



**CARTA**  
INTERNACIONAL

ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE  
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

ISSN 2526-9038

# The BRICS countries and the Russia-Ukraine conflict

*Os países do BRICS e o conflito  
entre Rússia e Ucrânia*

*Los países del BRICS y el conflicto  
entre Rusia y Ucrania*

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v17n3.2022.1286

Laerte Apolinário Júnior<sup>1</sup>

Giovana Dias Branco<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

This article<sup>3</sup> analyzes the actions of the BRICS concerning the conflict between Russia and Ukraine initiated in 2022. The question which guides this study is: how and why have these countries positioned themselves regarding this conflict? To answer the proposed question, we analyze the positionings of these countries in various international organizations regarding the conflict in Ukraine in light of their geopolitical and economic interests. The conclusion is that these countries have adopted a pro-Russian neutrality in various institutional spaces — even though it has not been in a homogeneous manner — for a variety of reasons which have led to Moscow not being isolated internationally.

**Keywords:** BRICS; Russia; Ukraine; International Organizations; Geopolitics.

### Copyright:

• This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are credited.

• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.



1 PhD in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (USP). Professor of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP). (lapolinario@pucsp.br). ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8326-4428>

2 Master's student in International Relations at the Postgraduate Program San Tiago Dantas (UNESP, Unicamp, PUCSP). (giovana.branco@unesp.br). ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1476-3378>

3 We thank the Research Incentive Plan of the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PIPEQ/PUCSP) for funding this research. Grant/Award Number: 25029. Artigo submetido em 10/06/2022 e aprovado em 07/11/2022.





## Resumo

Este artigo analisa a atuação dos BRICS em relação ao conflito entre Rússia e Ucrânia iniciado em 2022. A pergunta que guia este estudo é: como e — por que — estes países têm se posicionado em relação ao conflito? Para responder à questão proposta, foram analisados os posicionamentos destes países em relação ao conflito na Ucrânia em diferentes Organizações Internacionais à luz de seus interesses geopolíticos e econômicos. Conclui-se que estes países adotam uma postura de neutralidade pró-russa em diferentes espaços institucionais — embora de forma não homogênea — em função de interesses diversos, de modo que Moscou não se encontra isolada internacionalmente.

**Palavras-chave:** BRICS; Rússia; Ucrânia; Organizações Internacionais; Geopolítica.

## Resumen

Este artículo analiza la actuación de los BRICS con relación al conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania iniciado en 2022. La pregunta que guía este estudio es: ¿cómo y — por qué — estos países se han posicionado con relación al conflicto? Para responder a la pregunta propuesta, se analizaron las posiciones de estos países en relación con el conflicto de Ucrania en diferentes Organismos Internacionales a la luz de sus intereses geopolíticos y económicos. Se concluye que estos países adoptan una postura de neutralidad prorrusa en diferentes espacios institucionales — aunque de forma no homogénea — por intereses diferentes, de modo que Moscú no quede aislada internacionalmente.

**Palabras clave:** BRICS; Rusia; Ucrania; Organizaciones Internacionales; Geopolítica.

## Introduction

Since the Russian army's invasion of Ukrainian territory at dawn on February 24, 2022, world geopolitics has gone through a series of alterations in relation to the immediate previous scenario: the western bloc has been united with a high degree of internal coherence in the face of the common threat from Moscow, and have imposed various rounds of sanctions on the Russian economy (Washington Post 2022). However, this coherence has not been reflected in other regions, especially emerging countries, which have been cautious in their discourses about Russia's foreign policy and the Russian president himself. If the western powers did not delay in supporting the government of Volodymyr Zelensky on





the discursive plane and, more recently, sending military and financial assistance, the emerging powers that belong to the BRICS group have decided to abstain in votes in the United Nations. Despite the apparent neutrality of these decisions, it is understood that Russia is not politically isolated as the western powers envisaged, given that a relevant group of actors has sought to avoid any direct conflict with Moscow, even symbolically.

In this sense, it should be noted that these countries have not only avoided condemning Russia's actions, they have used the terminology used by the Russian government in this conflict (CNBC 2022), and have sought to intensify their commercial relationships with Russia, especially in terms of increasing their imports of Russian petroleum (BBC 2022b). Thus, we understand that this posture goes beyond neutrality, and can be conceived of as "pro-Russian neutrality" to the extent that these actions favor Russia in this conflict.

As weeks pass, the situation in Ukraine seems to be a conflict that will continue in the long-term, given the difficulty that Russian troops have had in maintaining control of their conquered cities, the Ukrainian counter offensives which have gained force with the arrival of western armaments, the Kremlin's reallocation of arms to eastern Ukraine (Washington Post 2022), and the realization of annexation referendums in the four Ukrainian *oblasts* which are partly occupied by Russia (Druzhinin 2022). Moreover, we should consider the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an important third actor in this conflict which not only stimulates the dispute of Manichean narratives that separates Russia from the so-called "free world" but also seeks to coopt actors in the developing world to take decisions against the actions of the government of Vladimir Putin. Even before the invasion, Russia and NATO disagreed about this military alliance for collective defense's waves of expansion to the East, which cover a large part of the post-Soviet space of historic Russian influence. This is a scenario which intensifies to the extent that Moscow associates western advances in Eastern Europe as a clear threat to its national security, as well as a cause of Russia's geopolitical weakness in recent years (Russia 2021; Savranskaya and Blanton 2018).

Even though the western countries have imposed economic sanctions in a joint manner<sup>4</sup>, there has not been an enforcement mechanism strong enough to

---

4 Up until now, there have been six packages of sanctions against Russia, directed towards individuals and members of the Duma; Russian access to European capital markets; economic relations with the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk; the assets of President Vladimir Putin and the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; members of the National Security Council; transactions of the Russian Central Bank; restrictions to Russian air space;





slow down the Russian invasion, given that Russia has veto power in the United Nations' Security Council through its permanent membership. Moreover, votes have also been taken in the UN's General Assembly and the Human Rights Council regarding this conflict which have demonstrated the positioning of various actors in relation to the belligerent actions of the Russian Federation. For the purposes of this article, we analyzed the positioning of the five members of the BRICS in the bodies mentioned above, as well as their economic and political partnerships with Moscow, in order to identify the interests of these countries in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In this manner, we intend to show that the Kremlin is isolated only in relation to the western world, but this relationship is not sustained when we look at other power axes within the International System.

This article is structured in the following manner. The next section analyzes the events which led to the conflict in Ukraine and its consequences. The following section discusses the formation of the BRICS coalition and its actions in terms of International Security. Next, we present the positioning of these countries in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, based on an analysis of their positions in various international organizations and their geopolitical and economic interests in light of this dispute. Finally, we present our main conclusions concerning the supposed isolation of Russia within the International System.

## 1. The Conflict in Ukraine and its Consequences

Even though the Russian military invasion of Ukrainian territory began at the end of February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has had many previous episodes, making it possible to return to 2014 and the context of Euromaidan or even the 1990s, when Ukraine declared its independence (Bushkovitch 2020). Even though many emphasize the ethnic, linguistic, historical and cultural proximity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, which have been described as “brother peoples” (Russia 2021), their relations over time have been characterized by cooperation as well as conflict (Reid 2022).

Ever since Ukraine's independence, its existence has been intrinsically linked to a dependent relationship with Russia, especially in terms of security

---

transactions with Russian state companies; new investments in the energy sector; restrictions to the importing of coal, wood, cement and other Russian products; restrictions to Russian ships in European ports; the banning of Russian oil imports; the banning of three Russian banks and one Belarussian bank from the SWIFT system (Comissão Europeia 2022).





(Bushkovitch 2020). This situation was more extreme during the Soviet period, when the level of tolerance in relation to “Ukrainization” varied in accordance with the Russian perception of whether nationalist groups signified a threat to the integrity of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, 1994 signaled an important landmark between these countries, with the Kravtchuk government’s acceptance of ceding Ukraine’s nuclear arms to Russia under the condition that Moscow would never use them against its neighbor (UNTC 1994).

After a period of relative stability between Russia and Ukraine, their relations passed through a new inflection point during the so-called Colored Revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in the first few years of this century (Karatnycky 2021). These revolutions were peaceful popular demonstrations against holdover corruption from the Soviet era and governments allied with the interests of Moscow, which sought to distance themselves from the western world and its institutions (Snyder 2019). To the Russian political elites, these revolutions were based on the influence of American interests in the region, bearing in mind the apparent unipolarity of the United States in the post-Cold War period (Stuenkel 2017).

In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a speech to a Security Conference in Munich, which dealt with subjects related to instability and global conflict which were worsening at that time, as well as issues related to concerns about Russian security and sovereignty on the European continent. NATO’s waves of expansion to the East and the increase in military interventions led by the United States in various regions in the global periphery preoccupied the Kremlin, which interpreted the actions of the western bloc as a kind of test of Russian influence and leadership in the post-Soviet space (Russia 2021). Moreover, the declaration by NATO member states the following year at their meeting in Bucharest opened the possibility of the future adherence of Ukraine and Georgia to this military alliance, which further deteriorated the relations with Moscow.

Ukraine again was the stage for disputes between the Russian government and western countries in 2014, within the context of the so-called Euromaidan. In not pursuing an association between Ukraine and the European Union, the government of Viktor Yanukovich opened the door to a series of demonstrations against his decision, given the broad popular support for the narrative of socioeconomic progress which was expected from the entrance in the European bloc (Snyder 2019). In addition to the political repression which put an end to the movement, a civil war erupted in the east of the country between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government which distanced Ukraine further from European





institutions. Ever since this period, Russian military personnel have been in the frontier region giving support to the separatist groups in the Donbas region, a scenario which was not necessary in the Crimean Peninsula, where a referendum consolidated its annexation into Russian territory in 2014.

In this sense, the conflict which began in 2022 is not a novelty, but rather a continuation of previous disputes between these neighboring countries. Even though it is difficult to determine which are the main interests and objectives of Russia in the conflict, we can affirm that it is part of its narrative strategy of using a diplomacy of memory that returns to national myths and discourses of the past, and the worsening of relations between Moscow and NATO, to justify the current actions of the Putin government in Ukraine (McGlynn 2021). In announcing the beginning of the invasion — called a special military operation by the Russians — Vladimir Putin relied on history to affirm the right of Russia to Ukrainian territories with a Russian majority population, questioning the country's right to exist, and declaring the frontier with Ukraine since the demise of the Soviet Union “artificial” (Russia 2021). Moreover, the eastern expansion of NATO and the installation of new military bases in ex-Soviet republics had been denounced by Russia ever since the 1990s as an “existential threat” to the Russian state (Savranskaya and Blanton 2017), long before Ukraine drew closer to the European bloc.

In the international scenario, nations adopted distinct positions in relation to the conflict: the western bloc, led by the United States and the members of the European Union, condemned Russia's actions from the outset, offering support to the Zelensky government; on the other hand, emerging powers such as China and India opted not to adhere to the unilateral economic sanctions promoted by the West on the Russian economy, which were not approved by the UN Security Council. These countries have constructed diplomatic and commercial ties with Russia over time which were institutionalized with the formation of the BRICS bloc and its Development Bank. Even though the bloc has lost its leadership role in recent years, the relations between the governments of Putin and Xi Jinping have become closer to the extent that Russia and China have come to question the leadership role of the United States, foreseeing the establishment of a multipolar order with an active role for the emergent bloc (Stuenkel 2017). Shortly before the military invasion, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China issued a joint declaration which announced the beginning of a new global era in which both countries would assume leading roles in terms of actions and influence (Russia 2022).





Even though the Chinese government has opted to abstain in most United Nations votes involving the Ukrainian conflict, which will be discussed later on, the publication of the Joint Declaration demonstrates the alignment between Moscow and Beijing, even though it is not automatic. Moreover, most Chinese companies have maintained their operations in Russian territory, in contrast to companies of western origin, which will also be discussed in this article. In this manner, the relations between different poles of power in the international system have become more and more uncertain to the extent that we have observed a division in the actions of the developed and developing world in relation to the Ukrainian conflict.

This international division is also reflected in terms of the economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, given that these initiatives have come exclusively from the Global North (Ferrer 2014). Even though the Russian strategic objectives in the conflict remain diffuse at this point, the United States, Canada, and the European Union have applied at least six rounds of sanctions against individuals, companies and the Russian state in a generalized manner as a form of retaliation and an attempt to weaken the Russian actions. On the other hand, there has been more caution on the part of the BRICS bloc in adopting measures specifically against Russia, given that they have opted not to break off relations with the government of Vladimir Putin.

Even though the initial expectations were for a quick, very intense war, with Russia attaining its military objectives without much resistance from Ukraine, what we can observe is a greater internal mobilization by the Ukrainians in defense of their territory, which has been strengthened by the sending of international military aid. With the retreat of Russian forces in the region of Kyiv, followed by the reorganization of troops in the Donbas region and the intensification of attacks, the Ukrainian conflict has taken on a new form, which could lead this war to new temporal horizons.

## **2. The BRICS and International Security**

The first decade of this century witnessed the development of a reorganization of the forces of the international system due to the ascension of the so-called emerging powers (Ikenberry 2018; Kitchen and Cox 2019). Among these countries, the so-called BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — have





gained space in the world economy as these countries presented constant rates of growth during the beginning of the century. Driven by this rhythm of growth, these countries have sought closer diplomatic ties through the formalization of the BRICS coalition, and have come to demand reforms in contemporary global governance institutions (Hurrell 2018; Stuenkel 2017).

However, a decade after its creation, the BRICS group and the narrative of the emerging powers have lost some of their appeal. The economic growth of its members has stagnated with the exceptions of India and China, and domestic political challenges have restricted the external politics of its members. Today more critical studies of the narrative of these ascending powers have become common (Prys-Hansen and Nolte 2016). Even though these critiques are not new, the overall tone in terms of the relevance and potential of this group to shape large events has become more pessimistic in recent years. Despite these more negative evaluations, recent studies on this subject do not necessarily question the relevance of the emerging powers, but have given more emphasis to their practical limitations especially due to the increasing asymmetry among its members, given China's economic and geopolitical ascension (Brosig 2021). Thus, this group has become more and more dependent on the imperatives of China's expansion within the International System to the extent that one cannot interpret the BRICS without taking into account the leadership role of China in the establishment of new global institutions, which imply changes in global hegemony (Vadell 2019).

There is still little clarity concerning the limits of the convergence of its members, especially outside of the economic arena (Rinaldi and Apolinário Júnior 2020), and it is in the area of International Security and the need to position themselves in relation to international conflicts in various international organizations, that the convergence of interests within this coalition is being tested.

International security issues have been mentioned at the BRICS summit meetings since the first Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations Media Statement in 2008. In general, declarations tend to be vague with condemnations of terrorism, mentions of more generic principles such as defending peace, stability and prosperity in accordance with the aspirations of every people, the idea that the use of force should be avoided, and the importance of respect for sovereignty, and countries' territorial integrity.

Analyzing the UN Security Council, it may be noted that these countries have occupied very heterogeneous positions historically in this organization, to the extent that China and Russia are permanent members, while Brazil, India and







South Africa have been elected to it at various times. For an analysis of the historic positions of BRICS in the Security Council, see Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha (2017).

The year 2011 is of particular interest because all five of these nations were part of the Security Council that year. Considering the five non-unanimous votes of 2011, three texts were adopted and two rejected, and from this it is possible to compare the voting patterns of these five countries. The only two cases in which the positions of the BRICS totally converged — Resolution 1984 concerning Iran and the rejected Israel-Palestine Resolution S/2011/24 — the five of them voted in favor. The most emblematic vote was the vote on Resolution 1973 about Libya (Brockmeier, Stuenkel and Tourinho 2016). Brazil, Russia, China and India abstained, while South Africa voted in favor, and received much criticism of its position subsequently, especially from African countries (Neethling 2012).

**Table 1 — Positioning of the BRICS in the Security Council in 2011**

	<b>Resolution 1973 Libya</b>	<b>Resolution 1984 Iran</b>	<b>Resolution 2023 Eritrea</b>	<b>Res. S/2011/24 Israel/Palestine</b>	<b>Res. S/2011/612 Syria</b>
<b>China</b>	Abstention	Affirmative	Abstention	Affirmative	Negative
<b>Russia</b>	Abstention	Affirmative	Abstention	Affirmative	Negative
<b>Brazil</b>	Abstention	Affirmative	Affirmative	Affirmative	Abstention
<b>India</b>	Abstention	Affirmative	Affirmative	Affirmative	Abstention
<b>South Africa</b>	Affirmative	Affirmative	Affirmative	Affirmative	Abstention

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha (2017).

Before the BRICS Summit in Sanya, China, South Africa had still not joined the group. Thus, the four members of the BRIC group were in agreement in their votes on this resolution. At the time, these countries demonstrated basically the same concerns, which did not question the gravity of the situation in Libya, but the lack of clarity of the resolution and possible precedents for action by the Security Council.

In the case of Resolution 2023 concerning sanctions in Eritrea, Russia and China abstained and the others voted in favor. We can speculate that the abstentions of Russia and China have more to do with the long-term dynamics between the permanent members than substantive issues that could be shared by the five countries (Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha 2017). The two countries in explaining their abstentions cited typical themes of the recurrent disputes among the five permanent members, especially the proliferation of sanction regimes.





In relation to Syria, while the two permanent members voted negatively, Brazil, India and South Africa abstained, assuming a traditional strategy among elected members. Even though there is evidence of articulation among the BRICS in this case, there were also discussions among the members of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa Forum), which may have contributed to the decision (Oliveira, Uziel and Rocha 2017). China's decision to collaborate with Russia in vetoing the resolutions in the Security Council against Syria demonstrated their mutual determination to counter the unilateralism of the United States in issues of global governance, with the clear objective of establishing a more egalitarian relationship based on a new multipolar political order (Eminue and Dickson 2013; Rinaldi and Pecequilo 2021).

### 3. The BRICS and the Conflict in Ukraine

Up until now, the BRICS countries have presented some convergent actions as well as other divergent ones in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. In relation to the votes on this subject in the Security Council — S/RES/2623 (2/27/2022) — in the General Assembly — Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 (3/2/2022) and Resolution A/ES-11/L.5 (10/12/2022) — and in the Human Rights Council (4/7/2022), Brazil was the only member of the BRICS group to vote for the condemnation of the attitudes of Russia regarding Ukraine. In the four cases, while Russia voted against them and the other BRICS<sup>5</sup> abstained, Brazil voted in favor (United Nations, 2022a, 2022b, 2022d, 2022f).

**Table 2 — Votes on the Conflict in the United Nations**

	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>South Africa</b>
<b>General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1 (3/2/2022)</b>	Yes	No	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention
<b>General Assembly Resolution A/ES-11/L.5 (10/12/2022)</b>	Yes	No	Abstention	Abstention	Abstention
<b>Security Council Resolution S/RES/2623(2/27/2022)</b>	Yes	No	Abstention	Abstention	-
<b>Human Rights Council (4/7/2022)</b>	Yes	No	Abstention	Abstention	-

Source: Elaborated by the Authors.

<sup>5</sup> South Africa is not a current member of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council.





The resolution that passed in the General Assembly on March 2 was approved with 141 favorable votes, 5 abstentions and 35 votes against, and its objective was to condemn the acts of the Russians, requesting the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (United Nations 2022d). Brazil voted in favor of the document but criticized some sections of its content. The Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations Ronaldo Costa Filho, criticized the lack of the launch of a negotiation process and the unbalanced tone of the document (Ministério de Relações Exteriores 2022b). President Bolsonaro also avoided making direct criticisms to Russia and President Putin (Correio Braziliense 2022). However, it should be noted that Brazil's desire to maintain neutrality in order to stay on good terms with Russia without displeasing the United States and other western powers has become increasingly difficult given that the country has had to take a position on the crisis in various international organizations.

The most recent, approved by the General Assembly on October 12th condemned Russia's annexation of regions of Ukraine, with 143 votes in favor, 5 against, and 35 abstentions (United Nations 2022f). Note that the pattern of voting for both resolutions was quite similar. In the March resolution, Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Russia and Syria voted in favor of Russia. In the October resolution, the countries that supported Russia were Belarus, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia and Syria (United Nations 2022d, 2022f).

The resolution approved by the Security Council was of a procedural nature and called for an emergency session of the General Assembly to discuss the Ukrainian situation. There were 11 votes in favor, 3 abstentions and 1 vote against from Russia itself. While Brazil voted in favor of the resolution, China and India abstained (United Nations, 2022b). Since it was merely a procedural resolution, Russia's vote against it did not constitute a veto, unlike other resolutions that have sought to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukrainian territory in February and the annexation of regions of Ukraine at the end of September (United Nations 2022c, 2022e).

The resolution adopted in the Human Rights Council, which is investigating Russia for human rights violations, sought to create a commission of inquiry to investigate violations and accusations of abuse during its military operations in Ukraine. Of the 47 countries which are members of the Council, 32 voted in favor of an Independent International Commission of Inquiry, including Brazil (United Nations 2022a). It should be pointed out that even though Brazil voted in favor of the document, the country presented reservations about the presented





text, and stated that it opposed the expulsion of Russia from this body. The Brazilian Ambassador Tovar da Silva Nunes especially criticized the negotiation process, which ignored the critiques of various countries, and some concepts employed in the text, which made the text more politicized and less balanced in his understanding. Despite the critiques, the justification presented for the vote was that the Council should fulfill its obligation to protect human rights in Ukraine, supporting a pacific solution to the country's crisis (Ministério de Relações Exteriores 2022a).

Thus, we can see how China, India and South Africa, even though they have sought to present a neutral posture since the beginning of the conflict, have demonstrated a greater tendency to support Russia within international organizations. These countries have not only used the Russian government's terminology but also abstained from votes that have sought to condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine.

To understand the reasons behind the positioning of these countries, we analyze how these countries relate to Russia in diplomatic as well as economic terms. Table 3 below displays the main international organizations that these countries belong to together with Russia, separated by subjects such as security, finance, diplomacy and commerce.

**Table 3 — International Partnerships between the BRICS Countries and Russia**

	Brazil	India	China	South Africa
<b>Security</b>				
UN Security Council (permanent)			X	
Shanghai Cooperation Organization		X	X	
<b>Finance</b>				
G20 Finance	X	X	X	X
New Development Bank	X	X	X	X
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank	X	X	X	X*
One Belt One Road Initiative		X	X	X
International North-South Transport Corridor		X		
<b>Diplomacy</b>				
BRICS	X	X	X	X
Strategic partnership accords	X	X	X	X
<b>Commerce</b>				
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation			X	
Eurasian Economic Union				

Source: Elaborated by the authors.





Among the BRICS, China and India are members of more international organizations together with Russia, especially in terms of security, like the UN Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and finance, such as the One Belt One Road Initiative with China, and the International North-South Transport Corridor with India.

On the economic front, Table 4 presents a summary of the commercial relationships between Russia and the other members of the coalition, highlighting important imports and exports with Russia in terms of all of the BRICS and the commercial balance for each relationship.

**Table 4 — Commerce between Russia and the other BRICS**

	Russian exports	Russian imports	Commercial balance
<b>Brazil</b>	Potassic fertilizers (US\$813M)	Soybeans (US\$354M)	
	Nitrogenous fertilizers (US\$640M)	Frozen bovine meat (US\$214M)	
	Mixed mineral or chemical fertilizers (US\$434M)	Aluminum oxide (US\$128M)	
	<b>Total: US\$2.98B / RNK 32</b>	<b>Total: US\$1.73B / RNK 28</b>	<b>Total: + US\$1.25B</b>
<b>India</b>	Crude petroleum (US\$1.11B)	Packaged medicaments (US\$505M)	
	Coal briquettes (US\$647M)	Broadcasting equipment (US\$465M)	
	Diamonds (US\$591M)	Tea (US\$107M)	
	<b>Total: US\$6.76B / RNK 15</b>	<b>Total: US\$3.15B / RNK 18</b>	<b>Total: + US\$3.61B</b>
<b>China</b>	Crude petroleum (US\$33.7B)	Broadcasting equipment (US\$4.1B)	
	Refined petroleum (US\$3.34B)	Computers (US\$2.13B)	
	Sawn wood (US\$2.52B)	Vehicle parts (US\$1B)	
	<b>Total: US\$58.1B / RNK 1</b>	<b>Total: US\$47.1B / RNK 1</b>	<b>Total: + US\$11B</b>
<b>South Africa</b>	Copper wire (US\$157M)	Inorganic salts (US\$111M)	
	Wheat (US\$92,9M)	Manganese ore (US\$102M)	
	Mixed mineral or chemical fertilizers (US\$51.8M)	Citrus (US\$92,9M)	
	<b>Total: US\$494M / RNK 72</b>	<b>Total: US\$648M / RNK 50</b>	<b>Total: -US\$154M</b>

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from The *Observatory of Economic Complexity* (2022).

We can observe that China plays a central role in Russian commerce, to the extent that this Asian giant represents its largest exporter as well as its largest importer. This relationship is marked by exports of energy resources by Russia to China and the export of industrialized products from China to Russia. India, even though it is not one of the Russian largest exporters or importers, plays a strategic role in Russian commerce to the extent that it is also a large importer of energy resources and arms (Bloomberg Línea 2022), and an exporter of strategic products, such as medicaments. Brazil is less important to Russia in commercial





terms, to the extent that it occupies lower positions compared to Russia's main commercial partners. However, this partnership is extremely important to Brazil, as agriculture is the main driver of its exports and it is significantly dependent on Russian fertilizers (BBC 2022a). On the other hand, South Africa, due to the small size of its economy, has little relevance for Russian commerce, with imports of minerals, food and fertilizers from Russia, and exports of several minerals and citrus fruits to Russia.

We now examine the economic relationships between these countries further. Table 5 presents the investment flows between the BRICS and Russia. We made this table from various sources such as The Moscow Trade Center (2021), the Russian Embassy in the Republic of South Africa (2022), the Indian Embassy in Russia (2022), and Stronski and NG (2018).

**Table 5 — Investment between the BRICS and Russia**

	<b>Russian Investments</b>	<b>Investments in Russia</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	Energy resources (Rosnefit, Gazprom) Mining (Serverstal) \$1.5B (2019)	Food (JBS) Manufacturing (WEG)
<b>India</b>	Telecommunications (AFK) Automotive sector (Kamaz) \$18B (2017)	Energy resources (ONGC, GAIL) \$13B (2017)
<b>China</b>	Energy resources (Rosnefit, Gazprom)	Energy resources (Sinopec, CNPC) Telecommunications (Huawei) \$12B (2016)
<b>South Africa</b>	Mining (Renova, OAO Severstal) Energy resources (RosGeo) Automotive sector (Kamaz) \$1.5B (2019)	Beverages (SAB Miller) Technology (Naspers) Heavy industry (Bateman, Bell) \$5B (2019)

Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on data from *the Moscow Trade Center, the Russian Embassy in the Republic of South Africa, the Indian Embassy in Russia, and Stronski and NG (2018)*.

Considering the financial relationships between the BRICS and Russia, what calls our attention are the Chinese and Indian investments in Russia, especially in the energy sector, the main driver of the country's economy. In terms of Russian investments in the other BRICS, the investments in India stand out, especially in the telecommunications and automotive sector, as well as the energy sector in China, even though we could not find quantitative information for these values.





In general, large Russian companies are those mainly responsible for Russian capital exports.

Moreover, it is worth analyzing how companies based in the BRICS which operate in Russia have behaved in the face of the international pressure on the country since the beginning of the conflict. Table 6 presents a summary of the actions of these companies.

**Table 6 — Actions of Foreign Companies in Russia since the Beginning of the Conflict**

	Total	Business as Usual	No decision	Reduced operations	Suspended activities	Complete exit
<b>China</b>	49	39	4	1	4	1
<b>India</b>	21	12	1	4	2	2
<b>Brazil</b>	1	0	0	0	1	0
<b>South Africa</b>	1	0	0	0	1	0
<b>USA + Canada</b>	401	26	41	54	159	121
<b>European Union + UK</b>	592	101	84	64	177	166

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the *Yale University (2022)*.

In analyzing Table 6, we note that the behavior of European, American and Canadian companies differs from that of Chinese and Indian companies in terms of the decision to maintain their operations in Russia or not after the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. By not engaging in packages of economic sanctions proposed by western countries, Chinese and Indian companies have mostly remained active in Russian territory since February — 79.59% of Chinese companies and 57.14% of Indian companies gave their status as *business as usual* according to this Yale University database (Yale University 2022)<sup>6</sup>. On the other hand, less than 20% of companies from the European Union and the United Kingdom continue to operate normally in Russia, while this number falls to less than 7% for American and Canadian firms. In comparing these scenarios, we perceive greater Chinese and Indian resistance through their maintaining economic ties with Moscow, which is based on their partnerships with the country and new opportunities that are now available with the withdrawal of western companies.

<sup>6</sup> Yale CELI List of Companies". Yale Companies List. 2022. <https://www.yalerussianbusinessretreat.com>. Access on 6/10/2022.





This scenario is also being maintained in relation to companies which have opted to close their operations in Russia after the invasion, with approximately 30% of European, American and Canadian companies exiting Russia compared to just 2.04% of Chinese firms and 9.92% of Indian firms. Therefore, it should be emphasized that some countries within the BRICS group have been more cautious in their positioning contrary to the Kremlin, even though this conflict is not in the direct interests of any of these countries. Even though the decision to sanction Russia is strictly political (The White House 2022), it is possible to observe a direct alignment with the commercial and financial sectors of western countries, which have also opted to cause damage to the Russian economy in an attempt to isolate the country.

Finally, Table 7 summarizes the positioning of the BRICS regarding Russia in relation to the conflict in Ukraine and the issues which involve these relationships in the geopolitical as well as economic dimensions. In sum, we note how the geopolitical and economic dimensions of the historical relationships between these countries helps us understand the current positioning of the BRICS in terms of avoiding the western countries' condemnation of Russia.

**Table 7 — Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions of the Relationships between the BRICS and Russia**

	<b>Geopolitical dimension</b>	<b>Economic dimensions</b>	<b>Posture</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	Alignment with the USA, search for integration with the OECD, and partnership with NATO, low geopolitical relevance	Commercial partner of lesser importance despite its strategic nature	Condemnation of Russia with reservations
<b>China</b>	Hegemonic dispute with the USA, strategic partnership	Major commercial partner and largest holder of Russian reserves	Posture of neutrality (pro-Russia)
<b>India</b>	“Strategic multi-alignment”, longtime strategic partnership	Important importer of energy and arms	Posture of neutrality (pro-Russia)
<b>South Africa</b>	Historic relationship with the ANC, regional importance	Few commercial relationships despite relevant financial relationship	Posture of neutrality (pro-Russia)

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The clear exception is Brazil, which since 2016 has conducted a foreign policy which is more in alignment with the United States (Lima and Albuquerque 2019;







Saraiva and Silva 2019). The Brazilian positioning in relation to this conflict appears to be better explained by this reorientation of this country's foreign policy, especially during the Bolsonaro administration, than the country's pragmatic interests in relation to Russia, which seem to only have moderated this position. Since 2017, the country has demonstrated its formal interest in joining the OECD, and since then it has sought to secure American support for its case (BBC 2019). However, in the economic sphere, even though Russia is a less relevant commercial power in terms of absolute commerce, this relationship has a strong strategic relevance. This importance resides mainly on Brazilian dependence on fertilizers imported from Russia, which are essential to the development of Brazilian agrobusiness, the chief driver of its economy. Nonetheless, in terms of broader geopolitics, Brazil tends to play a minor role in discussions of international security, especially in terms of the European continent and the Eurasian region.

India has presented quite a pragmatic posture since the beginning of the conflict marked by avoiding explicit condemnations of Russia and abstaining in various votes in international organizations. This positioning seems to be explained by the country's economic and geopolitical interests. In the geopolitical sphere, India is a longtime strategic partner of Russia, which has played an important role in this sense at various moments in its history. The Soviet Union supported India in its disputes with Pakistan and its conflict with China in 1962. They signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1971, and the Soviet Union provided economic support to India in its industrialization efforts. Moscow offered loans to India for the construction of new factories in the steel, energy and engineering sectors, among others (Mastny 2010). Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India continued to be a strategic partner with Russia, and they joined various coalitions together (Chenoy 2008; Ivashentsov 2022). In the economic sphere, India is heavily dependent on Russian energy imports, especially petroleum and coal. Finally, the arms trade between the two countries is notable to the extent that India is Russia's main client in terms of arms sales (Statista 2022).

China has also sought to act in a pragmatic manner in relation to the conflict as a function of its regional as well as global political and economic interests. Despite the historic rivalry between China and Russia, especially during the post-Stalin Soviet period (Luthi 2010) and during the Cold War, with the coming of the new century China sought closer relations with the Putin government, seeking a strategic approximation which involves various areas (Korolev 2016). In the geopolitical sphere, we can highlight the dissatisfaction of both with the





military prominence of the United States in the world, and military interventions led by western nations which have led to the toppling of various regimes around the globe, especially Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya (Korolev2016). As mentioned before, both of these countries have sought to act in a convergent manner in the UN Security Council in similar subsequent situations to impede new NATO interventions, especially in Syria. Within the context of China's ascension as a global power and its growing tensions with the United States, Russia has become an obvious ally given the converging positions of these countries concerning global issues of international security (Wenzhao and Shengwei 2020). In the economic sphere, this relationship is very strategic for both nations to the extent that China imports a significant quantity of Russian energy resources, and Russia is becoming more and more economically dependent on China, especially after the intensification of western sanctions.

The Russian military operation in Ukraine has put the traditional friendly relations between Russia and South Africa to the test. South Africa, as a projected continental leader, a member of the BRICS, and the only African participant with full rights in the G20, has been subject to strong international pressure in terms of its official position in light of the Ukraine crisis. Up until now, the South African position has been marked by neutrality and distancing. It has abstained in the anti-Russian resolutions which have been voted on in the General Assembly and the Security Council. In addition, it has presented its own resolution in terms of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, which contained moderate language and did not attribute responsibility for the cessation of hostilities or the complication of the humanitarian situation to either of the parties (Gachechiladze 2022).

In general, the discourse of the South African leaders, especially its President Cyril Ramaphosa, has been distinct from western leaders, even though South Africa has much closer commercial and economic ties to Europe and the United States than with Russia (Gachechiladze 2022). The reasons for South Africa's posture appear to be based on the historic relations between the two countries and a collective aversion to western interventions and sanctions. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported various liberation movements on the African continent, including that of the African National Congress (Porter 1986). Ever since the ANC came to power in 1994, its leaders have sought to maintain close diplomatic relations with Russia, being cautious in their declarations about Russia's politics and actions, especially when they were criticized by western nations. Moreover, important leaders share Russia's anti-western rhetoric. In





this sense, Russia represents a global alternative to the West, serving as a kind of counterweight to American hegemony, especially in light of interventions led by western nations on the African continent, especially in regard to the case of Libya (Geldenhuis 2015).

## Final considerations

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine did not begin in February 2022, but rather with various political and territorial disputes between the countries in recent years. Russia's decision to invade Ukrainian territory has led to countless consequences for the government of Vladimir Putin and its economic partners, leading to six sanction packages until June 2022 and the reorganization of international commerce. However, since the beginning of the conflict, the western bloc has sought Moscow's isolation and weakening, undermining its chances to economically sustain its troops over the long term. The objective of this article has been to analyze the real Russian isolation in the current scenario based on the actions of the BRICS countries, which have proven to be less tendentious in their condemnation of the Kremlin's actions.

Since the first day of the invasion, the political divide between the developed and developing nations concerning the Ukrainian question has become more and more evident, given that the emerging BRICS powers have positioned themselves closer to Moscow, different from the western countries. In analyzing the voting of the BRICS nations within the UN system regarding the conflict in Ukraine, we see a pattern that is different from that followed by the western powers, which have strengthened their alliances in the face of this new Russian menace. The emerging powers have not presented a direct ideological alignment with Moscow, but have been more cautious in avoiding a direct condemnation of Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Even though they are not in favor of the conflict, the BRICS countries do not support the history of interventions and sanctions, particularly driven by the United States, against nations that defy the reigning liberal order. Moreover, their strategic partnership with this Eurasian nation also influences the way they have positioned themselves in the United Nations in light of the possible political and economic scenarios in the post-war world. Besides their votes in multilateral systems, these countries have not only not adhered to western sanctions against





Russia, they have in fact intensified their commercial relationships with Russia especially in terms of the importing of natural resources. Moreover, it is notable that companies which are based in these countries, mainly Chinese and Indian firms, have maintained their operations in Russian territory, unlike many western companies.

In this manner, it is possible to observe that the Russian Federation is not totally isolated within the International System. Despite the great efforts of western nations to weaken its economy and suffocate its military efforts, the BRICS nations have opted to maintain their commercial and strategic partnerships with Moscow, believing that there are opportunities to be taken advantage of in the present and the future after the end of this conflict, which in this analysis is conceived of as pro-Russian neutrality. Thus, we argue that in not aligning themselves with the current bloc against Russia, these countries hope to maintain their autonomy and international prominence as alternative poles of power, positioning themselves distinctively from the western powers.

## References

- BBC. 2019. “O que o Brasil cedeu aos EUA em troca de apoio à entrada na OCDE”. *BBC News Brasil*, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-50009155>.
- BBC. 2022a. “Qual a dependência do Brasil dos fertilizantes da Rússia, argumento de Bolsonaro por neutralidade na guerra?” *BBC News Brasil*, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-60596334>.
- BBC. 2022b. “Ukraine Crisis: Russian Oil and Gas Turn to Asia”. *BBC News*, 29 de março de 2022, seç. India. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874>.
- Bloomberg Línea. 2022. “Dependência da Índia de armas russas amarra Modi a Putin”. 2022. <https://www.bloomberglinea.com.br/2022/03/21/dependencia-da-india-de-armas-russas-amarra-modi-a-putin/>.
- Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenkel, e Marcos Tourinho. 2016. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection”. *Global Society* 30 (1): 113–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029>.
- Brosig, Malte. 2021. “Has BRICS Lost Its Appeal? The Foreign Policy Value Added of the Group”. *International Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00327-y>.
- Bushkovitch, Paul. 2020. *História concisa da Rússia*. Edipro.
- Chenoy, Anuradha M. 2008. “India and Russia: Allies in the International Political System”. *South Asian Survey* 15 (1): 49–62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152310801500104>.





- CNBC. 2022. “China Refuses to Call Russian Attack on Ukraine an ‘Invasion,’ Deflects Blame to U.S.” CNBC. 2022. <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/24/china-refuses-to-call-attack-on-ukraine-an-invasion-blames-us.html>.
- Comissão Europeia. 2022. “Sanções da UE contra a Rússia na sequência da invasão da Ucrânia | Comissão Europeia”. 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine\\_pt](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine_pt).
- Consilium Europa. 2014. “Timeline — EU Restrictive Measures against Russia over Ukraine”. 2014. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>.
- Correio Braziliense. 2022. “Silêncio de Bolsonaro sobre ataque russo gera desconforto diplomático”. 2022. <https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/mundo/2022/02/4988338-silencio-de-bolsonaro-sobre-ataque-russo-gera-desconforto-diplomatico.html>.
- Druzhinin, Alexei. “Putin approves ratification of treaties to admit new regions to Russia”. TASS, 10 de maio de 2022. <https://tass.com/politics/1517899>.
- Embassy of India in the Russian Federation. 2022. “Embassy of India, Moscow (Russia)”. 2022. <https://www.indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/overview.php>.
- Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of South Africa. 2022. “Russia — SA relations — Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of South Africa”. 2022. <https://russianembassyza.mid.ru/economic-co-operation>.
- Eminue, Okon, e Monday Dickson. 2013. “The United Nations resolutions on Syria: Exploration of motivation from Russia and China”. *International Affairs and Global Strategy* 10 (1): 5–13.
- Ferrer, Isabel. 2014. “A Rússia é afastada do G8 depois da anexação da Crimeia”. El País Brasil. 2014. [https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/03/24/internacional/1395646165\\_225453.html](https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/03/24/internacional/1395646165_225453.html).
- Gachechiladze, Zurab. 2022. “South Africa’s Position on Ukrainian Crisis”. Russian Council. 2022. <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/african-policy/south-africa-s-position-on-ukrainian-crisis/>.
- Geldenhuis, Deon. 2015. “The comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and Russia”. *The Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 37 (2): 118.
- Gomes Saraiva, Miriam, e Álvaro Vicente Costa Silva. 2019. “Ideologia e pragmatismo na política externa de Jair Bolsonaro.” *Relações Internacionais*, nº 64.
- Hurrell, Andrew. 2018. “Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order”. *Ethics & International Affairs* 32 (1): 89–101. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679418000126>.
- Ikenberry, G John. 2018. “The end of liberal international order?” *International Affairs* 94 (1): 7–23, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241>.





- Ivashentsov, Gleb A. 2022. “Russia-India: Strategic Partnership, Not Alliance”. *Strategic Analysis* 46 (1): 100–105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2039579>.
- Karatnycky, Adrian. 2021. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, *Foreign Affairs*. 2021. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2005-03-01/ukraines-orange-revolution>.
- Kitchen, Nicholas, e Michael Cox. 2019. “Power, structural power, and American decline”. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 32 (6): 734–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1606158>.
- Korolev, Alexander. 2016. “Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: China–Russia Relations”. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9 (4): 375–97. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow013>.
- Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, e Marianna Albuquerque. 2019. “O estilo Bolsonaro de governar e a política externa”. *BOLETIM OPSA* 1809: 15.
- Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2010. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. The Sino-Soviet Split*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837625>.
- Mastny, Vojtech. 2010. “The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India”. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12 (3): 50–90. [https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS\\_a\\_00006](https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00006).
- McGlynn, Jade. 2021. “Moscow Is Using Memory Diplomacy to Export Its Narrative to the World”. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/25/russia-puting-ww2-soviet-ussr-memory-diplomacy-history-narrative/>.
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 2022a. “Explicação de voto do Chefe da Delegação Permanente do Brasil em Genebra, Embaixador Tovar da Silva Nunes, por ocasião do “debate urgente sobre a situação dos direitos humanos na Ucrânia decorrente da agressão russa”, durante a 49ª Sessão do Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU — 4 de março de 2022.” Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 2022. [https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais\\_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/explicacao-de-voto-do-chefe-da-delegacao-permanente-do-brasil-em-genebra-embaixador-tovar-da-silva-nunes-por-ocasio-do-201cdebate-urgente-sobre-a-situacao-dos-direitos-humanos-na-ucrania-decorrente-da-agressao-russa-durante-a-49a-sessao-do-conselho-de](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/explicacao-de-voto-do-chefe-da-delegacao-permanente-do-brasil-em-genebra-embaixador-tovar-da-silva-nunes-por-ocasio-do-201cdebate-urgente-sobre-a-situacao-dos-direitos-humanos-na-ucrania-decorrente-da-agressao-russa-durante-a-49a-sessao-do-conselho-de).
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 2022b. “Explicação de Voto do Representante Permanente do Brasil junto às Nações Unidas, Embaixador Ronaldo Costa Filho, por ocasião da 11ª sessão especial de emergência da Assembleia Geral da ONU sobre a situação na Ucrânia — 2 de março de 2022 (texto em inglês)”. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 2022. [https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais\\_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/explicacao-de-voto-do-representante-permanente-do-brasil-junto-as-nacoes-unidas-embaixador-ronaldo-costa-filho-por-ocasio-da-11a-sessao-especial-de-emergencia-da-assembleia-geral-da-onu-sobre-a-situacao-na-ucrania-2-de-marco-de-2022-texto-em-ingles](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/explicacao-de-voto-do-representante-permanente-do-brasil-junto-as-nacoes-unidas-embaixador-ronaldo-costa-filho-por-ocasio-da-11a-sessao-especial-de-emergencia-da-assembleia-geral-da-onu-sobre-a-situacao-na-ucrania-2-de-marco-de-2022-texto-em-ingles).





- Moscow Trade Center. 2021. “SCO and BRICS: Brazil: Russia’s strategic partner in Latin America”. 2021. [//engwtcmoscow.work9.ru/news/sco-and-brics-brazil-russia-s-strategic-partner-in-latin-america/](http://engwtcmoscow.work9.ru/news/sco-and-brics-brazil-russia-s-strategic-partner-in-latin-america/).
- Neethling, Theo. 2012. “Reflections on norm dynamics: South African foreign policy and the no-fly zone over Libya”. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 19 (1): 25–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2012.670381>.
- OEC — The Observatory of Economic Complexity. 2020. “Russia (RUS) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners | OEC”. OEC — The Observatory of Economic Complexity. 2020. <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus>.
- Oliveira, Ana Paula L, Eduardo Uziel, e Rafael Rocha. 2017. “Responsabilidade de Proteger sob os olhares dos países BRICS: o caso da Líbia no CSNU”. *Cadernos de Política Exterior*, nº 5: 77–104.
- Porter, Bruce D. 1986. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prys-Hansen, Miriam, e Detlef Nolte. 2016. “BRICS and IBSA: The Clubs of the Rising Powers Are Losing Their Lustre”. *GIGA Focus Global*, nº 05.
- Reid, Anna. 2022. “Putin’s War on History”, *Foreign Affairs*. 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-06/putins-war-history-ukraine-russia>.
- Relações da UE com a Ucrânia. Acessado 21 de outubro de 2022. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/>.
- Rinaldi, Augusto Leal, e Laerte Apolinário Júnior. 2020. “A Comparative Analysis of the BRICS in the International Development Cooperation Field”. *Conjuntura Austral* 11 (53): 8–27. <https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.97507>.
- Rinaldi, Augusto, e Cristina Pecequilo. 2021. “A ordem mundial contemporânea, o BRICS e o princípio R2P: os casos de Brasil e China (2005-2017)”. *Colombia Internacional*, nº 105: 3–28.
- Russia. 2021. “Vladimir Putin Answered Questions on the Article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians””. President of Russia. 2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66191>.
- Russia. 2022. “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”. President of Russia. 2022. <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770>.
- Savranskaya, Svetlana, e Tom Blanton. 2017. “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive”, 12 de dezembro de 2017. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>.





- Savranskaya, Svetlana, e Tom Blanton. 2018. “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard | National Security Archive”. 2018. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>.
- Snyder, Timothy. 2019. *Na contramão da liberdade: A guinada autoritária nas democracias contemporâneas*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- Statista. 2022. “Infographic: The Countries Importing Russian Arms”. Statista Infographics. 2022. <https://www.statista.com/chart/27055/russian-arms-exports-destination-countries/>.
- Steckelberg, Aaron, Adam Taylor, Ruby Mellen, Alex Horton, e Dylan Moriarty. 2022. “Why Russia Gave up on Urban War in Kyiv and Turned to Big Battles in the East”. Washington Post. 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/kyiv-urban-warfare-russia-siege-donbas/>.
- Stuenkel, Oliver. 2017. *BRICS e o futuro da ordem global*. Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra.
- The White House. 2022. “FACT SHEET: United States, G7 and EU Impose Severe and Immediate Costs on Russia”. The White House. 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/06/fact-sheet-united-states-g7-and-eu-impose-severe-and-immediate-costs-on-russia/>.
- United Nations. 2022a. “Conselho de Direitos Humanos cria comissão para investigar violações na Ucrânia | As Nações Unidas no Brasil”. 2022. <https://brasil.un.org/pt-br/173933-conselho-de-direitos-humanos-cria-comissao-para-investigar-violacoes-na-ucrania>, <https://brasil.un.org/pt-br/173933-conselho-de-direitos-humanos-cria-comissao-para-investigar-violacoes-na-ucrania>.
- United Nations. 2022b. “Security Council Calls Emergency Special Session of General Assembly on Ukraine Crisis, Adopting Resolution 2623 (2022) by 11 Votes in Favour, 1 Against, 3 Abstentions | UN Press”. 2022. <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14809.doc.htm>.
- United Nations. 2022c. “Russia Blocks Security Council Action on Ukraine”. UN News. 25 de fevereiro de 2022. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802>.
- United Nations. 2022d. “Assembleia Geral repudia ofensiva militar da Rússia à Ucrânia”. ONU News. 2 de março de 2022. <https://news.un.org/pt/story/2022/03/1781482>.
- United Nations. 2022e. “Russia Vetoes Security Council Resolution Condemning Attempted Annexation of Ukraine Regions”. UN News. 30 de setembro de 2022. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1129102>.
- United Nations. 2022f. “Assembleia Geral adota resolução condenando anexações de regiões da Ucrânia”. ONU News. 12 de outubro de 2022. <https://news.un.org/pt/story/2022/10/1803687>.







- UNTC. 1994. “Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. 1994. [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid = 0800000280401fbb](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb).
- Vadell, Javier. 2019. “La iniciativa BRICS y China: entre la emergencia y la irrelevancia”. *Nova Economia* 29 (outubro): 401–28. <https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-6351/5410>.
- Washington Post. 2022. “U.S., Allies Plan for Long-Term Isolation of Russia”. *Washington Post*, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/16/us-nato-isolate-russia/>.
- Wenzhao, Tao, e Xu Shengwei. 2020. “The US Factor in Post-Cold War China–Russia Relations”. *International Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00211-1>.
- Yale University. 2022. “Yale CELI List of Companies”. Yale Companies List. 2022. <https://www.yalerussianbusinessretreat.com>.

