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52 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative,

not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the

Indo-Pacific Region

O Quad: Mais uma Iniciativa “Minilateral”,

não uma Aliança Militar Embrionária na

Região do Indo-Pacífico

DOI: 10.21530/ci.v15n2.2020.1014

João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

Abstract

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, abbreviated to Quad, comprises Australia, the United

States, Japan, and India. Although many think tanks and media outlets have written

about recommendations to further this initiative, this essay believes the Quad is only

evidence of a rising patchwork of small strategical dialogues within the Indo-Pacific region.

The aims here are twofold: (a) to demonstrate the definitions and relevance of the Quad

amid the soaring rivalry in the Indo-Pacific; and (b) to grasp this initiative as a “minilateral”

grouping, which is settled in a more informal structure than multilateral institutions. In

assessing these hypotheses, this research employs a qualitative content analysis of official

statements and documents about the Quad meeting and national policies toward the

1 Doutorando do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

(UFMG) e Mestre em Relações Internacionais pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais

“San Tiago Dantas” (UNESP-UNICAMP-PUC-SP). Currículo Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/9356537757576148;

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4239-3522; email: joao_paulo_apd@hotmail.com

2 Mestrando do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade de São Paulo (USP) e

Bacharel em Relações Internacionais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP).

Currículo Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/5530298390803108; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5882-9327;

email: henoch@usp.br

3 Doutor em Economia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Professor da Pontifícia Universidade

Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), Departamento de Economia e Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações

Internacionais “San Tiago Dantas” (UNESP-UNICAMP-PUC-SP). Currículo Lattes: http://lattes.cnpq.br/

4531178739960001; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2962-9422; email: cecarv@uol.com.br

Artigo submetido em 06/10/2019 e aprovado em 05/05/2020.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

53João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

Indo-Pacific. A systematic bibliographical review was applied to refine theoretical frameworks

and to triangulate sources. In conclusion, this paper infers the Quad is not as ambitious and

strong as previous literature claimed. These four members developed divergent interests in

the Indo-Pacific; thereby, an alliance against China seems unlikely.

Keywords: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; Minilateralism; Indo-Pacific.

Resumo

O Diálogo Quadrilateral de Segurança, abreviado para Quad, é composto pela Austrália,

Estados Unidos, Japão e Índia. Embora muitos think tanks e meios de comunicação tenham

promovido recomendações para essa iniciativa, este artigo acredita que o Quad é apenas

uma evidência de uma crescente rede de pequenos diálogos estratégicos na região Indo-

Pacífico. Os objetivos aqui são duplos: (a) demonstrar as definições e a relevância do Quad

em meio à crescente rivalidade no Indo-Pacífico; e (b) compreender essa iniciativa como um

agrupamento “minilateral”, estabelecido em uma estrutura mais informal que propriamente

instituições multilaterais. Ao avaliar essas hipóteses, esta pesquisa emprega uma análise

qualitativa de conteúdo de declarações e documentos oficiais sobre a reunião da Quad e

políticas nacionais para o Indo-Pacífico. Uma revisão bibliográfica sistemática foi aplicada

para refinar referenciais teóricos e para triangular fontes. Em conclusão, este artigo infere

que o Quad não é tão ambicioso e forte quanto a literatura anterior alegou. Esses quatro

membros desenvolveram interesses divergentes no Indo-Pacífico; assim, uma aliança contra

a China parece improvável.

Palavras-chave: Diálogo Quadrilateral de Segurança; Minilateralismo; Indo-Pacífico.

Introduction

This essay aims to understand the relevance of the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue, abbreviated to Quad, to the current power shifts in the Indo-Pacific

region. The Quad is an initiative comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the

United States. It was revived in November 2017 when officials of these four

countries met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila (Miller 2018). Its

first configuration occurred in 2007 and lasted until 2008. Many pundits, think

tanks, and journalists referred to this initiative as a historical movement towards

an embryonic democratic alliance to challenge China’s growing regional influence.

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54 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

Such a hypothesis for this scenario is based upon two explaining variables:

(1) the soaring rivalry between China and the United States within the Indo-Pacific

region, and (2) the improvement of diplomatic ties among these four democracies.

The quad hence would be an initiative aimed at the coordination of policies in

the Indo-Pacific region, which is becoming the world’s economic and strategic

center of gravity (Cha 2014; Jaishankar 2017).

This paper aims to demonstrate a different hypothesis to assess the relevance of

the Quad within the Indo-Pacific region disputes. The main topics to be addressed

during this essay are: (a) to show that Quad is not a ‘military alliance’ and its

real configurations are less impressive than what some experts and media outlets

propose; (b) to describe the convergences and divergences of the four members

of Quad in their conceptions of Indo-Pacific region and in their policies to deal

with Beijing; finally, (c) to analyze Quad as part of this ‘minilateralist’ network

of groupings and initiatives that historically exists as a diplomatic interaction

within this context; in other words, mechanisms established by small groups of

countries which converge in certain issues and are usually settled in more informal

structures than multilateral institutions (Jaishankar 2018; Wuthnow 2019).

In assessing these hypotheses, this research employs qualitative methods

to collect evidence. Two instruments are applied: (a) a content analysis to find

observable implication inside primary sources; and a (b) systematic literature

review to refine our theoretical framework and hypotheses. Such descriptive

inferences serve to demonstrate how this work fills a gap in the literature.

This action depicted the geopolitical context to be tackled throughout the

paper. Inferences produced by content analysis were triangulated to secondary

sources. The theoretical framework was developed during the systematic review

of literature about the geopolitical disputes within the Indo-Pacific. On Chinese

influence in the Indo-Pacific, secondary sources were used to complement the lack

of a considerable amount of Chinese governmental sources translated to English.

Research papers published in leading peer-reviewed journals were selected to

enhance the confidence in our findings. Likewise, articles from Chinese official-

leaning editorial newspapers were used as proxy evidence.

Documents analyzed referred to the national perspective on the Quad. Two

sorts of documents were evaluated: official statements on Indo-Pacific national

strategies and reports about Quad meetings. The former provides some observable

implications to investigate the latter. How a country engages in the Quad is related

to its national policy towards the Indo-Pacific.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

55João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

The four members issue self-reported documents after the meetings, instead

of doing it together. Therefore, official statements about Quad meetings were

evaluated as primary sources. The idea was identifying how each country:

(a) defines this mechanism; (b) ultimate aims; (c) perspectives about furthering

the ongoing agenda; and (e) any mention about China to check whether Beijing

is considered a rival that sparked the creation of Quad. The period analyzed starts

from its revival in 2017.

The motivations that sparked this investigation of the Quad was the observation

that this dialogue has a more vivid life inside the media or think tanks summits

than the actual achievements of governments. Three groups are considered

responsible for this scenario: (a) the alarmist Chinese media led by theGlobal

Times, a newspaper with a pro-government editorial stance; (b) the ‘hawkish’

scholars and media outlets which depict the Quad as an embryonic ‘Asian NATO’

seeking to set a comprehensive agenda against growing leverage of Beijing in the

Indo-Pacific under the rule of Xi Jinping; and (c) think tanks releasing reports or

organizing summits envisaging possibilities to the Quad instead of describing its

actual configurations.

Among these groups, the Chinese media outlets are the wariest. The idea of

the rise of an alliance against Beijing gained momentum with the Quad; thereby,

this initiative is overrated when embedded in a dispute between the United States

and China. One can read in these newspapers the Quad described as: an initiative

‘doomed to fail’ or ‘aimed to target China,’ ‘a cornerstone of Washington’s Asia

strategy to counterbalance China,’ ‘united front to contain China’ and ‘a threat to

ASEAN unity because it could undermine the roles of this organization in regional

cooperation’ (Godement 2018; Liu 2018; Long 2018; Zhao 2019). Likewise, the

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi demonstrated irritation with the Quad calling

it “an idea that would dissipate like the seafoam” (Rai 2017).

There are also the ‘hawkish’ scholars, such as Chellaney (2017), who

endorses the settlement of a strategic constellation of democracies to contain the

challenges that threaten to disrupt stability and impede economic growth in the

Indo-Pacific. Such analysts believe that the Quad is a relevant mechanism in a

supposedly future dispute between the U.S.-led liberal international order against

the authoritarian alternative delivered by China. Unjhawala (2018) wrote that the

initiative could make great headway toward containing Beijing’s international

projects. These interpretations conclude that geopolitical and security factors

or even converging political regimes can lure these four countries into the idea

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56 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

of grouping against China regardless of the explanatory variable of divergences

among national interests and capabilities (Ayres 2019; Rai 2017). Furthermore,

during both the 2018 Halifax International Security Forum and the 2019 Raisina

Dialogue, panels gathered army officials due to think tanks invitations. Strategic

pundits and media outlets reported them as governmental initiatives towards the

formalization of a grouping to contain Beijing, although those events were not

official initiatives.

These definitions of the Quad need to be confronted due to an ongoing

overstretching of this concept. The Quad as a dialogue began to be grasped as

the whole network of bilateral and trilateral initiatives involving India, Japan, the

United States, and Australia (Jaishankar 2018). Without a clear agenda about its

purposes, many aspects were entitled as part of the aims of the Quad. This essay

advocates that journalists or pundits who endorsed this common perspective about

this subject incur in the imprecision of their research design due to an omitted

variable problem. The quad is only another part of the security architecture of

the Indo-Pacific, which historically comprises many “minilateral” initiatives

and where multilateral institutions are deficient in solving regional problems

(Green 2014; Wuthnow 2019). In other words, these interpretations are biased

to overestimate the Quad and make invalid inferences because (a) this initiative

would be considered a unique security-minded dialogue aimed to hedge against

Chinese global activities; (b) likewise, the concept of Indo-Pacific would be based

on a singular strategic meaning (Chacko and Panda 2019; Mishra 2019; Wroe and

Needham 2018; Wuthnow 2019); and (c) this perception also sees this grouping

strongly linked to United States’ ambitions and meaning of the Indo-Pacific region

since Washington’s idea of a growing competition against China could be replicated

in other members (Curran 2018).

The question hence is how much formalized a dialogue could be if it

were assumed that each state holds its own national strategy on international

engagement. This paper refers to “formalized” as the capacity of an organization

to set an agenda, to craft an official charter and bureaucracy, and to be considered

a relevant aspect to its members’ foreign policy. Domestic politics debates on

foreign policy and divergent perspectives are explanatory variables that could not

be dismissed in order to avoid measurement errors when attempting to understand

the Quad, once this initiative has never gone further than an informal dialogue

without an official agenda (Gyngell 2018; Madan 2017).

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57João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

The paper is divided as follows: (1) this introduction; (2) analysis on

the expansion of the Chinese sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific since the

ascension of Xi Jinping to power; (3) description of the real configurations of the

Quad to characterize this grouping as part of a tangle of strategies and initiatives

proposed by these four countries in the Indo-Pacific region; (4) a study stretching

the meaning of the term Indo-Pacific once this concept is crucial to observe

convergences and divergences inside the Quad in order to analyze each state’s

ambitions and perceptions of the geopolitics of this region; and (5) a section with

final considerations.

The Enlargement of the Chinese Sphere of Influence:

An Assertive Beijing

The rise of China’s material capability is impressive. Starting at the country’s

reform and opening policy, under Deng Xiaoping, between 1978 and 2010, the

Chinese economy grew at an average rate of 10 percent per year, when it slipped

to the current 6 to 7 percent annually (Naughton 2020). The country reached the

position of the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 when its gross domestic

product (GDP/PPP) surpassed Japan’s and today’s figures at $25.1 trillion

(Allison 2017; International Monetary Fund 2018).

Since the rise of Xi Jinping to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) in 2012, the country has exhibited increased confidence and proactiveness

on the world stage. The president has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s prescription

for passive diplomacy (“bide time, hide brightness do not take the lead”) with his

more activist dictum “striving for achievement”. Xi has also emphasized “China

Dream”, China’s “great rejuvenation”, and a “community of a shared future for

mankind” (Wang 2019; Shambaugh 2020).

Xi has also launched the concept of “major-country diplomacy”, which means

to transform the mission of China’s diplomacy from seeking a peaceful environment

conducive to domestic development to one that puts expanding China’s global

reach as a linchpin to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation

(Hu 2019; Zhao 2020). In June 2018, Xi underscored these goals during the Central

Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, when he urged the foreign policy

cadres to pursue “the efforts to firmly safeguard China’s sovereignty, security

and development interests, take an active part in leading the reform of the global

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58 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

governance system, and build a more complete network of global partnerships”

(Xinhua 2018).

To advance major-country diplomacy, Beijing has searched for a security

strategy that aims to project influence over the Indo-Pacific region through the

employment of its recently acquired economic, political, and military capabilities.

In 2013, Beijing launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to link

China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; to the Middle East through

Central Asia; and to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Whereas,

the “road” aims to connect China with Europe through the South China Sea and the

Indian Ocean; and with the South Pacific through the South China Sea. It is also a

massive project involving the funding and construction of an infrastructure system

of roads, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines, fiber-optic and communication

systems, ports, and airports. BRI encompasses 65 countries and reaches more than

60% of the global population. Estimations indicate that the project will cost more

than $1 trillion to China and, in the last five years, Beijing has already invested

more than $210 billion in it (Hendler 2019; Kuo and Kommenda 2018; Pautasso,

Leite and Doria 2017; Zhang, Alon and Latteman 2018).

However, some analysts state that this initiative could trigger undesirable

outcomes in vulnerable countries, fostering corruption, and autocratic behavior

in these fragile democracies. The debt trap, occurs when the states are not able

to pay the loans conceded by the Chinese government to arguably consolidate the

ambitious infrastructural projects, would drive them to a dependence on China.

Beijing already holds most of the debt of many nations along the BRI, such as

Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kenya,

and Djibouti (Berlie 2020; Fernholz 2018; Mayer 2018).

China has also been steadily increasing its annual defense spending since 2007,

reaching $170.4 billion in 2018, the equivalent of 1.3 percent of its GDP. The Chinese

government has been focused on the modernization of the 2 million personnel-

strong PLA as a warfighting instrument through the improvement of military

professionalism. Furthermore, China has also been developing new capabilities

that will enhance Beijing’s ability to project power and to deny foreign regional

intervention, namely, unmanned aircraft vehicles, stealth fighter jets, aircraft carriers,

and anti-ship ballistic missiles (Defense Intelligence Agency 2019; Economy 2018).

At the same time, China has sought to assert its presence more forcefully in

its neighborhood, especially the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Beijing

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59João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

claims sovereignty over most of the area of the South China Sea through its nine-

dash line, which encompasses the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the

Scarborough Shoal. It is a major transport hub through which the goods to and

from Northeast Asia are shipped, and the area contains reserves of crude oil and

gas. The zone is disputed by Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines,

and Taiwan. Since 2014, Beijing has been engaged in massive reclamation projects

and the construction of artificial islands in at least seven locations in the Spratly

Islands and at least three locations in the Paracel Islands (Hendler 2019; Pautasso,

Leite and Doria 2017; Turcsányi 2018).

In the documentChina’s National Defense in the New Era(The State Council

Information Office of The People’s Republic of China 2019), the Chinese government

stresses that “the South China Sea islands (…) are inalienable parts of the Chinese

territory” (p. 7). It also remembers that “China exercises its national sovereignty to

build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and

reefs in the South China Sea” (p. 7). The Chinese stance is due to the increasing

pressure exerted by the foreign military presence in the region, such as the Quad

members, the United Kingdom, and France. Zhang (2019) observes that when it

comes to resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Beijing has cautiously

approached the use of coercion in the region. The author notes that China relies

on military coercion less often the stronger it becomes, preferring to employ

unconventional tools such as coercive threats and “gray-zone coercion”. Gray-zone

coercion involves physical violence; however, it uses much smaller capabilities

than the military coercion. A recent example happened in 2014 when Beijing

used maritime law enforcement vessels to ram Vietnamese vessels in response

to Vietnam’s opposition to Chinese oil rigs operating in the Paracel Islands. Both

countries claim sovereignty over the Paracels. Nevertheless, China has occupied

the islands since 1974, where it has built military garrisons (housing 1,400 PLA

officials), an airfield, and an artificial harbor (Lendon 2019; Zhang 2019).

At the same time, the expansion of the Chinese economic and military clout

in the Indo-Pacific creates a deep connection in the security arena between East

and South Asia. It also has the goal to secure Chinese sea lines of communication

(SLOCs) and displace the US Navy as the predominant navy in the Indian Ocean

(Brewster 2019).

The United States is seeking a way to counteract the Chinese assertiveness

since the Barack Obama administration (2009-2017). In November 2011, Obama

promised to increase U.S. American diplomatic, economic and military presence

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60 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

in the Asia-Pacific and signaled the U.S. determination to counter the impact of

China’s rise in the region (Allison 2017). The United States declared that it was not

directed to any one country (“China”) and identified the five broad and interrelated

components of the rebalance: 1) Strengthening and modernizing security alliances;

2) Forging deeper relationships with emerging powers; 3) Engaging more deeply

in regional and global institutions to advance regional cooperation, peaceful

resolution of disputes, and adherence to human rights and international law;

4) Pursuing a stable and constructive relationship with China; and 5) Advancing

the region’s economic architecture, such as Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation

and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Mccormick 2016).

After his inauguration in 2017, President Donald Trump officially terminated

the engagement policy toward China and opted for competitive policies. The

2018 National Defense Strategy indicated that China would “continue to pursue a

military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the

near term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-eminence

in the future” (Department Of Defense 2018, 2). Therefore, the United States

has sought to increase its military presence in Asia. Between 2017 and 2019,

Washington carried out “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPS) 15 times

in the South China Sea (Wu 2019).

On its turn, India fears encroachment on its zone of strategic interest as well as

encirclement from Chinese projects in Pakistan. Japan is wary of China’s ability to

influence the energy supply chains on which East Asia depends and the possibility

of the country to use BRI to further push its People’s Liberation Army into the

Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, a move that could destabilize regional security.

Australia is concerned that China’s project aid could render fragile states more

vulnerable to coercion. These shared concerns on the expansion of the Chinese

political and military clout were fundamental to the revival of the Quad by the

four countries (Gale and Shearer 2018; Herskovitz 2019; Medcalf 2018; Pautasso,

Leite and Doria 2017).

Since the rise of Xi Jinping to power, the authorities have systematically

silenced human rights lawyers and all manner of peaceful criticism of the

government. Many have been forcibly disappeared or arbitrarily detained. Beyond

that, the state-controlled media have steadily discredited their work, trying to

deter future generations of whistle-blowers and others who seek to challenge

state authorities (Roth 2020).

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61João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

There is a growing concern about what China’s domestic crackdown means

for international security and the U.S.-led liberal international order. One of the

main analysts of China’s rise, Yan Xuetong (2019), says that the Chinese leadership

should recover the thought of philosophers from China’s pre-Qin era (prior to 221

B.C.) who argued that a country should be loved rather than to be feared by other

states. The author advocates that China should seek respect from its international

counterparts through “humane authority”, a crucial component of global power,

along with economic and military strength. For Yan (2019), “humane authority

requires consistency between a leading state’s domestic ideology and the political

values it pursues abroad” (p. 53). Thus, the author contends that the international

community is put off by China’s domestic rule and its assertive foreign policy,

which significantly damages its legitimacy abroad and capacity to lead. Yan warns

that Chinese officials should abandon their repressive practices at home if they

want to “lead by example” in the international arena (Nyrén 2019; Yan 2019).

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Indo-Pacific regional

architecture of security dialogues

First and foremost, it is essential to usher to what this initiative is not.

In 2017, the Quad returned as a topic inside official circles. At the same time,

‘Indo-Pacific’ also became a recurring strategic terminology amid the soaring

geopolitical tensions and concerns about China’s actions along the Indo-Pacific

(Choong 2019; Madan 2017). This scenario reinvigorated the argument that Quad

is an initiative with an offensive agenda towards Beijing, and its activities would

be related to the military potential of these four states to demonstrate interests

in regional maritime security issues (Ayres 2019; Grossman 2018). However, the

Quad is still not a formal military alliance or even an emulation of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) due to the five following aspects:

(a) It is a group without a legally binding treaty; therefore, members are not

officially committed to the principle of mutual defense (Kuo 2018). (b) The Quad

does not have an official schedule or a formal agenda (Madan 2017). (c) The

meetings are not even formalized at a ministerial level (Tweed, Koutsoukis and

Scott 2018). (d) The name Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is not institutionalized.

Leaders and bureaucracies from the four countries do not refer to this initiative in

a singular fashion. For example, the last National Security Strategy of the United

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62 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

States of America demonstrates the existence of a ‘quadrilateral cooperation’

(White House 2017). Furthermore, Australian and Indian governmental authorities

refused to use ‘quadrilateral security dialogue’ to officially name this diplomatic

mechanism (Ministry of External Affairs 2019b; Parliament of Australia 2007).

Actually, the name Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was coined and widespread

by scholars and journalists who envisaged the allocation of India to the already

existing Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between Australia, Japan, and the

United States (Lu 2018; Sharma 2010). (e) Likewise, references to this grouping

are more often found in academic journals and newspapers rather than in official

documents (Curran 2018).

In reference to the last topic, comparing the four statements about those

diplomatic meetings is an excellent exercise to notice divergences among these

countries (Panda 2018). India, which some scholars and media outlets consider the

weakest link of the Quad, prefers a milder reference to the need to ensure respect

towards international law than its partners. In the last three statements, New Delhi

advocated for an inclusive Indo-Pacific (Panda 2018; Ministry of External Affairs

2018a; 2018b; 2019a). On the other hand, Indian statements have similarities with

other countries in terms of concerns with terrorism and the necessity to increase

regional connectivity based on transparency and territorial integrity (Ministry

Of External Affairs 2018b). The United States, Australia, and Japan have already

emphasized democratic values as a pillar of this initiative (Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade 2018b; Department of State 2017a; 2018b; Ministry of Foreign

Affairs 2017a; 2018b).

The word ‘quadrilateral’ appeared only in Canberra’s and Washington’s

statements — an aspect that demonstrates a sort of blockage to classify this

dialogue, such as a group initiative (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

2017; Department of State 2017a; Panda 2018). The initial ‘Quad’ was only used

in a document from Washington (Department of State 2019). The United States

and Australia were also the only countries to recognize the discussion of political

issues involving the Maldives and Sri Lanka — India, notoriously considered as

the highest interesting part, averted mentioning it to avoid challenging Beijing (De

Silva 2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018b; Department of State

2018e; Malik 2018; Ministry of External Affairs 2018b). Furthermore, in 2019, all

the statements depicted the ASEAN-led mechanisms as initiatives to be supported

to reaffirm the intention to preserve the peace and freedom within the Indo-Pacific

region (Department of State 2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019;

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63João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

Ministry of External Affairs 2019a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018a). Canberra

and Washington also reported their support to The Pacific Islands Forum and the

Indian Ocean Rim Association in a moment that Beijing attempts to increase its

influence through the Pacific — a region with many states that still recognize

Taiwan diplomatically.

Likewise, it is worth mentioning that the Quad is a grouping comprising: a

superpower (the United States), a rising power (India), a traditional middle-power

(Australia), and a military-constrained economic leading-power (Japan). Therefore,

regarding the Quad, an instrument to Washington is an equivocated perspective

because, despite being the most powerful country in the group, it is not possible to

affirm that they agree on controversial topics such as dealing with Chinese growing

regional leverage or regional interests (Ayres 2019; Rai 2017). Inserting Quad into

disputes between Washington and Beijing is not only a misinterpretation of Indian,

Japanese and Australian perspectives over the issues, but it also overestimates the

current capabilities of this initiative by setting an agenda that the officials have

not done yet (Curran 2018; Madan 2017; Mishra 2019).

Those misconceptions about the Quad buried the first attempts to formalize

this grouping from 2007 to 2008 (Madan 2017). Beginning as an initiative called

Tsunami Core Group, it aimed temporarily to coordinate operations of humanitarian

relief for vulnerable people and villages affected by the tsunami that occurred in

2004. Many observers believed the maintenance of this arrangement would mean

a concert of democracies to balance against China (Jaishankar 2018; Madan 2017;

Medcalf 2008; Rai 2017). This vision was considered too provocative by leaders

and diplomats, mainly from Australia and India. Beijing was promptly assured that

they were not establishing a security alliance after Chinese officials demonstrated

concerns over the endorsement by the Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and

the then-U.S. vice president Richard B. Cheney to the solidification of this dialogue

and on the fact that, in 2007, these four countries joined the naval drills called

Malabar exercises that Washington and New Delhi organize annually (Madan

2017; Medcalf 2008; Pattanaik 2016; Rudd 2019). Likewise, this situation hampered

the formation of domestic political consensus about the Quad so that Yasuo

Fukuda, Shinzo Abe’s successor after his resignation in 2007, and Kevin Rudd,

who assumed in 2007 the role of the prime minister of Australia, did not show

the same enthusiasm for this mechanism (Rai 2017; Rudd 2019; Wuthnow 2019).

Once overlapped those issues, it is important to demonstrate what Quad

really is. The best description of the Quad is an association of Australia, India,

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64 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

Japan, and the United States aimed to facilitate their conversation and diplomatic

cooperation. (Ayres 2019; Madan 2017). According to the United States Department

of the State (Department of State, 2017a), these four partners gather together

because they are “committed to deepen cooperation, which rests on a foundation

of shared democratic values and principles, and to continue discussions to further

strengthen the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region”. However, countries

develop different interests and approaches to the Quad once this initiative does

not define clear guidelines; hence these four partners only underscore, in each

statement, aspects of their interests following foreign policy strategies (Hardy

2019; Panda 2018).

As a matter of fact, this diplomatic arrangement has never gone further than a

“less-than-alliance formation” in which these four countries cautiously watch the

rise of China’s international political and economic clout and to the consequent

redefinition in the global balance of power. However, they were not able to set a

unique and sophisticated agenda towards the Indo-Pacific region in this initiative

due to constraints imposed by domestic politics issues (Ayres 2019; Jaishankar

2017; O’Neil and West 2019). Furthermore, military meetings among members

of the Quad happened only within think tanks summits — official quadrilateral

dialogues related to diplomatic instances. Therefore, “suggest that the Quad is an

alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, or a mechanism aimed at containing

China, or to conflate it with understandings of the Indo-Pacific construct assigns

far too much strategic gravitas to the grouping at this stage” (Byrne 2019, 18).

A goal achieved by this initiative is demonstrating to Beijing that these four

states are able to group up in small forums to discuss geopolitical issues (Curran

2018). The Quad is not as relevant as some media outlets proposed as an institution.

Still, it is a good example to observe the maintenance of “minilateralism” as a

way of strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the best way to

grasp its real significance is to examine the Quad as part of a matrix of initiatives

comprising these four countries (Jaishankar 2018). Although this mechanism does

not have an official agenda, its members have developed trilateral and bilateral

strategic dialogues aimed to improve their ties in many instances, such as military

cooperation, infrastructure projects, and intelligence-sharing (Wuthnow 2019).

Descriptive analyses confirm the historical existence of “minilateralism” in Asia

and Oceania once Washington has preferred to engage with its regional partners

through a “hub-and-spoke” system since the Cold War (Cha 2014; Hemmer and

Katzenstein 2002; Wuthnow 2019). It is not the case here to explore the reasons

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

65João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

for this evidence. Still, it is an important implication to view the Quad as part

of this framework of small initiatives serving strategic ends usually do not move

forward in terms of formalization (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002).

For example, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established

in 1954 and formally disbanded in 1977, was the eastern initiative endorsed by

the United States that advanced the most in terms of formalization since it was

headquartered in Bangkok and hosted military exercises. However, it had very

few formal functions, and the official charter did not prescribe sophisticated

mechanisms of mutual protection or the constitution of a common military force

(Department of State 2017b). This aspect provides a relevant systematic feature

of historical Washington’s preference to coordinate its policy towards the Indo-

Pacific through a bilateral or trilateral mechanism, rather than a multilateral

institution, and the continuous idea about establishing a NATO-style organization

in Asia and Oceania (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002; Cha 2014). It is important

to underscore that among the reasons that dismantled those organizations was

the fact that some states disagreed with the United States’ actions in Vietnam

and Cambodia. Domestic politics strategies and perceptions played a crucial role

in the development of the SEATO (Department of State, 2017b).

The consolidation of this entangled framework of small-scale activities within

the Indo-Pacific region is not only sparked by the United States’ efforts, but also

China and other countries have developed instruments according to their individual

need to carve out new diplomatic and security ties without spending excessive capital

and time to structure a multilateral organization (Medcalf 2015; Wuthnow 2019).

Thus, over the past 20 years, it is possible to infer that “minilateralism” was

consolidated as a diplomatic trend within this context once it facilitates dialogues

among selected partners. Even so, this aspect does not necessarily incentive the

institutionalization of these small forums, preventing countries from setting legally

binding activities upon all partners, an instance that could constrain their own

strategies (Wuthnow 2019).

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States join different “minilateral”

forums that can compete against Beijing in specific issues. This paper underscores

a bunch of initiatives into this context. However, bearing in mind that national

programs are working concomitantly in the same areas such as the South Asia

Regional Infrastructure Connectivity initiative (SARIC) in Australia, the Expanded

Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in Japan or the Asia Reassurance Initiative

Act in the United States (Choong 2019). The aim here is to prioritize instruments

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66 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

comprising more than one member of the Quad and only these four states,

although they also group with other regional countries such as the United States-

Japan–South Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting or the Indonesia-Australia-India

Senior Officials’ Strategic Dialogue (Wuthnow 2019). Moreover, these mechanisms

present different degrees of consolidation and ambitions.

Here is a list showing how many initiatives are in vogue amid the Indo-Pacific

region geopolitical dynamics:

1. Connectivity and infrastructure: Trilateral Partnership for infrastructure

investment in the Indo-Pacific (Australia, Japan, and the United States),

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (India and Japan), and Trilateral Infrastructure

Working Group (India, Japan, and the United States) (Department of State

2018c; Ministry of External Affairs 2018e; White House 2018a).

2. Multiple issues: India-Australia-Japan Trilateral Dialogue, the United States-

Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and United States-Japan-India

Trilateral Meeting (Department of State 2018a; Ministry of External Affairs

2017a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018c).

3. Intelligence-sharing: Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement (Australia-

Japan-United States) (Wuthnow 2019).

Defining Indo-Pacific region: one question, many answers

The Quad is strongly linked to the concept of Indo-Pacific once all the four

members defined that this grouping aims to act in this region. Indeed, Australia,

India, Japan, and the United States used the last four meetings to assure their

commitment to the preservation of regional freedom and the enhancement of

regional security. Likewise, the four countries mean to assure the maintenance of

a rule-based Indo-Pacific to focus on mechanisms to develop regional connectivity

and economy and to combat the terrorism, cyber-crimes and piracy (Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018a; 2019; Department of State 2018d; 2019; Ministry

of External Affairs 2018a; 2019a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017b; 2017c).

Each of these four members emphasized the importance of deepening

diplomatic dialogues and strategies in order to preserve mutual interests in the Indo-

Pacific region (Abe, 2012; Australian Government, 2017, P. 40; Ministry of External

Affairs, 2018d; White House, 2017). However, as Bisley (2018), Jaishankar (2018),

and Mishra (2019) noticed, a common analytic mistake happens when observers

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67João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

assume the Quad as a formal initiative setting an agenda related to security issues

involving the Indo-Pacific and aggregating shared interests by four supposedly

like-minded democracies. In other words, due to geopolitics, the Quad emerges

as an important diplomatic initiative seeking to compete with Beijing in many

aspects: from investments in infrastructure and the construction of facilities along

the Indo-Pacific region to military issues (Huang 2018; Madan 2017; Pant 2017).

In the geopolitical realm, the earliest academic statement on the Indo-Pacific

dates back to the work of Karl Haushofer in 1920 (Indopazifischer Raum). Since then,

“Indo-Pacific” was often used in oral discourse, especially in Australia, which was

premised mainly on Canberra’s two-ocean geostrategic imperatives. Nevertheless,

until the beginning of the XXI century, the usage of the term was mainly confined to

Biology essays. Only recently, the term Indo-Pacific was embraced by international

politics studies because this macro-region, in geographical terms, comprehends

an area that covers from eastern Africa to western shores of America (Khurana

2019; Pan 2014).

Indo-Pacific has emerged as a strategic terminology in a moment when countries

are rearranging their policies and agendas to promptly react to possible consequences

sparked by the ongoing increase of security, economic, and diplomatic connections

throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans (Medcalf 2018; Phillips 2016).

Its relevance to the global order is manifold. In economic terms: (a) Indian

Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments and a third of bulk cargo (Medcalf

2018); (b) 50% of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific

along the sea routes (Department of State, 2018b); (c) the three world’s largest

gross domestic product are: the United States, China and Japan (World Bank 2019).

In demographic terms: (d) the five world’s most populous countries (China,

India, the United States, Indonesia, and Pakistan) are located there (United States

Census Bureau 2019); (e) by 2030, more than 60% of the world’s middle class will

reside throughout the Indo-Pacific (Davidson 2018). In military terms: (f) among

the biggest fifteen military spenders, in 2017, nine are part of the Indo-Pacific

region (the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea,

Australia, and Canada) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2018).

In other words, regional dynamics and rivalries in the Indo-Pacific can potentially

trigger consequences worldwide because it “represents the most populous and

economically dynamic part of the world” (White House 2017, 46).

All members of the Quad officially adopted the term Indo-Pacific envisaging

to address properly the challenges sparked by changes in this region in which

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68 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

adequate military strategies and economic and commercial policies are required

to protect national interests (Brewster 2018). For Canberra, this macro-region is

of primary importance because it encompasses their leading economic partners

and the soaring competition among states could hinder Australian international

engagement since these disputes between great powers in the region will determine

the future of the global order (Australian Government 2017; Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, 2018c). New Delhi claims “the destiny of the world will be deeply

influenced by the course of developments in the Indo-Pacific region” (Ministry

of External Affairs 2018d). Japanese diplomacy believes world peace relies on an

Indo-Pacific that values freedom, the rule of law, and free from coercion (Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, 2017b). Likewise, Washington’s foreign policy has officially

considered Beijing as a “revisionist power” which supposedly attempts to coerce

neighboring countries and reorder this region to their advantage, besides displacing

the United States (Department of Defense 2018; White House 2017).

Nevertheless, do the Quad members understand the boundaries of Indo-Pacific

similarly to the geographic definition? Not exactly. A region is a volatile idea based

more specifically on political interests rather than in geographical definitions

(Hemmere Katzenstein 2002; Pan 2014; Pekkanen, Ravenhill and Foot 2014). Indeed,

it is a strategic construction based on the interpretation of policymakers following

objectives and their ideas over national capabilities in terms of pursuing a political

project or a security agenda in the international arena (Bergin 2018; Le Thu 2018;

Phillips 2016). There are systematic patterns historically observed corroborating

this assumption, such as the idea of a macro-region called North Atlantic once

the United States intended to assure its influence over Western Europe (Hemmer

and Katzenstein 2002). Therefore, the Indo-Pacific is an imaginary terminology

that varies according to one country’s foreign policy; that means there is no such

a thing as a universal definition for this region because the meanings and borders

are interpreted to fit into a national strategy (Bergin 2018; Gyngell 2018; Hardy

2019; Varghese 2018).

For India, the Indo-Pacific is a region stretching from the African shores to

America (Ministry of External Affairs 2018d). Australia defines it as an area “ranging

from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia,

including India, North Asia, and the United States” (Australian Government 2017, 1).

Japan presents an interesting perspective because it urges the United States to

remain involved in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it officially emphasizes the

idea of an area connecting Asia to Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017c).

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

69João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

Finally, for the United States, the Indo-Pacific region “stretches from the west coast

of India to the western shores of the United States” (White House 2017, 45-46).

India and Japan have developed commercial and strategic relations with African

countries, and their definitions of Indo-Pacific include Africa (Brewster 2018;

Gabriel and Carvalho 2018). Furthermore, New Delhi considers its “Act East Policy”

crucial to Indian engagement to the Indo-Pacific (Hardy 2019; Ministry of External

Affairs 2017c). Canberra adopted a more restrictive terminology to emphasize a

region cored in Australia, demonstrating the primary interest of defending regional

influence and seizing new commercial opportunities due to the consolidation of

Western Australia as an economic center and diplomatic possibilities with countries

such as India (Australian Government 2017; Tyler and Bhutoria 2015; Varghese 2018).

For Washington, this concept reveals a strategy to manage China’s growing

influence through the establishment of regional partnership and encouraging

India, Japan, and Australia to take on a proactive diplomatic role alongside the

United States (Bisley and Phillips 2013; Department Of State 2018b; Scott 2018;

U.S. Congress 2018).

Managing issues sparked by the rise of China is considered critical for

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region once

this country has become an important player in terms of international politics

and economy (De Silva 2019; Medcalf 2018; Pattanaik 2016; White 2013). In this

respect, many scholars and officials observe such issues as an aspect able to alter

the post-Cold War liberal order maintained by Washington and organizations such

as the United Nations (Pant and Joshi 2016). Chinese presence and influence in

global affairs are not unusually portrayed as a hindrance to the maintenance of

international laws and organizations. For some scholars and leaders, Beijing has

attempted to carve out a better position in certain instances through the creation

or endorsement of commercial, financial or political institutions and initiatives

such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB),

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation

mechanism, the BRICS, the New Development Bank, China Union Pay, and the

Universal Credit Rating Group (Stuenkel 2016; Wuthnow 2019).

Each of these four countries has its reasons to be apprehensive about this

context: (a) India and Japan maintain historical quarrels, such as disputes for

territories, with Beijing (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018; Pant and Joshi 2016). (b) All

the members of the Quad are somehow wary about the establishment of the BRI

because it could strengthen China’s position not only as a leading regional power

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70 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

but also by expanding its influence throughout the world. In this aspect, New Delhi

also complains against the fact that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would

cross the disputed territories of Kashmir (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018; Ministry

of External Affairs 2018c). (c) Likewise, these democracies worry that China’s

diplomatic and economic initiatives could render fragile countries more prone to

coercive measures (Gale and Shearer 2018; White House 2017). (d) All of these

countries wish to preserve their own interests on the seas. However, Japan and

Australia, due to their geographical configuration, rely exclusively on sea lines of

communications to trade with other nations making them warier of the expansion

of the Chinese navy and the development of military facilities in the East China

Sea and the South Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018d). (e) Washington

understands that Beijing has pursued economic and military strategies aimed at

the consolidation of its influence and the regional displacement of the United

States (Department of Defense 2018). Finally, (f) Australia and the United States

accuse Chinese organizations of interfering in their domestic affairs (Turnbull 2017;

White House 2018b).

However, foreign policy is understood here as a translation of national

possibi lities, capabilities, and interests in the international arena to a strategy

elaborated in accordance with domestic politics outlooks (Bergin 2018; Le Thu 2018;

Phillips 2018). Ortega y Gasset once said that each perspective molds different

ways of understanding reality (Puy 1983); therefore, visions over the Indo-Pacific

region vary as well as ideas about dealing with China.

In this respect, some issues arise: Washington represents a conception of a

“free and open” Indo-Pacific, which for the United States means a region where

four common principles underpinning the international order are safeguarded:

1) Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations; 2) Peaceful resolution

of disputes; 3) Free, fair and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent

agreements, and connectivity; and 4) Adherence to international rules and norms,

including those of freedom of navigation and overflight. However, this vision

is intertwined with its disputes against Beijing. Washington considers that its

military advantage vis-à-vis China is eroding and a negative shift in the regional

balance of power may encourage competitors of the United States to challenge

and subvert the free and open order that supports prosperity and security to its

allies and partners (Defense Intelligence Agency 2019; Department of Defense

2018; 2019; Le Thu 2018). On the other hand, Australia, India, and Japan present

different approaches to China, demonstrated by developing their own strategies

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

71João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

in order to avoid provoking unwanted responses from Beijing and to maintain

solid security and diplomatic ties with Washington (Bisley 2018; Tyler and

Bhutoria 2015).

New Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo analyze this scenario according to their

economic, military, and diplomatic resources amidst a soaring rivalry between

two leading powers. India and Canberra have many complaints against China

about political and security issues, but these countries prefer to emphasize the

idea of an inclusive and pragmatic approach towards the Indo-Pacific (Australian

Government 2017; Bisle, 2018; Ministry of External Affairs 2018d; White 2013).

Likewise, the Indian diplomacy defends an Indo-Pacific based on a multipolar

order so that this country could maintain its strategic autonomy in order to define

positions and commitments in a context that is dominated neither by Washington

nor by Beijing (Chacko and Panda 2019). Although Tokyo shows some interest in

pursuing a more assertive position on China’s regional influence and territorial

claims, the Japanese government has also attempted to reduce tensions with

Beijing (Gabriel and Carvalho 2018).

It is worth to remember that: China is the major trading partner of the United

States, India, Japan, and Australia and, except for the US, Japan, India, and Australia

lack the economic weight to endanger their trade relations with this Asian power

(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018d; Simões, Landry and Hidalgo 2018;

United States Trade Representative 2018; White 2013); (b) India presents some

convergence with China in terms of reforming the instruments of global governance;

therefore, it joins, alongside Beijing, initiatives such as the BRICS and the AIIB,

in which New Delhi is the second-largest shareholder (Stuenkel 2016; Zhu 2018);

and (c) Japan is moving closer to China in the trade as a way to counterbalance

the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States (Lin 2019).

Thus, an important inference in this context is that the terminology

Indo-Pacific could not be reduced to a shared vision endorsed by four democracies

to refrain China’s military, naval and economic influence throughout this

macro-region (Gyngell 2018). The idea of the Quad is directly influenced by this

context because each of these four countries develops different ways and goals

to engage in the Indo-Pacific region, although they agree on certain topics. The

question “what is the Quad?” has many interpretations as well as the definitions

of the Indo-Pacific region. The following section seeks to analyze this initiative

and its capacities among those divergences on how to act regionally and before

China.

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72 The Quad: One More ‘Minilateral’ Initiative, not an Embryonic Military Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region

Conclusion

This paper concludes that: (1) the Quad holds only a symbolic significance

among the existing entangled framework of “minilateral forums” in Asia and

Oceania because it is the only one that comprises specifically Australia, India,

Japan, and the United States; (2) studying the Quad as an institution capable

of pursuing a similar status to NATO in the Indo-Pacific region implies in a high

degree of uncertainty because systematic features demonstrate that minilateral

forums are easily started, but the advancement towards their formalization is

less frequent; (3) domestic politics aspects matter in this context not due to a

state regime, but for national pragmatic understandings about the international

relations and commercial, diplomatic and security issues; (4) the Indo-Pacific

does not have a universal meaning based on Geography. Each state defines this

region according to its interests and to its idea of where the Quad should act;

(5) the Quad is not a United States-led coalition once the other members avoid

undesirable consequences; (6) therefore, the attempt to define a joint strategy

to act in the Indo-Pacific region is hampered by their different national interests;

these four countries demonstrate different outlooks on China and on how to

engage internationally, hence the idea of Quad as a military alliance stumbles in

domestic political issues; (7) thus, this initiative has a more vivid life inside think

tanks or newspapers than among officials and bureaucracies.

It is reasonable to assume that certain think tanks and media outlets

envisage a mighty Quad and try to improve the linkages within this initiative.

The role of such institutions in promoting new ideas and perspectives to different

governmental sectors is well-documented and triggers a debate about the foreign

policy decision-making process. However, these visions about the Quad could be

described as ‘wishful thinking’ since China’s encirclement goes against pragmatic

understandings of each member. Convergences on these states’ grievances

against Beijing’s assertive international engagement are an element that should

not be dismissed, but their divergences on the idea of Indo-Pacific and their

ways to cope with China are also relevant to understand the real capacities of

the Quad.

Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 2, 2020, p. 52-82

73João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel; Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum; Carlos Eduardo Carvalho

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