João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

1-25

Intergovernmental organisations and

the protection of democracy:

a multifaceted power in world politics

Organizações internacionais e a proteção

da democracia: um poder multifacetado

na política internacional

Las organizaciones internacionales y la

protección de la democracia: un poder

multifacetado en la política internacional

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v16n2.2021.1114

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Abstract

The international protection of democracy is a matter of power.

Although recent studies systematized the multidimensional

perspective of power in democracy protection policies, they focused

on national states. This article focused on another actor, the

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), assuming them as actors

capable of projecting power in world politics. First, we use the

typology of power in Barnett and Duvall, stated as multifaceted

and productive of different policies and results. Second, the article

applied the typology, observing how compulsory, institutional,

structural and productive powers appear in IGOs action. The

result was a complex, multilevel and interdisciplinary analysis

of power phenomenon.

Keywords: Power, Intergovernmental Organizations, Democracy

promotion.

1 Doutor em Ciência Política pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais e

Doutor em Ciência Política e Social pela Université Catholique de Louvain.

(joaoferrazoliveira@yahoo.com.br). Pesquisador do RIPPERP (Rede Interins-

titucional de Pesquisa em Política Externa e Regime Político) e GEOMM (Grupo

de Estudo Oriente Médio e Magreb) ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1740-4995.

Artigo submetido em 15/08/2020 e aprovado em 24/10/2020.

ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE

RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

ISSN 2526-9038

• This is an open-access

article distributed under

the terms of a Creative

Commons Attribution

License, which permits

unrestricted use,

distribution, and

reproduction in any

medium, provided that

the original author and

source are credited.

• Este é um artigo

publicado em acesso aberto

e distribuído sob os termos

da Licença de Atribuição

Creative Commons,

que permite uso irrestrito,

distribuição e reprodução

em qualquer meio, desde

que o autor e a fonte

originais sejam creditados.

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

2-25

Resumo

A proteção da internacional da democracia é uma questão de poder. Embora estudos

recentes sistematizaram a perspectiva multidimensional do poder nas políticas de proteção

democrática, o foco estava nos Estados nacionais. Este artigo enfocou as Organizações

Intergovernamentais (OIGs), assumindo-as como atores capazes de projetar poder na

política mundial. Primeiro, usamos a tipologia do poder em Barnett e Duvall, declarada

como multifacetada e produtora de diferentes políticas e resultados. Segundo, o artigo

aplicou essa tipologia observando como os poderes compulsórios, institucionais, estruturais

e produtivos aparecem na ação das OIGs. O resultado foi uma análise complexa, multinível

e interdisciplinar do fenômeno político.

Palavras-chave: Poder, Organizações Intergovernamentais, Proteção democrática.

Resumen

La protección de la democracia internacional es una cuestión de poder. Estudios recientes

han sistematizado la perspectiva multidimensional del poder en las políticas de protección

democrática con enfoque en los estados nacionales. Este artículo analisa las Organizaciones

Intergubernamentales (OIG), las entiendo como actores con poder proyectivo en la política

mundial. Primeiro, utilizamos los tipos de poder de Barnett y Duvall, declarados multifacéticos

y que producen distintas políticas y resultados. Segundo, analizamos los poderes obligatorios,

institucionales, estructurales y productivos en la acción de las OIG. El resultado fue un

análisis complejo, multinivel e interdisciplinario del fenómeno político.

Palabra clave: Poder, Organizaciones intergubernamentales, Protección democrática.

Introduction

In 2016, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) began to carry out a series of

violations against the European Acquis Communautaire values. These violations

included the manipulation of constitutional order and substantive actions to

hinder the court systems’ power of decision-making. In response, the European

Union (EU) reacted to this situation by mobilizing Article 7 in an attempt to

change the behavior of the authoritarian domestic elite (Halmai 2018). Similarly,

in Latin America, the Organization of American States (OAS) used Resolution

1080 against Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1991) and José Serrano Elias in Guatemala

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

3-25

(1993), both self-coup attempts, and applied the Inter-American Democratic

Charter (IADC) against Honduras’ military division in 2009, also a coup d’état

attempt (Heine and Weiffen 2015, Shaw 2004, Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007,

McCoy 2012). In all of these contexts, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

sought to prevent their State members’ democracies from backsliding.

Indeed, all of the above examples admit the following statement: “The

promotion of international democracy is concerned with power, in many aspects”

(Wolff 2015, 219). Seeking democratic compliance worldwide, international

actors wield power to accomplish their goals. However, to achieve these goals,

this political action requires an asymmetric relation of power concerning their

state targets (Wolff 2015). Surprisingly for Wolff, a limited number of scholars

paid attention to power issues within policies geared toward the promotion

of democracy, even if a significant part of the foreign affairs discussion was

in fact dedicated to this matter. Wolff’s article, entitled “Power in Democracy

Promotion”, insisted on a “systematic consideration of power in the academic

study of democracy promotion” (Wolff 2015, 220) using the typology of power

developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005).

Nevertheless, Wolff (2015) focused his analysis on nation-states. From his

perspective, nation-states present a prevalence over other actors. In his words,

“International Organizations and nonstate agencies are considered only to be

instruments of governmental democracy promotion, not as actors in their own

right” (Wolff 2015, 221). Indeed, most studies about the promotion of international

democracy have favored activities conducted by individual entities (mainly

nation-states) and spillover effects associated with contagion structures during

democratization processes, regardless of actions from other relevant actors

(Pevehouse 2005).

This article, therefore, proposes a dialog with Wolff’s (2015) proposition. First,

the same power typology of Barnett and Duvall (2005), divided into compulsory,

institutional, structural, and productive types, is mobilized. Second and even

more crucial, this study seeks to apprehend the multifaceted power of multilateral

promoters in matters of democracy promotion not discussed by Wolff. Precisely,

this work presents a theoretical and conceptual mobilization regarding the

power of IGOs in their participation in policies geared toward the promotion of

democracy.

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

4-25

This article begins by changing the use of “promotion of democracy” to

“protection of democracy”, claiming that these concepts are not interchangeable.

This occurs due to the application of Hawkins’ concept of democracy protection,

considered to be the “activities that offer tangible or intangible rewards or

penalties to the state as a whole for aggregate behavior with respect to democratic

standards” (Hawkins 2008, 375). This concept is particularly useful for the

multidimensional debate in this article. First, this concept allows the use of

material and immaterial forms of power, whether through rewards or penalty

mechanisms. Second, it contemplates the transformations in the actor’s behavior

toward a democratic standard constructed at the multilateral level. Finally, it

allows for reflection on the normative construction of a protected democratic

concept.

Thus, this article is divided as follows. The first section presents the “actorness”

of IGOs. In this regard, our study discusses the literature regarding how IGOs

can independently formulate policies according to the Principal-Agent model

and, mainly, what analytical concerns relate to the construction of democracy

promotion policies. The second section briefly discusses Barnett and Duvall’s

(2005) power typology, divided into compulsory, institutional, structural, and

productive types and features.

Finally, the core of the article demonstrates how these typologies appear

within IGOs’ idiosyncratic powers. As regards compulsory power, this article

focuses on: (1) how IGOs use their mechanisms to change behavior, (2) how

IGOs reach convergence to apply those mechanisms of power, and (3) what is

at stake when they do that. As regards productive power, this article focuses on:

(1) the social purpose of IGOs in democracy protection, (2) IGOs as protectors

of set norms (diffusers); (3) the values and concepts of democracy protection.

As regards structural power, the discussion treats the role of IGOs’ links and

governance policies in the export of structural prerequisites that prescribe the

actor’s behavior and institutional actions to be implemented. Finally, as regards

institutional power, the discussion treats the IGOs’ use of transnational (TNAs)

or transgovernmental (TGAs) actors to promote democracy.

The findings in this conceptual-theoretical discussion demonstrated that

the multifaceted observation of power in the IGOs’ participation in democracy

promotion policies is complex, multilevel, and interdisciplinary.

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

5-25

IGOs in rational and social approaches

IGOs are different from nation-states in their own characteristics (Hawkins et

al. 2006. Thus, the analytical endeavor must assume that this different characteristic

for IGOs in comparison to nation-states has direct impacts upon the comprehension

of power in these organizations. This differentiation is directly concerned with the

connection between Principal-Agents in their forms of delegation and bureaucratic

culture in decision-making procedures.

In general, IGOs have three main features: as formal institutions, as the

arena of decision-making, and as actors in world politics (Archer 2001). First,

IGOs are formally “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors

that prescribe, denounce, or authorize behavior” (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal

2001, 762). Second, IGOs are organizational structures for decision-making

processes among nation-states. According to Abbott and Snidal (1998), states

act through IGOs because they provide depoliticized or specialized forums.

In many theoretical approaches to international relations (especially within

regime theory), this formal organizational structure commonly provides an

optimal arena for negotiations aimed at shaping cooperation, coordination,

and compliance among nation-states (Keohane 2002; Archer 2001). Third, IGOs

possess operational and managerial facets that characterize the ‘actorness

’of

the organization. This results in the IGOs’ capacity to develop an actor-oriented

or strategic action towards international policies (Hawkins et al., 2006 Brattberg

and Rhinard, 2013).

Academically, the analysis of IGOs’ capacities divides into two main strands.

The first approach assumes a rational approach, mainly associated with the

Principal-Agent (PA) models (Hawkins et al. 2006). This approach focuses on

delegation factors between different actors for specific tasks. In the context of

IGOs, Principals are the Member-States, Agents are the international bureaucracies,

and formalized treaties and pacts are the typical instruments of delegation

(Hawkins et al. 2006).

For Bauer and Ege (2016), the PA model relates to situations of control by

Principals and discretion for Agents, summarized in studies of competences/

statutory powers, influences in decision-making, production of sanction policies,

2 According to Brattberg and Rhinard (2013), in the literature, “actorness” associates with the recognition,

authority, legitimacy, autonomy, opportunity, presence, capability, and consistency of actions of the IGO in

world politics.

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

6-25

and operational resources in international bureaucracies. In this sense, PA identifies

the primary explanations for delegation. This delegation is a result of a principal-

agent agreement in the form of a contract (Delreux and Adriaensen 2017).

Indeed, the contract allows for the crucial concept of autonomy. Autonomy

is considered to be “the range of independent action that is available to an

agent and can be used to benefit or undermine the principal, while slack is

actual behavior that is undesired” (Hawkins et al. 2006, 8). For Bauer and Ege

(2016), autonomy regards the IGOs’ capacity to produce an autonomy of one’s

will

and an autonomy to act

. Thus, IGOs can exert their influence in future

decision-making processes when achieving higher levels of delegation,

in turn

diminishing the level of control of nation-states (Hawkins et al. 2006), or when

IGOs exercise power based on their specialization (Bauer and Ege 2016).

However, the autonomy of the IOs is not a synonym of complete independence

(Hazelzet 1998). International bureaucracies still respond to nation-states

(Principals), inserted in a context of control (Hawkins et al. 2006). This control

occurs through monitoring mechanisms, constraints associated with the content

of delegation, and the political selection of agents designed to assimilate their

preferences in consonance with the Principal’s perspective. More importantly,

the relationship between principal and agent is grounded on mutual benefits,

which means fewer costs to the Principal in order to achieve a specific outcome

and higher autonomy for the international bureaucracy to act. Analytically

speaking, this requires the observation of how nation-states’ decision-making,

dialogs, and negotiations directly influence the autonomy decision construction

of IGOs and how a bureaucracy reacts to a state’s decision-making (Haftel and

Thompson 2006).

The second strand of the agency analysis of IGOs applies a sociological

perspective, which focuses on the characteristics of bureaucratic actors and their

social ambience (Bauer and Ege 2016). Indeed, following a Weberian bureaucratic

theory, the sociological approach opens up the “international institutions’ box”

3 "Autonomy of will" concerns the capacity of international bureaucracy to establish preferences apart from

the preferences of the member states. (Bauer and Ege 2016).

4 “Autonomy of action” concerns two types of resources: institutional resources, such as statutory powers, and

enhancement of administrative resources, to set the agenda. These also persuade states to delegate more

authority and reduce their level of control (Bauer and Ege 2016; Hawkins et al. 2006).

5 "Delegation is a conditional grant of authority from a Principal to an Agent, which empowers international

bureaucracy. This grant is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the Principal. (Hawkins et

al.2006).

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

7-25

searching for conditions for bureaucratic influence and channels of power in

particular directions. Assuming IGOs are autonomous, the use of sociological

approaches shed light on the constitutive and constructive form to project actors,

interests, and social purposes in intra-organizational structures. From Barnett

and Finnemore’s (1999) perspective, IGOs respond to normative and cultural

forces that shape how the institution constructs its missions, procedures, and

concepts. In this sense, ignoring the “social” aspects of organizations requires a

sensible look into cultural, normative, and identity issues in this endeavor (Hall

and Taylor 2003). As this article demonstrates, the different power typologies

mobilize various aspects of this engendering of institutional gears and social

forces, thus resulting in a complex array of power relations and outputs.

The typologies of power

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), power “is the production, in and

through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine

their circumstances and fate (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 8)”. For them, the conceptual

construction of power has two analytical dimensions: the “kinds of social relations

through which power works, and the specificity of social relations through which

effects on actors’ capacities are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). The

kinds of power relate to “an attribute of particular actors and their interactions

or a social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is,

their social identities and capacities (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). In relational

matters, an actor-centered perspective relates to “power over” others, a common

perspective found in realist approaches. Otherwise, constitutive power relates

to “power to”, associated with the capacity to produce meaning and structures

of the domain, typically approached by reflexivist perspectives (Barnett and

Duvall 2005).

The specificity of power concerns the “degree to which the social relations

through which power works are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially

diffuse (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 9). This concept is directly related to the fact

that “specific relations concern the direct causal/constitutive connection between

actors that are in physical, historical, or social-positional proximity” (Barnett

and Duvall 2005, 11). Indirect power is mediated by indirect mechanisms (role

of institutions, whether formal or informal) or produced discourses that shape

the actor’s subjectivity (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

8-25

Table 1 summarizes the type of power and their general characteristics by

kind and type.

Table 1 — Types of power and its main characteristics

Type of power General characteristics

Compulsory power

Actor-centered and direct: refers to “relations of the interaction

of direct control by one actor over another” (Wolff 2015, 221).

Institutional power

Actor-centered and diffuse: which refers to "the control actors

exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations of

interaction” (Wolff 2015, 222).

Structural power

Constitutive and direct: “the constitution of subjects capacities

indirect structural relation to one another” (Wolff 2015, 222).

Productive power

Constitutive and diffuse: “the socially diffuse production

of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification”

(Wolff 2015, 222).

Source: Compiled from Wolff’s (2015) table and typology content.

The next section will present each type of power exercised by IGOs in

democracy protection policies, calling attention to their features, including

the remarkable analytical aspects of each and how they operate in democracy

protection policies.

Power in place: IGOs and different types of power

Coercive

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), compulsory power is the direct

capacity of actors to shape the circumstances or actions of others, intentionally

or unintentionally. Often, this is the primary type of discussion in international

relations — typically associated with great power politics, whose studies discuss

how material resources are used to impose interests in diametric opposition to

one another (Wolff 2015). Specifically regarding the coercive power of IGOs, the

literature calls attention to three key aspects: (1) The use of IGO mechanisms

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

9-25

to change behavior, (2) the convergence between Principal-Agent to apply

those mechanisms of power, and (3) what is at stake when IGOs use coercive

mechanisms.

Predominantly, compulsory power relates to the leverage model of democracy

promotion. In this model, IGOs encourage countries to behave according to a

wide range of multilaterally defined institutions. Differently from other types,

leverage is a top-down approach that focuses on leaders (political elites), and

central agencies based on the politics of conditionality (Freyburg et al. 2015).

As a bargaining process, IGOs seek to maximize their utility when the exchange

of information, threats, promises, and the imposition of sanctions and rewards

toward a specific behavior deviate from the target. Consequently, this type of

bargaining process reflects some asymmetry among the actors involved in the

process (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning 2011).

Hence, the first issue on coercive power relates to IGOs’ different types of

institutional mechanisms that interfere in different moments of democratization.

Pevehouse (2002, 2005) dedicated a significant part of his work to analyzing the

role of IGOs in the democratization process. In his work, IGOs offer three causal

mechanisms that link their actions to democratization. First, IGOs can apply

pressure (diplomatic and economic) to compel internal forces toward democratic

behavior. Second, joining IGOs (membership) can ensure the international

legitimacy of the elite in transitional contexts. Third, IGOs can produce an

arena of socialization in which elites can be persuaded to become less averse

to liberalization and democratization systems, indicating a tendency of learning

democratic practices at the domestic level.

The second aspect relates to the Principal-Agent relationship within an IGO

— how IGOs produce convergences when applying coercive mechanisms. This

means that, for IGOs to act, some cooperation/coordination among member states

(IGOs as an arena) and international bureaucracies (IGO as an actor) is necessary,

whether by member-state preferences or through bureaucracy actions by delegation

(Hawkins et al. 2006). According to Hawkins (2008), the sanctioning of practices

is not easy to achieve, since member states are resistant to intervention and all

political costs due to uncertain results. As demonstrated in Table 2, different

sorts of analytical features come from the type of PA relation, for example: a) the

range of mechanisms allowed, b) the role of bureaucracy, c) the time for action,

d) the contents of democratic issues (democratic backsliding/coup d ‘état), and

e) different types of democracy protection policies and delegation.

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

10-25

Table 2 — The analytical issues for coercive mechanisms

Issues Features

What is the range of

mechanisms allowed

to use?

In this matter, the democratic protection policy demonstrates

what is at the hands of international bureaucracy to do (Hawkins

et al. 2006). It involves either material or immaterial tools for

compliance (Hawkins 2008).

What is the role of

bureaucracy?

In this matter, the delegation process sets the institutional

maneuvers for bureaucratic agents. Some bureaucracies possess

specialized tools, actions, and performances in democracy

protection policies. This includes the role of the Secretary-General

(SG), and specialized offices in different themes and at different

levels (Chesterman 2007; Hawkins et al. 2006).

What is the time for

action?

In this matter, the delegation process demonstrates when IGOs

would act in cases of democracy protection. For instance, in

transitions to democracy: after or before the transitional pact. In

democratic backsliding: after (curative) or before (preventive)

the coup d'état (Pevehouse 2005). The variance of possibilities

allows different strategies by international bureaucracies in terms

of action.

What is the content

of the democratic

issue?

Although productive powers also discuss this type of normative

aspect, in coercive elements, it relates to the legal actions toward

democratic issues inside the target state (Hawkins et al. 2006).

This settles a legalistic position about when coercion and what

types of mechanisms would be allowed.

What is the target of

coercion?

IGOs have two types of targets: third countries that do not belong

to the organization or member-states. For both types there are

different costs and rewards of action. The process of delegation

enlightens how to act in both cases, how to sustain different

types of asymmetries, and how to deal in bargaining processes

(Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004).

Source: Author’s compilation

The third issue relates to what is at stake in leverage policies concerning

coercion practices. In this sense, coercive power contemplates what mechanisms

are at the hands of IGOs and how effective they can be. Indeed, effective coercive

policies depend on the relative bargaining power between IGOs and the target

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

11-25

state. Thus, power asymmetry can tell more about how the targets can be a

subject of conditionality (Buscaneanu 2016). For Buscaneanu (2016), its efficiency

is mainly contingent on “domestic veto points, cost of adaptation, and the size

and credibility of rewards or sanctions normative agents can use” (Buscaneanu

2016, 30). In terms of causality, the more significant the size and credibility of

conditionality, the higher the chance that this coercive policy will affect the

cost-benefit curve of the target country.

This credibility also differs regarding the target country. For example, if

the target country is a member-state, the targeting relates to compliance issues

between this national state and the organization (Haas 1998). Otherwise, if the

target is the third country, it is treated as a matter of foreign policy (Smith 2002).

For each type of target country, belonging or not to the IGOs, some mechanisms

can be used, with a different range, different P-A coordination, and consequently,

a different outcome (Schimmelfenning 2007). According to Poppe, Leiniger, and

Wolff (2019) and Grimm (2019), the mechanism choice also relates to the “opening

box” of bargaining negotiation between IGOs and target countries. This opening

box relates to how the content and parameters of negotiation agenda, as well

as what conditions of this negotiation, might result in a gradual adaptation of

the promoter’s plan within the context of recipient countries. The protection of

democracy is rarely the only theme on the agenda, but it is overlapped with the

economic development agenda, assuming an issue-linkage form of bargaining

(Poppe, Leiniger and Wolff 2019).

Productive

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), productive power refers to “the

constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of

knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope (Barnett and

Duvall 2005, 20). In this sense, as a constructivist analytical approach, productive

power produces systems of meaning resulting from discourse construction that

produces, fixes, and transforms the processes and systems of knowledge. In

these discourses, the relation of power can be found in the practices of the

quotidian, the social fields of actions, and, mainly, the production of social

identities and capacities according to the socially constructed meaning (Barnett

and Duvall 2005; Guzzini 2000). Consequently, productive power is a matter

of subjectivity, as it concerns the social sharing of identity among actors in a

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

12-25

co-constituted relationship that produces subjects, meanings, terms of actions,

and all boundaries of social life (Guzzini 2000).

In matters of democracy protection policies, the perspective appears as a

normative construction, since it is a social reason provided by collectively shared

values and norms (Schimmelfenning 2003). In this sense, the analysis regards the

production of power in the normative prescriptions and a social/political modus

operandi in terms of decision-making and behavior for a constructed concept

of democracy (Schimmelfenning 2003). Hence, three main aspects stand out

regarding productive power in IGOs: (1) What is the social purpose of an IGO in

democracy protection? (2) What is the phenomenon of an IGO as protectors of

set norms (diffusers)? (3) What are the values and concepts protected in these

policies?

IGOs are producers of power because they generate norms and social meanings.

Thus, IGOs are norm promoters. They “spread norms through establishing

regimes, forming international agendas, constructing discourse, enforcing rules,

and mediating between states” (Park 2005,113), and make use of institutional

prerogatives as gatekeepers to select transnational actors in the global governance

structure (Tallberg 2010). According to Agné (2014), for instance, when IGOs

choose a particular concept of democracy, they formulate a given meaning of

democracy, that which differentiates from another perspective of democracy

(even those which contradict the selected idea), and, normatively, they determine

what particular kind of domestic institutional procedure should be protected.

Consequently, the selection of concepts is a matter of power.

As norm promoters, a crucial subject of study connects to the meaning of

the multilaterally constructed democratic concept. As Agné (2014) problematised,

democratic ideals come with several debates inside of IGOs, whether by conflicts

or convergences, regarding what concept of democracy should be protected

on an institutional basis. For Whitehead (2015), this political agenda follows a

particular discourse, an ambitious and intended universal claim, mobilizing both

institutional and ideational reinforcement. In his argument, the conceptualization

of democracy involved a strong ideology,

which influenced the public policy

agenda for years, but now faces resistance from “democracy prevention” or

“anti-democracy promotion”. According to Wetzel, Orbie and Bossuyt (2015), the

6 A strong ideology has four features: “(1) tight fusion of fact and value; (2) selective reinterpretation of the

past; (3) marginalization and suppression of alternative viewpoints; and (4) airbrushing inconsistencies to

hold together multiple constituencies” (Whitehead 2015, 14).

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

13-25

substance of this ideology generally followed a “Western model”

of democracy

or promoting polyarchy (Whitehead 2015), and, paradoxically, some skepticism

about the sustainability of this model is always debatable.

Recent literature sharply opposes the argument of the EU’s coherent concept

of democracy. According to Kurki (2015), the organizational complexity of the EU

does not lead to a “consistent and coherent” approach on democratic matters,

although, discursively, the EU extols these democratic qualities. Instead, the

EU’s form of democracy promotion works with a broad but vague definition

of democracy, mobilizing values, such as — liberty, equality, solidarity — but

without a systematic model of democracy promotion.

First, the complexity of the EU denies the possibility of a singular and definitive

idea of democracy. The historical pluralism in the EU, with different experiences

and institutions, guides the process of conceptual vagueness (Kurki 2015). Second,

in her findings, the EU promotes democracy in terms of a “depoliticized” manner,

a “technocratic, rules-export, governance focus” (Young and Pischchikova in

Wetzel 2015, 3) or strategies that display “a technocratic orientation and are

instrumental to deepening market-based reform in aid receiving countries” (Hout

in Wetzel 2015, 3). Third, the common ground of democracy in the EU follows

a more liberal model, but not a pure liberal model, as it is also connected to

economic conditions in favor of successful democratization (Kurki 2015).

The result is the promotion of a fuzzy liberal democracy within the EU context.

This fuzziness is not accidental or coincidental; instead, it favors a political-

economic model to export democracy. First, it serves to create an economic

restructuring of states; in other words, a robust normative approach of what

to do with political institutions in conjunction with economic policies. Second,

a broad and fuzzy agenda allows contradictions in agenda-setting policies.

It is particularly interesting for international bureaucracies for two reasons:

a more significant maneuver margin for action and a discourse of “depoliticizing”

democratic argument by technocratic discourse.

In this sense, this unique, fuzzy

liberalism works well when normative ideals are apparently put in second place

when faced with pragmatic interested-oriented cooperation, and when it puts

closure upon an ideological dispute taken up by target states confronting an

unclear ideological position regarding the concept of democracy (Kurki 2015).

7 From Kurki's (2011) perspective, technocratic discourses are "conceptual frameworks that seek to 'depoliticize,

'harmonize,' 'rationalize' and 'objectify' the democracy promotion policy agenda and knowledge-making and

management within it" (Kurki 2011, 212).

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

14-25

Thus, some consequences appear when contemplating the construction of

the concept of democracy. First, although the normative basis on the discourse

does exist, there is a tendency to avoid value-based rhetoric, giving space to

interest-based and instrumental arguments. The discourse of rationality and

coherence of policy-making overlaps the provision of normative justifications

in the process of formulating a democracy promotion policy. Second, coherent

reasoning can be given to the process in association with an incoherent

concept of democracy, which gives rise to a technocratic discourse. The result

is the presence of normative and political issues that are in fact denied by the

procedure. Third, the rational coherent discourse assumes any contesting and

debating of democracy’s meaning as hazardous (Kurki 2015). It means that

when discussions regarding “which democracy” or “whose democracy” appear,

they are instantly treated as dangerous or skeptically implemented. Fourth,

productive power favors some actors over others, especially when some biases

in the discourse occur; some liberal organization, types of NGOs, technical

personnel and offices, and some member states as leaders are preferred over others

(Kurki 2015).

Finally, the political dynamic does not favor new discussions regarding the

concept of democracy, considering that the focus on the concept of democracy is a

minimalist version at best. As demonstrated, ideals of “democracy” are crucial to

democracy protection policies. In Kurki’s view, the definition of liberal democracy

does not capture all aspects of the political process, and alternative models —

such as social democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and

radical democracy — must be discussed in parallel with the embedded democracy

assumption. Thus, “there are important reasons — theoretical, normative,

political, and practical — to take the essential contestability of the idea of

democracy in democracy promotion, for both scholars and practitioners, seriously”

(Kurki 2010, 376).

Structural

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), structural power consists of the

co-constitutive structure, which defines what social actors are. It denotes that

structural power exists because of an internal relation between a structural

position A in relationship with a structural position B. Thus, the consequences

of the co-constitutive connection between A and B shapes the actors not only by

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

15-25

the structural inequalities in capacity allocation, but also because of the different

meanings in a subjective interaction between those actors.

Specifically, for democracy protection policies implemented by IGOs, structural

power appears in linkages and governance policies (Freyburg et al. 2015). In

both cases, those policies export structural prerequisites and forms of behavior

production with a concept of democracy: a prescription of actor’s behavior and

institutional aspects to be implemented in a target country. More traditionally,

one of the first structural powers by IGOs was the linkage model of democracy

promotion. The linkage model associates democratization through some structural

prerequisites (Lipset 1959), whether by socioeconomic development or transnational

exchange (Freyburg et al. 2015). Thus, this perspective of democracy promotion

produces some substantive consequences in IGO actions.

First, linkage policies prepare the political scenario for a democratic culture

in a society. This democratic culture comes from several strategies of action:

economic aid (credits, assistances, and investments), intergovernmental negotiation

(bilateral and multilateral), promotion of societal interaction, actions of international

technocracy, communication and networks (Western media penetration, internet

connection, for example), adoption of development policies, educational policies,

strengthening of civil society associations, and the organization of the public

sphere (Freyburg et al. 2015; Sasse 2013).

Second, instead of focusing on specific preferences of governmental or

nongovernmental actors, linkage policies aim to transform long-term calculations

by changing socioeconomic structures, associating high levels of economic

development with the quality of democratization. Third, the focus remains on

bottom-up factors of democratization and not top-down, as seen in political

conditionality by means of leverage. Indeed, linkage strategies assume that

changing socioeconomic structures also change the dispersion of power in society.

Following an indirect strategy, linkage promotion seeks a profound economic

transformation, a long-term horizon of change, but with substantive analytical

implications due to the difficult access of empirical verification (Lavenex 2013).

Linkage strategies assume some necessary conditionality for successful

policies. First, some autonomy by the civil society in the third country enhances

transnational openness. In Freyburg et al. (2015), “Linkage efforts will not reach

civil society if a country is isolated from the outside world. Moreover, civil

society has no freedom to maneuver” (Freyburg et al., 2015, 17). Thus, less

accessibility on the part of the third country means less effectiveness in linkage

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

16-25

strategies. For Sasse (2013), successful linkage policies require the expertise of

some domestic actors in order to select, pragmatically, some of these policies.

Generally, third countries with different degrees of ‘stateness’

can produce different

outcomes, since they have different levels of domestic political competition. In

the author’s argument, international linkages can strengthen and weaken this

domestic competition, encouraging or suppressing regime openings because of

the role of these actors in an asymmetric structure.

The democratic governance model follows some similarities and differences

from the traditional strategy of linkage. Much like linkage strategies, the governance

model strengthens domestic forces in society but focuses on sectoral cooperation

arrangements in public administration (Lavenex, 2013). The structural power in

the governance model resides in the capacity to (1) introduce reforms on public

administration through policy transfer to change the practices in the conduction

of public policy. This means that, differently from linkage policies, the governance

model focuses on legal administrative grounds; (2) cooperation relates to legislation

transference, or, beyond policy transformation, governance model transfers

polity structures associated with democracy standards; (3) much like linkage

policies, the effectiveness assumes some openness and autonomy of domestic

administration, that is, “a certain degree of decentralization of administrative

structures, empowerment of administrative officials, and openness toward contacts

and cooperation with the administrations of international organizations and

other countries” (Lavenex, 2013,143-144).

Institutional power

According to Barnett and Duvall (2005), institutional power is the capacity of

the actor’s control of others in indirect ways. This is indirect because actor A uses

formal and informal institutions to guide, constrain, and propose conditions and

actions of others. Another crucial aspect of institutional power is that, spatially,

this type affects others’ behavior only through institutional arrangements, and

temporally, “institutions established at one point in time can have ongoing and

unintended effects at a later point” (Barnett and Duvall 2005,16).

It is interesting to note that the IGOs’ institutional power reflects the use

of organizations by other organizations. In this particular context, IGOs use

8 According to Sasse (2013), ‘stateness’ is defined as “tensions arising from the incongruence between the state

and the nation (ops cit, 2013, 554).

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

17-25

transnational actors (TNAs) or transgovernmental actors (TGAs) to promote

democratic policies. First, IGOs have the power to select, encourage, and limit

some aspects of institutional and informational access and budgetary issues.

Second, by its constitutions, transnational/transgovernmental organizations

have independence in action, which leads to cooperative delegations (Tallberg

2010). Thus, the institutional power of IGOs in democracy protection involves,

first, the authority in selecting TNAs/TGAs; second, power in IGO-TNA/TGA

interaction; third, the use of TNA/TGAs in democracy protection (Tallberg 2010).

TNAs are “both non-profit actors, such as NGOs, advocacy networks, social

movements, party associations, philanthropic foundations, and labor unions

(sometimes referred to as civil society actors), and profit-oriented actors, such

as multinational corporations and business associations” (Tallberg and Jonsson

2010, 4). In a context of an accusation of “democratic deficit” against IGOs,

TNAs have taken on the role as a supplement for the improvement of democratic

decision-making procedures and a new means through which to achieve adequate

problem-solving capacity in policy formation (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010). On

that account, TNAs have witnessed gradual participation in new modes of

governance, especially in those involving public and private actors (Tallberg and

Jonsson 2010). Over time, TNAs have taken part in a different moment of the

policy cycle, mobilized between representation for collaboration and access to

those policies, considered to be “policy experts, service providers, and compliance

watchdogs” (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010, 45).

According to Tallberg (2010), some reasons allow the access of TNAs within

IGOs. The first is the functional efficiency of TNAs. The selection of TNAs occurs

because of their technical capacity to achieve precise results in matters that IGOs

are unable to resolve. This process of delegation can vary according to the needs

of international organizations. The second reason is democratic legitimacy. As

discussed before, IGOs were heavily pressured at the beginning of the 1990s

due to several accusations regarding democratic deficits in their decision-making

procedures. In this sense, TNAs do not only act in favor of democracy promotion

as a system of government, but also as improvers of democratic legitimacy

within the IGOs, since global civil society can access procedures, decisions, and

consultations (Tallberg 2010). Finally, the greatest importance of institutional

power: IGOs and states can exploit TNAs to gain leverage inside IGOs, as both

an actor and an arena, respectively. Differently from IGOs, States use TNAs to

gain additional advantage within IGOs, supporting actors according to their

political positions (Tallberg 2010).

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

18-25

IGOs, on the other hand, can use TNAs in two ways. First, IGOs aims to

improve their policies’ efficiency, thus maneuvering different actors according

to their like-minded practices. IGOs control the presence of TNAS in a policy

cycle, focusing on programmatic activities in the field, as service providers or

enforcement mechanisms of IGOs in some issue-areas, but not in decision-making

stages (or agenda-setting phases) (Tallberg 2010). According to Tallberg (2010),

these interactions between stages would achieve an optimal result from both

actors, as IGOs would propose an issue in the agenda-setting stage and TNAs

could participate through independent maneuvers and the implementation of

these issues.

Second, IGOs can control access to these TNAs in the organization. IGOs

can discriminate TNAs ex-ante, according to their mechanisms of selection. It is

a powerful institutional mechanism, because TNAs, to obtain access, must adapt

to perspectives and procedures of the contractor IGOs (Tallberg 2010). According

to Mahoney and Beckstrand (2011), in the case of the EU, the Commission has

funded pro-EU TNAs in matters of democracy, cultural exchange, educational

projects, and integrative policies. grounding the argument that the institutional

power appeared in the selection and funding of TNAs. This level of asymmetry

interferes directly in which process of the policy cycle TNAs will work and what

type of TNAs will be allowed: who and when. According to Tallberg (2010), the

dynamics of power would result in three concerns: “support for like-minded

actors, opposition to antagonistic actors, and reinforcement of existing power

structures” (Tallberg 2010, 57).

According to Johnson (2016), because of the differences in displays of

power, the interaction between IGOs and transnational actors can achieve four

possibilities: cooperation, co-optation, competition, and conflict. In the authors’

point of view, two causes lead the IGO-TNA interaction to these different paths:

(1) a shared array of values concerning cross-national layering and (2) distinct

resource bases. In the absence of one or two of these factors, co-optation,

competition, or conflict occur.

The IGO-TNA interaction contributes to other power relations. First, although

asymmetric, NGOs are not always adversaries, but rather tamed partners. In

this relation, ideational and material factors appear in a supply and demand

relationship. On one hand, the ideational factor is a dialog between what fits

in an IGO’s international bureaucracy intentions and what TNAs offer to it. On

the other hand, a material factor relates to physical factors. TNAs search for

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

19-25

resources, which the IGOs have. It is through this combination of supply and

demand that a relationship of interdependence arise, but in an asymmetric form.

The asymmetry mainly appears in an IGO’s power as a gatekeeper agenda-setter

in policy-making circles, and TNAs as service providers in policy implementation

(Johsson 2016).

TGAs are “sub-units of governments”. A transgovernmental (TG) cooperation

relates “to a cross-border peer-to-peer partnership between public institutions

in specific policy sectors in pursuit of policy coordination, coalition building,

and other functional goals” (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017, 1). The use of

TGAs by IGOs is generally associated with the governance model of democracy

promotion. In fact, they use TGAs to change public administration rules and

frameworks towards “good governance” policies (Panchuk, Bossuyt and

Orbie 2017).

The type of institutional power in cases of TGAs relates to the “sectoral

conditionality”, in which the IGOs can possess greater bargaining power over

some countries, including some democratic governance norms and policies in

their particular governmental sectors (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017). In this

sense, the IGO´s control relates to the selection and capacity provision of TG

cooperation works as a democratic governance promoter. Another aspect is the

sector politicization, or the susceptibility of the sector of conflict of interest or

corruption, which has some influence on the quality of democracy promotion.

In this sense, TG cooperation relates to the IGO’s sectoral conditionality in

the particular policy sector (Panchuk, Bossuyt and Orbie 2017). Differently of

NGOs, TG cooperation gives more importance to domestic factors in matters

of organizational capacity, the politicization of internal bureaucracy, and the

leverages of the IGOs in the incentives to produce democratic norms. Empirically,

as demonstrated by Panchuk Panchuk, Bossuyt, and Orbie (2017), the use of

TGAs varies according to “political liberalization, sector politicization, sector

technical complexity, and EU sectoral conditionality” (Panchuk, Bossuyt and

Orbie 2017, 5).

Therefore, as a means to summarize this information, Table 3 presents the

dimensions mobilized in this article: a) the types of power; b) the application to

the state-centric promotion; c) the IGOs discussed in this article; d) the models

of democracy promotion associated with their types.

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

20-25

Table 3 — Typologies of power in a comparative perspective: State-centric vs IGOs

Type of

power

Application to state-centric

promotion

Intergovernmental

Organizations

Model of

democracy

promotion

Compulsory

power

“Concerns the capacity of

democracy promoters to directly

shape the behavior of (actors in)

recipient countries”

(Wolff 2015, 222)

Concerns the capacity

of the direct use of

institutional mechanisms

(both rewards or

punishments) in

different moments of

democratization. These

institutional mechanisms

serve as political

conditionality based on

compliance responses and

in an asymmetric relation

between IGOs and target

countries.

Leverage

Institutional

power

“Concerns the capacity to

indirectly influence recipient

behavior through a democracy

promoter’s impact on

international institutions and

nongovernmental organizations”

(Wolff 2015, 222)

Concerns the indirect

use of TNA/TGAs

organizations to protect

democracies.

Governance

Structural

power

“Concerns the capacity to

directly shape the structure of

relations between democracy

promoter and recipient, as well

as the structural conditions

in recipient countries through

interaction with (actors in)

recipient countries”

(Wolff 2015, 222)

Concerns the capacity

to project structures of

governance (technocratic

organizations) and

long-term policy

changes (economic and

political) to enhance

democratization

scenarios.

Linkage/

Governance

Productive

power

“Concerns the capacity to

indirectly shape the structure

of bilateral relations and the

structural conditions in recipient

countries through effects on

general systems of knowledge

and discursive practices”

(Wolff, 2015, 222).

Concerns the constitutive

capacity of bureaucracies

to a) construct a

normative concept,

meaning, and identity

of democracy b) project

this concept as promoter/

protector of set norms

Governance

and Linkage

Source: Authors’ compilation in dialog with Wolff (2015) and Freyburg et al. (2015).

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

21-25

Conclusion

As discussed in this article, the international promotion of democracy is a

matter of power. In this regard, the current literature paid little attention to the

multifaceted feature of this power, especially as regards the role of the nation-

state (Wolff 2015). Specifically, this article called attention to the literature gap

concerning the role of IGOs in this multifaceted power found in the promotion of

democracy. Some crucial insights have also arisen for further analysis. First, the

analytical decision for the role of IGOs called for understanding the differences

between these organizations and nation-states.

Indeed, as demonstrated, this differentiation is not trivial. First, the use

of power in democracy protection requires the understanding of international

bureaucracies. As sources of IGOs’ actorness, international bureaucracies seem

to be the core of instrumental, substantive, and normative action of IGOs in

world politics. Second, in association with the role of bureaucracies (actors), the

analysis of the interaction with the arena of negotiation (nation-states) can be

loose. In other words, although the international bureaucracies can trace some

independence, nation-states still have a place in the democracy protection policies

in IGOs. Third, the understanding of power by IGOs in democracy protection need

to answer three essential questions: a) What is the substance (normative) of the

concept of democracy protection?; b) What type of institutions are protected,

expanded, promoted?; c) What institutional mechanisms and organizations are

used for this end? Indeed, the theoretical-conceptual debate of IGOs in democracy

protection open a range of analysis, not only to understand the types of power

in place, but also how they interact toward democracy expansion. This opens

an interdisciplinary approach and an empirical mobilization that is not trivial,

but rather requires attentive eyes of those who delve into it.

References

Abbott, Kenneth W.; Snidal, Duncan. 1998. “Why States Act Through Formal International

Organizations.” The Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 42, no. 2, 3-32. https://doi.org/

10.1177/0022002798042001001

Agné, Hans. 2014. Is successful democracy promotion possible? The conceptual problem.

Democratisation, 21, no. 1, 49-71. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.709240

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

22-25

Arceneaux, Craig; Pion-Berlin, David. 2007. Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining

OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America. Latin American Politics

and Society 49, issue 2, 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2007.tb00405.x

Archer, Clive. 2001. International Organization. Routledge London; New York. 3

ed.

Barnett, Michael N; Finnemore, Martha. 1999. The politics, power, and Pathologies of

International Organizations. International Organization 53, no. 4, 695-732.

Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond. 2005. Power in Global Governance. Cambridge

University Press.

Bauer, Michael; Ege, Jörn. 2016. Bureaucratic autonomy of international organisations’

secretariats. Journal of European Public Policy 23, Issue 7, 1019–37. https://doi.org/

10.1080/13501763.2016.1162833.

Brattberg, E; Rhinard, M. 2013. Actorness and effectiveness in international disaster relief:

The European Union and United States in comparative perspective. International

Relations 27, no. 3, 356–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117813497298.

Buscaneanu, Sergiu. 2016. Regime Dynamics in EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood EU Democracy

Promotion, International Inﬂuences, and Domestic Contexts. Palgrave Macmillan US.

Chesterman, Simon. 2007. Secretary or General? The UN secretary-general in world

politics. Cambridge University Press.

Delreux, Tom; Adriaesen, Johan. 2017. Use and Limitations of the PrincipalAgent: Model

in Studying the European Union. In The Use and Limitations of the Principal-Agent

(ed. Delreux, Tom; Adriaensen, Johan), 1-34. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Freyburg, Tina, Lavenex, Sandra, Schimmelfenning, Frank, Skripka, Tatiana & Wetzel,

Anne. 2015. Democracy promotion by functional cooperation: the European Union

and its neighbourhood. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Grimm, Sonja. 2019. Democracy promotion in EU enlargement negotiations: more

interaction, less hierarchy, democratization 26, Issue 5, 851-868. https://doi.org/10.

1080/13510347.2019.1590701

Guzzini, S. 2000. A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. European

Journal of International Relations 6, n. 2, 147–182. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354

066100006002001.

Haas, Peter M. 1998. Compliance with EU directives: insights from international

relations and comparative politics, Journal of European Public Policy 5: no. 1: 17-37.

https://doi/abs/10.1080/13501768880000021

Haftel, Yoram Z; Thompson, Alexander. 2006. The independence of International

Organisations. Journal of conﬂict resolution 50, no. 2, 253-275. https://doi.org/

10.1177/0022002705285288.

Hall, Peter A; Taylor, Rosemary C.R. 2003. As três versões do neo-institucionalismo.Lua

Nova[online] n. 58, 193-223. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-64452003000100010.

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

23-25

Halmai, Gábor. 2018, The Possibility and Desirability of Economic Sanction: Rule of Law

Conditionality Requirements Against Illiberal EU Member States. EUI Department

of Law Research Paper. no. 06, 1-29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126231.

Hawkins, Darren. 2008. Protecting democracy in Europe and the Americas. International

Organization 62, No. 3: 373-403. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080193

Hawkins, Darren, Lake, David A, Nielson, Daniel L & Tierney, Michael. J. 2006. Delegation

and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge University Press.

Hazelzet, Hadewych. 1998. The decision-making approach to international organizations:

Cox and Jacobson´s anatomic lesson revisited. In Autonomous policy making by

International Organizations. (ed. Reinalda, Bob; Verbeek, Bertjan), 27-40. Routledge.

Heine, Jorge; Weiffen, Brigitte. 2015. 21st Century democracy promotion in the Americas:

standing up for the polity. Routledge. 1

Edition.

Johnson, Tana. 2016. Cooperation, co-optation, competition, conﬂict: international

bureaucracies and nongovernmental organisations in an interdependent world,

Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 5, 737-767. https://doi.org/10.

1080/09692290.2016.1217902

Keohane, Robert O. 2002. Introduction: from interdependence and institutions to

globalisation and governance. In Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised

World, (ed. Keohane, Robert.O), 1-24. Routledge.

Koremenos, Barbara; Lipson, Charles; Snidal, Duncan. 2001. The Rational Design of

International Institutions. International Organization 5, n. 44, 761-799. https://doi.org/

10.1162/002081801317193592

Kurki, Milja. 2010. Democracy and conceptual contestability: reconsidering conceptions of

democracy in democracy promotion. International Studies Review 12, No. 3, 362-386.

DOI: 10.HH/j.1468-2486.2010.00943.x

Kurki, Milja. 2011. Democracy through Technocracy? Reﬂections on Technocratic

Assumptions in EU Democracy Promotion Discourse, Journal of Intervention and

Statebuilding 5, n. 2, 211-234. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.566482

Kurki, Milja. 2015. Political economy perspective: fuzzy liberalism and EU democracy

promotion: Why Concepts Matter. In The substance of EU democracy promotion:

concepts and cases (ed. Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie), 35-46. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Lavenex, Sandra. 2013. Globalisation and the horizontal promotion of democracy. In

Democracy in the age of globalisation and mediatisation, (ed. Kkriesi, Hanspeter;

Lavenex, Sandra, Esser, Frank, Matthes, Jörg, Bühlmann, Marc; Bochsler, Daniel),

105-134. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lavenex, Sandra; Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2011. EU democracy promotion in the

neighbourhood: from leverage to governance? Democratisation 18, n. 4, 885-909.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.584730

Intergovernmental organisations and the protection of democracy: a multifaceted power in world politics

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

24-25

Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan A. 2006. Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the

international dimension of Regime change. Comparative Politics 38, no. 4, 379-400.

https://doi.org/10.2307/20434008

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic

Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53,

n. 1, 69-105. https://doi.org/10.2307/1951731

Mahoney, Cristine; Beckstrand, Michael J. 2011. Following the money: European

Union funding of civil society organisations. JCMS 49. Number 6, 1339–1361.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02197.x

Mccoy, Jennifer L.2012. Challenges for the Collective Defense of Democracy on the

Tenth Anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Latin American

Policy 3, no. 1, 33–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2012.00055.x

Panchuk, Dmytro; Bossuyt, Fabienne; Orbie, Jan. 2017. The substance of EU democratic

governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation with the Eastern

neighbourhood, Democratisation. 24, n. 6, 1044-1065. DOI: https://www.tandfonline.

com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2016.1271785

Park, Susan. 2005. Norm diffusion within international organisations: a case study of

the World Bank. Journal of International Relations and Development, 8, 111–141.

https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800051

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organization

and Democratization.International Organisation 56, n. 3, 515-549. https://doi.

org/10.1162/002081802760199872

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. Democracy from Above. Cambridge University Press.

Poppe, Elena Annika; Leiniger, Julia; Wolff, Jonas. 2019. Introduction: negotiating the

promotion of democracy, Democratisation 26, n. 5, 759-776. https://doi.org/10.1080/

13510347.2019.1593379

Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2013. Linkages and the promotion of democracy: the EU’s eastern

neighbourhood, Democratisation, 20:4, 553-591. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351034

7.2012.659014

Schimmelfenning, Frank. 2007. European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality,

and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and

Societies 21, No. 1, 126–141. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325406297131

Schimmelfenning, Frank. 2003. Strategic action in a community environment. Comparative

political studies. 36, n. 1-2, 156-183. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414002239375

Schimmelfenning, Frank; Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2004. Governance by conditionality EU rule

transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.Journal of European

Public Policy 11, v. 4, 661-679. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000248089

João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 16, n. 2, e1114, 2021

25-25

Shaw, Carolyn M. 2004. Cooperation, Conﬂict, and Consensus in the Organization of

American States. Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, Hazel. 2002. European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it does. Pluto

Press.

Tallberg, Jonas. 2010. Transnational access to international institutions: Three approaches.

In Transnational Actors in Global governance: patterns, explanations and implications

(ed. Jönsson, Christer; Tallberg, Jonas), 45-66. Palgrave Macmillan.

Tallberg, Jonas; Jönsson, Christer. 2010. Transnational actors participation in international

institutions: where, why, and with what consequences? In Transnational Actors in

Global governance: patterns, explanations and implications (ed. Jönsson, Christer;

Tallberg, Jonas), 1-21. Palgrave Macmillan.

Vachudova, Milada Anna. 2005. Europe Undivided: democracy, leverage, and integration

after communism. Oxford University Press.

Wetzel, Anne; Orbie, Jan; Bossuyt, Fabienne. 2015. One of what kind? Comparative

perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion. Cambridge Review of

International Affairs 28, v. 1: 21-34. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1019726

Wetzel, Anne. 2015. The substance of EU democracy promotion: introduction and

conceptual framework.In: The substance of EU democracy promotion: concepts

and cases, edited by Anne Wetzel & Jan Orbie, 1-23.Palgrave Macmillan.

Whitehead, Laurence. 2015. International democracy promotion as a political ideology:

upsurge and retreat, Journal of Political Ideologies 20, v. 1: 10-26. https://doi.org/

10.1080/13569317.2015.991510

Wolff, Jonas. 2015. Power in democracy promotion. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 40,

v. 3-4: 219-236. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375415612269