Angélica Saraiva Szucko
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British perceptions on Brexit:
findings from fieldwork in
April 2019
Percepções britânicas sobre o Brexit:
resultados do trabalho de campo em
abril de 2019
Percepciones británicas sobre el Brexit:
resultados del trabajo de campo en
abril de 2019
10.21530/ci.v17n1.2022.1198
Angélica Saraiva Szucko*
Abstract
This paper identifies some of the long—, medium—, and short-
term Brexit factors by presenting the results of fieldwork held in
London in April 2019. This research aimed to locally monitor the
reaction of the population during the deadlock of the Brexit process
since the original UK exit deadline was the month before. The
observationin locoof street manifestations, and the analysis of
the British newspapers’ headlines provide the context in which the
fieldwork was undertaken. The interviews carried out with experts
and politicians lead to conclusions about the British perceptions
of Brexit which are cross-checked with the literature review.
Keywords: Brexit, United Kingdom; European Union; British
Perceptions.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
ISSN 2526-9038
Copyright:
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unrestricted use,
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• Este é um artigo
publicado em acesso aberto
e distribuído sob os termos
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distribuição e reprodução
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* Pós-doutoranda na Universidade de Brasília (UnB). Doutora em Relações Inter
-
nacionais pela UnB com período sanduíche na Université Sorbonne Nouvelle —
Paris. (angelicaszucko@gmail.com) ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8589-7827
Artigo recebido em 21/05/2021 e aprovado em 17/10/2021.
British perceptions on Brexit: findings from fieldwork in April 2019
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Resumo
Este artigo identifica alguns dos fatores de longo, médio e curto prazo do Brexit, apresentando
os resultados de um trabalho de campo realizado em Londres em abril de 2019. Esta pesquisa
teve como objetivo monitorar localmente a reação da população durante o impasse do
processo Brexit, visto que o prazo original de saída do Reino Unido era no mês anterior.
A observação in loco das manifestações de rua e a análise das manchetes dos jornais
britânicos fornecem o contexto em que o trabalho de campo foi conduzido. As entrevistas
realizadas com especialistas e políticos levam a conclusões sobre as percepções britânicas
em relação ao Brexit, as quais são confrontadas com a revisão da literatura.
Palavras-chave: Brexit, Reino Unido, União Europeia; Percepções Britânicas.
Resumen
Este documento identifica algunos de los factores a largo, medio y corto plazo del Brexit
al presentar los resultados del trabajo de campo realizado en Londres en abril de 2019.
Esta investigación tuvo como objetivo monitorear localmente la reacción de la población
durante el estancamiento del proceso Brexit, ya que la fecha límite original de salida del
Reino Unido fue el mes anterior. La observación in loco de las manifestaciones callejeras y
el análisis de los titulares de los periódicos británicos proporcionan el contexto en el que
se llevó a cabo el trabajo de campo. Las entrevistas realizadas con expertos y políticos
llevan a conclusiones sobre las percepciones británicas acerca del Brexit que se cotejan
con la revisión de la literatura.
Palabras llave: Brexit, Reino Unido, Unión Europea; Percepciones Británicas.
Introduction
On 23 June 2016, British citizens went to the polls, and 51.9% of the voters
opted to leave the European Union (The Electoral Commission 2016). The outcome
of the referendum has raised further questions about the future of the regional
bloc, given that it was the first time that a Member State decided to leave
the integration process1. The referendum revealed several disparities within
1 So far, only three territories of Member States have left the bloc: Algeria, when it gained independence from
France in 1962; and Greenland and St. Bartholomew, which became overseas territories of the European Union
respectively in 1985 and 2012.
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the United Kingdom, considering that most of the population of Scotland and
Northern Ireland voted to remain in the regional integration process, whereas
England and Wales predominantly opted for withdrawing from it (The Electoral
Commission 2016). Moreover, in terms of age group and educational level, the
younger and more educated voted to continue in the EU, as opposed to the older
and less educated population (The UK in a Changing Europe 2018). Statistical
data on the referendum reveals huge fragmentation within the country, which
may further exacerbate over the years.
This article is part of a broader research effort to analyze the relationship
between the United Kingdom and the European Union within the context of the
regional integration process in order to understand the factors that contributed
to the outcome of the British referendum. In this sense, a field research trip2
was held during April 2019 aiming to bring light to the main research questions
as well as to monitor locally the British perceptions regarding the withdrawal
process after the first official deadline.
According to the European Union exit procedure established on Article 50 of
the Lisbon Treaty3, the parties have up to two years from the official departure
communication to negotiate a withdrawal agreement and set the basis for a
future relationship. Thus, since the UK letter communicating the withdrawal
decision was sent to the European Council on 29 March 2017, the Brexit term
would officially end on 29 March 2019. However, three extensions were granted
to the United Kingdom in 2019 following the Article 50 procedure that requires
unanimity among all EU Member States. The UK officially withdrew from the
European Union on 1 February 2020.
The main question that instigated this field research was: “Which are
the British perceptions on Brexit?” The interviews carried out with scholars,
2 Funded by a UACES (The Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies) scholarship.
3 “1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union following its constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light
of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement
with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting
by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 3. The Treaties shall cease to
apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that,
two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with
the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.” (Treaty of Lisbon 2009)
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politicians, and experts on the subject — both British and Europeans-, as well
as the observation in loco of street manifestations and protests, enabled me to
trace some conclusions about the general perceptions of the British population
on Brexit, particularly regarding some of the factors that contributed to the
referendum outcome. This article argues that long—, medium— and short-term
factors interacted culminating with the UK decision to leave the EU. This research
expects to contribute to the understanding of an unprecedented phenomenon
that impacts the whole European integration process.
To present some findings obtained in the research trip, this paper is divided
into four sections. Firstly, a context of the Brexit-related events in March
and April 2019 will be introduced in order to set the scene of that deadlock
moment. Secondly, a brief analysis of the front-page headlines of the main UK’s
newspapers will be presented, comparing references to the Brexit process during
the analyzed period, to illustrate the general context in which the interviews
were conducted, as well as to highlight the perspective of the British traditional
media on the subject. Then, the structure and the method of the field research
will be described, evidencing the choice of the interviewees and the script
of the interview. Finally, the main findings of the interviews will be reported
showing how the relationship with the European bloc was interpreted by the
respondents and the main Brexit factors according to them. Those findings are
cross-checked with the literature review that supported the elaboration of the
interview script.
Brexit fieldwork context
Two years after the official communication of the UK’s intention to
leave the EU, Brexit was not sorted out yet. So, the decisions of March 2019
culminated with the first extension of the UK exit deadline. On March 12th, the
withdrawal agreement negotiated with the European Union by Theresa May
was rejected for the second time
4
in the British Parliament by 391 to 242 votes.
The next day, parliamentarians also rejected the “no-deal” option by 321 to
4 The first rejection had taken place on 15 January 2019 by 432 to 202, the greatest historic defeat of a Prime
Minister in the British Parliament since the 1920s.
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298 votes. However, this last vote had only symbolic political value, since it
has no legal effect on European legislation, and the possibility of a crash out
continued to apply if no agreement was reached before the exit deadline. In
addition, in the same week, on March 14th, the British Parliament approved
by 412 to 202 votes the request for an extension of the withdrawal deadline
(UK Parliament 2019).
The then-British Prime Minister Theresa May intended to hold a third vote
on the deal negotiated with the European Union before the meeting with the
European Council scheduled for 21-22 March. Nevertheless, her request was
denied by House Speaker John Bercow on the grounds that a new vote could only
be taken if the agreement had changed “substantially”. Therefore, on March 20
th
,
Theresa May sent a letter to the European Council requesting an extension to
June 30th, before the inauguration of the new European Parliament, scheduled for
July 2nd (UK Government 2019a). The European Council, for its part, deliberated
and presented a counter-proposal considering the approach of the European
parliamentary elections between 23-26 May. If the British Parliament had approved
the agreement by the end of March, an extension would be granted until May 22
nd
;
otherwise, the new deadline for the UK to decide which way to proceed would
be April 12th (European Council 2019a). After that date, the United Kingdom
should prepare to hold elections for the European Parliament.
Then, on the one hand, the British Parliament held a series of indicative votes
to try to find an alternative Brexit option, but it was unable to reach a consensus
on any of them5. On the other hand, Theresa May submitted the negotiated
deal with the European Union to the vote on March 29th, being defeated again.
Although the Brexit deal was rejected three times by the British Parliament,
the difference between opposing and favorable votes decreased considerably
at each new consultation: 1st ballot on 15 January: 432 to 202 (rejected by 230
votes); 2nd ballot on 12 March: 391 to 242 (rejected by 149 votes); 3rd ballot
on 29 March: 344-286 (rejected by 58 votes) (UK Parliament 2019). Given the
renewed rejection, the UK withdrawal deadline from the European Union was set
5 The 16 proposals submitted by the parliamentarians were reformulated in 8 alternatives, all rejected in a
vote on March 27th. The results were: 1. Customs Union: 271 to 265; 2. Confirmatory public vote (second
referendum): 295-268; 3. Labour’s alternative plan: 307 to 237; 4. Common Market 2.0 (Norway Plus): 283 to
189; 5. Revocation (article 50) to avoid no-deal: 293 to 184; 6. No deal: 400 to 160; 7. Contingent preferential
arrangements: 422 to 139; 8. EFTA and EEA: 377 to 64 (UK Parliament 2019).
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at 12 April 2019, as agreed by the European Council, and the British Parliament
conducted a new round of indicative votes on April 1st intending to come up
with other Brexit paths to follow6.
Those discussions in the British Parliament further intensified divisions
between and within the parties. Theresa May displeased her own cabinet and most
of the conservatives by offering the possibility of dialogue with the opposition
leader, Jeremy Corbyn. Faced with these enormous impasses, on April 5th, the
British prime minister sent a new request for a deadline extension, until June
30
th
, to the European Council. According to Theresa May’s letter, the UK would
prepare for the European Parliament elections, but if the agreement were approved
before May 23rd, the extension would be suspended as well as the participation
in the elections (UK Government 2019b). May’s request was discussed at an
extraordinary European Council meeting on April 10th. The decision of the
European Council was a further extension until 31 October 2019 (European
Council 2019b).
Then, the British Parliament took an Easter recess from 12 to 23 April.
During the previous voting sessions, “the House of Commons has sat later than
10.30 p.m. 14 times” (Politico 2019a) in weeks of intensive Brexit discussions.
Finally, on May 23rd, the UK held elections for the European Parliament. Due
to the huge hurdles, Theresa May announced, the day after, her resignation on
June 7th (UK Government 2019c). She would continue to serve as Prime Minister
until the process to choose her successor has been concluded.
All those subsequent events in March and April reshaped the fieldwork and
influenced the immediate perceptions regarding the Brexit deadlock process in the
UK. Never before had the discussions on Brexit’s directions been so ubiquitous
on the news, on the streets of London, and even in the British Parliament.
The arrival of the first official deadline for the exit of the UK from the EU has
brought up somewhat several debates on possible alternative paths and future
scenarios. The cleavages of the referendum between Leavers and Remainers have
been in the spotlight and, in many cases, have replaced the traditional political
ones. Indeed, Brexit has brought important consequences not only for European
integration but also for British domestic policy.
6 The results again demonstrate the inability to reach a consensus: 1. Customs Union: 276 (noes) to 273(ayes);
2. Confirmatory public vote (second referendum): 292 to 280; 3. Common Market 2.0 (Norway Plus): 282 to
261; 4. Parliamentary supremacy: 292 to 191 (UK Parliament 2019).
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Media perceptions in April 2019
As mentioned above, never before the British media gave so much attention
to Brexit. Indeed, Brexit dominated the news in March 2019 and during the first
two weeks of April when striking events took place, before the second extension
and the parliamentary recess. Then, other topics gained ground as the Brexit
deadline had been postponed.
To some extent, comparing front-page headlines of the main British newspapers
is one way to assess media perspectives regarding the Brexit process at that
moment and its repercussions daily. Although it does not encompass the whole
coverage of Brexit events, this investigation can point out reported trends in the
mass media. Also, despite the big decline in newspaper readership observed in
the past few decades (NatCen 2018), editors’ choice to highlight a story on the
front page reflects a perception of which should be the most important news
of the day considering their target audience. In sum, it helps to understand in
which stories the average British population is interested and how they absorb
Brexit news. Even those who are not regular newspaper readers usually take a
glance at the major headlines once in a while.
In this sense, a brief analysis of main front-page headlines from British
newspapers during April 2019 was conducted aiming to highlight the major
trends reported and set the context in which the fieldwork interviews were
conducted. Ten newspapers were chosen among the twelve with the highest
circulation in the United Kingdom (Statista 2019) due to their ease of online
access. In alphabetical order: Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Financial
Times, Metro, The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Sun,
The Times, and their Sunday sister papers. For this investigation, only the
main front-page headlines were taken into account dismissing minor entries.
All of them were reviewed to check any mention related to the Brexit process,
including British parties’ arrangements that could have implications on the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU. Besides, results were balanced on a proportional scale
to avoid distortions on the weekends or holidays when some newspapers do not
circulate. The vertical ax shows the percentage of these ten selected newspapers
reporting a front-page headline related to the Brexit process in April.
British perceptions on Brexit: findings from fieldwork in April 2019
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Figure 1 — Main front-page headlines related to Brexit in April 2019 per day
in ten selected British newspapers
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.
As explained in the previous section, the first days of April were characterized
by a huge uncertainty regarding the foreseeable Brexit future. On account of the
third deal rejection on March 29th, the Brexit deadline had been delayed only
to two weeks later on April 12th. On April 3rd, all ten reviewed newspapers had
front-page headlines reporting Theresa May’s proposal of Brexit cross-party talks
with the opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn. As figure 1 shows, during the first
fortnight of April, Brexit was every day on at least one front-page headline. This
rate drastically decreased in the second fortnight after a new Brexit extension
to 31 October 2019. By Politico (2019b) London Playbook statement on April
17
th
: “Britain is a Brexit-free zone this morning (…) The word which has hunted
every waking hour for months on end appears just once across all 10 national
newspaper front pages today”.
In effect, newspapers are usually concerned to report significant very short-
term subjects and, since Brexit was deferred for more than six months, other
relevant facts get into the newspapers. On April 12th, for example, whereas
only two front-page headlines were still talking about Brexit postponement, six
in ten reported Julian Assange’s arrest at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London.
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Then, on April 16th, Notre Dame fire images and headlines took almost all
front pages. During the Easter holiday (19-22 April), not only news about the
Extinction Rebellion movement and their climate change protests spread all over
the UK, but also their public outcries replaced Brexit manifestations in front of
Westminster for days.
On April 22
nd
and 23
rd
, in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday massacre, most
news reported the bomb attacks in three churches in Sri Lanka that injured British
citizens. At the end of April, Brexit references were linked to party arrangements
for the European parliamentary elections and the fear that Nigel Farage’s Brexit
Party could take the lead. In sum, since the UK withdrawal was not looming
on the short-term horizon, a decline in the front-page headlines was expected.
It does not necessarily mean that the topic fell into oblivion, but it would no
longer be in the spotlight for a while.
Another interesting aspect to consider about the media is how often Brexit-
related front-page main headlines were published in each of the ten reviewed
newspapers (Figure 2). While The Daily Telegraph reached almost 50%, releasing
14 Brexit front pages — all of them in the first fortnight of April —, The Sun,
a well-known tabloid focused on celebrities, gossip, and sports news, had only
one single mention in the whole month. Also, Daily Mail and Daily Mirror, other
British tabloids, had just four and three Brexit front pages, respectively, in this
period. Other newspapers such as The Daily Express, Metro, The Guardian,
The Independent, and The Times presented an average of more than a third of
Brexit-related news in April. Financial Times, in turn, which traditionally gives
preference to economic and financial news, had a fifth of Brexit front pages’
main headlines.
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Figure 2 — Main front-page headlines related to Brexit in April per newspaper
33%
13%
10%
21%
35%
47%
36%
43%
4%
34%
0% 10% 20%3 0% 40% 50%
Daily Express
Daily Mail
Daily Mirror
Financial Times
Metro
The Daily Telegraph
The Guardian
The Independent
The Sun
The Times
Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.
Each newspaper targets its average audience in the headlines. According to
Heinz Brandenburg (2019), readers usually shift their allegiance and almost a third
of them no longer read the same paper they have listed in previous surveys in
2017, for example. Moreover, although tabloids still have the highest circulation,
they are suffering net losses of readers, while newspapers such as The Times and
The Guardian have been increasing their readership. Among the listed newspapers
in his analysis, two of them have unambiguously Brexit preferences which are
also reflected in their publishing line, as demonstrated below.
On the one hand, readers of The Guardian are almost unanimously Remainers.
Considering three possible Brexit paths — remain, government deal, or no-deal —,
over 90% would choose to remain instead of other options (Brandenburg 2019).
On the other hand, readers of The Daily Telegraph are predominantly Leavers
and increasingly in favor of a no-deal. Around 60% would choose a crash-out
over a government deal and over 70% would prefer a no-deal against remain
ing (Brandenburg 2019). The comparison between their front-page headlines on
April 3
rd
to report May’s proposal of cross-party talks illustrates those preferences.
For pro-Remain The Guardian (2019): “May calls for talks with Corbyn in bid
to save Brexit”, whereas for pro-Leave The Daily Telegraph (2019): “Cabinet
backs no-deal Brexit — but May turns to Corbyn instead”. According to the first
editorial line, cross-party talks were a movement to rescue Brexit, while for the
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latter May’s proposal means turning her back to the Conservative cabinet who
supported a no-deal.
To some extent, the appearance of the Brexit topic on the front-page headlines
helps to shape the British population’s perceptions regarding this process. If
before the referendum news about the European Union were not a real topic for
discussion, since June 2016 and, particularly, in the first two weeks of April after
a short withdrawal deadline extension, Brexit news reached people’s lives almost
on a daily basis. The salience of this issue at that moment, for example, was
reflected in the increase of street manifestations in front of the British Parliament,
as observed in loco. However, the brief analysis in this section does not aim
to discuss in deep how the media can shape British perceptions of Brexit, but
instead to provide the context in which fieldwork interviews were conducted.
Field research framework
As mentioned above, the scholarship enabled me to conduct one month of
fieldwork in London between April 1st-30th for the purpose of my Ph.D. thesis
focused on the background of the British relationship with the European Union
and the paths that led to the Brexit process. In this sense, in a broader research
effort, the British government’s historical positions regarding regional integration,
the opt-outs to community legislation, and the aspects highlighted by the Remain
and Leave campaigns were studied more comprehensively, as well as the British
perceptions regarding the process to leave the bloc. The main purpose of the
thesis research was to investigate the constraints of this unprecedented process
— the first case of a Member State’s decision to exit the European Union — by
identifying long-, medium-, and short-term factors that contributed to the June
2016 referendum calling and its outcome.
When the research trip was planned, it was supposed that the UK would
already have left the EU, since Article 50’s original deadline was on 29 March
2019. However, as exposed above, unfolding striking events in March and April
2019 changed the Brexit path. The field research profited from a unique experience
in London while Parliament was taking indicative votes about how to proceed
with Brexit and the tough negotiation process for another extension was ongoing.
Although the doctoral thesis focuses mainly on the 2016 referendum antecedents,
it was an exciting opportunity to witness live Brexit events.
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Prior to arrival in London, the fieldwork framework began to be designed.
Specific groups were targeted, such as scholars’ experts in British or European
politics or who have recently published on Brexit on “The UK in a Changing
Europe” website or at LSE Brexit blog; Members of the Parliament (MPs) from
the Exiting the EU Committee and their staff; analysts from the EU Select
Committee at the House of Lords; representatives from the British Academy,
and the Konrad Adenauer office; diplomats; party offices; social movements; and
media representatives. Since January 2019, more than a hundred contacts were
made by email to set up an agenda and fix appointments with the interviewees.
Unfortunately, no response was obtained from civil society groups, such as
People’s Vote, or party offices, and only a few MPs were available for interviews.
In general, scholars were more willing to contribute to the research. Then,
while in London, new appointments were arranged according to interviewees’
recommendations, via snowball sampling.
This method, also known as chain-referral sampling, is a non-probability
tool used when potential participants are rare or difficult to find. In this case,
as the target group was experts in British and European politics that usually are
in contact with other potential data sources, it would be easier to get in touch
and recruit new participants via their references. Thus, the snowball sampling
method is based on referrals from the initial interviewees to generate new
potential sources.
The field research focused on the comprehension of the British perceptions
concerning the Brexit process and, particularly, the short-term impressions in
April 2019. Forty semi-structured interviews were carried out with British and
European scholars, international analysts, diplomats, media representatives,
policy-makers, and parliament staff in order to assess their insights on a turning
point in the UK-EU relationship. The semi-structured design was chosen to
explore the expertise of each respondent allowing more flexibility for deeper
incursions on specific topics. Seven comprehensive questions were elaborated,
based on the recent Brexit literature already available at that moment, to conduct
the interview focusing on the main subjects of the researcher’s interest. Find
below the interview script:
1. How do you describe the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European
Union?
2. How do you understand British resistance to deepening integration
regarding the opt-outs, especially the European Monetary Union and the
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Schengen Area? (But also, the Area of Freedom, Liberty and Justice, and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU?)
3. Which conditions do you believe led the Conservative Party’s decision
to call a referendum on the EU?
4. Which factors do you believe contributed to the referendum results?
5. According to Eurobarometer, the UK usually presents the highest rates of
identification as “only national” instead of “national and European” or
“European and national”. How do you believe that the lack of Europeanness
contributed to Brexit?
6. Which elements characterize British Euroscepticism? Is it different from
Eurosceptic approaches in the other EU Member States?
7. Do you believe that other EU countries could follow the British decision
to leave the Community? Why?
For this field research, interviewees were divided into five categories:
1. Scholars; 2. British Parliament staff; 3. Think tanks; 4. Diplomats; and 5.
Media. Among the scholars, most of them are based at the London School of
Economics and the King’s College London, including some linked to the “LSE
Brexit Blog” and “The UK in a Changing Europe”, a think tank created to
promote research about the ever-changing UK-EU relationship. Concerning the
British Parliament, unfortunately, due to the busy parliamentary schedule in the
first two weeks of April and the recession after the second Brexit extension and
the Easter holiday, I had access only to two MPs — one from the Conservative
Party and the other from the Plaid Cymru -; one MP assistant from the Liberal
Democrats; one political analyst and the clerk from the EU Select Committee;
and the clerk from the Exiting the EU Committee. Moreover, three interviews
were conducted with Brazilian diplomats working at the Embassy of Brazil in
London, as well as three interviews with experts working for think tanks such
as the British Academy and the Konrad Adenauer office. Regarding the media,
three interviews were held with representatives from Politico.eu, Reuters, and
the Head of Media at the House of Lords. Figure 3 shows the interviewees’
distribution into the categories.
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Figure 3: Categories of interviewees
62,5%
15,0%
7,5%
7,5%
7,5%
Scholar Parliament Think Tank Diplomat Media
Source: elaborated by the author, 2019.
Most interviews were digitally recorded, except for four people that demanded
to be off-the-records; in addition, notes were taken. Interviews were preferably
conducted face-to-face, with some exceptions depending on the interviewees’
agenda and location. In total, 31 interviews were held face-to-face, 8 via Skype
meetings, and 1 via telephone. Moreover, in loco reaction of the British population,
such as street manifestations, were observed, and informal conversations were
held with representatives from both “Vote Leave” (pro-Leave) and “People’s Vote”
(pro-Remain) movements in front of the Parliament aiming to complement the
fieldwork. The next section sums up the main findings and highlights interesting
comments from the interviews cross-checking them with the literature review
and other statistical data.
Fieldwork findings
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union is a complex
social-political phenomenon that encompasses a tangle of multiple conditioning
factors (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017) which interacted in a “perfect
storm”. A “perfect storm” means a rare or unusual combination of factors that
produce unexpected outcomes. Although it is not possible to point out exactly
which was the most decisive factor for the 2016 British referendum outcome, an
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in-depth investigation allows us to list a slew of relevant variables to comprehend
this event. In this sense, the fieldwork enabled the identification of major trends
regarding the UK-EU relationship and the Brexit process.
First of all, concerning the first question of the interview script, almost half of
the interviewees described Britain’s relationship with the European Union as an
instrumental or utilitarian one, in which the United Kingdom is more interested
in the economic relation and market opening than in the political union aspect.
Indeed, the word most used to portray the British relationship with the EU was
“transactional” — mentioned by seven interviewees. However, some respondents
highlighted that the UK was not exactly an exception or a unique case in the
EU and recalled that Scandinavian countries also embrace a similar attitude —
Denmark, for example, has three opt-outs and Sweden did not join the Euro yet.
The second most frequent group of synonyms to depict this relationship was
difficult/complicated/uneasy/awkward as also pointed out by the traditional
literature on the UK-EU relationship (George 1998; Gowland 2017; Schnapper
2000; Wall 2008; Young 1998). Then, some respondents described it as a different,
distant or semi-detached relationship to explain that the UK was not fully integrated
into the EU. Others called it an ambivalent relation with mixed feelings because
the UK was an enthusiast of some regional projects, such as the single market,
but resistant to supranational integration policies. Most of the interviewees
made several references to the historical UK-EU relation, including its accession
process and opt-outs, to support their responses. To cut a long story short, a key
expression, used by one of the interviewees, to sum up, the British relationship
with the European Union was “interested, but not engaged”, which resonates with
Winston Churchill’s (1930) famous quote “We are with Europe, but not of it”.
Usually, answers to the second script question were linked to explanations
already mentioned in the previous one. Some interviewees added issues of
parliamentary sovereignty, Commonwealth relationship, and identity to account
for British resistance to deeper integration. Again, those findings were in line
with the reviewed literature used to draft this question (Diamond, Nedergaard
and Rosamond 2018; Evans and Menon 2017; Perisic 2010; Sanders 1989). The
interviewees also reinforced the British preference for a more intergovernmental
than a supranational project for Europe.
Concerning the third question from the semi-structured script, most of
the interviewees considered that both internal and external pressures were
fundamental for the referendum calling. Even though the then-prime minister
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David Cameron was not personally in favor to leave the European Union, at that
moment, it seemed to be no other way to deal with the internal demands from
the Eurosceptic wing of his party and the threat that UKIP posed to enlist votes
from a portion of the traditionally Conservative electorate, then proportionally
strengthening the opposition. Several respondents perceived the referendum
pledge as an attempt to unite the Conservative party and win the next general
elections.
Moreover, many interviewees claimed that an in/out referendum promise
was a gamble from Cameron, who, in fact, did not believe he could win a
parliamentary majority in the 2015 elections. Thus, according to them, the
referendum was only a campaign pledge that he could not accomplish in another
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The fact that the outcome of
the election was not a hung parliament was seen as Cameron’s miscalculation by
them. However, few respondents disagreed with this interpretation and reiterated
that the real purpose of offering an in/out referendum was precisely to win the
absolute majority instead of a bluff.
Some interviewees also described Cameron as a weak figure that failed when
he called the referendum, when he negotiated with the European Union, and, then,
when he campaigned for Remain. His negotiations for a special status inside the
EU were not enough to convince his backbenchers to support remaining in the
Community. Respondents also highlighted that although Cameron felt confident
and unstoppable after his victories in the 2015 UK general elections and the
2014 Scottish independence referendum, he behaved arrogantly and ignorantly
and he was unable to understand the mood of the moment inside his party and
among the British population. According to Andrew Glencross (2016), the UK
vote for Brexit was Cameron’s great miscalculation which culminated with his
resignation after the referendum.
The fourth question of the interview script refers to the core of the doctoral
thesis, which sought to understand the determining factors of the referendum
outcome. In this sense, the field research contributed not only to a deeper
investigation of the conditions already identified in the literature (Clarke, Goodwin
and Whiteley 2017; Curtice 2017; MacShane 2016; Swales 2016) but also to the
inclusion of new variables that had not been broadly explored until then. In
short, the main referendum constraints mentioned by the interviewees were
migration, media, and economy, in this order, and all of them are also directly
linked to one another.
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Migration was mentioned by almost a third of the interviewees as one of
the main factors that influenced referendum results, particularly in the way it
was portrayed by the Leave campaign — for example, the reference to Turkey’s
possible accession to the EU and its population of 76 million. Some respondents
recalled that non-EU migration was higher than EU migration to the UK since
1980, as figure 4 shows. In addition, according to data from the Office of National
Statistics (2019), EU migration began to increase after the 2004 enlargement and
new Labour’s migration policy, which established few restrictions to immigration
flow into the UK. Between 2008 and 2012, EU migration slightly decreased due
to the financial crisis’s effects, retaking its expanding route after this recession
period.
The 2010 and 2015 Conservative Party manifestos pledged to cut net migration
below 100,000 per year. However, this balance between immigration and emigration
was never reached during its governments and the impacts of an increasing net
migration started to be felt, considerably in the countryside. Eastern EU migrants
were targeted as scapegoats by the Leave campaign, which was able to mobilize
strong resentment feelings against them (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017).
Figure 4 — Long-term international net migration into the UK
by citizenship, 1980–2018 (in thousands of people)
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
Net migra on balance EU ci zens (thousands)
Non EU ci zens (thousands) Bri sh ci zens (thousands)
Source: elaborated by the author using data from the Office of National Statistics 2019.
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Additionally, at least a quarter of the interviewees suggested that the media
played a significant role in the referendum outcome. In accordance with many
respondents, traditional media, notably newspapers, was mostly Eurosceptic
from the 1980s on. The EU was portrayed as “the other” in a superficial and
caricatural illustration of regional integration. The appointment of Boris Johnson
in 1989 as a correspondent from The Daily Telegraph in Brussels to report on
the European Commission contributed to a growing Eurosceptic feeling among
the British population as pointed out by some interviewees, notably media
representatives.
The influence of the media in building the British mindset has a long-
term effect. Fake or misconceived news about the EU has been disseminated
decades ahead of the referendum. Most of the interviewees also reiterated that
social media had a decisive impact in amplifying this phenomenon in the short
term immediately before the referendum. Another media factor mentioned by
four respondents was the BBC’s misconception of impartiality and neutrality
during the campaign period. According to them, while the Remain side brought
respected figures and economists to defend their arguments in the debates, the
Leave campaign was based on populists’ politicians and controversial data.
The third major constraint mentioned by around a quarter of respondents was
the UK’s economic background. Unpopular austerity measures were implemented
by the Conservative government to deal with the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis (Fetzer 2019). Those policies increased the poverty and inequality in
different areas inside the UK. By many respondents, a general perception of social
and economic exclusion spread across the country raising grievances against
the financial city of London and its elites. Thus, the Leave vote could also be a
reaction against this mainstream economic system.
Also linked to the economic variable, some respondents mentioned the
mistakes of the Remain campaign, which focused on a rational economic approach
to point out the negative impacts of leaving the EU, dubbed “project fear” by the
Leave side. Three interviewees reported the same situation that occurred during a
Remain campaign in which economists tried to explain to people from Northern
England those economic negative impacts on UK GDP and, then, a person from
the audience raised his hand and said: “It is your GDP, not mine!”. This event
illustrates how Remain’s campaign discourse was disconnected from Britain’s
daily life needs. Moreover, as the Remain official campaign was tied to n.10, it
hampered a more active engagement from other political parties (Schnapper 2017).
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Besides those three central variables — migration, media, and economy
—, other ancillary conditioning factors were listed by the interviewees, such
as distrust in politicians; an anti-globalization mood from the left-behind; the
UK’s nostalgic imperial memory of greatness; and the British binary political
tradition of confrontation that led UK to deal with the EU in a more combative
than consensual way. Furthermore, almost half of the respondents highlighted the
effectiveness of the Leave campaign in using all the aforementioned elements to
convey the British population to vote to Leave in the referendum. Additionally,
leavers had the benefit of two campaigns: an official (Vote Leave), led by Boris
Johnson and Michael Gove; and a non-official (Leave.EU), under Nigel Farage’s
radical leadership. The official slogan “take back control” appealed to an emotional
message of regaining national power in a world full of uncertainties. In this vein,
a chauvinist national identity was mobilized in the UK. All those conditioning
factors interacted to create a Brexit “perfect storm”.
The fifth question of the interview script was related to UK identity perceptions
and its lack of Europeanness. This question was elaborated based on the literature
investigating the relationship between British national identity, Englishness,
and Brexit (Henderson et al. 2016, 2017; Evans, Carl and Dennison 2019), as
well as on the results of Eurobarometer public opinion polls. Traditionally, per
Eurobarometer data, the UK presents the lowest rates of identification as European
and the highest as “only national”. Many respondents reiterated that the national
identity in the UK is not so clear, because it could have different meanings, such
as British, English, Scottish, North Irish, and/or Welsh. Also, they stated that
identity perception has a long-term effect in shaping the population mindset.
Some interviewees also mentioned that a pro-European movement gained ground
in Britain since the referendum. Remainers began to express their Europeanness
in a more explicit way by holding EU flags and claiming their rights as European
citizens after the Leave victory (Brändle, Galpin and Trenz 2018).
As shown in figure 5, the referendum boosted European identification
within the British population. According to Eurobarometer, from the first to
the second half of 2016, there was a drop of fourteen percentage points in the
“only national” option: from 62% in May — a month before the referendum
— to 48% in November. In the same period, the “national and European”
option increased by 10 percentage points, from 31% to 41%, and the “European
and national” option by three percentage points, from 3% to 6% (European
Commission 2016, 36).
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Figure 5 — UK identity perceptions, 2013-2018
60% 63% 64%
58%
64% 66% 62%
48% 45%
50% 51% 50%
33% 29% 30% 33% 31% 29% 31%
41% 45% 42% 41%
34%
3% 3% 2% 4% 2% 3% 3% 6% 7% 6% 6%
14%
2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Only European
Source: elaborated by the author using data from the Standard Eurobarometer 79-90.
In less than six months, 14% of the British population, which had previously
affirmed to identify itself as “only national”, began to identify itself also as
European, filling into other categories that combine national and European
identities, for example. Besides the slight increase in the national identity rate after
November 2017 — when the withdrawal negotiations with the EU had already
started-, it still did not reach the same levels of years before the referendum.
Concerning the sixth question of the interview script, respondents highlighted
that Euroscepticism in the UK and also across the EU does not follow a clear
political division, in accordance with the specialized literature (Szczerbiak and
Taggart 2008; Usherwood and Startin 2013). In both cases, there are Eurosceptic
approaches from the right and left sides of the political spectrum. Usually,
whereas the Eurosceptic right-wing fears a supranational political union that
could undermine national sovereignty; the left-wing perceives the EU as a liberal
capitalist club.
The major difference pointed out by the interviewees is that Euroscepticism
in the UK is more of a political mainstream than in the other EU Member States,
where Eurosceptic groups are usually linked to minor parties. Additionally, many
respondents said that British Euroscepticism is a long-term tradition linked with
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issues of identity and historical imperial memory, as well as parliamentary
sovereignty; whilst, in other EU countries, Eurosceptic movements are a more
recent phenomenon pushed by the economic and migration crises combined
with elements of hardline nationalist uprisings.
As mentioned by the respondents, Euroscepticism has been increasing in
the United Kingdom since the Treaty of Maastricht. Indeed, the British Social
Attitudes report, which ascertained attitudes towards Britain’s relationship with
the EU regularly since 1992, shows Euroscepticism development over time
that proves interviewees statements (NatCen 2019). As the “stay but reduce
EU’s powers” option in figure 6 shows, over the years, the British population
presented significant rates of dissatisfaction with the European Union; however,
the “leave the EU” option started to increase sharply in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis with a tiny reduction from 2013 to 2015. Then, in 2016, the
UK presented the highest rates in this time series for the “leave the EU” option
(41%) confirming the effective success of the Leave campaign.
Figure 6 — Attitudes towards Britain’s relationship with the EU, 1992-2018
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2008
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Leave the EU Stay but reduce EU’s powers
Leave things as are Stay and increase EU’s powers
Work for single European government
Source: elaborated by the author using data from the British Social Attitudes 36, 2019.
Finally, the last question of the interview script concerns forecasts for
European integration. The vast majority of respondents stated that, despite the
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rise of nationalist and Eurosceptic groups across the continent, other EU Member
States will not follow the UK’s decision to withdraw from the Community in the
short term. The tough negotiations proved how hard is to leave the EU and how
each country is tangled in the integration process. Indeed, since 2016, the EU27
managed to stay together during the negotiations with the UK and no Member
State presented a similar trend to leave the EU in the next years. Some interviewees
affirmed that, among all EU countries, the UK would bethe one that could
do better outside the Community due to its economic structure based more on
services than any other Member State. According to them, Britain’s economy will
take time to adapt, but if it does well, it may lead other EU countries to follow its
path in the medium term. However, it will be hard to assess the economic impact
of Brexit due to its overlap with the current pandemic crisis. Many respondents
also pointed out that, regardless of UK withdrawal, the EU has to tackle future
challenges in a more flexible way recognizing that its integration model needs
to be revisited.
Conclusion
Brexit is portrayed as one of the major crises faced by the European integration
project along with the economic downturn and its impacts on the Eurozone, the
increasing immigration flows to the continent, and the uprising of nationalist,
xenophobic and Eurosceptic movements. However, according to interviewees’
statements, it seems that both the referendum calling and its outcome tell
more about British than European politics in the UK. Indeed, the referendum
bespoke a fragmented society and increased political division between and
inside traditional parties, mainly in the Conservative Party, which led both
Remain and Leave campaigns. As mentioned by many respondents, Brexit adverse
impacts not only on the economy but also on the British political system will be
perceived for decades. One immediate consequence was the foundation of two
new political groups: the Brexit Party (now Reform UK), under the Eurosceptic
leadership of Nigel Farage; and the Change UK — The Independent Group, a
pro-European party founded by politicians, who defected from the two major
parties — Conservatives and Labours.
Also, the outcome of the referendum and, particularly, the events of March
and April 2019, which culminated with the first two Brexit deadline extensions,
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contributed to a broader debate about the UK-EU relationship at that moment.
Most interviewees said that, never before, the EU was so much in the British
spotlight than in these months. At that time, the looming withdrawal brought
discussions about Brexit that filled up the newspapers’ front pages, and popular
manifestations took the streets in front of the British Parliament during the first
fortnight of April. Nonetheless, after the second extension to 31 October 2019,
the topic has lost momentum. Nowadays, even after the UK’s official departure
from the EU, Brexit is still not sorted out, negotiations between the two sides
continue and its effects will be experienced for decades.
The fieldwork enabled me to take a close look at the phenomenon via
qualified interviews with target groups and help me to comprehend a little bit
of the British mindset via this immersion process. Besides some conditioning
factors previously identified by the researcher in the literature review, such as
immigration flow, economic crisis, and nationalist rise, the fieldwork proved
that many other elements interacted to create the Brexit “perfect storm”. Some
of them were long-term conditions, such as an overwhelmingly Eurosceptic
media; the British imperial memory of greatness and its nationalist identity; and
the UK political binary system and its lack of tradition in referendums. Others
were medium-term constraints, such as the consequences of the new Labour
migration policy after the 2004 EU enlargement and Conservative promises to cut
net migration; the economic impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and Conservative
austerity policies; the increasing distrust in politicians; and an expanding anti-
globalization mood. Last but not least, short-term conditions also had a significant
contribution to the referendum results, such as the misplaced promise of an in/
out referendum by David Cameron; the option for a simple majority referendum;
and the mistakes of the Remain campaign and the successes of the Leave side.
Many of the British perceptions apprehended by the interviews were
validated in the recent literature published on Brexit, and others may need
further investigation. The length of this article is not enough to explore all those
aforementioned conditioning factors. However, the fieldwork was fundamental
to identify the constraints to the referendum outcome, cross-check them with the
Brexit literature, and enable an in-depth analysis of British perceptions concerning
this phenomenon during the troubled month of April 2019. The results of this
fieldwork can be broader investigated in future research.
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