countries to adopt
a similar agenda, increase the challenges of controlling nuclear proliferation
and deepen the inequalities within the NPT. Consequently, these cases imply
an even bigger complication to the nuclear non-proliferation regime4, which
faces several dilemmas due to a lack of advances in nuclear disarmament and
the ongoing modernisation of nuclear arsenals.
This article employs the Comparative Method. According to Collier (1993,
105), comparison enhances our description capabilities, playing a central role
in “concept-formation by bringing suggestive similarities and contrasts among
cases” into focus. The types of occurrences largely influence the option to analyse
a restricted number of cases under study and how they are defined. As noted
by Collier (1993), the decision to explore a small number of cases can also be
influenced by the relatively few instances of the phenomenon under exploration
that possess the characteristic of interest to the analysts. This is precisely the
case in this article since Brazil and Australia are the only countries that currently
3 The existence of this loophole has been contested by Silva (2022). Silva (2022) argues that, especially in
the Brazilian case “it is not about a gap or loophole but the fact that it is the first time that arrangements
for special procedures must be negotiated for the application of safeguards to nuclear material used for the
propulsion of submarines of NNWS” (verbal information).
4 The nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises the NPT, a system of safeguards administered by the IAEA,
nuclear-weapon-free zones, export control measures, and limits placed on nuclear testing, among other
mechanisms.
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share the inherent attributes of concerns to this article: the active pursuit of a
nuclear-powered submarine while being a NNWS.
However, beyond a small number of cases, the Comparative Method requires
highlighting the kind of “events” or the type of occurrences that will be considered.
Therefore, the comparative axis applied to the Australian and Brazilian cases
consists of a historical analysis that starts with each nation’s interest in a nuclear
programme. In addition, other points considered for comparison are the reasoning
behind such interest, the characteristics of the eventual nuclear-powered submarine
programme, and the historical stance adopted by both countries regarding the
non-proliferation regime and how they have been handling their nuclear submarine
programme within the commitments to non-proliferation. Consequently, the
Comparative Method demands a selective focus on the “events” chosen by the
researchers as the axis of comparison, leading to a necessary centralisation
around those events, reducing secondary issues (Beasley; Kaarbo, 1999 ).
The research consisted of a literature review of primary and secondary
sources, which enabled the comparison of the two cases. According to Beasley
and Kaarbo (1999), employing different types of sources in research using the
Comparative Method is relevant because it reinforces the validity of definitions
and conclusions. Comparing the two directly supports the analysis scrutiny of
Australia’s and Brazil’s submarine programmes while providing a historical
background for a better understanding of the motivations and reasoning behind
each country’s programme.
The present article is divided into three sections, in addition to the introduction
and the conclusion. The first section presents the Brazilian case and is more
focused on the development of the nuclear-powered submarine programme
and the country’s position in relation to safeguards. The second discusses the
AUKUS deal and adopts an exploratory approach to understand Australia’s
historical position in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its perception
of regional security that stimulated the collaboration with the United Kingdom
and the United States to enhance its security. Finally, the third section compares
the two cases and identifies some consequences of these cases for the nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
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The brazilian case
In the late 1970s, Brazil decided to pursue the development of a nuclear-powered
submarine. Brasília made this decision when it tried to obtain the technology to
enrich uranium. The transfer of West German ultracentrifugation technology to
Brazil faced opposition from the US and the Soviet Union. Such opposition led to
an agreement with West Germany in 1975 to develop enrichment technology by
the jet nozzle method, which was revealed to be technically and economically
impractical. Besides this, the country also had to deal with the safeguards that
were part of the agreement with West Germany and the tripartite agreement with
the IAEA. These agreements imposed severe limits on the length of research and
experimentation carried out in the country with materials, technology and facilities
related to the West German agreement (Silva; Moura 2018; Kassenova 2014).
As a result of these constraints imposed by major powers and international
regimes, as well as the need to maintain and expand Brazilian energy capacity,
Brazil opted to develop enrichment technology through covert means and by
cooperating with other countries on the margins of the NPT (Silva; Moura 2018;
Patti 2014; Bandarra 2016). This decision led to the creation of the Autonomous
Nuclear Technology Program (also known as the parallel programme) in 1978.
This programme was not related to international cooperation with West Germany.
Therefore, it was not subjected to safeguards and did not need to obey the growing
restrictions imposed by the US and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Patti 2014).
The Brazilian Navy launched two projects under this programme: Cyclone
and Row. The first aimed to develop the fuel cycle with ultracentrifugation
technology, while the second sought to develop naval nuclear propulsion with
a vision to build nuclear submarines (Brasil 1985). “The Brazilian Navy, like all
the navies in the world, saw in the nuclear submarine the solution to its strategic
problem, a kind of technological rupture that would take it to the level of the
best navies and place it in a position of great superiority over other navies who
could not dispose of this weapon” (Vidigal 2002, 18). The decision to develop
nuclear-powered submarines was also related to the perceived technological
advantages such as speed, stealth and operational independence compared to
the conventional counterparts (Sá 2015, 15-17).
Authors such as Kassenova (2014) and Sá (2015) argue that the navy’s
nuclear-fuel-cycle efforts, the investment in civilian nuclear infrastructure and
the development of the civilian nuclear programme was driven by the ambition to
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build a nuclear-powered submarine. It should be noted that the navy’s “pursuit of
uranium enrichment and a nuclear submarine programme was the most determined
and sustained effort” of the entire Autonomous Nuclear Technology Program
(Kassenova, 2014, 23). In fact, the armed force that dedicated more time, resources,
and personnel to the autonomous development of nuclear technology and had
the most successful projects was the Navy (Bandarra 2016; Alvim; Goldemberg;
Mafra 2018). It was successful in developing the nuclear cycle in the mid-1980s.
During Fernando Collor de Mello’s administration, the government reduced
the nuclear submarine programme funding. However, the appointment of Admiral
Mário César Flores, one of the prominent supporters of the submarine programme,
as Minister of the Navy guaranteed sufficient resources for the programme’s survival
(Martins Filho 2011). However, during the administrations of Itamar Franco and
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Ministers of the Navy reduced the funds allocated
to the programme, as they had a critical view of the support given by Admiral
Flores to the programme (Martins Filho 2011; 2014). Thus, from the middle of that
decade, the navy’s programme practically halted (Martins Filho 2014).
The programme resumption occurred in the second mandate of President
Lula’s administration within a framework of strengthening the Ministry of Defence
under Nelson Jobim (2007-2011). He imposed as a precondition for investments
in the Armed Forces the elaboration of the National Defence Strategy (NDS)
(Martins Filho 2011). The NDS placed among its guidelines the strengthening of
strategic sectors: space, cyber and nuclear (Brasil 2012; Brasil 2020). The NDS
also established as a strategic guideline the deterrence of hostile forces within
the limits of its jurisdictional waters (Brasil 2012). Regarding deterrence against
hostile forces in Brazilian jurisdictional waters, the document defined the strategic
and operational objectives for the Navy. The established priority was to ensure
the means to deny the use of the sea to enemy forces that approaches the country
by sea to accomplish this the NDS established that the country “will have a large
submarine naval force, made up of conventional submarines and nuclear-powered
submarines. Brazil will maintain and develop its capacity to design and manufacture
both conventional and nuclear-powered submarines” (Brasil 2012, 67,70).
In order to achieve these goals, Prosub was created in 2008, which provided,
among other things, for the construction of a conventional nuclear-powered
submarine (submarino convencional de propulsão nuclear — SCPN). In the same
year, Brazil announced a partnership with France for, among other things, the
construction of the hull of the submarine that will house nuclear propulsion
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(Martins Filho 2014; Sá 2015. The project of the first SCPN started in 2009 and
was expected to be concluded in 2032 (Ministério da Defesa 2019). In 2010, the
country tried to acquire controllers (CPUs) from the US, that they would be more
economically efficient; however, the purchase was denied and was accompanied
by this note from the US Department of State: “The U.S. Government does not
support Brazil´s indigenous naval nuclear reactor program” (Bezerril 2011).
One of the biggest challenges this programme currently faces is the safeguards
negotiations that Brazil initiated in May 2022 with the IAEA. In addition, the
country also needs to secure the fuel for the submarine. Brazil had difficulties
certifying the fuel it intends to use and has reached out to the United States and
Russia. The first refused to offer support, while the negotiations with the second
had to be stopped due to the War in Ukraine (Gielow 2022).
In relation to the negotiations with the IAEA, it is important to remember
that Brazil did not sign the IAEA Model Additional Protocol (AP), also known
asINFCIRC/540 (Corrected), created in 1997, due to its intrusive nature, sovereignty
relativization, and the fact that more sensitive issues related to this protocol were
linked to the protection of valuable technological and strategic information on the
SCPN (Moura 2001). Furthermore, it must also be underscored that in the early
2010s, the NSG included as an eligibility criterion for the transfer of sensitive
materials the ratification of the AP. Nevertheless, there was a reformulation
in the group guidelines that explicitly accepted the Quadripartite Agreement5
(IAEA, 2016A: § 6 [c]). Hence, Brazil and Argentina were temporarily deemed
in full compliance with the NSG guidelines (Herz; Lage 2013; Kassenova 2014).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that this meant that “the NSG started to
recognize the Quadripartite Agreement (...) as an alternative criterion to the
Additional Protocol and the IAEA safeguards agreements” (MRE 2011 ). However,
for Jonas, Carlson and Goorevich (2012), the NSG accepted ABACC’s claim that
these mutual agreements (of the ABACC and the Common System for Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials — SCCC) provided a higher level of security
than the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards per se, but did not accept the idea
that these agreements are as strong as an AP.
Still in relation to the AP, in its 2012 NDS, Brazil made public its official
position toward this protocol by stating that it would not adhere to additions to
5 Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards that its parties signed on December 13th,
1991.
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the NPT which envisioned the expansion of this treaties’ restrictions without the
nuclear powers having advanced their own nuclear disarmament” (Brasil 2012,
96). However, in 2020 the NDS was revised, and the new text did not include
that statement. The revision of the NDS is in line with the statement made by
Kassenova, Perez, Spektor (2020) that it is possible to verify a flexibilization of the
official position of Brazil which even though it does not conclude any additional
protocol with the IAEA in the short term, does not exclude the possibility of
discussing it in the future (Kassenova; Perez; Spektor 2020).
Kassenova, Perez, Spektor (2020) argue that Brazil is reluctant to accept
additional non-proliferation obligations until substantial progress has been made
toward nuclear disarmament by the existing nuclear weapon states as a matter of
principle and understands that opening its facilities for more intrusive inspections
under an AP would bring vulnerabilities about industrial espionage. Brazilian
nuclear authorities claim that the country’s uranium enrichment technology is
indigenous and contains technological knowledge that the government wants
to protect. Nevertheless, international experts on safeguards disagree, affirming
that IAEA inspectors did not leak confidential information and even questioning
whether the enrichment technology used in Brazil is entirely national (Kassenova;
Perez; Spektor 2020).
To prevent negotiations that are not favourable to the country, Brazil
anticipated its discussions with the IAEA after the announcement of AUKUS in
late 2021. On June 6th, 2022, during the IAEA Director General’s Introductory
Statement to the Board of Governors, Grossi declared that Brazil had formally
communicated “to initiate discussions with the Secretariat on an arrangement for
Special Procedures for the use of nuclear material under safeguards in nuclear
propulsion and in the operation of submarines and prototypes, as set out in the
Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement” (IAEA 2022). As diplomats at the IAEA
noted, this authorization is unlikely to occur without Brazil giving in to some
historic positions (Gielow 2022).
The australian case
Australia’s nuclear submarine programme is directly influenced by its
American and British allies. It is worth mentioning that the British programme
has been closely linked to the American one since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence
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Agreement. The Agreement established high-level nuclear cooperation between
the two countries and included the US selling “one complete submarine nuclear
propulsion plant” to the British (Botti1987). Therefore, despite differences, the
British cooperation with the Americans influenced subsequent nuclear propulsion
designs of the UK’s Royal Navy.
Unlike the UK in the late 1950s, Australia in the early 2020s is not a nuclear
weapon state; it has claimed it has no desire to diversify or create nuclear strike
capabilities. However, during the 1950s and early 1960s, Australia was interested
in obtaining nuclear weapons, particularly from the British. Nevertheless, British
agreements of exchange of non-vital information with the Americans created
challenges to establishing nuclear cooperation with “third countries”. The 1958
US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement further complicated the British position. Thus,
the UK’s arrangement limited Australia as a partner for acquiring uranium and
sites for British nuclear testing (Reynolds 1998). Even then, that did not impede
further attempts from Canberra to acquire British atomic weapons.
In 1958, Australian officers approached the British Government enquiring
about the possibility of purchasing tactical nuclear weapons. In 1961, Australia
proposed a secret accord to transfer British nuclear weapons. Australian ambitions
included acquiring and implementing the weapon under exclusive national control,
effectively creating a nuclear power that would not have — at least initially —
complete technical knowledge of its new military asset (Walsh 1997). Talks
with the UK initially proved to be positive. Still, they did not advance due to the
increasing British cooperation with the Americans and the latter’s reluctance to
share nuclear information with third parties (Reynolds 1998).
Furthermore, China’s entry into the nuclear club in 1964, the 1968
announcement of the British withdrawal from regions East of Suez, and the
growing worries about an American disengagement from Vietnam led to the
persistent idea of nuclear capabilities as a partial reassurance to an Australian
perception of its strategic isolation. Hence, there were further considerations
and attempts to develop an indigenous nuclear capability between 1964 and
1972 (Walsh 1997). In 1968, Australia was asked to sign the NPT, which would
result in a renouncement of nuclear weapons. During the next two years, the
Australian Government was divided on this issue. Within that context, Canberra
launched a study programme to build an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, which
would allow the manufacture of atomic weapons. By 1970, Japan, Italy, and West
Germany had signed the NPT, strengthening the position of the NPT supporters
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in the country. Changes in government between 1971 and 1972 weakened the
hand of the proponents of an Australian nuclear bomb resulting in the adoption
of a policy of “nuclear abstinence”, with Australia signing the NPT in 1970, and
ratifying it in 1973 (Walsh 1997).
In the following decades, the quest for a nuclear weapon disappeared from
the Australian political debate, and its civilian nuclear infrastructure remained
circumscribed by growing international obligations. When Canberra ratified
the NPT in 1973, the opposition to nuclear weapons prevailed as the national
political consensus. That same year, Australia and New Zealand submitted a case
against the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia to the International Court
of Justice. Similarly, Chinese tests caused public and governmental declarations
of disapproval, reinforcing the growing role of Australia in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime (Weltman 1981).
Since the 1970s, consecutive governments in Canberra have supported the
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. According to Watson (2020),
this position can be seen through the Australian championing of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Rarotonga), and contributions to the International Partnership for
Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). It is worth noting that, in 2007, the
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was founded in
the country by a coalition of non-governmental organisations led by the Medical
Association for the Prevention of War (Australia) (ICAN, 2022). Australia also
conducts contacts to encourage other countries to sign and ratify the IAEA AP,
opening the way for enhanced inspections, and is one of the founding members
of the Proliferation Security Initiative (Watson 2020). Concerning the AP, Australia
took a leading position within the nuclear non-proliferation regime and became
the first country to adopt the Protocol in September 1997 (IAEA 1997). Moreover,
the government has sponsored non-proliferation initiatives, including the Canberra
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in 1995-1996 and the
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative in 2010. Lastly, the government’s
export of nuclear materials is rigorously controlled by international and domestic
obligations. However, this position has shifted between commercial gains and
a restrained approach aligned with its non-proliferation stance (Watson 2020).
Despite this, Australia has still not signed the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) after it was opened for signature in September
2017. The central reservations of Canberra on the issue are said to be the need
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for universality, strong verification provisions and compatibility with the NPT
(Watson 2020). Many observers point out that these are unnecessary or contrived
concerns and that the real reason Australia has not (yet) signed is its alliance with
the US6. Despite that, in 2022, the Labor Party was victorious in the Australian
federal election replacing the Liberal-National Coalition in government. When
in the Opposition, the new Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, was an avid
supporter of the TPNW indicating that once in government, his Party would
sign. Nonetheless, this has not yet happened. The new government continues to
consider the country’s stance on the TPNW and still needs to officially change
its position on the issue (Doherty 2022).
Concomitantly, in the 2010s and early 2020s, there was a determined shift
against China in Canberra, based on Chinese military expansion, but also often
exaggerated and seen as a direct security threat to Australia. Many analysts have
condemned what they see as China-scaremongering tactics. Nonetheless, the
anti-China faction successfully increased the pursuit of enhanced conventional
capabilities and defence partnerships. AUKUS symbolises the growing willingness
of its members to create initiatives that allow the strengthening of their strategic
positions in the Indo-Pacific. As already mentioned, the highlight of the security
partnership is the planned joint endeavour between the three nations to assist
in developing Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines (Australia 2021a). This
partnership indicates the informal establishment of a “conditional proliferation”
in the international regulatory system, enhancing the inequalities present within
the treaty.
Considering that the three nations have strategic concerns in the Indo-Pacific,
the Australian nuclear submarines programme is seen as a reassurance. It must
be noted, however, that there is considerable resistance to this narrative within
Australia. Many China experts within Australia do not believe that China poses
a military threat to Australia or that Australia should join in a war against China.
There is considerable push-back against the dramatic shift towards an anti-China
stance, and many Australians are unhappy about closer enmeshment with the
American military (Carr 2023; Keating 2023; Kenny; White 2023; Mackerras
6 The ANZUS alliance carries no guarantee that the US will come to the aid of Australia. It merely commits each
state to discuss options making no mention of any nuclear umbrella. Thus, the assumption that Australia is
under extended nuclear deterrence is self-anointed. This has led advocates of the TPNW to argue that Australia
can maintain the ANZUS alliance and join the TPNW. It would, however, have to renounce any association
with nuclear deterrence (Kelly 2020).
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2020; Menadue 2023; Tanter 2023). The government states that the partnership
with the British and Americans is an effort to meet the “challenges” of a world
that is becoming more complex, especially in the Indo-Pacific. According to
the Australian Government, AUKUS was born as a security initiative to “enable
and empower” its members and allies (Australia 2021b) and “to enhance our
joint capabilities and interoperability” (Australia 2021a). Although not directly
addressed, the strategic concern with a rising China and possible Australian
isolation in a scenario of weakening Anglo-American influence in the Indo-Pacific
concerns Canberra.
Security worries in Canberra, London and Washington about such waning
of the American — and to a lesser extent British — influence in the region are
reinforced by statements from officers of the US Armed Forces on Beijing’s
expanding military capabilities. These declarations include estimates that China is
growing its military assets five to six times faster than the United States (Norman
2022); while, between 2020 and 2021, the UK, witnessed its defence budget fall
for two consecutive years (Sabbagh 2022).
The Australian quest to replace the conventional diesel-powered Collins-
class submarines goes back to 2009 when the Australian Government published
the defence White Paper “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century”,
committing to the pursuit of a “conventional” replacement for the Collins and
doubling the size of the submarine fleet in the future (Australia 2009, p. 70-71).
In 2010, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers raised the possibility of acquiring
nuclear-powered submarines through the British (Reynolds 2013). Nevertheless,
that idea did not advance, and the 2013 Defence White Paper maintained the
commitment to new and more capable “conventional” submarines (Australia 2013).
The 2013 decision was criticised by some officers of RAN and the Navy League
of Australia, arguing for the nuclear-powered option since the decommissioning
of the Oberon class that preceded the Collins (Reynolds 2013). In 2016, Canberra
announced that the French-backed bid had won the procurement for the 12
hulls. However, plans for the French-backed project were ended when AUKUS
was announced.
In March 2023, the members of AUKUS announced that — pending US
Congress approval — Australia would purchase in the early 2030s three Virginia-
class nuclear-powered submarines from the US, with an option for two more
if requested. These submarines are temporary solutions until a new design is
in active service in the RAN in the 2040s. That same month, Australia decided
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to select the British design to be its future nuclear-powered submarine. The
British design is also planned to use American technology, making it a direct
by-product of the AUKUS agreement (Doherty; Hurst 2023 ). The RAN will have
access to American and British bases and might even have permission to base
its submarines in Japan. The nuclear reactors will not be built in Australia; they
will arrive from the UK and the US in a “wielded power unit”, not requiring
refuelling during their lifetime. Thus, Australia will not access the technology
in question. Moreover, the country also stated that it would not enrich uranium
for the submarines but has plans to manage all radioactive waste generated by
the vessels (Doherty; Hurst 2023).
The advent of AUKUS has changed Australia’s position within the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime and increased its strategic alignment and
cooperation with the US and the UK (Reynolds 1998). For Hanson (2023), “it
appears to be a conscious decision to switch from a defensive security approach
to an undeniably aggressive approach” (verbal information). The Australian case
might contribute to the creation by the US and the UK of a “double standard”,
for these two powers directly support the Australian nuclear naval propulsion
programme while adopting punishing measures to potential adversaries that
may try the same (Acton 2021). Furthermore, both London and Washington see
Canberra as a “responsible” partner who can receive their nuclear propulsion
technology without proliferation risks. However, while trying to enhance the
strategic stance of its three members, the precedents that the AUKUS submarine
deal might open have the potential to weaken the overall nuclear non-proliferation
regime. Hence, the losses might outweigh the strategic gains from AUKUS.
NNWS with nuclear-powered submarines
and the non-proliferation regime
As seen by the previous two sections, the Brazilian and the Australian case
have many differences and similarities. In terms of differences, the following
points can be emphasised. First, Brazil developed an indigenous technology to
enrich uranium and is developing the nuclear part of the submarine on its own.
At the same time, Australia has not developed technology to enrich uranium. It
will receive aid from Washington and London for its nuclear fuel — which can
be characterised as a framework of conditional proliferation and reinforcement
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of inequality within the Treaty. Unlike the Brazilian case, the Australian case
and the significance of AUKUS as a whole have spurred much concern among
its neighbours — Southeast nations and South Pacific states. It should be noted
that Brazil plans to use LEU while Australia plans to use HEU, thus posing an
even more complex problem. Second, while Canberra signed the AP in the year
the protocol was created, Brasília still resists signing it. In the meantime, Brasília
signed the TPNW and has given significant support for the creation of the Treaty,
while Canberra has not yet supported it. Nonetheless, it is essential to note that
both countries are reviewing such positions as discussed in the previous sections
— Brazil about the AP and Australia in relation to the TPNW.
Although there are differences, there are also some similarities. Both countries
have good credentials in the non-proliferation regime
7
, both are NNWS pursuing
nuclear-powered submarines and both need to deal with the need to close the
loophole in the NPT and IAEA safeguard system. In this sense one of the most
important consequences that these cases present to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime is safeguarding the nuclear material and the proliferation aspect that
it opens. The possibility of Brazil and/or Australia, NNWS, commissioning
nuclear-powered submarines in the near future raises the issue of enforcing
nuclear safeguards for naval fuel. The practice accepted by these countries might
set a precedent for other NNWS. Concerns with the AUKUS nuclear submarine
partnership centre on the precedent it opens within the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime. As Acton (2021) argues, would-be proliferators might
use the reactor programme as a disguise for the development of nuclear weapons
and the Australian precedent and/or Brazilian precedent may reduce the political
cost of adopting such a policy.
According to Kaplow (2017), the reason for this proliferation risk lies in
the language used in the NPT, which arguably allows States to exempt nuclear
material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarines. The nuclear
fuel that powers naval reactors, especially HEU, could be useful for making
nuclear weapons, so there has long been a concern that countries could divert
exempt materials into a nuclear weapons programme without the inspectors’
knowledge. As the NPT does not address military uses of nuclear technology
other than nuclear weapons, it was up to the IAEA to create rules on how to
7 Brazil is a member of the NSG and the New Agenda Coalition. It has placed in force many important treaties
such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the NPT as well as signed the Missile Technology
Control Regime and the TNPW.
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protect enriched uranium intended for use in naval military reactors. However,
recognising that international inspections of military installations would lead to
a political impasse, the IAEA chose to rely on State declarations (Kaplow 2017).
This can be verified in paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153. According to it, States,
when exempting nuclear material from safeguards for use in non-prescribed
military activity, must declare the activity and quantity of material used, provide
guarantees that the material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons
and agree to reinstate safeguards in the material when its use is reintroduced
for peaceful nuclear activities. Nonetheless, according to Kaplow (2017), the
IAEA sometimes does not seek to verify these statements, so States may view
this exemption as a convenient way to divert nuclear material for use in a secret
weapons programme.
Failure to address military non-explosive uses of nuclear technology in the
NPT was not an accident. Early drafts of the Treaty were written in a way that
would require the NNWS to place all of their nuclear activities under safeguards.
Notwithstanding, in 1968, when the Treaty was opened for signature, Article III
excluded military non-explosive uses such as naval propulsion. The change was
related to the complex dynamics of Treaty negotiations, in which two factors are
noteworthy. First, the US recognised that the NPT would be effective only to the
extent that it received broad international adherence. Second, the Treaty was
criticised for being asymmetrical, allowing the NWS to be treated differently from
the NNWS — to soften this situation, the US voluntarily offered to implement
IAEA safeguards in its civilian facilities. Still, as with the other NWS, the US was
unwilling to allow its military facilities to be examined via safeguards. If the NPT
required NNWS to place non-explosive military activities under safeguards or
prohibited such activities, it could have been seen as another way in which the
NNWS would be asked to bear a heavier burden of the Treaty (Kaplow 2017).
Currently, any attempt by a would-be proliferating state to withdraw nuclear
material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine programme can be seen as a
potential step toward developing nuclear weapons. Thus, the naval propulsion
gap presents an opportunity for potential proliferators to manufacture nuclear
weapons. However, the warning power of the naval nuclear propulsion gap today
is partly due to the fact that no state has yet taken advantage of it. Thus, if a
precedent that legitimises the non-explosive military use of nuclear material is
established, the second state to use the exemption will find it easier to acquire
sensitive technology, face less international pressure to change course, and raise
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fewer proliferation alarms that could make it a very dangerous breach. Thus, it
is reasonable to seek to prevent countries from exercising the exemption or, if a
precedent is needed, to try to reduce its damage (Kaplow 2017). It is important
to emphasise that various proposals have been made to deal with the NPT
loophole and several of them recommend the development of naval nuclear
propulsion safeguards, the prioritisation of activities using low enriched uranium
(LEU) instead of HEU as well as discussions on the possibility of a future Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that includes materials for naval propulsion8.
Regarding the prioritisation of LEU over HEU, it is essential to note that the
nuclear propulsion of the Royal Navy and US Navy’s submarines require HEU
that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. This level of uranium enrichment
to be used in Australia’s submarines has become a source of concern to many
observers, as it might weaken the IAEA safeguards system. Meanwhile, in the
Brazilian case, due to technical obstacles and economic disadvantages that can be
very difficult to overcome, some authorities, while reaffirming the commitment to
LEU fuel, have suggested the possibility that it will be closer to the 20% threshold
of U-235 (Costa 2017; Spektor 2017). Hence, Costa (2017, p. 8-10) suggests that,
albeit not certain from a technical point of view, the degree of uranium enrichment
which will be used in the nuclear material for the reactor fuel should be clearly
disclosed, as this would help alleviate concerns and avoid unpleasant surprises.
The Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine and the AUKUS create a precedent for
many countries, such as South Korea, Japan, Canada, Pakistan, Iran and Argentina,
to pursue nuclear submarines. These countries have already demonstrated interest
in pursuing this goal in the past. Under AUKUS, the difficulties experienced in
the past will be facilitated since the US and UK are willing to share technology
with a ‘partner’ seen as responsible, and Western.
Conclusion
According to Kassenova (2014, 4), Brazil’s perception of the non-proliferation
regime is that it is unfair, it benefits the NWS, and it puts undue pressure on NNWS.
Furthermore, the lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament and the questionable
policy choices of NWS allows Brazil to claim that NNWS should not be expected
8 For more information on proposals to deal with the NPT loophole, see: Egel; Goldblum; Suzuki 2015; Kaplow
2017; Shea 2017; Reddie; Goldblum 2018; Philippe 2014; Costa 2017.
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to do more. In short, for the author, the Brazilian position is characterised by an
emphasis on nuclear justice and opposition to “double standards” (Kassenova
2014, 4). As can be seen, Brazil has an extensive commitment towards the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. Even though the country hasn’t always promptly adopted
nuclear treaties, this was not related to discomfort with disarmament and non-
proliferation but consisted of a political position against the imbalance of mutual
responsibilities and obligations inherent to the treaties (Guimarães 2021 ).
Since the mid-1970s, Canberra has maintained a leading role within the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, security concerns led to the AUKUS
partnership and the reinforcement of Australia’s security and defence ties with
the UK and the US. The reasoning behind the Australian choice is primarily the
resulting military deterrence against perceived security threats (White 2022).
However, AUKUS can lead to exacerbated regional military rivalries, particularly
within the fields of nuclear competition (Tilemann 2021). Concerning its position
within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Australian nuclear submarine
programme has not changed Canberra’s defence and support for the regime.
Nonetheless, it reinforces doubts about the possibility of Australian support for
initiatives such as the TPNW due to the increasing Australian alignment with
the two atomic powers of AUKUS. It also risks undermining the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone and the South East Asian Nuclear Free Zone. Especially for
states like Indonesia, AUKUS is seen as another example of providing preferential
treatment to a Western state by the hegemonic powers. Moreover, the likely
AUKUS employment of HEU in its submarine fleet differentiates Australia’s
case from Brazil’s, adding a new layer of proliferation concerns. For example,
the dependence of Canberra on HEU undermines the efforts to create a norm
against high levels of uranium enrichment, which is one of the main objectives
of the Iranian nuclear deal (Tilemann 2021), as well as the motivation to create
a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
This article’s main objective consisted in identifying the consequences of
Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and Brazil’s development
of a nuclear-powered submarine in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
major consequences identified are mainly related to naval reactor safeguards
issues, nuclear proliferation and reinforcement of inequalities within the NPT —
by having NWS aiding a NNWS to acquire nuclear-powered submarines while
explicitly denying support to other NNWS. The study concludes that to avoid
complications related to safeguards and proliferation of nuclear weapons, if
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Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 18, n. 1, e1299, 2023
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these two cases are to proceed, these states should consider the development
of naval nuclear propulsion safeguards, prioritise activities using LEU instead
of HEU, and discuss a future FMCT. Finally, it is important to underscore that
nuclear submarine programmes are complex, needing decades to be completed,
thus providing a suitable time to address these implications.
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