Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

1-23

Normative Political Theory and

Global Migration Governance: An

Assessment of the Global Compacts

on Refugees and Migration

Teoria Política Normativa e

Governança Global Migratória:

uma avaliação dos pactos globais

sobre refugiados e migração

Teoría política normativa y

gobernanza de la migración mundial:

una evaluación de los pactos mundiales

sobre refugiados y migración

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v16n3.2021.1176

Marcelo Santos

Abstract

Based on the main contributions of normative political theory on

global justice and migration ethics, this article assesses the global

Compacts on refugees and migration, approved by the United

Nations General Assembly in December 2018. The set of conclusions

indicates that the Compacts constitute an important advance in

global moral and political projects and commitments. However,

the application of their predicted terms can bring about problems,

distortions, and impasses in the sharing of responsibilities.

Keywords: Global Migration Governance; Global Justice; The

Global Compact on Refugees; Global Compact for Safe, Orderly

and Regular Migration.

1 P.H.D. in Social Sciences and MA in Sociology from the State University of

Campinas — UNICAMP, Campinas, SP. Professor of Political Science at the

São Paulo State University (Unesp). (marcelo.santos@unesp.br).

ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0151-4284

Artigo submetido em 05/04/2021 e aprovado em 19/07/2021.

ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

ISSN 2526-9038

• This is an open-access

article distributed under

the terms of a Creative

Commons Attribution

License, which permits

unrestricted use,

distribution, and

reproduction in any

medium, provided that

the original author and

source are credited.

• Este é um artigo

publicado em acesso aberto

e distribuído sob os termos

da Licença de Atribuição

Creative Commons,

que permite uso irrestrito,

distribuição e reprodução

em qualquer meio, desde

que o autor e a fonte

originais sejam creditados.

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

2-23

Resumo

Com base nas principais contribuições da teoria política normativa sobre justiça global e

ética da migração, o presente artigo avalia os pactos globais sobre refugiados e migração,

aprovados pela Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas em dezembro de 2018. O conjunto

de conclusões indica que os pactos constituem um avanço importante em projetos e

compromissos morais e políticos globais, porém a operação dos seus termos previstos pode

trazer e manter problemas, distorções e impasses no compartilhamento de responsabilidades.

Palavras-chave: Governança Global Migratória; Justiça Global; Pacto Global sobre Refugiados;

Pacto Global para uma Migração Segura, Ordenada e Regular.

Resumen

Con base en los principales aportes de la teoría política normativa sobre justicia global

y ética migratoria, este artículo evalúa los Pactos globales sobre refugiados y migración,

aprobados por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en diciembre de 2018. El

conjunto de conclusiones indica que los Pactos constituyen un importante avance en los

proyectos y compromisos morales y políticos globales. Sin embargo, la aplicación de los

términos previstos puede generar problemas, distorsiones y estancamientos en el reparto

de responsabilidades.

Palabras clave: Gobernanza de la Migración Global; Justicia Global; El Pacto Mundial sobre

Refugiados; Pacto Mundial para una Migración Segura, Ordenada y Regular.

Introduction

Historically, although there is a consolidated legal framework with regard to

refugees, the general governance framework regarding international migration

has always been one of little consensus, cooperation, and commitments by the

international community. The divergent concerns between countries of origin,

transit, and destination led to unilateral, bilateral or regional treatment of the

issue, constituting fragmented management without a multilateral institutional

framework defined through the UN. In the recent situation of mass migration

and the global migratory crises of 2015 and 2016, with their repercussions

concentrated in the developed countries of the north, many States and other

involved actors realized there was a need to expand multilateral cooperation,

highlighting the global dimension of the issue and the difficulty of dealing with it

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

3-23

in isolation, on a national scale. This framework accelerated the process that led

to the formulation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact

for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, approved by the United Nations General

Assembly in December 2018.

As a permanently dynamic phenomenon, migration, especially its international

management, raises important normative theoretical questions arising from the

empirical claims of the various involved actors, including origin, transit, and

destination countries, developed or developing, as well as refugees, asylum seekers,

and immigrants. In other words, the multiple actors involved in this phenomenon

constantly formulate and reformulate a broad set of strategies, practices, and

policy designs that, from the perspective of normative political theory, reflect

fundamentals, bases, and principles, often competing and contradictory, about

political values like freedom, equality, equity, justice, security, sovereignty, and

democracy.

There has been a lengthy debate in the normative political theory and

political philosophy about global justice and the ethics of migration, but even

though part of this theoretical discussion is based on the empirical claims of

the involved actors, the assessment of international migration regimes has been

scarce. It is possible to raise some factors that may explain this gap. Firstly, the

dynamics of international migration regimes have historically been marked by

institutional weakness, informality, and a lack of global agreement through the

UN. Secondly, global migratory management has not been dealt with directly as

an issue of ethics and justice. And finally, divergent ethical and justice positions

on migration have not followed the same standards of international cooperation.

With the formulation of the two Compacts under the auspices of the UN,

albeit not binding, the international community has expanded the institutional

frameworks for migratory governance. Against this background, the prospect of

addressing that gap has become more viable. To this end, this article retrieves the

main contributions of normative political theory on global justice and migration

ethics to assess the new international agreements on migration.

The normative theoretical debate

Liberal theorists with statist and communitarian approaches tend to prioritize

the right of nation states to control their borders and access to their citizenship,

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

4-23

and, in this sense, present restrictions on governance proposals supported in

the defence of free international migration. This argumentation is based on

parameters of state sovereignty, self-determination, cultural identity, democratic

governance, and economic resources. The idea is that these parameters are

fundamental for maintaining the political community, which must guarantee

individual freedom and promote distributive justice (equality). In this sense, the

loss of these parameters can mean the disintegration of the political community

and the impossibility of a stable and well-ordered society.

Michael Walzer’s argument (1983) is not exactly to open or close borders,

but focuses on the right for political communities to freely decide on their own

affiliation rules, according to their own identity. Walzer (1983: 61-62) places self-

determination as the foundation of community independence, i.e. a community has

the basic right to establish its criteria for the admission and refusal of immigrants.

In Walzer’s (1983: 62) view of communitarianism, the political space is the same

as the ethical and cultural space. Without self-determination, communities of

character, historically stable, with some sense of association and common life,

would not exist. However, for Walzer (1983: 39) the right to restrict entry does

not imply the right to restrict exit, since emigration control implies coercion over

people who no longer wish to be members of a particular community. Based on

the principle of mutual aid, Walzer (1983: 47-50) recognizes the moral obligation

to admit refugees, but this obligation is limited by the importance of maintaining

the self-determination of communities of character. In this sense, the admission

of refugees cannot threaten the cultural and political community, which has

the autonomy to decide how many and which refugees to accept. In the case

of economic migrants, Walzer (1983: 45) suggests that wealthy societies should

promote positive assistance, providing economic aid to foreigners in their own

countries, provided that such a measure is urgent and their risks and costs are

relatively low.

In the wake of the self-determination argument, Christopher Heath Wellman

(2008; 2011) resorts to the right to freedom of association to argue that legitimate

states have the right to formulate the immigration regime they want and are

entitled to close their borders. Wellman (2011: 13) supports this position on three

main premises: 1) legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination; 2)

freedom of association is an essential component of political self-determination;

3) freedom of association does not imply an obligation to associate with outsiders.

For Wellman (2008: 129), relational egalitarian duties require that richer states

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

5-23

promote material and military aid to the poorest, but this does not imply opening

their borders. In the case of refugees, Wellman (2008: 129) recognizes that States

have must offer assistance (“export of justice”), but this does not include an

obligation to admit them, as this decision is a determination arising from the

freedom of association, which allows for the non-association with others.

David Miller also defends immigration restrictions based on the right to

national self-determination. In Miller’s perspective (2016), the nature of the

relationship between compatriots is multidimensional, since it involves a system

of economic cooperation, a shared political and legal system, and a similar set of

cultural and belonging values. Miller (2016: 161) argues that a shared national

culture is essential to guarantee citizens’ commitments to democracy and more

egalitarian forms of social justice. This fact, according to him (2016: 160), has

implications for the issue of immigration, since a huge flow of immigrants could

overcome the capacity of the receiving country to incorporate them into the

dominant public culture. While recognizing that national communities change

over time, Miller (2016: 64-65) argues that a certain level of immigration can put

an unsustainable tension on the shared public culture and threaten its integrity.

Therefore, Miller suggests that the use of quotas to limit the flow of

immigration is legitimate. As well as the use of social, civic and cultural integration

mechanisms for potential permanent residents, without violating their reasonable

preferences or offending their identities, traditions, and beliefs. Miller (2016: 204)

rejects racial and ethnic exclusions. According to him (2016: 27), national identity

does not mean affirming national superiority or inferiority, but rather providing

essential solidarity in addition to economic and political relations. With regard to

refugees, Miller (2007: 202) emphasizes that States have an obligation to admit

them at least temporarily, guaranteeing immediate security. Nonetheless, this

does not imply a right to the permanent residency or citizenship.

Different from the statist or communitarian assumptions presented until

here, when the migration issue involves costs and benefits for all involved,

some theorists allege that international migration can be harmless to alleviate

global poverty. For Gillian Brock (2009: 193), an increase in the admission of

immigrants by developed countries alone does not constitute a comprehensive

solution to global justice problems, given that the latter must be accompanied

by other measures such as fairer trade rules and other initiatives. It also suggests

a series of global institutional reforms towards responsive democracy in the

global system (Brock 2009: 310). In Brock’s perspective (2009), migration policies

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

6-23

should be better managed in order to benefit all parties involved. For her, there

is evidence that immigration benefits immigrants and host countries more than

the countries of origin. According to Brock (2009: 211), it is not clear that, even

with remittances, immigration favours those who stay in their country of origin.

In addition to the brain drain, the financial flows that immigrants send to their

country of origin are not very effective in terms of justice. Remittances can have

negative indirect effects, such as decreasing demand for fundamental economic

reforms in developing countries and failing to resolve structural poverty issues

(Brock 2009: 208).

Contrary to liberal statist and communitarian arguments, liberal and non-

liberal cosmopolitan theorists, global egalitarians, and global libertarians defend

international migration management projects with more open borders. Together,

in a deontological perspective, much of the argument around more open borders

is based on the principles of international freedom of movement and universal

equality (opportunities) and, in a consequentialist perspective, as a way of dealing

with global poverty. In accordance with these views, although states have a duty

to maintain their borders, they do not have the right to close them to immigrants,

since this would violate the right of individuals to freedom of movement and

equal moral consideration for all human beings. In addition, even though they

often claim that the measure is not enough to guarantee greater global equality,

some of these theorists believe that more open borders for immigrants can be a

way to reduce global poverty.

Joseph Carens (1987; 1992; 2013) has developed a normative justification for

open borders based on the value of freedom of movement for individual autonomy,

equal opportunities, and substantive economic, social and political equality

at the global level. For Carens (1987; 1992; 2013), the freedom of movement

is one of the fundamental freedoms and a basic human right that contributes

to the exercise of individual autonomy and other forms of freedom. This right

is not restricted to the national space but constitutes freedom of international

movement. Carens (1987: 261) reinforces his defense of international freedom of

movement with the argument of lucky egalitarianism, which in this case means

that immigration restrictions should not be justified based on birthplace and

kinship, which are arbitrary and irrelevant contingencies from a moral point

of view. In Carens’ (1992: 26) argument, equal opportunities are associated

with the equal moral value of human beings, who should not have access to

social positions limited by arbitrary native characteristics (such as class, race,

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

7-23

sex, or birth). In this sense, freedom of movement is a precondition for equal

opportunities, as it enables people to seek opportunities anywhere, including

across borders. Thus, according to Carens (2013: 226-228), by maintaining

borders and discretionary control over immigration, democratic states violate

their commitments to individual freedom and equality. In addition, for Carens

(2013: 226-228), free movement can contribute to the alleviation of substantial

global inequalities.

Aiming to reform the global refugee regime, Carens (2013: 198) treats

resettlement as a strong and extensive moral duty of States, which must also

find a more just way of distributing refugee resettlement. For a fairer allocation

of refugees, Carens (2013) highlights some factors, such as: absorptive capacity

of the receiving States; population density; economic capacity; cultural similarity,

religion and ethnicity, and history of immigrant admission.

Kieran Oberman (2016: 36) also bases his theses on immigration in the defence

of international freedom of movement as a human right, with no moral distinction

between the freedom of movement within borders. While recognizing that the

human right to migrate is not absolute and that there may be some restriction

in situations with severe costs, Oberman (2016: 37) stresses that immigration

restrictions are unfair, as they violate people’s basic freedoms. For Oberman

(2017: 104), the argument for the right to migrate is related to people’s interests

to choose freely about basic issues such as where they live, with whom they

live, with whom they associate, which religions they practice, etc. According to

Oberman (2017: 104), this is all recognized by international law in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.

Phillip Cole (2011) agrees with Carens and Oberman in defending more

open borders for human rights reasons related to freedom of movement. Cole’s

position (2011 : 178) is also supported by the idea of moral equality for all

people, regardless of the place of birth, advocating equal access to territories.

Immigration controls are unethical, considering that they violate the fundamental

moral principle of equality between people. For him, a liberal universalist and

egalitarian ethic does not end at the national frontier. Thus, for Cole (2011 :

306), the right to cross borders can only be restricted in extreme circumstances,

something that threatens the life of the nation, such as wars or natural disasters,

for example. Other than that, there are no “common sense” arguments to restrict

immigration. He proposes a global migration regime based on a liberal order of

universal mobility in which states do not enjoy a unilateral authority to exclude

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

8-23

others. Cole (2000: 56) argues that without the right to international freedom

of movement, which involves the right to enter, the right to leave is worthless.

For him, the right to leave and the right to enter must be symmetrical. In this

sense, he defends that immigration falls within the same international legal

framework as emigration.

Finally, in this long theoretical debate, there is a set of positions that,

in different aspects, seek to reconcile the demands of universalism and

particularism. In general, these analyses try to find terms of reconciliation

between the territorial rights of States, democratic sovereignty, and the rights

of immigrants. Seyla Benhabib (2004) argues that an ideal of equality can be

pursued with a reconciliation between redistribution and “regulated” migration,

which does not imply a complete opening of borders and fully free movement

of people. For Benhabib (2004: 21), migration is a complex global phenomenon

and sovereignty is a relational concept, not a self-referential one. In this sense,

policies related to access to citizenship should not be seen as unilateral acts of

self-determination, but as an act of democratic negotiation that involves national

and international constitutional norms, given that in the case of migration there

are multilateral consequences in the world community. In this way, Benhabib

(2004) tries to establish a moral basis for admitting foreigners to democratic states

that balances the will for democracy with moral obligations arising from our

global interdependence. In Benhabib’s (2004: 138-139) terms, this equalization

would occur in guaranteeing the exercise of communicative freedom, which

would avoid acceptance criteria based on characteristics not chosen by people,

such as race, religion, gender, etc. Consequently, States could only deny the

entry of foreigners for reasons that do not deny the freedom of communication,

like qualifications, marketable skills, material resources, length of stay, language

skills, etc. This would result, according to Benhabib (2004: 146), in a model of

fragmented citizenship, in which foreigners receive rights, but not necessarily

the rights of national citizens.

Also to point out difficulties in analyses focused strictly on justifications to

restrict or allow international migration, Serena Parekh (2017) calls attention

to the need for normative elaboration that considers the dynamics of migration

policies, their effects, and current political conditions. Addressing the issue of

refugees, Parekh (2017: 3) presents the fact that 65.3 million people worldwide

are displaced from their countries of origin and have not yet found legal refuge in

another country. Of that multitude, only 1% will be resettled in another country

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

9-23

of refuge. This means that the rest live in a situation of temporary solutions,

such as refugee camps, where people stay on average for seventeen years. In this

sense, for Parekh (2017), both analyses that tend to minimize and analyses that

increase the responsibility for refugees fail to provide robust responses to certain

situations created by the refugee regime, notably refugee camps. In Parekh’s

(2017) argument, the concentration of political theorization in the debate on

admission and permanent and non-temporary solutions for refugees leads to a lack

of adequate responses to these facts. For her (2017: 18), in the current political

conditions, camps for refugees and stateless persons have become permanent

fixtures, because, in addition to the official solutions of repatriation, integration,

and resettlement, there is another: containment in camps. The camps constitute

a space distinct from common political communities, with widespread violations

of human rights (Parekh 2017: 32). Against this background, Parekh (2017: 52)

has developed a normative argument called “Temporary Ethics”, which stipulates

that in refugee camps human rights and political participation for refugees must

be guaranteed.

International Migration Governance

The phenomenon of international migration affects all regions and peoples

on the planet, involving various social, political, economic, cultural, and security

dimensions. According to the International Migration Report 2017 (UN 2017: 4),

around 258 million migrants live outside their country of birth, constituting 3.4%

of the world population. As a permanent and long-lasting phenomenon, it can

be said that most migration processes occur through legal channels. However, in

the last decades, with the limitations of the regimes on international migration,

an increase of restrictive control policies in the northern countries, and the

intensification of displacements forced by conflicts, violence, insecurity, economic

crises, environmental changes, and others, the flow of irregular migration has

increased. This situation has impacted States and populations of origin, transit,

and destination, requiring international governance and cooperation mechanisms.

Historically, especially after World Wars I and II, there has been a significant

increase in the formulation of international laws, procedures, and institutions

related to international migration. Despite the existence of a consolidated legal

framework concerning refugees, the general governance framework around the

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

10-23

theme has always been very fragmented, uncoordinated, ad-hoc, and imprecise

in various spheres that involve the phenomenon. In addition, as highlighted

by Nicholas R. Micinski and Thomas G. Weiss (2017: 179), global migration

management has rarely resulted in binding, normative or applicable agreements.

According to Alexander Betts (2011: 7), although the phenomenon of international

migration has always demanded it, a coherent multilateral and formal global

governance structure has not yet developed within the scope of the UN. On

the contrary, the treatment of the phenomenon has remained largely under the

control of sovereign states.

Taken together, the institutional fragility and ineffectiveness of migration

regimes are related to the historical predominance of the approach and treatment

of the international migratory theme on a state, national and sovereign level. Based

on parameters of equity and global justice, it can be said that the predominance

of the state approach, in addition to hindering multilateral, formal, and UN-

sponsored referrals, has also revealed the disparity of power between developed

and developing countries. There has been a clear predominance of the approaches

and interests of developed countries, which is also reflected in an unbalanced

distribution in the sharing of the burden and responsibilities when facing different

aspects of the migratory phenomenon.

In recent decades unprecedented levels of global migration, situations of

increased vulnerability of migrants, and great challenges in managing the migration

phenomenon have made it evident that international migration could no longer be

effectively managed or controlled by national migration policies, requiring greater

international cooperation to achieve national goals in international migration

(Koser 2010: 302-303). In this context, albeit different perspectives on the role

of global migration governance, mainly with regard to political and normative

demands between countries of origin in the South and receiving countries in

the North, from the beginning of the 2000s countries recognized the need for

some kind of multilateral governance architecture to manage migration (Betts

and Kainz 2017: 4). This fact can be evidenced in the actions of the UN, which

placed the issue as one of its central topics of discussion, mainly due to the

efforts of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN (1997-2006). The creation

of the Global Commission on International Migration (CGMI) in 2003, with the

prospect of greater UN involvement in addressing the various dimensions of the

international migration phenomenon, can be considered a milestone in the UN’s

attempt at greater participation in global management of international migration.

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

11-23

Following this fact, in 2006, in response to a recommendation from the Global

Commission on International Migration, the UN Secretary-General established

the Global Migration Group. It is a high-level inter-agency group involved in

migration-related activities, with the role of promoting the broader application

of all relevant international and regional instruments and standards related to

migration, encouraging the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive, and

better-coordinated approaches. Two events that should also be noted in this

process of greater UN involvement in migration governance were the High-Level

Dialogues on Migration and Development held in 2006 and 2013. Although they

had a limited deliberative format and produced little expressive results, the two

Dialogues were important steps in attempting to deal with the international

migration phenomenon on an integrated, global, and non-fragmented basis.

In the wake of these events, in July 2016, the UN General Assembly

unanimously adopted a resolution that approved the agreement to incorporate the

International Organization for Migration (IOM) into the UN (UN 2016a). Initially

created to resettle refugees from Europe, the IOM has long been an important player

in the field of human mobility, acting for the protection of migrants and displaced

persons, and in the resettlement of refugees and voluntary returns. However,

many scholars have noted that over time, the IOM has had a controversial and

ambivalent performance, oscillating between cooperation and non-cooperation

with UN agencies, depending on the political interests in question (Pécoud 2018).

By linking the IOM to the UN, the UN General Assembly took an important step

in aligning the IOM with multilateral demands and the multiple actors involved.

This scenario of broadening the discussion on global migratory governance

was accelerated by an increase in the movement of large numbers of refugees and

migrants, mainly the refugee crisis in Europe 2015 and 2016. This fact also made

it more evident that the discussion on migration management has ceased to be

a political issue for the exclusive treatment of national states. The emergence of

demands from civil society to be included in discussions about the topic and the

involvement of all stakeholders has given governance dynamics multiple levels,

as well as formal and informal spheres. For Marion Panizzon and Micheline Van

Riemsdijk (2019 : 1225), the large flows of migrants and the refugee crisis have

changed the capacities of States to govern international migration. According to

Marion Panizzon and Micheline Van Riemsdijk (2019 : 1225), actors from civil

society, regions, and cities working in crisis management have assumed roles

traditionally played by national governments and international organizations.

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

12-23

Even if the degrees of interaction between the proposals formulated at these

scales and levels remain fragmented, and considering that the participation

by multiple actors is subject to hierarchies, it is already possible to verify an

emerging framework of a multilevel global migratory governance.

Together, the processes described above culminated in the New York Declaration.

Unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on

September 19, 2016, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants laid the

groundwork and commitments for two intergovernmental consultation processes

for negotiations about the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact

for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. An important fact highlighted by the

Declaration was the call for the formulation of the two agreements “through an

open, transparent and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations, and

the effective participation of all interested parties”. (UN 2016b).

The New York Declaration outlined three phases for the drafting of Global

Compacts. First, a consultation phase, carried out between April and December 2017,

involving contributions and recommendations not only from different government

actors but also from civil society stakeholders and affected communities, who

participated in five thematic discussions in Geneva. For Stefan Rother and Elias

Steinhilper (2019: 244), an established framework for “migration governance

from below” has allowed civil society and migrant organizations, in particular, to

significantly impact the process and outcome of the Global Compact for Orderly

and Regular Migration while, in the case of the Global Compact on Refugees,

international refugee networks used the negotiation process to be recognized as

actors in the international system.

Next, a survey phase took place where the information collected during the

consultations was processed. This resulted in a “Zero Draft” prepared by Mexico

and Switzerland, co-facilitators of the process. Between February and July 2018

intergovernmental negotiations were conducted, which resulted in the texts of

the two Compacts. In December 2018, at the UN Conference in Morocco, the vast

majority of the General Assembly approved the “Global Compact on Refugees”

and the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”.

The Global Compact on Refugees

The Global Compact on Refugees is based on the 1951 Convention on the

Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, centred on the fundamental principle

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

13-23

of non-refoulement and governed by international human rights instruments,

international humanitarian law, and other international instruments on the

subject (UNHCR 2018a: paragraph 5). The Compact establishes four objectives:

1) relieve pressure on host countries; 2) increase refugee self-sufficiency;

3) expand access to third-country solutions; 4) and helping to create conditions

in countries of origin for citizens to return in security and dignity (paragraph 7).

The Compact seeks to address the root causes of refugee movements to facilitate

access to long-term solutions. To this end, recognizes voluntary repatriation under

safe and dignified conditions as the preferred solution in most refugee situations

(paragraph 87). The Compact’s preferred long-term solution is not new, since

voluntary repatriation is already the predominant practice of the international

refugee regime. In the normative theoretical terms presented in this case, it can

be said that the justifications of the statist-communitarian (Walzer 1983; Wellman

2008; Miller 2016) basis for the admission of refugees remain in the Compact, such

as the sovereignty of States to decide on the entry of refugees into their territories,

the cultural integrity of receiving countries, limited economic resources for receiving

a large contingent of refugees and defending refugees’ human rights in their

communities of origin. In fact, voluntary repatriation in a safe and dignified way

remains the ideal solution. It turns out that, in recent decades, mass repatriation

movements have been carried out under very adverse conditions for refugees.

Developing countries often lack the resources to sustain a large refugee population

for a long time in their territories. Developed countries, on the other hand, may

provide insufficient funding for long-term assistance programs. Furthermore,

countries of origin might support repatriation measures as a way of demonstrating

internal stability to the international community, even if this situation does not

exist. All these factors have contributed to situations of extreme vulnerability of

refugees, a problem the Compact seeks to address. Success, however, will depend

on significantly improving the above-mentioned issues.

Paragraph 3 establishes a bold commitment to providing a basis for a

predictable and equitable sharing of responsibilities among all Member States

of the UN. In this perspective, the Compact provides for the periodic convening

of the World Forum on Global Refugees, so that all Member States and interested

parties can announce pledges to contribute to concrete measures aimed at achieving

the objectives and improving the distribution of burdens and responsibilities;

assess progress in achieving the objectives; and exchange good practices and

experiences (paragraphs 17; 103). The Compact is not legally binding (paragraph

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

14-23

4). In this sense, contributions will be voluntary, determined by each State and

each stakeholder, considering the realities, capacities, and levels of development

of each country and respecting its national policies and priorities (paragraph 4).

The articulation of a more equitable, predictable and sustainable distribution of

burdens and responsibilities will be under the coordination of UNHCR, States,

and stakeholders (paragraph 48). The use of indicators by the international

community to assess the achievement of objectives in the planned World Refugee

Forums is the tool for examining the mechanisms for the distribution of burdens

and responsibilities (paragraphs 102; 103; 104).

Seen from a perspective of global justice and migration ethics, it can be said

that the Compact addresses one of the most important issues of the international

refugee regime, which is the sharing of burdens and responsibilities, a field notably

marked by tensions, inequalities, and little commitment of States. Although there is

an institutionalized normativity around asylum, with States recognizing they have

certain obligations towards refugees present in their territory, the same is not true

concerning refugees outside their territory. Since the origin of the international refugee

regime, States have been reluctant to make mandatory and continuous financial

and resettlement commitments to refugee crises distant from their territories. In

general, the sharing of responsibilities is uneven, with most of the burden assumed

by States in the vicinity of where refugee generating crises occur.

As a rule, supported by the rules governing the international refugee regime,

developed countries grant asylum to refugees who are in their territories and cannot

return to their countries of origin for security reasons. However, by complying

with the principle of non-refoulement, these countries work with the prospect of

preventing potential refugees from reaching their territories, which would imply

granting asylum (Gibney 2005; Parekh 2017). According to Matthew Gibney

(2005: 4), to avoid the commitment of non-refoulement, developed countries

apply “non-arrival measures”, such as the use of visa regimes, carrier sanctions,

immigration pre-inspection, and interdiction at sea. Such strategies and deterrence

practices in migration management have generated informal or institutionalized

“transit spaces”, which include transit points and temporary or semi-permanent

residences for the containment and retreat of people who seek refuge (De Vries

& Guild 2019). By characterizing the reality of these spaces as a combination of

fractured mobility, daily violence, and fundamental uncertainty, Leonie Ansems de

Vries and Elspeth Guild (2019: 2157) have recovered the term “exhaustion policy”;

a deliberate strategy of mobility governance aimed at demotivating people from

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

15-23

attempting to cross borders. Such migration governance practices in developed

countries demonstrate the low level of commitment of these countries to refugees

outside their territory.

According to the Global Trends Forced Displacement study of 2018 (UNHCR

2019: 13) the refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate at that point stood at

20.4 million, having almost doubled since 2012 when it was 10.5 million, with

two thirds from just five countries (Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar,

and Somalia). According to the study, the total global refugee population is at

the highest level ever recorded — 25.9 million at the end of 2018, including 5.5

million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate. As has been the case since

2014, the main country of origin of refugees in 2018 was Syria, with 6.7 million.

These refugees were received by 127 countries on six continents, but the vast

majority (85%) remained in countries in the region (UNHCR 2019: 14). Turkey

continued to host the largest population of Syrian refugees, with 3.7 million at

the end of the year. More than 98% of the refugees in Turkey were from Syria,

totalling 3.6 million (UNHCR 2019: 14). These data show that the majority of

refugees flee to a neighbouring country.

As can be seen, there is an imbalance in the sharing of burdens and

responsibilities, since the countries closest to the situations of conflict and violence

receive the bulk of the refugees. Note that these countries are low and middle

income, belonging to the Global South. According to the report Global Trends

Forced Displacement in 2017 (UNHCR 2018b: 15), low and middle-income countries

are home to around 85% of the world’s refugees. Although the largest UNHCR

financiers are developed countries, with emphasis on the USA, the European Union,

and Germany, respectively, in 2018, the UNHCR budget fell short, presenting a

deficit of 43% (UNCHR 2018c: 10). Therefore, there is a need for more countries

to release resources. In high-income countries, there are on average only 2.7

refugees per thousand inhabitants, but that number is more than double in middle

and low-income countries, with 5.8 refugees per thousand (UNHCR 2019: 21).

There is also a need for a better distribution of resettlement among countries,

especially those with higher incomes. The Compact does not establish State

quotas for refugee resettlement, mainly from the north, as humanitarian groups

and associations wanted. Nor does it establish a mandatory resettlement duty,

according to the principle of humanitarianism argued in theories like those of

Carens (2013) and Benhabib (2004). In this respect, in normative theoretical terms,

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

16-23

it can be said that the right of self-determination of the statist-communitarian

approaches prevails.

Additionally, there is the issue of long-term refugees. Paragraph 14 of the

Compact recognizes that countries that receive and accommodate refugees for long

periods must obtain support from the international community, as they make an

immense contribution to humanity. According to UNHCR (UNHCR 2019: 22), in

2018 78% of all refugees were in prolonged situations, equivalent to 15.9 million

refugees. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000

or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive

years or more in a given host country. In fact, the protracted refugee situation in

camps is the main picture of the refugee phenomenon in our time. With no return

conditions, no resettlement or integration in other countries, refugees remain in

the camps. As Parekh (2017: 3) pointed out, the average stay in refugee camps is

seventeen years. There is no obligation in the Compact for temporary admission

or the expansion of political rights for refugees in long-term camps.

As pointed out, the Compact establishes mechanisms for solidarity, cooperation,

and sharing responsibilities. However, as it is not legally binding, the Compact does

not create mandatory normative commitments for financing, resettlement, and

sharing responsibilities. In this sense, the predictable and equitable burden and

the sharing of responsibilities can be compromised. The suggested mechanisms

will depend on voluntary contributions and consider the absorption capacity,

the level of development, and the demographic situation of different countries.

UNHCR’s track record in ensuring responsibility-sharing is not very encouraging.

In general, commitments are not long-lasting and are more present in critical

situations. The nationalist, identitarian, and anti-immigration sentiments present

in some countries do not help, nor does the reduction of resettlement programs,

which are already small given the number of refugees. In societies with a high

degree of polarization around the issue, it is difficult for States to make lasting

commitments and obligations to provide financial support and receive refugees.

The voluntary character, subject to national priorities, may reinforce this, and

contributions can fluctuate as needed.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was, above all,

the adoption of the first comprehensive framework of principles and objectives to

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

17-23

supply international migration governance with a single framework. In addition,

although always emphasizing state sovereignty, it recognizes the challenges of

coordinating, operating, monitoring, and financing a system of multilateral and

multilevel global governance. According to paragraph 1, the Compact is based

on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter (UN 2018). Its

format comprises 4 parts: “Vision and Guiding Principles”; 23 “Objectives” with

respective “Commitments”; “Implementation”; and “Follow-up and Review”

mechanisms. Its application provides for local, regional, and global cooperation

under the UN system, and in association with migrants and civil society

(paragraphs 40; 43; 44; 45).

Adopted with a greater number of abstentions and votes against than the

Refugee Compact, the Global Compact on Migration reiterated the distinction

between refugees and migrants, who have the same universal human rights

and fundamental freedoms that must be respected, protected, and fulfilled, but

which constitute separate groups that are governed by separate legal frameworks

(paragraph 4). In this case, the concern of many States, mainly from the developed

north, has prevailed in preventing economic migrants from being governed by the

same legal frameworks as refugees. On the issue of human rights, the Compact

adopts the principle of non-regression (paragraph 15f), which means that once

a human right is recognized, it cannot be removed or restricted. Note that the

Compact does not establish the right to migration as a human right, nor does

it create new human rights, as advocated by cosmopolitan normative theories.

Recognized as a harmful problem for all agents involved in the migratory

process, irregular migration highlights one of the central mismatches between

migration regimes and migratory social dynamics. In Objective 5, paragraph 21,

States commit to improving the availability and flexibility of routes for regular

migration. It is not a matter of regularizing all migrants in an irregular situation,

nor of creating an international standard that provides for State obligations or

individual rights to regularization. But, as provided for in objective 7, item (i),

ensures an individual assessment that allows individuals to regularize their

situation, per case with clear and transparent criteria. Non-state stakeholders

demanded commitments to regularize irregular long-term migrants, but there was

no agreement between States on this issue. In objective 5, item (i), the Compact

provides for facilitating access to family reunification procedures for migrants,

at all skill levels. Family reunification has always been a demand from countries

in the Global South and civil society actors. The expression “at all skill levels” is

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

18-23

in line with the demands of scholars and human rights groups that often point

to a selective procedure in the policies of developed countries, which offer the

possibility of family reunification to highly qualified workers whilst denying it

for less qualified workers.

The adoption of more inclusive, cooperative, and comprehensive perspectives

can be a way to mitigate the problem. Nevertheless, putting these perspectives

into practice is not easy. On the one hand, it is not possible to reach a situation

where all people can satisfy their basic needs for life in their place of birth in the

near future. On the other hand, despite the efforts of some political and societal

leaders to establish and enforce the Compact, the current global political scenario

has experienced an increase in protectionism, isolationism, and xenophobic

nationalism, all of which have reduced the willingness of governments and

societies to assume and share the responsibilities for migration.

With regard to labour migration, historically, the prevalence of global

governance based on the domestic policies of sovereign states has created a situation

in which northern destination countries have adopted selective immigration

policies, facilitating the entry of highly skilled workers and wealthy individuals,

whilst tightly controlling the entry of low-skilled workers. Such facts represent

an unequal cost distribution among States, with poorer countries bearing the

cost of losing qualified labour. Objective two aims to minimize the adverse and

structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin. In item

(e) of this objective, the Compact deals with brain drain and investment in the

development of human capital, and the creation of productive jobs in cooperation

with the private sector and unions to reduce youth unemployment. In this way,

a contribution can be made to alleviate the brain drain in poorer countries

and take advantage of the demographic dividend. The emphasis here is on the

realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (objective 2, item

a), which would eliminate the adverse factors and structural factors that compel

people to leave their country of origin. In the theoretical debate presented here,

the diagnosis of the Compact seems to follow the line of authors like Gillian

Brock (2015), who pointed to evidence that the “brain drain” presents losses to

the poor countries of origin.

Another controversial issue in terms of global justice and migration ethics

is related to the remittances that immigrants send to their countries of origin.

In the Compact, some objectives address the demands of countries of origin,

such as Objective 20, which provides for the promotion of faster, safer, and more

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

19-23

economical remittance transfers and fosters the financial inclusion of migrants,

recognizing the transformative effect that remittances have on the well-being of

migrant workers and their families, as well as on the sustainable development

of countries. In paragraph 36, the Compact stresses that remittances are an

important source of private capital and cannot be equated with other currents

of international financing like foreign direct investment, official development

assistance and other public sources of financing for development. Accordingly,

according to the Compact, in line with the proposals of developing countries,

remittances cannot replace other forms of development assistance. There is no

recognition in the Compact that remittances are an inadvertent cause of irregular

migration and family separation. According to a report by the World Bank and

KNOMAD (2018: 4), migrants worldwide sent US $ 613 billion in remittances in

2017. This number is much higher than all international assistance for development

abroad in 2017, which according to OECD (2018: 267) data totalled $ 146.6 billion.

The involuntary return of migrants has always been a subject of disagreements

and controversies between countries of origin in the South and destination

countries in the North. The latter often claim that there is little effort from

countries of origin to guarantee return migration. In turn, countries of origin

argue that human rights and the dignity of migrants are often violated in return

actions. Additionally, they complain about the difficulties of reintegration in

poor countries and a lack of assistance and international financial aid for this

reintegration. In this matter, both sides make commitments, as is the case of

Objective 21, paragraph 37, which provides for collaboration to facilitate the

return and readmission in safe and dignified conditions, as well as sustainable

reintegration in the country of origin to ensure that their nationals are properly

received and readmitted. Note that Objective 21, paragraph 37, also endorses

fundamental principles of protection, providing for the prohibition of collective

expulsion and the return of migrants when there is a real and foreseeable risk

of death, torture, and other cruel, inhuman treatment such as punishment or

humiliation, or other irreparable damage. Thus, while recognizing that States

have a sovereign right to return migrants who are not authorized to stay in their

territories, the Compact establishes a dignified return, due process of law, and

a ban on collective expulsions or returns in situations where there is a serious

risk of damage or death.

The Compact presents itself as a framework of non-legally binding cooperation,

whose purpose is to foster international, regional, and bilateral cooperation

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

20-23

and dialogue on migration, recognizing that no State can approach migration in

isolation, and respecting the sovereignty of States and their obligations under

international law (paragraphs 7; 15b). In paragraph 15c, the Compact reaffirms the

sovereign right of States to determine their migration policy and the prerogative

to regulate migration within their jurisdiction in accordance with international

law, being able to distinguish between regular and irregular migration status.

Even though it did not impose new obligations on the signatory countries, the

Compact was rejected by some countries on the grounds that its adoption implies

an infringement on their sovereignty. Evidently, taking into account the different

positions of the negotiating governments, the Compact has simultaneously adopted

both the principles of international cooperation and national sovereignty. The

great challenge lies in the coordination and integration of these principles that

may collide. In certain cases, the exercise of national sovereignty can preclude

international cooperation.

Conclusion

After a long history of fragmentation in global migration management,

despite not being binding, the two multilateral global Compacts within the UN

system constitute a significant advance in global moral and political projects

and commitments. Notably marked by a predominance of sovereign national

policies in developed countries and by informal processes, which have always

hampered more equitable terms of cooperation and responsibility between States

and other actors involved, international migration regimes have demonstrated

their inefficiencies in the face of the challenges presented in recent decades.

This has made it possible to expand the treatment of migratory governance in

multilateral and multilevel terms, under the coordination of the UN. It does not

mean, however, that this process and consequently the Compacts, are free of

contradictions, objections, and non-adhesions.

Altogether, from a normative theoretical perspective on global justice and

migration ethics, it can be said that the Compacts are based on positions more in

tune with statist-communitarian positions on sovereignty and self-determination,

which provide for a conditioned admission of refugees and restrictions on economic

migration. The emphasis is on development aid to ensure the self-sufficiency of

countries of origin, thus preventing the departure of their inhabitants and resulting

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

21-23

in “brain drain”. Furthermore, in cases where a considerable outflow does occur, the

emphasis is on promoting and facilitating safe return and repatriation. In relation

to the integration of immigrants, besides rejecting all forms of discrimination,

the goal is social, civic, and cultural integration in the destination countries. As

a deal between countries with different positions and powers in the international

system, an agreement was reached because the coordination, accountability,

monitoring, and financing of the terms and objectives of the Compacts are not

binding, even though they do contain mechanisms for assessment and review.

Seen in this way, the Compacts are an expression of the views and standards of

international migration governance generally upheld by more developed transit

and destination countries.

For this reason, operationalization of the terms provided for in the Compacts

can bring about problems, distortions, and impasses in the sharing responsibilities,

despite the focus on multilateral, multilevel perspectives of solidarity and

cooperation, and considering the specific interests of countries of origin, transit

and destination. In the case of refugees, the unfair distribution of responsibilities

between developed and developing countries is likely to remain, as well as the

prevalence of non-entry and selective immigration policies in developed countries.

References

Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of Others: aliens, citizens and residents. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Betts, Alexander (ed). (2011). Global Migration Governance. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Betts, Alexander and Lena Kainz. 2017. ‘The history of global migration governance’.

Working Paper Series (122): 1-18. At https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-

history-of-global-migration-governance [Accessed on 5 May 2019].

Brock, Gillian. 2009. Global Justice: a cosmopolitan account. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Carens, Joseph. 1987. ‘Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders’. Review of

Politics (49) (2): 251-273.

Carens, Joseph. 1992. ‘Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective’.

In Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (eds) Free Movement: ethical issues in the

transnational migration of people and of money. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania

University Press, pp. 25-47.

Normative Political Theory and Global Migration Governance [...]

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

22-23

Carens, Joseph. 2013. The Ethics of Immigration. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cole, Phillip. 2000. Philosophies of Exclusion: liberal political theory and immigration.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Cole, Phillip. 2011. ‘Open Borders: An Ethical Defense’. In Christopher H. Wellman and

Phillip Cole (eds), Debating the Ethics of Immigration: is there a right to exclude?

New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 159-313.

De Vries, Leonie Ansems and Elspeth Guild. 2019. ‘Seeking refuge in Europe: spaces of

transit and the violence of migration management’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration

Studies (45) (12): 2156-2166.

Gibney, Matthew J. 2005. ‘Beyond the bounds of responsibility: western states and

measures to prevent the arrival of refugees’. Global Migration Perspectives (22): 1-23.

Koser, Khalid. 2010. ‘Introduction: International Migration and Global Governance’. Global

Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations(16) (3):

301-315.

Micinski, Nicholas and Thomas G. Weiss. 2017. ‘Global Migration Governance: Beyond

Coordination and Crises’. In Giuliana Z. Capaldo (ed), The Global Community

Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

pp. 175-193.

Miller, David. 2007. National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Miller, David. 2016. Strangers in Our Midst: the political philosophy of immigration.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Oberman, Kieran. 2016. ‘Immigration as a Human Right’. In Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi

(eds), Migration in Political Theory: the ethics of movement and membership.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 32-56.

Oberman, Kieran. 2017. ‘Immigration, citizenship, and consent: what is wrong with

permanent alienage?’ The Journal of Political Philosophy (25) (1): 91-107.

OECD. 2018. Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining forces to leave no one

behind. At https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-en [Accessed on 3 August 2019].

Panizzon, Marion and Micheline van Riemsdijk. 2019. ‘Introduction to Special issue:

‘migration governance in an era of large movements: a multi-level approach’’.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (45) (8): 1225-1241.

Parekh, Serena. 2017. Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement.New York: Routledge.

Pécoud, Antoine. 2018. ‘What do we know about the International Organization for

Migration? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (44) (10): 1621-1638.

Rother, Stefan and Elias Steinhilper. 2019. ‘Tokens or Stakeholders in Global Migration

Governance? The Role of Affected Communities and Civil Society in the Global

Compacts on Migration and Refugees’. International Migration (57) (6): 243-257.

Marcelo Santos

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 3, e1176, 2021

23-23

UN. 2016a. Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and

the International Organization for Migration. At https://www.un.org/ga/search/

view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/976 [Accessed on 23 January 2018].

UN. 2016b. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. At https://www.un.org/

en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1 [Accessed on 23 January 2018].

UN. 2017. International Migration Report 2017. At https://www.un.org/en/development/

desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_

Highlights.pdf [Accessed on 9 July 2019].

UN. 2018. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. At https://

refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/ﬁles/180711_ﬁnal_draft_0.pdf [Accessed

on 11 September 2018].

UNHCR. 2018a. The Global Compact on Refugees. At https://www.unhcr.org/events/

conferences/5b3295167/ofﬁcial-version-ﬁnal-draft-global-compact-refugees.html

[Accessed on 4 September 2019].

UNHCR. 2018b. Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2017. At https://www.unhcr.

org/5b27be547.pdf [Accessed on 4 September 2019].

UNHCR. 2018c. Global Report 2018. At https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/ﬁles/

gr2018/pdf/GR2018_English_Full_lowres.pdf [Accessed on 4 September 2019].

UNHCR. 2019. Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2018. At https://www.unhcr.

org/5d08d7ee7.pdf [Accessed on 6 October 2019].

Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: a defense of pluralism and equality. New

York: Basic Books.

Wellman, Christopher H. 2008. ‘Immigration and freedom of association’. Ethics (119) (1):

109-141.

Wellman, Christopher H. 2011. ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude’. In

Christopher H. Wellman and Phillip Cole (eds), Debating the Ethics of Immigration:

is there a right to exclude? New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 13-155.

World Bank Group and KNOMAD. 2018. Migration and Remittances: recent developments

and outlook. Migration and Development Brief (29). At https://www.knomad.org/

sites/default/ﬁles/2018-04/Migration%20and%20Development%20Brief%2029.

pdf [Accessed on 10 October 2019].