Laerte Apolinário Júnior; Giovana Dias Branco

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 17, n. 3, e1286, 2022

1-25

The BRICS countries and the

Russia-Ukraine conflict

Os países do BRICS e o conflito

entre Rússia e Ucrânia

Los países del BRICS y el conflicto

entre Rusia y Ucrania

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v17n3.2022.1286

Laerte Apolinário Júnior

Giovana Dias Branco

Abstract

This article

analyzes the actions of the BRICS concerning the

conflict between Russia and Ukraine initiated in 2022. The question

which guides this study is: how and why have these countries

positioned themselves regarding this conflict? To answer the

proposed question, we analyze the positionings of these countries

in various international organizations regarding the conflict in

Ukraine in light of their geopolitical and economic interests. The

conclusion is that these countries have adopted a pro-Russian

neutrality in various institutional spaces — even though it has

not been in a homogeneous manner — for a variety of reasons

which have led to Moscow not being isolated internationally.

Keywords: BRICS; Russia; Ukraine; International Organizations;

Geopolitics.

1 PhD in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (USP). Professor of

International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP).

(lapolinario@pucsp.br). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8326-4428

2 Master's student in International Relations at the Postgraduate Program

San Tiago Dantas (UNESP, Unicamp, PUCSP). (giovana.branco@unesp.br).

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1476-3378

3 We thank the Research Incentive Plan of the Pontifical Catholic University of São

Paulo (PIPEQ/PUCSP) for funding this research. Grant/Award Number: 25029.

Artigo submetido em 10/06/2022 e aprovado em 07/11/2022.

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relAções internAcionAis

ISSN 2526-9038

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The BRICS countries and the Russia-Ukraine conflict

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Resumo

Este artigo analisa a atuação dos BRICS em relação ao conflito entre Rússia e Ucrânia

iniciado em 2022. A pergunta que guia este estudo é: como e — por que — estes países

têm se posicionado em relação ao conflito? Para responder à questão proposta, foram

analisados os posicionamentos destes países em relação ao conflito na Ucrânia em diferentes

Organizações Internacionais à luz de seus interesses geopolíticos e econômicos. Conclui-

se que estes países adotam uma postura de neutralidade pró-russa em diferentes espaços

institucionais — embora de forma não homogênea — em função de interesses diversos,

de modo que Moscou não se encontra isolada internacionalmente.

Palavras-chave: BRICS; Rússia; Ucrânia; Organizações Internacionais; Geopolítica.

Resumen

Este artículo analiza la actuación de los BRICS con relación al conflicto entre Rusia y

Ucrania iniciado en 2022. La pregunta que guía este estudio es: ¿cómo y — por qué- estos

países se han posicionado con relación al conflicto? Para responder a la pregunta propuesta,

se analizaron las posiciones de estos países en relación con el conflicto de Ucrania en

diferentes Organismos Internacionales a la luz de sus intereses geopolíticos y económicos.

Se concluye que estos países adoptan una postura de neutralidad prorrusa en diferentes

espacios institucionales — aunque de forma no homogénea — por intereses diferentes, de

modo que Moscú no quede aislada internacionalmente.

Palabras clave: BRICS; Rusia; Ucrania; Organizaciones Internacionales; Geopolítica.

Introduction

Since the Russian army’s invasion of Ukrainian territory at dawn on February

24, 2022, world geopolitics has gone through a series of alterations in relation to

the immediate previous scenario: the western bloc has been united with a high

degree of internal coherence in the face of the common threat from Moscow, and

have imposed various rounds of sanctions on the Russian economy (Washington

Post 2022). However, this coherence has not been reflected in other regions,

especially emerging countries, which have been cautious in their discourses

about Russia’s foreign policy and the Russian president himself. If the western

powers did not delay in supporting the government of Volodymyr Zelensky on

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the discursive plane and, more recently, sending military and financial assistance,

the emerging powers that belong to the BRICS group have decided to abstain in

votes in the United Nations. Despite the apparent neutrality of these decisions,

it is understood that Russia is not politically isolated as the western powers

envisaged, given that a relevant group of actors has sought to avoid any direct

conflict with Moscow, even symbolically.

In this sense, it should be noted that these countries have not only avoided

condemning Russia’s actions, they have used the terminology used by the Russian

government in this conflict (CNBC 2022), and have sought to intensify their

commercial relationships with Russia, especially in terms of increasing their

imports of Russian petroleum (BBC 2022b). Thus, we understand that this posture

goes beyond neutrality, and can be conceived of as “pro-Russian neutrality” to

the extent that these actions favor Russia in this conflict.

As weeks pass, the situation in Ukraine seems to be a conflict that will

continue in the long-term, given the difficulty that Russian troops have had in

maintaining control of their conquered cities, the Ukrainian counter offensives

which have gained force with the arrival of western armaments, the Kremlin’s

reallocation of arms to eastern Ukraine (Washington Post 2022), and the realization

of annexation referendums in the four Ukrainian oblasts which are partly occupied

by Russia (Druzhinin 2022). Moreover, we should consider the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) as an important third actor in this conflict which

not only stimulates the dispute of Manichean narratives that separates Russia

from the so-called “free world” but also seeks to coopt actors in the developing

world to take decisions against the actions of the government of Vladimir Putin.

Even before the invasion, Russia and NATO disagreed about this military alliance

for collective defense’s waves of expansion to the East, which cover a large part

of the post-Soviet space of historic Russian influence. This is a scenario which

intensifies to the extent that Moscow associates western advances in Eastern

Europe as a clear threat to its national security, as well as a cause of Russia’s

geopolitical weakness in recent years (Russia 2021; Savranskaya and Blanton 2018).

Even though the western countries have imposed economic sanctions in a

joint manner

, there has not been an enforcement mechanism strong enough to

4 Up until now, there have been six packages of sanctions against Russia, directed towards individuals and

members of the Duma; Russian access to European capital markets; economic relations with the areas of

Donetsk and Luhansk; the assets of President Vladimir Putin and the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; members

of the National Security Council; transactions of the Russian Central Bank; restrictions to Russian air space;

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slow down the Russian invasion, given that Russia has veto power in the United

Nations’ Security Council through its permanent membership. Moreover, votes

have also been taken in the UN’s General Assembly and the Human Rights Council

regarding this conflict which have demonstrated the positioning of various actors

in relation to the belligerent actions of the Russian Federation. For the purposes

of this article, we analyzed the positioning of the five members of the BRICS in

the bodies mentioned above, as well as their economic and political partnerships

with Moscow, in order to identify the interests of these countries in the face

of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In this manner, we intend to show that the

Kremlin is isolated only in relation to the western world, but this relationship is

not sustained when we look at other power axes within the International System.

This article is structured in the following manner. The next section analyzes

the events which led to the conflict in Ukraine and its consequences. The following

section discusses the formation of the BRICS coalition and its actions in terms of

International Security. Next, we present the positioning of these countries in the

conflict between Russia and Ukraine, based on an analysis of their positions in

various international organizations and their geopolitical and economic interests

in light of this dispute. Finally, we present our main conclusions concerning the

supposed isolation of Russia within the International System.

1. The Conflict in Ukraine and its Consequences

Even though the Russian military invasion of Ukrainian territory began at

the end of February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has had many previous

episodes, making it possible to return to 2014 and the context of Euromaidan or

even the 1990s, when Ukraine declared its independence (Bushkovitch 2020). Even

though many emphasize the ethnic, linguistic, historical and cultural proximity

of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, which have been described as “brother

peoples” (Russia 2021), their relations over time have been characterized by

cooperation as well as conflict (Reid 2022).

Ever since Ukraine’s independence, its existence has been intrinsically

linked to a dependent relationship with Russia, especially in terms of security

transactions with Russian state companies; new investments in the energy sector; restrictions to the importing

of coal, wood, cement and other Russian products; restrictions to Russian ships in European ports; the banning

of Russian oil imports; the banning of three Russian banks and one Belarussian bank from the SWIFT system

(Comissão Europeia 2022).

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(Bushkovitch 2020). This situation was more extreme during the Soviet period,

when the level of tolerance in relation to “Ukrainization” varied in accordance

with the Russian perception of whether nationalist groups signified a threat to

the integrity of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, 1994 signaled an important landmark

between these countries, with the Kravtchuk government’s acceptance of ceding

Ukraine’s nuclear arms to Russia under the condition that Moscow would never

use them against its neighbor (UNTC 1994).

After a period of relative stability between Russia and Ukraine, their relations

passed through a new inflection point during the so-called Colored Revolutions,

especially the Orange Revolution in the first few years of this century (Karatnycky

2021). These revolutions were peaceful popular demonstrations against holdover

corruption from the Soviet era and governments allied with the interests of Moscow,

which sought to distance themselves from the western world and its institutions

(Snyder 2019). To the Russian political elites, these revolutions were based on

the influence of American interests in the region, bearing in mind the apparent

unipolarity of the United States in the post-Cold War period (Stuenkel 2017).

In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a speech to a Security

Conference in Munich, which dealt with subjects related to instability and global

conflict which were worsening at that time, as well as issues related to concerns

about Russian security and sovereignty on the European continent. NATO’s

waves of expansion to the East and the increase in military interventions led

by the United States in various regions in the global periphery preoccupied the

Kremlin, which interpreted the actions of the western bloc as a kind of test of

Russian influence and leadership in the post-Soviet space (Russia 2021). Moreover,

the declaration by NATO member states the following year at their meeting in

Bucharest opened the possibility of the future adherence of Ukraine and Georgia

to this military alliance, which further deteriorated the relations with Moscow.

Ukraine again was the stage for disputes between the Russian government and

western countries in 2014, within the context of the so-called Euromaidan. In not

pursuing an association between Ukraine and the European Union, the government

of Viktor Yanukovich opened the door to a series of demonstrations against his

decision, given the broad popular support for the narrative of socioeconomic

progress which was expected from the entrance in the European bloc (Snyder

2019). In addition to the political repression which put an end to the movement,

a civil war erupted in the east of the country between pro-Russian separatists

and the Ukrainian government which distanced Ukraine further from European

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institutions. Ever since this period, Russian military personnel have been in the

frontier region giving support to the separatist groups in the Donbas region, a

scenario which was not necessary in the Crimean Peninsula, where a referendum

consolidated its annexation into Russian territory in 2014.

In this sense, the conflict which began in 2022 is not a novelty, but rather

a continuation of previous disputes between these neighboring countries. Even

though it is difficult to determine which are the main interests and objectives of

Russia in the conflict, we can affirm that it is part of its narrative strategy of using

a diplomacy of memory that returns to national myths and discourses of the past,

and the worsening of relations between Moscow and NATO, to justify the current

actions of the Putin government in Ukraine (McGlynn 2021). In announcing the

beginning of the invasion — called a special military operation by the Russians —

Vladimir Putin relied on history to affirm the right of Russia to Ukrainian territories

with a Russian majority population, questioning the country’s right to exist, and

declaring the frontier with Ukraine since the demise of the Soviet Union “artificial”

(Russia 2021). Moreover, the eastern expansion of NATO and the installation of

new military bases in ex-Soviet republics had been denounced by Russia ever

since the 1990s as an “existential threat” to the Russian state (Savranskaya and

Blanton 2017), long before Ukraine drew closer to the European bloc.

In the international scenario, nations adopted distinct positions in relation to

the conflict: the western bloc, led by the United States and the members of the

European Union, condemned Russia’s actions from the outset, offering support

to the Zelensky government; on the other hand, emerging powers such as China

and India opted not to adhere to the unilateral economic sanctions promoted by

the West on the Russian economy, which were not approved by the UN Security

Council. These countries have constructed diplomatic and commercial ties with

Russia over time which were institutionalized with the formation of the BRICS

bloc and its Development Bank. Even though the bloc has lost its leadership

role in recent years, the relations between the governments of Putin and Xi

Jinping have become closer to the extent that Russia and China have come to

question the leadership role of the United States, foreseeing the establishment

of a multipolar order with an active role for the emergent bloc (Stuenkel 2017).

Shortly before the military invasion, the Russian Federation and the People’s

Republic of China issued a joint declaration which announced the beginning of

a new global era in which both countries would assume leading roles in terms

of actions and influence (Russia 2022).

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Even though the Chinese government has opted to abstain in most United

Nations votes involving the Ukrainian conflict, which will be discussed later on,

the publication of the Joint Declaration demonstrates the alignment between

Moscow and Beijing, even though it is not automatic. Moreover, most Chinese

companies have maintained their operations in Russian territory, in contrast to

companies of western origin, which will also be discussed in this article. In this

manner, the relations between different poles of power in the international system

have become more and more uncertain to the extent that we have observed a

division in the actions of the developed and developing world in relation to the

Ukrainian conflict.

This international division is also reflected in terms of the economic sanctions

imposed on the Russian Federation, given that these initiatives have come

exclusively from the Global North (Ferrer 2014). Even though the Russian strategic

objectives in the conflict remain diffuse at this point, the United States, Canada,

and the European Union have applied at least six rounds of sanctions against

individuals, companies and the Russian state in a generalized manner as a form

of retaliation and an attempt to weaken the Russian actions. On the other hand,

there has been more caution on the part of the BRICS bloc in adopting measures

specifically against Russia, given that they have opted not to break off relations

with the government of Vladimir Putin.

Even though the initial expectations were for a quick, very intense war, with

Russia attaining its military objectives without much resistance from Ukraine, what

we can observe is a greater internal mobilization by the Ukrainians in defense

of their territory, which has been strengthened by the sending of international

military aid. With the retreat of Russian forces in the region of Kyiv, followed

by the reorganization of troops in the Donbas region and the intensification of

attacks, the Ukrainian conflict has taken on a new form, which could lead this

war to new temporal horizons.

2. The BRICS and International Security

The first decade of this century witnessed the development of a reorganization

of the forces of the international system due to the ascension of the so-called

emerging powers (Ikenberry 2018; Kitchen and Cox 2019). Among these countries,

the so-called BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — have

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gained space in the world economy as these countries presented constant rates

of growth during the beginning of the century. Driven by this rhythm of growth,

these countries have sought closer diplomatic ties through the formalization of

the BRICS coalition, and have come to demand reforms in contemporary global

governance institutions (Hurrell 2018; Stuenkel 2017).

However, a decade after its creation, the BRICS group and the narrative of

the emerging powers have lost some of their appeal. The economic growth of its

members has stagnated with the exceptions of India and China, and domestic

political challenges have restricted the external politics of its members. Today

more critical studies of the narrative of these ascending powers have become

common (Prys-Hansen and Nolte 2016). Even though these critiques are not new,

the overall tone in terms of the relevance and potential of this group to shape

large events has become more pessimistic in recent years. Despite these more

negative evaluations, recent studies on this subject do not necessarily question the

relevance of the emerging powers, but have given more emphasis to their practical

limitations especially due to the increasing asymmetry among its members, given

China’s economic and geopolitical ascension (Brosig 2021). Thus, this group

has become more and more dependent on the imperatives of China’s expansion

within the International System to the extent that one cannot interpret the BRICS

without taking into account the leadership role of China in the establishment of

new global institutions, which imply changes in global hegemony (Vadell 2019).

There is still little clarity concerning the limits of the convergence of its

members, especially outside of the economic arena (Rinaldi and Apolinário

Júnior 2020), and it is in the area of International Security and the need to

position themselves in relation to international conflicts in various international

organizations, that the convergence of interests within this coalition is being tested.

International security issues have been mentioned at the BRICS summit

meetings since the first Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International

Relations Media Statement in 2008. In general, declarations tend to be vague

with condemnations of terrorism, mentions of more generic principles such as

defending peace, stability and prosperity in accordance with the aspirations of

every people, the idea that the use of force should be avoided, and the importance

of respect for sovereignty, and countries’ territorial integrity.

Analyzing the UN Security Council, it may be noted that these countries have

occupied very heterogeneous positions historically in this organization, to the

extent that China and Russia are permanent members, while Brazil, India and

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South Africa have been elected to it at various times. For an analysis of the historic

positions of BRICS in the Security Council, see Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha (2017).

The year 2011 is of particular interest because all five of these nations were

part of the Security Council that year. Considering the five non-unanimous votes

of 2011, three texts were adopted and two rejected, and from this it is possible

to compare the voting patterns of these five countries. The only two cases in

which the positions of the BRICS totally converged — Resolution 1984 concerning

Iran and the rejected Israel-Palestine Resolution S/2011/24 — the five of them

voted in favor. The most emblematic vote was the vote on Resolution 1973 about

Libya (Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho 2016). Brazil, Russia, China and India

abstained, while South Africa voted in favor, and received much criticism of its

position subsequently, especially from African countries (Neethling 2012).

Table 1 — Positioning of the BRICS in the Security Council in 2011

Resolution 1973

Libya

Resolution 1984

Iran

Resolution 2023

Eritrea

Res. S/2011/24

Israel/Palestine

Res. S/2011/612

Syria

China Abstention Afﬁrmative Abstention Afﬁrmative Negative

Russia Abstention Afﬁrmative Abstention Afﬁrmative Negative

Brazil Abstention Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Abstention

India Abstention Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Abstention

South Africa Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Afﬁrmative Abstention

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha (2017).

Before the BRICS Summit in Sanya, China, South Africa had still not joined

the group. Thus, the four members of the BRIC group were in agreement in their

votes on this resolution. At the time, these countries demonstrated basically the

same concerns, which did not question the gravity of the situation in Libya, but

the lack of clarity of the resolution and possible precedents for action by the

Security Council.

In the case of Resolution 2023 concerning sanctions in Eritrea, Russia and China

abstained and the others voted in favor. We can speculate that the abstentions

of Russia and China have more to do with the long-term dynamics between the

permanent members than substantive issues that could be shared by the five

countries (Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha 2017). The two countries in explaining

their abstentions cited typical themes of the recurrent disputes among the five

permanent members, especially the proliferation of sanction regimes.

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In relation to Syria, while the two permanent members voted negatively,

Brazil, India and South Africa abstained, assuming a traditional strategy among

elected members. Even though there is evidence of articulation among the BRICS

in this case, there were also discussions among the members of IBSA (India,

Brazil and South Africa Forum), which may have contributed to the decision

(Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha 2017). China’s decision to collaborate with Russia in

vetoing the resolutions in the Security Council against Syria demonstrated their

mutual determination to counter the unilateralism of the United States in issues

of global governance, with the clear objective of establishing a more egalitarian

relationship based on a new multipolar political order (Eminue and Dickson

2013; Rinaldi and Pecequilo 2021).

3. The BRICS and the Conflict in Ukraine

Up until now, the BRICS countries have presented some convergent actions

as well as other divergent ones in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In relation to

the votes on this subject in the Security Council — S/RES/2623 (2/27/2022) — in

the General Assembly — Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 (3/2/2022) and Resolution

A/ES-11/L.5 (10/12/2022) — and in the Human Rights Council (4/7/2022),

Brazil was the only member of the BRICS group to vote for the condemnation of

the attitudes of Russia regarding Ukraine. In the four cases, while Russia voted

against them and the other BRICS

abstained, Brazil voted in favor (United

Nations, 2022a, 2022b, 2022d, 2022f).

Table 2 — Votes on the Conflict in the United Nations

Brazil Russia China India South Africa

General Assembly Resolution

A/RES/ES-11/1 (3/2/2022) Yes No Abstention Abstention Abstention

General Assembly Resolution

A/ES-11/L.5 (10/12/2022) Yes No Abstention Abstention Abstention

Security Council Resolution

S/RES/2623(2/27/2022) Yes No Abstention Abstention -

Human Rights Council

(4/7/2022) Yes No Abstention Abstention -

Source: Elaborated by the Authors.

5 South Africa is not a current member of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council.

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The resolution that passed in the General Assembly on March 2 was approved

with 141 favorable votes, 5 abstentions and 35 votes against, and its objective

was to condemn the acts of the Russians, requesting the immediate withdrawal

of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (United Nations 2022d). Brazil voted

in favor of the document but criticized some sections of its content. The Brazilian

Ambassador to the United Nations Ronaldo Costa Filho, criticized the lack of

the launch of a negotiation process and the unbalanced tone of the document

(Ministério de Relações Exteriores 2022b). President Bolsonaro also avoided

making direct criticisms to Russia and President Putin (Correio Braziliense 2022).

However, it should be noted that Brazil’s desire to maintain neutrality in order

to stay on good terms with Russia without displeasing the United States and

other western powers has become increasingly difficult given that the country

has had to take a position on the crisis in various international organizations.

The most recent, approved by the General Assembly on October 12th

condemned Russia’s annexation of regions of Ukraine, with 143 votes in favor,

5 against, and 35 abstentions (United Nations 2022f). Note that the pattern of

voting for both resolutions was quite similar. In the March resolution, Belarus,

Eritrea, North Korea, Russia and Syria voted in favor of Russia. In the October

resolution, the countries that supported Russia were Belarus, Nicaragua, North

Korea, Russia and Syria (United Nations 2022d, 2022f).

The resolution approved by the Security Council was of a procedural nature

and called for an emergency session of the General Assembly to discuss the

Ukrainian situation. There were 11 votes in favor, 3 abstentions and 1 vote against

from Russia itself. While Brazil voted in favor of the resolution, China and India

abstained (United Nations, 2022b). Since it was merely a procedural resolution,

Russia’s vote against it did not constitute a veto, unlike other resolutions that

have sought to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukrainian territory in February

and the annexation of regions of Ukraine at the end of September (United Nations

2022c, 2022e).

The resolution adopted in the Human Rights Council, which is investigating

Russia for human rights violations, sought to create a commission of inquiry to

investigate violations and accusations of abuse during its military operations

in Ukraine. Of the 47 countries which are members of the Council, 32 voted in

favor of an Independent International Commission of Inquiry, including Brazil

(United Nations 2022a). It should be pointed out that even though Brazil voted

in favor of the document, the country presented reservations about the presented

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text, and stated that it opposed the expulsion of Russia from this body. The

Brazilian Ambassador Tovar da Silva Nunes especially criticized the negotiation

process, which ignored the critiques of various countries, and some concepts

employed in the text, which made the text more politicized and less balanced

in his understanding. Despite the critiques, the justification presented for the

vote was that the Council should fulfill its obligation to protect human rights

in Ukraine, supporting a pacific solution to the country’s crisis (Ministério de

Relações Exteriores 2022a).

Thus, we can see how China, India and South Africa, even though they

have sought to present a neutral posture since the beginning of the conflict,

have demonstrated a greater tendency to support Russia within international

organizations. These countries have not only used the Russian government’s

terminology but also abstained from votes that have sought to condemn Russia’s

actions in Ukraine.

To understand the reasons behind the positioning of these countries, we

analyze how these countries relate to Russia in diplomatic as well as economic

terms. Table 3 below displays the main international organizations that these

countries belong to together with Russia, separated by subjects such as security,

finance, diplomacy and commerce.

Table 3 — International Partnerships between the BRICS Countries and Russia

Brazil India China South Africa

Security

UN Security Council (permanent) X

Shanghai Cooperation Organization X X

Finance

G20 Finance X X X X

New Development Bank X X X X

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank X X X X*

One Belt One Road Initiative X X X

International North-South Transport Corridor X

Diplomacy

BRICS X X X X

Strategic partnership accords X X X X

Commerce

Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation X

Eurasian Economic Union

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

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Among the BRICS, China and India are members of more international

organizations together with Russia, especially in terms of security, like the UN

Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and finance, such

as the One Belt One Road Initiative with China, and the International North-

South Transport Corridor with India.

On the economic front, Table 4 presents a summary of the commercial

relationships between Russia and the other members of the coalition, highlighting

important imports and exports with Russia in terms of all of the BRICS and the

commercial balance for each relationship.

Table 4 — Commerce between Russia and the other BRICS

Russian exports Russian imports Commercial

balance

Brazil

Potassic fertilizers (US$813M) Soybeans (US$354M)

Nitrogenous fertilizers (US$640M) Frozen bovine meat (US$214M)

Mixed mineral or chemical fertilizers (US$434M) Aluminum oxide (US$128M)

Total: US$2.98B / RNK 32 Total: US$1.73B / RNK 28 Total: +US$1.25B

India

Crude petroleum (US$1.11B) Packaged medicaments (US$505M)

Coal briquettes (US$647M) Broadcasting equipment (US$465M)

Diamonds (US$591M) Tea (US$107M)

Total: US$6.76B / RNK 15 Total: US$3.15B / RNK 18 Total: +US$3.61B

China

Crude petroleum (US$33.7B) Broadcasting equipment (US$4.1B)

Reﬁned petroleum (US$3.34B) Computers (US$2.13B)

Sawn wood (US$2.52B) Vehicle parts (US$1B)

Total: US$58.1B / RNK 1 Total: US$47.1B / RNK 1 Total: +US$11B

South

Africa

Copper wire (US$157M) Inorganic salts (US$111M)

Wheat (US$92,9M) Manganese ore (US$102M)

Mixed mineral or chemical fertilizers (US$51.8M) Citrus (US$92,9M)

Total: US$494M / RNK 72 Total: US$648M / RNK 50 Total: -US$154M

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2022).

We can observe that China plays a central role in Russian commerce, to the

extent that this Asian giant represents its largest exporter as well as its largest

importer. This relationship is marked by exports of energy resources by Russia

to China and the export of industrialized products from China to Russia. India,

even though it is not one of the Russian largest exporters or importers, plays a

strategic role in Russian commerce to the extent that it is also a large importer of

energy resources and arms (Bloomberg Línea 2022), and an exporter of strategic

products, such as medicaments. Brazil is less important to Russia in commercial

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terms, to the extent that it occupies lower positions compared to Russia’s main

commercial partners. However, this partnership is extremely important to Brazil,

as agriculture is the main driver of its exports and it is significantly dependent

on Russian fertilizers (BBC 2022a). On the other hand, South Africa, due to the

small size of its economy, has little relevance for Russian commerce, with imports

of minerals, food and fertilizers from Russia, and exports of several minerals

and citrus fruits to Russia.

We now examine the economic relationships between these countries further.

Table 5 presents the investment flows between the BRICS and Russia. We made

this table from various sources such as The Moscow Trade Center (2021), the

Russian Embassy in the Republic of South Africa (2022), the Indian Embassy in

Russia (2022), and Stronski and NG (2018).

Table 5 — Investment between the BRICS and Russia

 Russian Investments Investments in Russia

Brazil



Energy resources (Rosneﬁt, Gazprom) Food (JBS)

Mining (Serverstal) Manufacturing (WEG)

$1.5B (2019) 

India



Telecommunications (AFK) Energy resources (ONGC, GAIL)

Automotive sector (Kamaz)

$18B (2017) $13B (2017)

China



Energy resources (Rosneﬁt, Gazprom) Energy resources (Sinopec, CNPC)

Telecommunications (Huawei)

 $12B (2016)

South Africa



Mining (Renova, OAO Severstal) Beverages (SAB Miller)

Energy resources (RosGeo) Technology (Naspers)

Automotive sector (Kamaz) Heavy industry (Bateman, Bell)

$1.5B (2019) $5B (2019)

Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the Moscow Trade Center, the Russian Embassy in the

Republic of South Africa, the Indian Embassy in Russia, and Stronski and NG (2018).

Considering the financial relationships between the BRICS and Russia, what

calls our attention are the Chinese and Indian investments in Russia, especially in

the energy sector, the main driver of the country’s economy. In terms of Russian

investments in the other BRICS, the investments in India stand out, especially in

the telecommunications and automotive sector, as well as the energy sector in

China, even though we could not find quantitative information for these values.

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In general, large Russian companies are those mainly responsible for Russian

capital exports.

Moreover, it is worth analyzing how companies based in the BRICS which

operate in Russia have behaved in the face of the international pressure on the

country since the beginning of the conflict. Table 6 presents a summary of the

actions of these companies.

Table 6 — Actions of Foreign Companies in Russia

since the Beginning of the Conflict

 Total

Business

as Usual

decision

Reduced

operations

Suspended

activities

Complete

exit

China 49 39 4 1 4 1

India 21 12 1 4 2 2

Brazil 1 0 0 0 1 0

South Africa 1 0 0 0 1 0

USA + Canada 401 26 41 54 159 121

European Union + UK 592 101 84 64 177 166

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the Yale University (2022).

In analyzing Table 6, we note that the behavior of European, American

and Canadian companies differs from that of Chinese and Indian companies

in terms of the decision to maintain their operations in Russia or not after the

beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. By not engaging in packages of economic

sanctions proposed by western countries, Chinese and Indian companies have

mostly remained active in Russian territory since February — 79.59% of Chinese

companies and 57.14% of Indian companies gave their status as business as

usual according to this Yale University database (Yale University 2022)6. On

the other hand, less than 20% of companies from the European Union and the

United Kingdom continue to operate normally in Russia, while this number falls

to less than 7% for American and Canadian firms. In comparing these scenarios,

we perceive greater Chinese and Indian resistance through their maintaining

economic ties with Moscow, which is based on their partnerships with the

country and new opportunities that are now available with the withdrawal of

western companies.

6 Yale CELI List of Companies". Yale Companies List. 2022. https://www.yalerussianbusinessretreat.com. Access

on 6/10/2022.

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This scenario is also being maintained in relation to companies which have

opted to close their operations in Russia after the invasion, with approximately

30% of European, American and Canadian companies exiting Russia compared

to just 2.04% of Chinese firms and 9.92% of Indian firms. Therefore, it should

be emphasized that some countries within the BRICS group have been more

cautious in their positioning contrary to the Kremlin, even though this conflict

is not in the direct interests of any of these countries. Even though the decision

to sanction Russia is strictly political (The White House 2022), it is possible to

observe a direct alignment with the commercial and financial sectors of western

countries, which have also opted to cause damage to the Russian economy in

an attempt to isolate the country.

Finally, Table 7 summarizes the positioning of the BRICS regarding Russia in

relation to the conflict in Ukraine and the issues which involve these relationships

in the geopolitical as well as economic dimensions. In sum, we note how the

geopolitical and economic dimensions of the historical relationships between

these countries helps us understand the current positioning of the BRICS in terms

of avoiding the western countries’ condemnation of Russia.

Table 7 — Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions of the

Relationships between the BRICS and Russia

Geopolitical dimension Economic dimensions Posture

Brazil

Alignment with the USA, search

for integration with the OECD,

and partnership with NATO,

low geopolitical relevance

Commercial partner of

lesser importance despite its

strategic nature

Condemnation

of Russia with

reservations

China

Hegemonic dispute

with the USA, strategic

partnership

Major commercial partner

and largest holder of Russian

reserves

Posture of

neutrality

(pro-Russia)

India

“Strategic multi-alignment”,

longtime strategic

partnership

Important importer of

energy and arms

Posture of

neutrality

(pro-Russia)

South

Africa

Historic relationship

with the ANC, regional

importance

Few commercial relationships

despite relevant ﬁnancial

relationship

Posture of

neutrality

(pro-Russia)

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The clear exception is Brazil, which since 2016 has conducted a foreign policy

which is more in alignment with the United States (Lima and Albuquerque 2019;

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Saraiva and Silva 2019). The Brazilian positioning in relation to this conflict

appears to be better explained by this reorientation of this country’s foreign policy,

especially during the Bolsonaro administration, than the country’s pragmatic

interests in relation to Russia, which seem to only have moderated this position.

Since 2017, the country has demonstrated its formal interest in joining the

OECD, and since then it has sought to secure American support for its case (BBC

2019). However, in the economic sphere, even though Russia is a less relevant

commercial power in terms of absolute commerce, this relationship has a strong

strategic relevance. This importance resides mainly on Brazilian dependence

on fertilizers imported from Russia, which are essential to the development of

Brazilian agrobusiness, the chief driver of its economy. Nonetheless, in terms of

broader geopolitics, Brazil tends to play a minor role in discussions of international

security, especially in terms of the European continent and the Eurasian region.

India has presented quite a pragmatic posture since the beginning of the

conflict marked by avoiding explicit condemnations of Russia and abstaining in

various votes in international organizations. This positioning seems to be explained

by the country’s economic and geopolitical interests. In the geopolitical sphere,

India is a longtime strategic partner of Russia, which has played an important role

in this sense at various moments in its history. The Soviet Union supported India

in its disputes with Pakistan and its conflict with China in 1962. They signed a

Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1971, and the Soviet Union provided economic

support to India in its industrialization efforts. Moscow offered loans to India for

the construction of new factories in the steel, energy and engineering sectors,

among others (Mastny 2010). Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,

India continued to be a strategic partner with Russia, and they joined various

coalitions together (Chenoy 2008; Ivashentsov 2022). In the economic sphere,

India is heavily dependent on Russian energy imports, especially petroleum and

coal. Finally, the arms trade between the two countries is notable to the extent

that India is Russia’s main client in terms of arms sales (Statista 2022).

China has also sought to act in a pragmatic manner in relation to the conflict

as a function of its regional as well as global political and economic interests.

Despite the historic rivalry between China and Russia, especially during the

post-Stalin Soviet period (Luthi 2010) and during the Cold War, with the coming

of the new century China sought closer relations with the Putin government,

seeking a strategic approximation which involves various areas (Korolev 2016).

In the geopolitical sphere, we can highlight the dissatisfaction of both with the

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military prominence of the United States in the world, and military interventions

led by western nations which have led to the toppling of various regimes around

the globe, especially Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya (Korolev2016). As mentioned

before, both of these countries have sought to act in a convergent manner in

the UN Security Council in similar subsequent situations to impede new NATO

interventions, especially in Syria. Within the context of China’s ascension as a

global power and its growing tensions with the United States, Russia has become

an obvious ally given the converging positions of these countries concerning

global issues of international security (Wenzhao and Shengwei 2020). In the

economic sphere, this relationship is very strategic for both nations to the extent

that China imports a significant quantity of Russian energy resources, and Russia

is becoming more and more economically dependent on China, especially after

the intensification of western sanctions.

The Russian military operation in Ukraine has put the traditional friendly

relations between Russia and South Africa to the test. South Africa, as a projected

continental leader, a member of the BRICS, and the only African participant with

full rights in the G20, has been subject to strong international pressure in terms of

its official position in light of the Ukraine crisis. Up until now, the South African

position has been marked by neutrality and distancing. It has abstained in the

anti-Russian resolutions which have been voted on in the General Assembly and

the Security Council. In addition, it has presented its own resolution in terms of

the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, which contained moderate language and

did not attribute responsibility for the cessation of hostilities or the complication

of the humanitarian situation to either of the parties (Gachechiladze 2022).

In general, the discourse of the South African leaders, especially its President

Cyril Ramaphosa, has been distinct from western leaders, even though South

Africa has much closer commercial and economic ties to Europe and the United

States than with Russia (Gachechiladze 2022). The reasons for South Africa’s

posture appear to be based on the historic relations between the two countries

and a collective aversion to western interventions and sanctions. During the Cold

War, the Soviet Union supported various liberation movements on the African

continent, including that of the African National Congress (Porter 1986). Ever

since the ANC came to power in 1994, its leaders have sought to maintain close

diplomatic relations with Russia, being cautious lin their declarations about

Russia’s politics and actions, especially when they were criticized by western

nations. Moreover, important leaders share Russia’s anti-western rhetoric. In

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this sense, Russia represents a global alternative to the West, serving as a kind

of counterweight to American hegemony, especially in light of interventions led

by western nations on the African continent, especially in regard to the case of

Libya (Geldenhuys 2015).

Final considerations

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine did not begin in February 2022,

but rather with various political and territorial disputes between the countries in

recent years. Russia’s decision to invade Ukrainian territory has led to countless

consequences for the government of Vladimir Putin and its economic partners,

leading to six sanction packages until June 2022 and the reorganization of

international commerce. However, since the beginning of the conflict, the western

bloc has sought Moscow’s isolation and weakening, undermining its chances to

economically sustain its troops over the long term. The objective of this article

has been to analyze the real Russian isolation in the current scenario based on

the actions of the BRICS countries, which have proven to be less tendentious in

their condemnation of the Kremlin’s actions.

Since the first day of the invasion, the political divide between the developed

and developing nations concerning the Ukrainian question has become more and

more evident, given that the emerging BRICS powers have positioned themselves

closer to Moscow, different from the western countries. In analyzing the voting

of the BRICS nations within the UN system regarding the conflict in Ukraine,

we see a pattern that is different from that followed by the western powers,

which have strengthened their alliances in the face of this new Russian menace.

The emerging powers have not presented a direct ideological alignment with

Moscow, but have been more cautious in avoiding a direct condemnation of

Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Even though they are not in favor of the conflict, the BRICS countries do

not support the history of interventions and sanctions, particularly driven by

the United States, against nations that defy the reigning liberal order. Moreover,

their strategic partnership with this Eurasian nation also influences the way they

have positioned themselves in the United Nations in light of the possible political

and economic scenarios in the post-war world. Besides their votes in multilateral

systems, these countries have not only not adhered to western sanctions against

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Russia, they have in fact intensified their commercial relationships with Russia

especially in terms of the importing of natural resources. Moreover, it is notable

that companies which are based in these countries, mainly Chinese and Indian

firms, have maintained their operations in Russian territory, unlike many western

companies.

In this manner, it is possible to observe that the Russian Federation is not

totally isolated within the International System. Despite the great efforts of

western nations to weaken its economy and suffocate its military efforts, the

BRICS nations have opted to maintain their commercial and strategic partnerships

with Moscow, believing that there are opportunities to be taken advantage of in

the present and the future after the end of this conflict, which in this analysis

is conceived of as pro-Russian neutrality. Thus, we argue that in not aligning

themselves with the current bloc against Russia, these countries hope to maintain

their autonomy and international prominence as alternative poles of power,

positioning themselves distinctively from the western powers.

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